Network Working Group B. Carpenter
Internet-Draft Univ. of Auckland
Intended status: Informational B. Liu
Expires: March 16, 2019 Huawei Technologies
September 12, 2018
Limited Domains and Internet Protocols
draft-carpenter-limited-domains-03
Abstract
There is a noticeable trend towards network requirements, behaviours
and semantics that are specific to a limited region of the Internet
and a particular set of requirements. Policies, default parameters,
the options supported, the style of network management and security
requirements may vary. This document reviews examples of such
limited domains and emerging solutions, and develops a related
taxonomy. It shows the needs for a precise definition of a limited
domain boundary and for a corresponding protocol to allow nodes to
discover where such a boundary exists.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 16, 2019.
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Failure Modes in Today's Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Examples of Limited Domain Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Examples of Limited Domain Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Taxonomy of Limited Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. The Domain as a Whole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Individual Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. The Domain Boundary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4. Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.5. Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.6. Connection to the Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.7. Security, Trust and Privacy Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.8. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Common Features of Limited Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Defining a Limited Domain Boundary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Defining Protocol Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
13. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
As the Internet continues to grow and diversify, with a realistic
prospect of tens of billions of nodes being connected directly and
indirectly, there is a noticeable trend towards local requirements,
behaviours and semantics. The word "local" should be understood in a
special sense, however. In some cases it may refer to geographical
and physical locality - all the nodes in a single building, on a
single campus, or in a given vehicle. In other cases it may refer to
a defined set of users or nodes distributed over a much wider area,
but drawn together by a single virtual network over the Internet, or
a single physical network running partially in parallel with the
Internet. We expand on these possibilities below. To capture the
topic, this document refers to such networks as "limited domains".
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Some people have concerns about splintering of the Internet along
political or linguistic boundaries by mechanisms that block the free
flow of information across the network. That is not the topic of
this document, which does not discuss filtering mechanisms and does
not apply to protocols that are designed for use across the whole
Internet. It is only concerned with domains that have specific
technical requirements.
The word "domain" in this document does not refer to naming domains
in the DNS, although in some cases a limited domain might
incidentally be congruent with a DNS domain.
The requirements of limited domains will be different in different
scenarios. Policies, default parameters, and the options supported
may vary. Also, the style of network management may vary, between a
completely unmanaged network, one with fully autonomic management,
one with traditional central management, and mixtures of the above.
Finally, the requirements and solutions for security and privacy may
vary.
This documents analyses and discusses some of the consequences of
this trend, and how it impacts the idea of universal interoperability
in the Internet. In particular, we challenge the notion that all
Internet standards must be universal in scope and applicability. To
the contrary, we assert that some standards need to be specifically
limited in their applicability. This requires that the concepts of a
limited domain, and of its boundary, need to be formalised.
2. Failure Modes in Today's Internet
Today, the Internet does not have a well-defined concept of limited
domains. One result of this is that certain protocols and features
fail on certain paths. Previously, this has been analysed in terms
of transparency [RFC2775], [RFC4924] or of intrusive middleboxes
[RFC3234], [RFC7663], [I-D.dolson-plus-middlebox-benefits].
Unfortunately the problems persist, both in application protocols,
and even in very fundamental mechanisms. For example, the Internet
is not transparent to IPv6 extension headers [RFC7872], and Path MTU
Discovery has been unreliable for many years [RFC2923], [RFC4821].
IP fragmentation is also unreliable
[I-D.bonica-intarea-frag-fragile], and problems in TCP MSS
negotiation have been reported [I-D.andrews-tcp-and-ipv6-use-minmtu].
On the security side, the widespread insertion of firewalls at domain
boundaries that are perceived by humans but unknown to protocols
results in arbitrary failure modes as far as the application layer is
concerned.
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This situation is not acceptable, so it seems that a new approach is
needed.
3. Examples of Limited Domain Requirements
This section describes various examples where limited domain
requirements can easily be identified. It is of course not a
complete list.
NOTE: The authors welcome more suggestions and references for this
list.
