Federated Authentication for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Using OpenID Connect
RFC 9560
| Document | Type | RFC - Proposed Standard (April 2024) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Scott Hollenbeck | ||
| Last updated | 2024-04-26 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| IESG | Responsible AD | Murray Kucherawy | |
| Send notices to | (None) |
RFC 9560
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Hollenbeck
Request for Comments: 9560 Verisign Labs
Category: Standards Track April 2024
ISSN: 2070-1721
Federated Authentication for the Registration Data Access Protocol
(RDAP) Using OpenID Connect
Abstract
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides
Representational State Transfer (RESTful) web services to retrieve
registration metadata from domain name and regional internet
registries. RDAP allows a server to make access control decisions
based on client identity, and as such, it includes support for client
identification features provided by the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP). Identification methods that require clients to obtain and
manage credentials from every RDAP server operator present management
challenges for both clients and servers, whereas a federated
authentication system would make it easier to operate and use RDAP
without the need to maintain server-specific client credentials.
This document describes a federated authentication system for RDAP
based on OpenID Connect.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9560.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Problem Statement
1.2. Approach
2. Conventions Used in This Document
3. Federated Authentication for RDAP
3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect
3.1.1. Terminology
3.1.2. Client Considerations
3.1.3. Overview
3.1.4. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps
3.1.4.1. Provider Discovery
3.1.4.2. Authentication Request
3.1.4.3. End User Authorization
3.1.4.4. Authorization Response and Validation
3.1.4.5. Token Processing
3.1.4.6. Delivery of User Information
3.1.5. Specialized Claims and Authorization Scope for RDAP
3.1.5.1. Stated Purposes
3.1.5.2. Do Not Track
4. Common Protocol Features
4.1. OpenID Connect Configuration
4.2. RDAP Query Parameters
4.2.1. RDAP Query Purpose
4.2.2. RDAP Do Not Track
4.2.3. Parameter Processing
5. Protocol Features for Session-Oriented Clients
5.1. Data Structures
5.1.1. Session
5.1.2. Device Info
5.2. Client Login
5.2.1. End-User Identifier
5.2.2. OP Issuer Identifier
5.2.3. Login Response
5.2.4. Clients with Limited User Interfaces
5.2.4.1. UI-Constrained Client Login
5.2.4.2. UI-Constrained Client Login Polling
5.3. Session Status
5.4. Session Refresh
5.5. Client Logout
5.6. Request Sequencing
6. Protocol Features for Token-Oriented Clients
6.1. Client Login
6.2. Client Queries
6.3. Access Token Validation
6.4. Token Exchange
7. RDAP Query Processing
8. RDAP Conformance
9. IANA Considerations
9.1. RDAP Extensions Registry
9.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registry
9.3. RDAP Query Purpose Registry
10. Security Considerations
10.1. Authentication and Access Control
11. References
11.1. Normative References
11.2. Informative References
Acknowledgments
Author's Address
1. Introduction
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides
Representational State Transfer (RESTful) web services to retrieve
registration metadata from domain name and regional internet
registries. RDAP allows a server to make access control decisions
based on client identity, and as such, it includes support for client
identification features provided by the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) [RFC9110].
RDAP is specified in multiple documents, including "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7480], "Security
Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7481],
"Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query Format" [RFC9082],
and "JSON Responses for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)"
[RFC9083]. [RFC7481] describes client identification and
authentication services that can be used with RDAP, but it does not
specify how any of these services can (or should) be used with RDAP.
1.1. Problem Statement
The conventional "username and password" authentication method does
not scale well in the RDAP ecosystem. Assuming that all domain name
and address registries will eventually provide RDAP service, it is
impractical and inefficient for users to secure login credentials
from the hundreds of different server operators. Authentication
methods based on usernames and passwords do not provide information
that describes the user in sufficient detail (while protecting the
personal privacy of the user) for server operators to make fine-
grained access control decisions based on the user's identity. The
authentication system used for RDAP needs to address all of these
needs.
1.2. Approach
A basic level of RDAP service can be provided to users who possess an
identifier issued by a recognized provider who can authenticate and
validate the user. For example, the identifiers issued by social
media services can be used. Users who require higher levels of
service (and who are willing to share more information about
themselves to gain access to that service) can secure identifiers
from specialized providers who are or will be able to provide more
detailed information about the user. Server operators can then make
access control decisions based on the identification information
provided by the user.
A federated authentication system in which an RDAP server outsources
identification and authentication services to a trusted identity
provider would make it easier to operate and use RDAP by reusing
existing identifiers to provide a basic level of access. It can also
provide the ability to collect additional user identification
information, and that information can be shared with the RDAP server
operator with the consent of the user in order to help the server
operator make access control decisions. This type of system allows
an RDAP server to make access control decisions based on the nature
of a query and the identity, authentication, and authorization
information that is received from the identity provider. This
document describes a federated authentication system for RDAP based
on OpenID Connect [OIDC] that meets these needs.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
All of the HTTP requests described in this document that are sent
from an RDAP client to an RDAP server use the HTTP GET method as
specified in [RFC9110].
Long lines in examples are wrapped using "The Single Backslash
Strategy" described in [RFC8792].
3. Federated Authentication for RDAP
RDAP itself does not include built-in security services. Instead,
RDAP relies on features that are available in other protocol layers
to provide needed security services including access control,
authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
data integrity, and identification. A description of each of these
security services can be found in "Internet Security Glossary,
Version 2" [RFC4949]. This document focuses on a federated
authentication system for RDAP that provides services for
authentication, authorization, and identification, allowing a server
operator to make access control decisions. Section 3 of [RFC7481]
describes general considerations for RDAP access control,
authentication, and authorization.
The conventional client-server authentication model requires clients
to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This
situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers
increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use
one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client
credential management complexity.
3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect
OpenID Connect 1.0 [OIDCC] is a decentralized, Single Sign-On (SSO)
federated authentication system that allows users to access multiple
web resources with one identifier instead of having to create
multiple server-specific identifiers. Users acquire identifiers from
OpenID Providers (OPs). Relying Parties (RPs) are applications (such
as RDAP) that outsource their user authentication function to an OP.
OpenID Connect is built on top of the authorization framework
provided by the OAuth 2.0 protocol [RFC6749].
The OAuth authorization framework describes a method for users to
access protected web resources without having to hand out their
credentials. Instead, clients are issued access tokens by OPs with
the permission of the resource owners. Using OpenID Connect and
OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a federation, and clients can
access any server in the federation by providing one credential
registered with any OP in that federation. The OAuth authorization
framework is designed for use with HTTP and thus can be used with
RDAP.
3.1.1. Terminology
This document uses the following terminology.
Terms defined by [RFC7480]:
* client
* server
Terms defined by [RFC6749]:
* access token
* authorization code
* authorization endpoint
* authorization grant
* client authentication
* client identifier
* protected resource
* refresh token
* resource owner
* resource server
* token endpoint
Terms defined by [RFC7519]:
* claim name
* claim value
* JSON Web Token (JWT)
Terms defined by [OIDCC]:
* ID Token
* UserInfo Endpoint
Term defined by [RFC9068]:
* JWT access token
Additional terms from Section 1.2 of the OpenID Connect Core
specification are incorporated by reference.
