SAVI D. McPherson
Internet-Draft VeriSign, Inc.
Intended status: Informational F.J. Baker
Expires: October 12, 2013 Cisco Systems
J.M. Halpern
Ericsson
April 10, 2013
SAVI Threat Scope
draft-ietf-savi-threat-scope-08
Abstract
Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) effort aims to
complement ingress filtering with finer-grained, standardized IP
source address validation. This document describes threats enabled
by IP source address spoofing both in the global and finer-grained
context, describes currently available solutions and challenges, and
provides a starting point analysis for finer-grained (host
granularity) anti-spoofing work.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2013.
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Table of Contents
1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Spoofed-based Attack Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Blind Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1. Single Packet Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Flood-Based DoS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3. Poisoning Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.4. Spoof-based Worm/Malware Propagation . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.5. Reflective Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.6. Accounting Subversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.7. Other Blind Spoofing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Non-Blind Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Man in the Middle (MITM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.2. Third Party Recon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.3. Other Non-Blind Spoofing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Current Anti-Spoofing Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Topological Locations for Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1.1. Host to link layer neighbor via switch . . . . . . . 12
4.1.2. Upstream Switches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.3. Upstream Routers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.4. ISP Edge PE Router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.5. ISP NNI Router to ISP NNI Router . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.6. Cable Modem Subscriber Access . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.7. DSL Subscriber Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2. Currently Available Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.1. BCP 38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.2. Unicast RPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.3. Port-based Address Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.4. Cryptographic Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.2.5. Residual Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17