1. A home network. It will be unmanaged, constructed by a non-
specialist, and will possibly include wiring errors such as
physical loops. It must work with devices "out of the box" as
shipped by their manufacturers and must create adequate security
by default. Remote access may be required. The requirements
and applicable principles are summarised in [RFC7368].
2. A small office network. This is very similar to a home network,
since whoever is in charge will probably have little or no
specialist knowledge, but may have differing security and
privacy requirements. Remote access may be required.
3. A vehicle network. This will be designed by the vehicle
manufacturer but may include devices added by the vehicle's
owner or operator. Parts of the network will have demanding
performance and reliability requirements with implications for
human safety. Remote access may be required to certain
functions, but absolutely forbidden for others. Communication
with other vehicles, roadside infrastructure, and external data
sources will be required. See
[I-D.ietf-ipwave-vehicular-networking] for a survey of use
cases.
4. A building services network. This will be designed specifically
for a particular building, but using standard components.
Additional devices may need to be added at any time. Parts of
the network may have demanding reliability requirements with
implications for human safety. Remote access may be required to
certain functions, but absolutely forbidden for others.
[I-D.martocci-6lowapp-building-applications] (need current
reference!)
5. Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks in
general, which will exhibit widely differing requirements,
including tough real-time performance targets, of which building
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networks are a simple example. See for example
[I-D.ietf-detnet-use-cases]
6. The three preceding cases will all include sensors, but some
networks may be specifically limited to sensors and the
collection and processing of sensor data. They may be in remote
or technically challenging locations and installed by non-
specialists.
7. "Traditional" enterprise and campus networks, which may be
spread over many kilometres and over multiple separate sites.
8. Data centres and hosting centres, or distributed services acting
as such centres. These will have high performance, security and
privacy requirements and will typically include large numbers of
independent "tenant" networks overlaid on shared infrastructure.
9. Content Delivery Networks, comprising distributed data centres
and the paths between them, spanning thousands of kilometres.
10. Internet of Things (IoT) networks. While this term is very
flexible and covers many innovative types of network, including
ad hoc networks that are formed spontaneously, it seems
reasonable to expect that many IoT edge networks will have
special requirements and protocols that are useful only within a
specific domain, and that these protocols cannot, and for
security reasons should not, run over the Internet as a whole.
11. An important subclass of IoT networks consists of constrained
networks [RFC7228] in which the nodes are limited in power
consumption and communications bandwidth, and are therefore
limited to using very frugal protocols.
12. Delay tolerant networks may consist of domains that are
relatively isolated and are connected only intermittently to the
outside, with a very long latency on such connections [RFC4838].
Clearly the protocol requirements and possibilities are very
specialised in such networks.
13. Many of the above types of network may be extended throughout
the Internet by a variety of virtual private network (VPN)
techniques. Therefore we may argue that limited domains may
overlap each other in an arbitrary fashion by use of
virtualization techniques.
Two other concepts, while not tied to specific network types, also
strongly depend on the concept of limited domains:
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1. Intent Based Networking. In this concept, a network domain is
configured and managed in accordance with an abstract policy
known as "Intent", to ensure that the network performs as
required [I-D.moulchan-nmrg-network-intent-concepts]. Whatever
technologies are used to support this, they will be applied
within the domain boundary.
2. Network Slicing. A network slice is a virtual network that
consists of a managed set of resources carved off from a larger
network [I-D.geng-netslices-architecture]. Whatever technologies
are used to support slicing, they will require a clear definition
of the boundary of a given slice.
While it is clearly desirable to use common solutions, and therefore
common standards, wherever possible, it is increasingly difficult to
do so while satisfying the widely varying requirements outlined
above. However, there is a tendency when new protocols and protocol
extensions are proposed to always ask the question "How will this
work across the open Internet?" This document suggests that this is
not always the right question. There are protocols and extensions
that are not intended to work across the open Internet. On the
contrary, their requirements and semantics are specifically limited
(in the sense defined above).