This document uses the terms "remote" and "default" to describe the
relationship between an RDAP server and the OPs that it interacts
with. A "remote" OP is one that is identified by the RDAP client by
providing either an Issuer Identifier or an end-user identifier in a
login request. Whether an Issuer Identifier or end-user identifier
can be provided in the login request for the purposes of selecting an
OP can be determined by retrieving the RDAP server's OIDC
configuration details (see Section 4.1). A "default" OP is one that
the RDAP server will use when the RDAP client does not provide an
Issuer Identifier or an end-user identifier in the login request.
This document uses the term "session" to describe a set of
interactions between an RDAP client and an RDAP server during a given
period of time. For session-oriented clients (see Section 3.1.2),
the RDAP session is a typical HTTP session starting with a
farv1_session/login request and ending with either a farv1_session/
logout request (see Section 5 for a description of both path
segments) or a timeout. For token-oriented clients (see Sections
3.1.2 and 6), the RDAP session corresponds to the lifespan of an
authorization obtained from an OP and the corresponding access token,
including any refreshed access tokens.
3.1.2. Client Considerations
Clients that delegate OIDC authentication to an RDAP server as part
of session-oriented interactions and can accept and process HTTP
cookies [RFC6265] to maintain the session are known as "session-
oriented" clients. This type of RDAP client performs the role of a
user agent [RFC9110]. An RDAP server performs the role of an OpenID
Connect Core Relying Party (RP). A web browser used to send queries
directly to an RDAP server is an example of a session-oriented
client. Specifications for this type of client can be found in
Section 5.
Clients that perform OIDC authentication directly, taking the role of
an RP in interactions with an OP and sending access tokens [RFC6749]
to an RDAP server to authorize RDAP queries, are known as "token-
oriented" clients. An RDAP server performs resource server [RFC6749]
functions to verify the tokens received from the client and RP
functions to retrieve information from the OP as necessary to make
access control decisions. A web browser running JavaScript received
from a web service that sends queries to an RDAP server directly or
through its back-end web service is an example of a token-oriented
client. Specifications for this type of client can be found in
Section 6.
Clients MAY operate as either session-oriented or token-oriented
clients, but they MUST do so consistently by not mixing token-
oriented and session-oriented requests while interacting with an OP.
Servers SHOULD support both types of client to maximize
interoperability but MAY choose to support only one type of client as
required by local policy or operating conditions. A server that does
not support a particular client type will not support the protocol
features (the data structures, path segments, parameters, and
interactions) specified for that client type. Server signaling of
supported client types is described in Section 4.1.
3.1.3. Overview
At a high level, RDAP authentication of a session-oriented client
using OpenID Connect requires completion of the following steps:
1. An RDAP client sends an RDAP "help" query to an RDAP server to
determine the types and capabilities of the OPs that are used by
the RDAP server. This information is returned in the
"rdapConformance" section of the response. A value of "farv1"
indicates support for the extension described in this
specification. If one or more remote OPs are supported, the
RDAP client SHOULD evaluate the additional information described
in Section 4.1 in order to discover the capabilities of the RDAP
server and optionally obtain the set of supported OPs unless
that information is available from a trusted out-of-band source
and has already been processed.
2. An RDAP client sends an RDAP "login" request to an RDAP server
as described in Section 5.2.
3. The RDAP server prepares an Authentication Request containing
the desired request parameters.
4. The RDAP server sends an Authentication Request to an OP
authorization endpoint and redirects the RDAP client to the OP
using an HTTP redirect.
5. The OP authenticates the end user.
6. The OP obtains end-user consent and authorization.
7. The OP sends the RDAP client back to the RDAP server with an
authorization code using an HTTP redirect.
8. The RDAP server requests tokens using the authorization code at
the OP's token endpoint.
9. The RDAP server receives a response that contains an ID Token
and access token in the response body.
10. The RDAP server validates the tokens as described in [OIDCC] and
retrieves the claims associated with the end user's identity
from the OP's UserInfo Endpoint.
The steps above can be described in a sequence diagram:
End OpenID RDAP RDAP
User Provider Client Server
| | | |
| | |-----Help Query---->|
| | | |
| | |<---Help Response---|
| | | |
|-------Login Request------>| |
| | | |
| | |---Login Request--->|
| | | |
| |<-----Authentication Request------|
| | | |
| Credential--| | |
|<--Request | | |
| | | |
|--Credential | | |
| Response->| | |
| | | |
| |-----Authentication Response----->|
| | | |
| |<----------Token Request----------|
| | | |
| |-----------Token Response-------->|
| | | |
| |<----------Claim Request----------|
| | | |
| |-----------Claim Response-------->|
| | | |
| | |<--Login Response---|
| | | |
|<------Login Response------| |
| | | |
|----------RDAP Query------>| |
| | | |
| | |-----RDAP Query---->|
| | | |
| | |<---RDAP Response---|
| | | |
|<------RDAP Response-------| |
Figure 1
The RDAP server can then make identification, authorization, and
access control decisions based on end-user identity information and
local policies. Note that OpenID Connect describes different process
flows for other types of clients, such as script-based or command-
line clients.
RDAP authentication of a token-oriented client using OpenID Connect
requires completion of the following steps:
1. An RDAP client sends an RDAP "help" query to an RDAP server to
determine the type and capabilities of the OPs that are used by
the RDAP server. This information is returned in the
"rdapConformance" section of the response. A value of "farv1"
indicates support for the extension described in this
specification. If one or more remote OPs are supported, the
RDAP client SHOULD evaluate the additional information described
in Section 4.1 in order to discover the capabilities of the RDAP
server and optionally obtain the set of supported OPs. Support
for token-oriented clients requires a default OP.
2. The RDAP client determines the end user's OP and confirms that
it's supported by the RDAP server.
3. The RDAP client sends an Authentication Request to the OP's
authorization endpoint.
4. The OP authenticates the end user.
5. The OP obtains end-user consent or authorization.
6. The OP returns an authorization code to the RDAP client.
7. The RDAP client requests tokens using the authorization code at
the OP's token endpoint.
8. The RDAP client receives a response that contains an ID Token
and an access token in the response body.
9. The RDAP client monitors the token validity period and either
refreshes the token or requests new tokens as necessary.
10. The RDAP client sends queries that require user identification,
authentication, and authorization to an RDAP server that include
an access token in an HTTP "authorization" header using the
"bearer" authentication scheme described in [RFC6750].
11. The RDAP server validates the access token and retrieves the
claims associated with the end user's identity from the OP's
UserInfo Endpoint.
12. The RDAP server determines the end user's authorization level
and processes the query in accordance with server policies.
