Mitigating IPv6 Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack Using Stateless Neighbor Presence Discovery
draft-smith-6man-mitigate-nd-cache-dos-slnd-06
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Mark Smith | ||
| Last updated | 2013-08-24 (Latest revision 2013-02-20) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
One of the functions of IPv6 Neighbor Discovery is to discover whether a specified neighbor is present. During the neighbor presence discovery process state is created. A node's capacity for this state can be intentionally exhausted to perform a denial of service attack, known as the "Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack". This memo proposes a stateless form of neighbor presence discovery to prevent this Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)