A common argument is that if a protocol is intended for limited use,
the chances are very high that it will in fact be used (or misused)
in other scenarios including the so-called open Internet. This is
undoubtedly true and means that limited use is not an excuse for bad
design or poor security. In fact, a limited use requirement
potentially adds complexity to both the protocol and its security
design, as discussed later.
Nevertheless, because of the diversity of limited environments with
specific requirements that is now emerging, specific standards will
necessarily emerge. There will be attempts to capture each market
sector, but the market will demand standardised limited solutions.
However, the "open Internet" must remain as the universal method of
interconnection. Reconciling these two aspects is a major challenge.
4. Examples of Limited Domain Solutions
This section lists various examples of specific limited domain
solutions that have been proposed or defined. It intentionally does
not include Layer 2 technology solutions, which by definition apply
to limited domains.
NOTE: Please suggest additional items for this list.
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1. Differentiated Services. This mechanism [RFC2474] allows a
network to assign locally significant values to the 6-bit
Differentiated Services Code Point field in any IP packet.
Although there are some recommended codepoint values for
specific per-hop queue management behaviours, these are
specifically intended to be domain-specific codepoints with
traffic being classified, conditioned and re-marked at domain
boundaries (unless there is an inter-domain agreement that makes
re-marking unnecessary).
2. Network function virtualisation. As described in
[I-D.irtf-nfvrg-gaps-network-virtualization], this general
concept is an open research topic, in which virtual network
functions are orchestrated as part of a distributed system.
Inevitably such orchestration applies to an administrative
domain of some kind, even though cross-domain orchestration is
also a research area.
3. Service Function Chaining (SFC). This technique [RFC7665]
assumes that services within a network are constructed as
sequences of individual functions within a specific SFC-enabled
domain. As that RFC states: "Specific features may need to be
enforced at the boundaries of an SFC-enabled domain, for example
to avoid leaking SFC information". A Network Service Header
(NSH) [RFC8300] is used to encapsulate packets flowing through
the service function chain: "The intended scope of the NSH is
for use within a single provider's operational domain."
4. Data Centre Network Virtualization Overlays. A common
requirement in data centres that host many tenants (clients) is
to provide each one with a secure private network, all running
over the same physical infrastructure. [RFC8151] describes
various use cases for this, and specifications are under
development. These include use cases in which the tenant
network is physically split over several data centres, but which
must appear to the user as a single secure domain.
5. Segment Routing. This is a technique which "steers a packet
through an ordered list of instructions, called segments"
[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]. The semantics of these
instructions are explicitly local to a segment routing domain or
even to a single node. Technically, these segments or
instructions are represented as an MPLS label or an IPv6
address, which clearly adds a semantic interpretation to them
within the domain.
6. Autonomic Networking. As explained in
[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model], an autonomic network is also a
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security domain within which an autonomic control plane
[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] is used by service
agents. These service agents manage technical objectives, which
may be locally defined, subject to domain-wide policy. Thus the
domain boundary is important for both security and protocol
purposes.
7. Homenet. As shown in [RFC7368], a home networking domain has
specific protocol needs that differ from those in an enterprise
network or the Internet as a whole. These include the Home
Network Control Protocol (HNCP) [RFC7788] and a naming and
discovery solution [I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming].
8. Creative uses of IPv6 features. As IPv6 enters more general
use, engineers notice that it has much more flexibility than
IPv4. Innovative suggestions have been made for:
* The flow label, e.g. [RFC6294],
[I-D.fioccola-v6ops-ipv6-alt-mark].
* Extension headers, e.g. for segment routing
[I-D.ietf-6man-segment-routing-header].
* Meaningful address bits, e.g. [I-D.jiang-semantic-prefix].
Also, segment routing uses IPv6 addresses as segment
identifiers with specific local meanings
[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].