The steps above can be described in a sequence diagram:
End OpenID RDAP RDAP
User Provider Client Server
| | | |
| | |-----Help Query---->|
| | | |
| | |<----Help Response--|
| | | |
|-------Login Request------>| |
| | | |
| |<-Authentication |
| | Request---| |
| | | |
|<-Credential | | |
| Request---| | |
| | | |
|--Credential | | |
| Response->| | |
| | | |
| |--Authentication |
| | Response--->| |
| | | |
| |<-Token | |
| | Request----| |
| | | |
| |--Token | |
| | Response-->| |
| | | |
|<------Login Response------| |
| | | |
|-----RDAP Query----------->| |
| | | |
| | |----RDAP Query----->|
| | | |
| |<------------Claim |
| | Request---------------|
| | | |
| |-------------Claim |
| | Response------------->|
| | | |
| | |<---RDAP Response---|
| | | |
|<----RDAP Response---------| |
Figure 2
3.1.4. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps
End users MAY present an identifier (an OpenID) issued by an OP to
use OpenID Connect with RDAP. If the RDAP server supports a default
OP or if provider discovery is not supported, the end-user identifier
MAY be omitted. An OP SHOULD include support for the claims
described in Section 3.1.5 to provide additional information needed
for RDAP end-user authorization; in the absence of these claims,
clients and servers MAY make authorization and access control
decisions as appropriate given any other information returned from
the OP. OpenID Connect requires RPs to register with OPs to use
OpenID Connect services for an end user. The registration process is
often completed using out-of-band methods, but it is also possible to
use the automated method described by the OpenID Connect Dynamic
Client Registration protocol [OIDCR]. The parties involved can use
any method that is mutually acceptable.
3.1.4.1. Provider Discovery
An RDAP server acting as an RP needs to be able to map an end user's
identifier to an OP. This can be accomplished using the OPTIONAL
OpenID Connect Discovery protocol [OIDCD], but that protocol is not
widely implemented. Out-of-band methods are also possible and can be
more dependable. For example, an RP can support a limited number of
OPs and maintain internal associations of those identifiers with the
OPs that issued them.
Alternatively, if mapping an end user's identifier is not possible,
or not supported by the RDAP server, the RDAP server SHOULD support
explicit specification of a remote OP by the RDAP client in the form
of a query parameter as described in Section 5.2.2 unless the remote
OP has been identified using an out-of-band mechanism. An RDAP
server MUST provide information about its capabilities and supported
OPs in the "help" query response in the "farv1_openidcConfiguration"
data structure described in Section 4.1. An RDAP server acting as an
RP MUST support at least one of these methods of OP discovery.
3.1.4.2. Authentication Request
Once the OP is known, an RP MUST form an Authentication Request and
send it to the OP as described in Section 3 of [OIDCC]. The
authentication path followed (authorization, implicit, or hybrid)
will depend on the Authentication Request response_type set by the
RP. The remainder of the processing steps described here assume that
the authorization code flow is being used by setting
"response_type=code" in the Authentication Request.
The benefits of using the authorization code flow for authenticating
a human user are described in Section 3.1 of [OIDCC]. The Implicit
Flow is more commonly used by clients implemented in a web browser
using a scripting language; it is described in Section 3.2 of
[OIDCC]. At the time of this writing, the Implicit Flow is
considered insecure and efforts are being made to deprecate the flow.
The Hybrid Flow (described in Section 3.3 of [OIDCC]) combines
elements of the authorization code and Implicit Flows by returning
some tokens from the authorization endpoint and others from the token
endpoint.
An Authentication Request can contain several parameters. REQUIRED
parameters are specified in Section 3.1.2.1 of [OIDCC]. Apart from
these parameters, it is RECOMMENDED that the RP include the optional
"login_hint" parameter in the request, with the value being that of
the "farv1_id" query parameter of the end user's RDAP "login"
request, if provided. Passing the "login_hint" parameter allows a
client to pre-fill login form information, so logging in can be more
convenient for users. Other parameters MAY be included.
The OP receives the Authentication Request and attempts to validate
it as described in Section 3.1.2.2 of [OIDCC]. If the request is
valid, the OP attempts to authenticate the end user as described in
Section 3.1.2.3 of [OIDCC]. The OP returns an error response if the
request is not valid or if any error is encountered.
3.1.4.3. End User Authorization
After the end user is authenticated, the OP MUST obtain consent from
the end user to release authorization information to the RDAP server
acting as an RP. This process is described in Section 3.1.2.4 of
[OIDCC].
3.1.4.4. Authorization Response and Validation
After obtaining an authorization result, the OP will send a response
to the RP that provides the result of the authorization process using
an authorization code. The RP MUST validate the response. This
process is described in Sections 3.1.2.5 - 3.1.2.7 of [OIDCC].
3.1.4.5. Token Processing
The RP sends a token request using the authorization grant to a token
endpoint to obtain a token response containing an access token, ID
Token, and an OPTIONAL refresh token. The RP MUST validate the token
response. This process is described in Section 3.1.3.5 [OIDCC].
3.1.4.6. Delivery of User Information
The set of claims can be retrieved by sending a request to a UserInfo
Endpoint using the access token. The claims are returned in the ID
Token. The process of retrieving claims from a UserInfo Endpoint is
described in Section 5.3 of [OIDCC].
OpenID Connect specifies a set of standard claims in Section 5.1 of
[OIDCC]. Additional claims for RDAP are described in Section 3.1.5.
3.1.5. Specialized Claims and Authorization Scope for RDAP
OpenID Connect claims are pieces of information used to make
assertions about an entity. Section 5 of [OIDCC] describes a set of
standard claims. Section 5.1.2 of [OIDCC] notes that additional
claims MAY be used, and it describes a method to create them. The
set of claims that are specific to RDAP are associated with an OAuth
scope request parameter value (see Section 3.3 of [RFC6749]) of
"rdap".
3.1.5.1. Stated Purposes
Communities of RDAP users and operators may wish to make and validate
claims about a user's "need to know" when it comes to requesting
access to a protected resource. For example, a law enforcement agent
or a trademark attorney may wish to be able to assert that they have
a legal right to access a protected resource, and a server operator
may need to be able to receive and validate that claim. These needs
can be met by defining and using an additional
"rdap_allowed_purposes" claim.
The "rdap_allowed_purposes" claim identifies the purposes for which
access to a protected resource can be requested by an end user. Use
of the "rdap_allowed_purposes" claim is OPTIONAL; processing of this
claim is subject to server acceptance of the purposes, the trust
level assigned to this claim by the server, and successful
authentication of the end user. Unrecognized purpose values MUST be
ignored, and the associated query MUST be processed as if the
unrecognized purpose value was not present at all. See Section 9.3
for a description of the IANA considerations associated with this
claim.
The "rdap_allowed_purposes" claim is represented as an array of case-
sensitive StringOrURI values as specified in Section 2 of [RFC7519].
An example:
"rdap_allowed_purposes": ["domainNameControl","dnsTransparency"]
Purpose values are assigned to an end user's credential by an
identity provider. Identity providers MUST ensure that appropriate
purpose values are only assigned to end user identities that are
authorized to use them.
3.1.5.2. Do Not Track
Communities of RDAP users and operators may wish to make and validate
claims about a user's wish to not have their queries logged, tracked,
or recorded. For example, a law enforcement agent may wish to assert
that their queries are part of a criminal investigation and should
not be tracked due to a risk of query exposure compromising the
investigation, and a server operator may need to be able to receive
and validate that claim. These needs can be met by defining and
using an additional "do not track" claim.
The "do not track" ("rdap_dnt_allowed") claim can be used to identify
an end user that is authorized to perform queries without the end
user's association with those queries being logged, tracked, or
recorded by the server. Client use of the "rdap_dnt_allowed" claim
is OPTIONAL. Server operators MUST NOT log, track, or record any
association of the query and the end user's identity if the end user
is successfully identified and authorized, if the "rdap_dnt_allowed"
claim is present, if the value of the claim is "true", and if
accepting the claim complies with local regulations regarding logging
and tracking.
