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Security Requirements for BGP Path Validation
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs-12

Document type: Active Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Document stream: IETF
Last updated: 2014-07-15 (latest revision 2014-07-14)
Intended RFC status: Informational
Other versions: plain text, pdf, html

IETF State: Submitted to IESG for Publication
Consensus: Unknown
Document shepherd: Chris Morrow
Shepherd Write-Up: Last changed 2014-06-13

IESG State: RFC Ed Queue
IANA Review State: IANA OK - No Actions Needed
IANA Action State: No IC
RFC Editor State: EDIT
Responsible AD: Alia Atlas
Send notices to: sidr-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs@tools.ietf.org

Network Working Group                                        S. Bellovin
Internet-Draft                                       Columbia University
Intended status: Informational                                   R. Bush
Expires: January 15, 2015                      Internet Initiative Japan
                                                                 D. Ward
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                           July 14, 2014

             Security Requirements for BGP Path Validation
                     draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs-12

Abstract

   This document describes requirements for a BGP security protocol
   design to provide cryptographic assurance that the origin AS
   (Autonomous System) had the right to announce the prefix and to
   provide assurance of the AS Path of the announcement.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
   appear in all upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed
   case as English words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 15, 2015.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Recommended Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  General Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  BGP UPDATE Security Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)-based Origin Validation,
   [RFC6811], provides a measure of resilience to accidental mis-
   origination of prefixes.  But it provides neither cryptographic
   assurance (announcements are not signed), nor assurance of the AS
   Path of the announcement.

   This document describes requirements to be placed on a BGP security
   protocol, herein termed BGPsec, intended to rectify these gaps.

   The threat model assumed here is documented in [RFC4593] and
   [RFC7132].

   As noted in the threat model, [RFC7132], this work is limited to
   threats to the BGP protocol.  Issues of business relationship
   conformance, while quite important to operators, are not security
   issues per se, and are outside the scope of this document.  It is
   hoped that these issues will be better understood in the future.

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