All of these suggestions are only viable within a specified
domain. The case of the extension header is particularly
interesting, since its existence has been a major "selling
point" for IPv6, but it is notorious that new extension headers
are virtually impossible to deploy across the whole Internet
[RFC7045], [RFC7872]. It is worth noting that extension header
filtering is considered as an important security issue
[I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering]. There is considerable
appetite among vendors or operators to have flexibility in
defining extension headers for use in limited or specialised
domains, e.g. [I-D.voyer-6man-extension-header-insertion] and
[BIGIP].
9. Deterministic Networking (DetNet). The Deterministic Networking
Architecture [I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture] and encapsulation
[I-D.ietf-detnet-dp-sol] aim to support flows with extremely low
data loss rates and bounded latency, but only within a part of
the network that is "DetNet aware". Thus, as for differentiated
services above, the concept of a domain is fundamental.
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10. Provisioning Domains (PvDs). An architecture for Multiple
Provisioning Domains has been defined [RFC7556] to allow hosts
attached to multiple networks to learn explicit details about
the services provided by each of those networks.
5. Taxonomy of Limited Domains
This section develops a taxonomy for describing limited domains.
Several major aspects are considered in this taxonomy:
o The domain as a whole.
o The individual nodes.
o The domain boundary.
o The domain's topology.
o The domain's technology.
o How the domain connects to the Internet.
o The security, trust and privacy model.
o Operations.
The following sub-sections analyse each of these aspects.
5.1. The Domain as a Whole
o Why does the domain exist? (e.g., human choice, administrative
policy, orchestration requirements, technical requirements)
o If there are special requirements, are they at Layer 2, Layer 3 or
an upper layer?
o Is the domain managed by humans or fully autonomic?
o If managed, what style of management applies? (Manual
configuration, automated configuration, orchestration?)
o Is there a policy model? (Intent, configuration policies?)
o Does the domain provide controlled or paid service or open access?
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5.2. Individual Nodes
o Is a domain member a complete node, or only one interface of a
node?
o Are nodes permanent members of a given domain, or are join and
leave operations possible?
o Are nodes physical or virtual devices?
o Are virtual nodes general-purpose, or limited to specific
functions, applications or users?
o Are nodes constrained (by battery etc)?
o Are devices installed "out of the box" or pre-configured?
5.3. The Domain Boundary
o How is the domain boundary identified or defined?
o Is the domain boundary fixed or dynamic?
o Are boundary nodes special? Or can any node be at the boundary?
5.4. Topology
o Is the domain a subset of a layer 2 or 3 connectivity domain?
o In IP addressing terms, is the domain Link-local, Site-local, or
Global?
o Does the domain overlap other domains? (In other words, a node
may or may not be allowed to be a member of multiple domains.)
o Does the domain match physical topology, or does it have a virtual
(overlay) topology?
o Is the domain in a single building, vehicle or campus? Or is it
distributed?
o If distributed, are the interconnections private or over the
Internet?
o In IP addressing terms, is the domain Link-local, Site-local, or
Global?
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5.5. Technology
o In routing terms, what routing protocol(s) are used, or even
different forwarding mechanisms (MPLS or other non-IP mechanism)?
o In an overlay domain, what overlay technique is used (L2VPN,
L3VPN,...)?
o Are there specific QoS requirements?
o Link latency - normal or long latency links?
o Mobility - are nodes mobile? Is the whole network mobile?
o Which specific technologies, such as those in Section 4, are
applicable?
5.6. Connection to the Internet
o Is the Internet connection permanent or intermittent? (Never
connected is out of scope.)
o What traffic is blocked, in and out?
o What traffic is allowed, in and out?
o What traffic is transformed, in and out?
o Is secure and privileged remote access needed?
o Does the domain allow unprivileged remote sessions?
5.7. Security, Trust and Privacy Model
o Must domain members be authorized?
o Are all nodes in the domain at the same trust level?
o Is traffic authenticated?
o Is traffic encrypted?
o What is hidden from the outside?
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5.8. Operations
o Safety level - does the domain have a critical (human) safety
role?
o Reliability requirement - normal or 99.999% ?
o Environment - hazardous conditions?
o Installation - are specialists needed?
o Service visits - easy, difficult, impossible?
o Software/firmware updates - possible or impossible?