The "rdap_dnt_allowed" value is represented as a JSON boolean
literal. An example:
rdap_dnt_allowed: true
No special query tracking processing is required if this claim is not
present or if the value of the claim is "false". Use of this claim
MUST be limited to end users who are granted "do not track"
privileges in accordance with service policies and regulations.
Specification of these policies and regulations is beyond the scope
of this document.
4. Common Protocol Features
As described in Section 3.1.4.1, an RDAP server MUST provide
information about its capabilities and supported OPs in a "help"
query response. This specification describes a new
"farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure that describes the OpenID
Connect configuration and related extension features supported by the
RDAP server. This data structure is returned to all client types.
4.1. OpenID Connect Configuration
The "farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure is an object with the
following members:
"sessionClientSupported": (REQUIRED) a boolean value that describes
RDAP server support for session-oriented clients (see
Section 3.1.2).
"tokenClientSupported": (REQUIRED) a boolean value that describes
RDAP server support for token-oriented clients (see
Section 3.1.2).
"dntSupported": (REQUIRED) a boolean value that describes RDAP
server support for the "farv1_dnt" query parameter (see
Section 4.2.2).
"providerDiscoverySupported": (OPTIONAL) a boolean value that
describes RDAP server support for discovery of providers of end-
user identifiers. The default value is "true".
"issuerIdentifierSupported": (OPTIONAL) a boolean value that
describes RDAP server support for explicit client specification of
an Issuer Identifier. The default value is "true".
"implicitTokenRefreshSupported": (OPTIONAL) a boolean value that
describes RDAP server support for implicit token refresh. The
default value is "false".
"openidcProviders": (OPTIONAL) a list of objects with the following
members that describes the set of OPs that are supported by the
RDAP server. This data is RECOMMENDED if the value of
issuerIdentifierSupported is "true":
"iss": (REQUIRED) a URI value that represents the Issuer
Identifier of the OP as per the OpenID Connect Core
specification [OIDCC].
"name": (REQUIRED) a string value representing the human-friendly
name of the OP.
"default": (OPTIONAL) a boolean value that describes RDAP server
support for an OPTIONAL default OP that will be used when a
client omits the "farv1_id" and "farv1_iss" query parameters
from a "farv1_session/login" request. Only one member of this
set can be identified as the default OP by setting a value of
"true". The default value is "false".
"additionalAuthorizationQueryParams": (OPTIONAL) an object where
each member represents an OAuth authorization request parameter
name-value pair supported by the OP. The name represents an
OAuth query parameter, and the value is the query parameter
value. A token-oriented RDAP client SHOULD add these query
parameters and their corresponding values to the Authentication
Request URL when requesting authorization by a specified OP
through a proxy OP.
An RDAP server MUST set either the "sessionClientSupported" or the
"tokenClientSupported" value to "true". Both values MAY be set to
"true" if an RDAP server supports both types of clients.
The "providerDiscoverySupported" value has a direct impact on the use
of the "farv1_id" query parameter described in Sections 3.1.4.2 and
5.2.1. The value of "providerDiscoverySupported" MUST be "true" for
an RDAP server to properly accept and process "farv1_id" query
parameters. Similarly, the "issuerIdentifierSupported" value has a
direct impact on the use of the "farv1_iss" query parameter described
in Section 5.2.2. The value of "issuerIdentifierSupported" MUST be
"true" for an RDAP server to properly accept and process "farv1_iss"
query parameters.
An example of a "farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure:
"farv1_openidcConfiguration": {
"sessionClientSupported": true,
"tokenClientSupported": true,
"dntSupported": false,
"providerDiscoverySupported": true,
"issuerIdentifierSupported": true,
"openidcProviders":
[
{
"iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"name": "Example IDP"
},
{
"iss": "https://accounts.example.net",
"name": "Login with EXAMPLE",
"additionalAuthorizationQueryParams": {
"kc_idp_hint": "examplePublicIDP"
}
},
{
"iss": "https://auth.nic.example/auth/realms/rdap",
"name": "Default OP for the Example RDAP server",
"default": true
}
]
}
Figure 3
4.2. RDAP Query Parameters
This specification describes two OPTIONAL query parameters for use
with RDAP queries that request access to information associated with
protected resources:
"farv1_qp": A query parameter to identify the purpose of the query.
"farv1_dnt": A query parameter to request that the server not log or
otherwise record information about the identity associated with a
query.
One or both parameters MAY be added to an RDAP request URI using the
syntax described in Section "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" of
[HTMLURL].
4.2.1. RDAP Query Purpose
This query is represented as a "key=value" pair using a key value of
"farv1_qp" and a value component that contains a single query purpose
string from the set of allowed purposes associated with the end
user's identity (see Section 3.1.5.1). If present, the server SHOULD
compare the value of the parameter to the "rdap_allowed_purposes"
claim values associated with the end user's identity and ensure that
the requested purpose is present in the set of allowed purposes. The
RDAP server MAY choose to ignore both the requested purpose and the
"rdap_allowed_purposes" claim values if they are inconsistent with
local server policy. The server MUST return an HTTP 403 (Forbidden)
response if the requested purpose is not an allowed purpose. If the
"farv1_qp" parameter is not present, the server MUST process the
query and make an access control decision based on any other
information known to the server about the end user and the
information they are requesting. For example, a server MAY treat the
request as one performed by an unidentified or unauthenticated user
and return either an error or an appropriate subset of the available
data. An example domain query using the "farv1_qp" query parameter:
https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com?farv1_qp=legalActions
Figure 4
4.2.2. RDAP Do Not Track
This query is represented as a "key=value" pair using a key value of
"farv1_dnt" and a value component that contains a single boolean
value. A value of "true" indicates that the end user is requesting
that their query is not tracked or logged in accordance with server
policy. A value of "false" indicates that the end user is accepting
that their query can be tracked or logged in accordance with server
policy. The server MUST return an HTTP 403 (Forbidden) response if
the server is unable to perform the action requested by this query
parameter. An example domain query using the "farv1_dnt" query
parameter:
https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com?farv1_dnt=true
Figure 5
4.2.3. Parameter Processing
Unrecognized query parameters MUST be ignored. An RDAP server that
processes an authenticated query MUST determine if the end-user
identification information is associated with an OP that is
recognized and supported by the server. RDAP servers MUST reject
queries that include identification information that is not
associated with a supported OP by returning an HTTP 400 (Bad Request)
response. An RDAP server that receives a query containing
identification information associated with a recognized OP MUST
perform the steps required to authenticate the user with the OP,
process the query, and return an RDAP response that is appropriate
for the end user's level of authorization and access.
5. Protocol Features for Session-Oriented Clients
This specification adds the following features to RDAP that are
commonly used by session-oriented clients:
1. Data structures to return information that describes an
established session and the information needed to establish a
session for a UI-constrained device.
2. A query parameter to request authentication for a specific end-
user identity.
3. A query parameter to support authentication for a specific end-
user identity on a device with a constrained user interface.
4. A query parameter to identify the purpose of the query.
5. A query parameter to request that the server not log or otherwise
record information about the identity associated with a query.
6. Path segments to start, stop, refresh, and determine the status
of an authenticated session for a specific end-user identity.
5.1. Data Structures
This specification describes two new data structures that are used to
return information to a session-oriented client:
"farv1_session": A data structure that contains information that
describes an established session.
