This Internet-Draft is no longer active. Unofficial copies of old Internet-Drafts can be found here:
http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-v6ops-rogue-ra.
Abstract:
When deploying IPv6, whether IPv6-only or dual-stack, routers are configured
to send IPv6 Router Advertisements (RAs) to convey information to nodes that enable them to autoconfigure on
the network. This information includes the implied default router address taken from the observed source address of
the RA message, as well as on-link prefix information. However, unintended misconfigurations by users or administrators, or
possibly malicious attacks on the network, may lead to bogus RAs being present, which in turn can
cause operational problems for hosts on the network. In this document, we summarise the scenarios in which
rogue RAs may be observed and present a list of possible solutions to the problem. We focus
on the unintended causes of rogue RAs in the text. The goal of this text is to
be Informational, and as such to present a framework around which solutions can be
proposed and discussed. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it
is published for informational purposes.
Authors:
Stig Venaas <stig@cisco.com>
Tim Chown <tjc@ecs.soton.ac.uk>
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid)
datatracker.ietf.org