6. Common Features of Limited Domains
As the preceding taxonomy shows, there are very numerous aspects to a
domain, so the common features are not immediately obvious. It would
be possible, but tedious, to apply the taxonomy to each of the domain
types described in Section 3. However, we can observe some recurrent
features without doing so:
1. It must be possible to define the domain boundary.
2. It must be possible for domain members to determine whether a
particular node is in the the domain.
3. It must be possible for a node to determine which domain(s) it is
in.
4. It must be possible for a node to find boundary nodes
(interfacing to the Internet).
5. In a domain with security requirements, it must be possible for a
node to present and acquire security credentials.
6. In a domain with management requirements, it must be possible for
a node to acquire domain policy and/or domain configuration data.
7. In a domain with dynamic membership, join and leave operations
must be possible.
More TBD
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7. Defining a Limited Domain Boundary
This section justifies the need for a precise definition of a limited
domain boundary and for a corresponding protocol to allow nodes to
discover where such a boundary exists.
More TBD
8. Defining Protocol Scope
This section suggests that protocols or protocol extensions should,
when appropriate, be standardised to interoperate only within a
Limited Domain Boundary. Such protocols are not required to operate
across the Internet as a whole.
Point noted in discussion: "Operate" is a weaker statement than
"interoperate". A question to be addressed is whether a limited-
domain protocol is allowed to have local variants, such that
implementations in different domains could not interoperate if those
domains were unified by some mechanism.
More TBD
9. Security Considerations
Clearly, the boundary of a limited domain will almost always also act
as a security boundary. In particular, it will serve as a trust
boundary, and as a boundary of authority for defining capabilities.
Within the boundary, limited-domain protocols or protocol features
will be useful, but they will be meaningless if they enter or leave
the domain.
The security model for a limited-scope protocol must allow for the
boundary, and in particular for a trust model that changes at the
boundary. Typically, credentials will need to be signed by a domain-
specific authority.
10. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of the IANA.
11. Contributors
Sheng Jiang made important contributions to this document.
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12. Acknowledgements
Useful comments were received from Edward Birrane, Ron Bonica, Tim
Chown, Darren Dukes, John Klensin, Michael Richardson, Rick Taylor,
Niels ten Oever, and other members of the ANIMA and INTAREA WGs.
13. Informative References
[BIGIP] Li, R., "HUAWEI - Big IP Initiative.", 2018,
<https://www.iaria.org/announcements/HuaweiBigIP.pdf>.
[I-D.andrews-tcp-and-ipv6-use-minmtu]
Andrews, M., "TCP Fails To Respect IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU",
draft-andrews-tcp-and-ipv6-use-minmtu-04 (work in
progress), October 2015.
[I-D.bonica-intarea-frag-fragile]
Bonica, R., Baker, F., Huston, G., Hinden, R., Troan, O.,
and F. Gont, "IP Fragmentation Considered Fragile", draft-
bonica-intarea-frag-fragile-03 (work in progress), July
2018.
[I-D.dolson-plus-middlebox-benefits]
Dolson, D., Snellman, J., Boucadair, M., and C. Jacquenet,
"Beneficial Functions of Middleboxes", draft-dolson-plus-
middlebox-benefits-03 (work in progress), March 2017.
[I-D.fioccola-v6ops-ipv6-alt-mark]
Fioccola, G., Velde, G., Cociglio, M., and P. Muley, "IPv6
Performance Measurement with Alternate Marking Method",
draft-fioccola-v6ops-ipv6-alt-mark-01 (work in progress),
June 2018.
[I-D.geng-netslices-architecture]
67, 4., Dong, J., Bryant, S., kiran.makhijani@huawei.com,
k., Galis, A., Foy, X., and S. Kuklinski, "Network Slicing
Architecture", draft-geng-netslices-architecture-02 (work
in progress), July 2017.
[]
Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Leddy, J., Matsushima, S., and
d. daniel.voyer@bell.ca, "IPv6 Segment Routing Header
(SRH)", draft-ietf-6man-segment-routing-header-14 (work in
progress), June 2018.