"farv1_deviceInfo": A data structure that contains information that
describes an active attempt to establish a session on a UI-
constrained device.
5.1.1. Session
The "farv1_session" data structure is an object that contains the
following members:
"userID": an OPTIONAL string value that represents the end-user
identifier associated with the session.
"iss": an OPTIONAL URI value that represents the issuer of the end-
user identifier associated with the session.
"userClaims": an OPTIONAL object that contains the set of claims
associated with the end user's identity based on the user
information provided by the OP as described in Section 3.1.4.6 and
processed by the RDAP server in the authentication and
authorization process. The set of possible values is determined
by OP policy and RDAP server policy.
"sessionInfo": an OPTIONAL object that contains two members:
"tokenExpiration": an integer value that represents the number of
seconds that remain in the lifetime of the access token.
"tokenRefresh": a boolean value that indicates if the OP supports
refresh tokens. As described in [RFC6749], support for refresh
tokens is OPTIONAL.
Note that all of the members of the "farv1_session" data structure
are OPTIONAL. See Section 5.2.3 for instructions describing when to
return the minimum set of members.
An example of a "farv1_session" data structure:
"farv1_session": {
"userID": "user.idp.example",
"iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"userClaims": {
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"name": "User Person",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"email": "user@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"locale": "en",
"rdap_allowed_purposes": [
"domainNameControl",
"personalDataProtection"
],
"rdap_dnt_allowed": false
},
"sessionInfo": {
"tokenExpiration": 3599,
"tokenRefresh": true
}
}
Figure 6
5.1.2. Device Info
The flow described in Section 3.1.4 requires an end user to interact
with a server using a user interface that can process HTTP. This
will not work well in situations where the client is automated or an
end user is using a command-line user interface such as curl
(https://curl.se/) or wget (https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/).
This limitation can be addressed using a web browser on a second
device. The information that needs to be entered using the web
browser is contained in the "farv1_deviceInfo" data structure, an
object that contains members as described in Section 3.2 of
[RFC8628].
An example of a "farv1_deviceInfo" data structure:
"farv1_deviceInfo": {
"device_code": "AH-1ng2ezu",
"user_code": "NJJQ-GJFC",
"verification_uri": "https://www.example.com/device",
"verification_uri_complete":
"https://www.example.com/device?user_code=NJJQ-GJFC",
"expires_in": 1800,
"interval": 5
}
Figure 7
5.2. Client Login
Client authentication is requested by sending a "farv1_session/login"
request to an RDAP server. If the RDAP server supports only remote
OPs, the "farv1_session/login" request MUST include at least one end-
user identifier or OP Issuer Identifier.
The server sets an HTTP cookie as described in [RFC6265] when the
"farv1_session/login" request is received and processed successfully.
The client MUST include the session cookie received from the server
in any RDAP request within the scope of that session, including
"farv1_session/refresh", "farv1_session/status", and "farv1_session/
logout". A "farv1_session/login" followed by another "farv1_session/
login" that does not include an HTTP cookie MUST start a new session
on the server that includes a new cookie. A server that receives a
"farv1_session/login" followed by another "farv1_session/login" that
includes an HTTP cookie MUST return an HTTP 409 (Conflict) response.
To help reduce the risk of resource starvation, a server MAY reject a
"farv1_session/login" request and refuse to start a new session by
returning an HTTP 409 (Conflict) response if a server-side maximum
number of concurrent sessions per user exists and the client exceeds
that limit. Additionally, an active session MAY be removed by the
server due to timeout expiration or because a maximum session
lifetime has been exceeded. Clients SHOULD proactively monitor the
"tokenExpiration" value associated with an active session and refresh
the session as appropriate to provide a positive user experience.
5.2.1. End-User Identifier
The end-user identifier is delivered using one of two methods: by
adding a query component to an RDAP request URI using the syntax
described in Section "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" of [HTMLURL]
or by including an HTTP "authorization" request header for the Basic
authentication scheme as described in [RFC7617]. Clients can use
either of these methods to deliver the end-user identifier to a
server that supports remote OPs and provider discovery. Servers that
support remote OPs and provider discovery MUST accept both methods.
If the RDAP server supports a default OP or if provider discovery is
not supported, the end-user identifier MAY be omitted.
The query parameter used to deliver the end-user identifier is
represented as an OPTIONAL "key=value" pair using a key value of
"farv1_id" and a value component that contains the client identifier
issued by an OP. An example for client identifier
"user.idp.example":
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/\
login?farv1_id=user.idp.example
Figure 8
The authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme contains
a base64-encoded representation of the client identifier issued by an
OP. No password is provided. An example for client identifier
"user.idp.example":
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/login
Authorization: Basic dXNlci5pZHAuZXhhbXBsZQ==
Figure 9
An example for use with a default OP:
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/login
Figure 10
5.2.2. OP Issuer Identifier
The OP's Issuer Identifier is delivered by adding a query component
to an RDAP request URI using the syntax described in Section
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded" of [HTMLURL]. If the RDAP server
supports a default OP, the Issuer Identifier MAY be omitted.
The query parameter used to deliver the OP's Issuer Identifier is
represented as an OPTIONAL "key=value" pair using a key value of
"farv1_iss" and a value component that contains the Issuer Identifier
associated with an OP. An RDAP server MAY accept Issuer Identifiers
not specified in the "farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure and
MAY also decide to accept specific Issuer Identifiers only from
specific clients. An example for Issuer Identifier
"https://idp.example.com":
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/\
login?farv1_iss=https://idp.example.com
Figure 11
5.2.3. Login Response
The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response per
[RFC9083]. It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a specific
RDAP object type (e.g., "events" or "status"). In addition, the
response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
success or failure in the "notices" data structure. If successful,
the response MUST include a "farv1_session" data structure that
includes a "sessionInfo" object and an OPTIONAL "userClaims" object.
If unsuccessful, the response MUST include a "farv1_session" data
structure that omits the "userClaims" and "sessionInfo" objects.
An example of a successful "farv1_session/login" response:
{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Login Result",
"description": [
"Login succeeded"
]
}
],
"farv1_session": {
"userID": "user.idp.example",
"iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"userClaims": {
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"name": "User Person",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"email": "user@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"locale": "en",
"rdap_allowed_purposes": [
"domainNameControl",
"personalDataProtection"
],
"rdap_dnt_allowed": false
},
"sessionInfo": {
"tokenExpiration": 3599,
"tokenRefresh": true
}
}
}
Figure 12
An example of a failed "farv1_session/login" response:
{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Login Result",
"description": [
"Login failed"
]
}
],
"farv1_session": {
"userID": "user.idp.example",
"iss": "https://idp.example.com"
}
}
Figure 13
5.2.4. Clients with Limited User Interfaces
"OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant" [RFC8628] provides an OPTIONAL
method to request user authorization from devices that have an
Internet connection but lack a suitable browser for a more
conventional OAuth flow. This method requires an end user to use a
second device (such as a smartphone) that has access to a web browser
for entry of a code sequence that is presented on the UI-constrained
device.
5.2.4.1. UI-Constrained Client Login
Client authentication is requested by sending a "farv1_session/
device" request to an RDAP server. If the RDAP server supports only
remote OPs, the "farv1_session/device" request MUST include either an
end-user identifier as described in Section 5.2.1 or an OP Issuer
Identifier as described in Section 5.2.2.
An example using wget for client identifier "user.idp.example":
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
wget -qO- "https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/device\
?farv1_id=user.idp.example"
Figure 14
The authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme contains
a base64-encoded representation of the client identifier issued by an
OP. No password is provided.
An example using curl and an authorization header:
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
curl -H "Authorization: Basic dXNlci5pZHAuZXhhbXBsZQ=="\
"https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/device"
Figure 15
The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response per
[RFC9083]. It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a specific
RDAP object type (e.g., "events" or "status"). In addition, the
response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
success or failure in the "notices" data structure and, if
successful, a "farv1_deviceInfo" data structure.
An example of a "farv1_session/device" response:
{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Device Login Result",
"description": [
"Login succeeded"
]
}
],
"farv1_deviceInfo": {
"device_code": "AH-1ng2ezu",
"user_code": "NJJQ-GJFC",
"verification_uri": "https://www.example.com/device",
"verification_uri_complete":
"https://www.example.com/device?user_code=NJJQ-GJFC",
"expires_in": 1800,
"interval": 5
}
}
Figure 16
5.2.4.2. UI-Constrained Client Login Polling
After successful processing of the "farv1_session/device" request,
the client MUST send a "farv1_session/devicepoll" request to the RDAP
server to continue the login process. This request initiates the
polling function described in [RFC8628] on the RDAP server. The RDAP
server polls the OP as described in Section 3.4 of [RFC8628],
allowing the RDAP server to wait for the end user to enter the
information returned from the "farv1_session/device" request using
the interface on their second device. After the end user has
completed that process, or if the process fails or times out, the OP
will respond to the polling requests with an indication of success or
failure. If the RDAP server supports only remote OPs, the
"farv1_session/devicepoll" request MUST include either an end-user
identifier as described in Section 5.2.1 or an OP Issuer Identifier
as described in Section 5.2.2.
The "farv1_session/devicepoll" request MUST also include a "farv1_dc"
query parameter. The query parameter is represented as an OPTIONAL
"key=value" pair using a key value of "farv1_dc" and a value
component that contains the value of the device_code that was
returned in the response to the "farv1_session/device" request.
An example using wget:
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
wget -qO- --keep-session-cookies --save-cookies cookie.txt\
"https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/devicepoll\
?farv1_id=user.idp.example&farv1_dc=AH-1ng2ezu"
Figure 17
An example using curl:
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
curl -c cookie.txt "https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/\
devicepoll?farv1_id=user.idp.example&farv1_dc=AH-1ng2ezu"
Figure 18
The response to this request MUST use the response structures
described in Section 5.2. RDAP query processing can continue
normally on the UI-constrained device once the device polling process
has been completed successfully.
5.3. Session Status
Clients MAY send a query to an RDAP server to determine the status of
an existing login session using a "farv1_session/status" path
segment. An example "farv1_session/status" request:
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/status
Figure 19
The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response per
[RFC9083]. It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a specific
RDAP object type (e.g., "events" or "status"). In addition, the
response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
success or failure in the "notices" data structure. If the operation
is successful and an active session exists, the response MUST include
a "farv1_session" data structure that includes a "sessionInfo" object
and an OPTIONAL "userClaims" object. If the operation is
unsuccessful or if no active session exists, the response MUST NOT
include a "farv1_session" object.
An example of a "farv1_session/status" response for an active
session:
{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Session Status Result",
"description": [
"Session status succeeded"
]
}
],
"farv1_session": {
"userID": "user.idp.example",
"iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"userClaims": {
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"name": "User Person",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"email": "user@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"locale": "en",
"rdap_allowed_purposes": [
"domainNameControl",
"personalDataProtection"
],
"rdap_dnt_allowed": false
},
"sessionInfo": {
"tokenExpiration": 3490,
"tokenRefresh": true
}
}
}
Figure 20
If the operation is successful and an active session does not exist,
the response MAY note the lack of an active session in the "notices"
data structure. The "farv1_session" data structure MUST be omitted.
An example of a "farv1_session/status" response with no active
session:
{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Session Status Result",
"description": [
"Session status succeeded",
"No active session"
]
}
]
}
Figure 21
5.4. Session Refresh
Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to refresh or extend an
existing login session using a "farv1_session/refresh" path segment.
The RDAP server MAY attempt to refresh the access token associated
with the current session as part of extending the session for a
period of time determined by the RDAP server. As described in
[RFC6749], OP support for refresh tokens is OPTIONAL. An RDAP server
MUST determine if the OP supports token refresh and process the
refresh request by either requesting refresh of the access token or
returning a response that indicates that token refresh is not
supported by the OP in the "notices" data structure. An example
"farv1_session/refresh" request:
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/refresh
Figure 22
The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response per
[RFC9083]. It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a specific
RDAP object type (e.g., "events" or "status"). In addition, the
response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
success or failure in the "notices" data structure. The response
MUST include a "farv1_session" data structure that includes a
"sessionInfo" object and an OPTIONAL "userClaims" object. If
unsuccessful but an active session exists, the response MUST include
a "farv1_session" data structure that includes a "sessionInfo" object
and an OPTIONAL "userClaims" object. If unsuccessful and no active
session exists, the response MUST omit the "farv1_session" data
structure.
An example of a successful "farv1_session/refresh" response:
{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Session Refresh Result",
"description": [
"Session refresh succeeded",
"Token refresh succeeded."
]
}
],
"farv1_session": {
"userID": "user.idp.example",
"iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"userClaims": {
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"name": "User Person",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"email": "user@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"locale": "en",
"rdap_allowed_purposes": [
"domainNameControl",
"personalDataProtection"
],
"rdap_dnt_allowed": false
},
"sessionInfo": {
"tokenExpiration": 3599,
"tokenRefresh": true
}
}
}
Figure 23
Alternatively, an RDAP server MAY attempt to refresh an access token
upon receipt of a query if the access token associated with an
existing session has expired and the corresponding OP supports token
refresh. The default RDAP server behavior is described in the
"implicitTokenRefreshSupported" value that's included in the
"farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure (see Section 4.1).
If the value of "implicitTokenRefreshSupported" is "true", the client
MAY either explicitly attempt to refresh the session using the
"farv1_session/refresh" query or depend on the RDAP server to attempt
to refresh the session as necessary when an RDAP query is received by
the server. In this case, a server MUST attempt to refresh the
access token upon receipt of a query if the access token associated
with an existing session has expired and the corresponding OP
supports token refresh. Servers MUST return an HTTP 401
(Unauthorized) response to a query if an attempt to implicitly
refresh an existing session fails.
If the value of "implicitTokenRefreshSupported" is "false", the
client MUST explicitly attempt to refresh the session using the
"farv1_session/refresh" query to extend an existing session. If a
session cannot be extended for any reason, the client MUST establish
a new session to continue authenticated query processing by
submitting a "farv1_session/login" query. If the OP does not support
token refresh, the client MUST submit a new "farv1_session/login"
request to establish a new session once an access token has expired.
Clients SHOULD NOT send a "farv1_session/refresh" request in the
absence of an active login session because the request conflicts with
the current state of the server. Servers MUST return an HTTP 409
(Conflict) response if a "farv1_session/refresh" request is received
in the absence of a session cookie.
5.5. Client Logout
Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to terminate an existing
login session. Termination of a session is requested using a
"farv1_session/logout" path segment. Access and refresh tokens can
be revoked during the "farv1_session/logout" process as described in
[RFC7009] if supported by the OP (token revocation endpoint support
is OPTIONAL per [RFC8414]). If supported, this feature SHOULD be
used to ensure that the tokens are not mistakenly associated with a
future RDAP session. Alternatively, an RDAP server MAY attempt to
log out from the OP using the OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout
protocol [OIDCL] if that protocol is supported by the OP. In any
case, to prevent abuse before the cookie times out, an RDAP server
SHOULD invalidate the HTTP cookie associated with the session as part
of terminating the session.
An example "farv1_session/logout" request:
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/logout
Figure 24
The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response per
[RFC9083]. It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a specific
RDAP object type (e.g., "events" or "status"). In addition, the
response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
success or failure in the "notices" data structure. The "notices"
data structure MAY include an indication of the success or failure of
any attempt to logout from the OP or to revoke the tokens issued by
the OP.
An example of a "farv1_session/logout" response:
{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Logout Result",
"description": [
"Logout succeeded"
"Provider logout failed: Not supported by provider.",
"Token revocation successful."
]
}
]
}
Figure 25
In the absence of a "logout" request, an RDAP session MUST be
terminated by the RDAP server after a server-defined period of time.
The server SHOULD also take appropriate steps to ensure that the
tokens associated with the terminated session cannot be reused. This
SHOULD include revoking the tokens or logging out from the OP if
either operation is supported by the OP.
5.6. Request Sequencing
The requests described in this document are typically performed in a
specific sequence:
1. "farv1_session/login" (or the related "farv1_session/device" and
"farv1_session/devicepoll" requests) to start a session,
2. "farv1_session/status" and/or "farv1_session/refresh" to manage a
session,
3. and "farv1_session/logout" to end a session.
If a client sends a "farv1_session/status", "farv1_session/refresh",
or "farv1_session/logout" request in the absence of a session cookie,
the server MUST return an HTTP 409 (Conflict) error.
A client can end a session explicitly by sending a "farv1_session/
logout" request to the RDAP server. A session can also be ended
implicitly by the server after a server-defined period of time. The
status of a session can be determined at any time by sending a
"farv1_session/status" query to the RDAP server.
An RDAP server MUST maintain session state information for the
duration of an active session. This is commonly done using HTTP
cookies as described in [RFC6265]. Doing so allows end users to
submit queries without having to explicitly identify and authenticate
themselves for every query.
An RDAP server can receive queries that include a session cookie
where the associated session has expired or is otherwise unavailable
(e.g., due to the user requesting explicit logout for the associated
session). The server MUST return an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) error in
response to such queries.
6. Protocol Features for Token-Oriented Clients
This specification adds additional processing steps for token-
oriented clients as described in this section and Section 3.1.3. It
does not define additional data structures or RDAP-specific protocol
parameters specifically for token-oriented clients.
6.1. Client Login
Clients identify and authenticate end users by exchanging information
with an OP that is recognized by the RDAP server as described in
Sections 3.1.4.2, 3.1.4.3, and 3.1.4.4. A client SHOULD append the
"additionalAuthorizationQueryParams" values retrieved from the
"openidcProviders" array described in Section 4.1 to the
authorization endpoint URL when requesting authorization from the OP.
Once these processes are completed successfully, the client can
request tokens from the OP as described in Section 3.1.4.5. The OP
SHOULD include the RDAP server's client_id in the "aud" claim value
of an issued ID Token. The RDAP server MAY choose to ignore the
value of the "aud" claim or exchange the token as described in
Section 6.4. With these steps completed, the access token received
from the OP can be passed to an RDAP server in an HTTP
"authorization" request header [RFC6750] for RDAP queries that
require end-user identification, authentication, and authorization.
6.2. Client Queries
An RDAP server that receives a bearer token in an HTTP
"authorization" request header as part of an RDAP object query MUST
validate the token in accordance with local policy and confirm that
the token is a legitimate access token. Once validated, the access
token MAY be used to retrieve the claims associated with the end
user's identity, including claims associated with the "rdap" scope
that are not already included in the access token, as described in
Section 3.1.4.6. The RDAP server can then evaluate the end user's
identity information to determine the end user's authorization level
and process the query in accordance with server policies. A client
MUST include the "farv1_iss" query parameter and Issuer Identifier
value with an RDAP query if the token was issued by a remote OP.
6.3. Access Token Validation
An RDAP server MUST validate a received access token prior to using
that token for access control purposes. Validation MAY include token
introspection [RFC7662] using the issuing OP or analysis of the
values included in a JWT access token. Once an access token is
validated, an RDAP server MAY use that token to request user claims
from the issuing OP.
There are performance considerations associated with the process of
validating a token and requesting user claims as part of processing
every received RDAP query. An RDAP server MAY cache validated
information and use that cached information to reduce the amount of
time needed to process subsequent RDAP queries associated with the
same access token as long as the token has not expired. The client
SHOULD monitor the token expiration time and refresh the token as
needed.
6.4. Token Exchange
Tokens can include an "aud" (audience) claim that contains the OAuth
2.0 client_id of the RP as an audience value. In some operational
scenarios (such as a client that is providing a proxy service), an RP
can receive tokens with an "aud" claim value that does not include
the RP's client_id. These tokens might not be trusted by the RP, and
the RP might refuse to accept the tokens. This situation can be
remedied by having the RP exchange the access token with the OP for a
set of trusted tokens that reset the "aud" claim. The token exchange
protocol is described in [RFC8693].
7. RDAP Query Processing
Once an RDAP session is active, an RDAP server MUST determine if the
end user is authorized to perform any queries that are received
during the duration of the session. This MAY include rejecting
queries outright, and it MAY include omitting or otherwise redacting
information that the end user is not authorized to receive. Specific
processing requirements are beyond the scope of this document.
8. RDAP Conformance
RDAP responses that contain values described in this document MUST
indicate conformance with this specification by including an
rdapConformance [RFC9083] value of "farv1" (federated authentication
method for RDAP version 1). The information needed to register this
value in the "RDAP Extensions" registry is described in Section 9.1.
Example rdapConformance structure with extension specified:
"rdapConformance" :
[
"rdap_level_0",
"farv1"
]
Figure 26
9. IANA Considerations
9.1. RDAP Extensions Registry
IANA has registered the following value in the "RDAP Extensions"
registry:
Extension Identifier: farv1
Registry Operator: Any
Specification: RFC 9560
Contact: IETF <iesg@ietf.org>
Intended Usage: This extension describes federated authentication
method for RDAP version 1 using OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect.
9.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registry
IANA has registered the following values in the "JSON Web Token
Claims" registry:
Claim Name: rdap_allowed_purposes
Claim Description: This claim describes the set of RDAP query
purposes that are available to an identity that is presented for
access to a protected RDAP resource.
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: Section 3.1.5.1 of RFC 9560.
Claim Name: rdap_dnt_allowed
Claim Description: This claim contains a JSON boolean literal that
describes a "do not track" request for server-side tracking,
logging, or recording of an identity that is presented for access
to a protected RDAP resource.
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: Section 3.1.5.2 of RFC 9560.
9.3. RDAP Query Purpose Registry
IANA has created a new protocol registry to manage RDAP query purpose
values.
Section at https://www.iana.org/protocols: Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP)
Registry Name: Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query
Purpose Values
Registration Procedure(s): This registry is operated under the
"Specification Required" policy defined in [RFC8126]. The
designated expert must ensure that requests to add values to this
registry meet the syntax, value, and description requirements
described in this section.
Required Information: Registration requests are described in a
specification that's consistent with the "Specification Required"
policy defined in [RFC8126]. The specification must include one
or more purpose values as described below.
Individual purpose values are registered with IANA. Each entry in
the registry contains the following fields:
Value: The purpose string value being registered. Value strings can
contain uppercase ASCII characters from "A" to "Z", lowercase
ASCII characters from "a" to "z", and the underscore ("_")
character. Value strings contain at least one character and no
more than 64 characters.
Description: One or two sentences in English describing the meaning
of the purpose value, how it might be used, and/or how it should
be interpreted by clients and servers.
Reference: RFC 9560
The set of initial values used to populate the registry as described
below are derived from the final report produced by the Expert
Working Group on gTLD Directory Services chartered by the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) [gTLD].
Value: domainNameControl
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include, for a
registrant's own domain name, creating the domain name, updating
information about the domain name, transferring the domain name,
renewing the domain name, deleting the domain name, maintaining a
domain name portfolio, and detecting fraudulent use of the
registrant's own contact information.
Reference: RFC 9560
Value: personalDataProtection
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
identifying the accredited privacy or proxy provider associated
with a domain name, reporting abuse, requesting reveal, or
otherwise contacting the provider.
Reference: RFC 9560
Value: technicalIssueResolution
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include (but are
not limited to) working to resolve technical issues, including
email delivery issues, DNS resolution failures, and website
functionality issues.
Reference: RFC 9560
Value: domainNameCertification
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include a
Certification Authority (CA) issuing an X.509 certificate to a
subject identified by a domain name.
Reference: RFC 9560
Value: individualInternetUse
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
identifying the organization using a domain name to instill
consumer trust or contacting that organization to raise a customer
complaint to them or file a complaint about them.
Reference: RFC 9560
Value: businessDomainNamePurchaseOrSale
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include making
purchase queries about a domain name, acquiring a domain name from
a registrant, and enabling due diligence research.
Reference: RFC 9560
Value: academicPublicInterestDNSResearch
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include academic
public interest research studies about domain names published in
the registration data service, including public information about
the registrant and designated contacts, the domain name's history
and status, and domain names registered by a given registrant
(reverse query).
Reference: RFC 9560
Value: legalActions
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
investigating possible fraudulent use of a registrant's name or
address by other domain names, investigating possible trademark
infringement, contacting a registrant's or licensee's legal
representative prior to taking legal action, and then taking a
legal action if the concern is not satisfactorily addressed.
Reference: RFC 9560
Value: regulatoryAndContractEnforcement
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
investigating the tax authority of businesses with online
presences, investigating Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy (UDRP), investigating contractual compliance, and
registering data escrow audits.
Reference: RFC 9560
Value: criminalInvestigationAndDNSAbuseMitigation
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
reporting abuse to someone who can investigate and address that
abuse or contacting entities associated with a domain name during
an offline criminal investigation.
Reference: RFC 9560
Value: dnsTransparency
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose involve querying
the registration data made public by registrants to satisfy a wide
variety of use cases around informing the public.
Reference: RFC 9560
10. Security Considerations
Security considerations for RDAP can be found in [RFC7481]. Security
considerations for OpenID Connect Core [OIDCC] and OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] can be found in their reference specifications; best
current security practice for OAuth 2.0 can be found in
[OAUTH-SECURITY]. Additionally, the practices described in [RFC9325]
MUST be followed when the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is
used.
As described in Section 3.1.4.2, the OAuth 2.0 Implicit Flow
[RFC6749] is considered insecure, and efforts are being made to
deprecate the flow. It MUST NOT be used.
Some of the responses described in this specification return
information to a client from an RDAP server that is intended to help
the client match responses to queries and manage sessions. Some of
that information, such as the "userClaims" described in
Section 5.1.1, can be personally identifiable and considered
sensitive if disclosed to unauthorized parties. An RDAP server
operator must develop policies for information disclosure to ensure
that personally identifiable information is disclosed only to clients
that are authorized to process that information.
The "do not track" claim relies on the good will of the RDAP server
and associated proxies. As such, using and processing this claim
depends on out-of-band trust relationships that need to be
established before the claim is used in practice. If used and
accepted by the RDAP server, there is a risk of information loss that
could seriously impair audit capabilities.
10.1. Authentication and Access Control
Having completed the client identification, authorization, and
validation process, an RDAP server can make access control decisions
based on a comparison of client-provided information (such as the set
of "userClaims" described in Section 5.1.1) and local policy. For
example, a client who provides an email address (and nothing more)
might be entitled to receive a subset of the information that would
be available to a client who provides an email address, a full name,
and a stated purpose. Development of these access control policies
is beyond the scope of this document.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[HTMLURL] WHATWG, "URL (Living Standard)", March 2024,
<https://url.spec.whatwg.org/>.
[OIDCC] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
errata set 2", December 2023,
<https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[OIDCD] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID
Connect Discovery 1.0 incorporating errata set 2",
December 2023, <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-
discovery-1_0.html>.
[OIDCL] Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Agarwal, N., Sakimura, N., and
J. Bradley, "OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout 1.0",
September 2022, <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-
rpinitiated-1_0.html>.
[OIDCR] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect
Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 incorporating errata set
2", December 2023, <https://openid.net/specs/openid-
connect-registration-1_0.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
August 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>.
[RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 7480, DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>.
[RFC7481] Hollenbeck, S. and N. Kong, "Security Services for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 7481, DOI 10.17487/RFC7481, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7481>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8628] Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
"OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8628>.
[RFC8693] Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693>.
[RFC9068] Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0
Access Tokens", RFC 9068, DOI 10.17487/RFC9068, October
2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9068>.
[RFC9082] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9082>.
[RFC9083] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 9083, DOI 10.17487/RFC9083, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9083>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.
[RFC9325] Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325>.
11.2. Informative References
[gTLD] Expert Working Group on gTLD Directory Services (EWG),
"Final Report from the Expert Working Group on gTLD
Directory Services: A Next-Generation Registration
Directory Service (RDS)", June 2014,
<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-report-
06jun14-en.pdf>.
[OAUTH-SECURITY]
Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
"OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-security-
topics-26, 21 April 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
security-topics-26>.
[OIDC] OpenID, "What is OpenID Connect",
<https://openid.net/developers/how-connect-works/>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
[RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
"Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
their contributions to the development of this document: Julien
Bernard, Marc Blanchet, Tom Harrison, Russ Housley, Jasdip Singh,
Rhys Smith, Jaromir Talir, Rick Wilhelm, and Alessandro Vesely. In
addition, the Verisign Registry Services Lab development team of
Joseph Harvey, Andrew Kaizer, Sai Mogali, Anurag Saxena, Swapneel
Sheth, Nitin Singh, and Zhao Zhao provided critical "proof of
concept" implementation experience that helped demonstrate the
validity of the concepts described in this document.
Pawel Kowalik and Mario Loffredo provided significant text
contributions that led to welcome improvements in several sections of
this document. Their contributions are greatly appreciated.
Author's Address
Scott Hollenbeck
Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190
United States of America
Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
URI: https://www.verisignlabs.com/