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[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]
Eckert, T., Behringer, M., and S. Bjarnason, "An Autonomic
Control Plane (ACP)", draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane-18 (work in progress), August 2018.
[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]
Behringer, M., Carpenter, B., Eckert, T., Ciavaglia, L.,
and J. Nobre, "A Reference Model for Autonomic
Networking", draft-ietf-anima-reference-model-07 (work in
progress), August 2018.
[I-D.ietf-detnet-architecture]
Finn, N., Thubert, P., Varga, B., and J. Farkas,
"Deterministic Networking Architecture", draft-ietf-
detnet-architecture-07 (work in progress), August 2018.
[I-D.ietf-detnet-dp-sol]
Korhonen, J., Andersson, L., Jiang, Y., Finn, N., Varga,
B., Farkas, J., Bernardos, C., Mizrahi, T., and L. Berger,
"DetNet Data Plane Encapsulation", draft-ietf-detnet-dp-
sol-04 (work in progress), March 2018.
[I-D.ietf-detnet-use-cases]
Grossman, E., "Deterministic Networking Use Cases", draft-
ietf-detnet-use-cases-17 (work in progress), June 2018.
[I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming]
Lemon, T., Migault, D., and S. Cheshire, "Simple Homenet
Naming and Service Discovery Architecture", draft-ietf-
homenet-simple-naming-02 (work in progress), July 2018.
[I-D.ietf-ipwave-vehicular-networking]
Jeong, J., "IP Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
(IPWAVE): Problem Statement and Use Cases", draft-ietf-
ipwave-vehicular-networking-04 (work in progress), July
2018.
[I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering]
Gont, F. and W. LIU, "Recommendations on the Filtering of
IPv6 Packets Containing IPv6 Extension Headers", draft-
ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-06 (work in progress), July
2018.
[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]
Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Ginsberg, L., Decraene, B.,
Litkowski, S., and R. Shakir, "Segment Routing
Architecture", draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-15 (work
in progress), January 2018.
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[I-D.irtf-nfvrg-gaps-network-virtualization]
Bernardos, C., Rahman, A., Zuniga, J., Contreras, L.,
Aranda, P., and P. Lynch, "Network Virtualization Research
Challenges", draft-irtf-nfvrg-gaps-network-
virtualization-10 (work in progress), September 2018.
[I-D.jiang-semantic-prefix]
Jiang, S., Qiong, Q., Farrer, I., Bo, Y., and T. Yang,
"Analysis of Semantic Embedded IPv6 Address Schemas",
draft-jiang-semantic-prefix-06 (work in progress), July
2013.
[I-D.martocci-6lowapp-building-applications]
Martocci, J., Schoofs, A., and P. Stok, "Commercial
Building Applications Requirements", draft-martocci-
6lowapp-building-applications-01 (work in progress), July
2010.
[I-D.moulchan-nmrg-network-intent-concepts]
Sivakumar, K. and M. Chandramouli, "Concepts of Network
Intent", draft-moulchan-nmrg-network-intent-concepts-00
(work in progress), October 2017.
[]
daniel.voyer@bell.ca, d., Leddy, J., Filsfils, C., Dukes,
D., Previdi, S., and S. Matsushima, "Insertion of IPv6
Segment Routing Headers in a Controlled Domain", draft-
voyer-6man-extension-header-insertion-04 (work in
progress), June 2018.
[RFC2474] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
"Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2474, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2474>.
[RFC2775] Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency", RFC 2775,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2775, February 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2775>.
[RFC2923] Lahey, K., "TCP Problems with Path MTU Discovery",
RFC 2923, DOI 10.17487/RFC2923, September 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2923>.
[RFC3234] Carpenter, B. and S. Brim, "Middleboxes: Taxonomy and
Issues", RFC 3234, DOI 10.17487/RFC3234, February 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3234>.
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[RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>.
[RFC4838] Cerf, V., Burleigh, S., Hooke, A., Torgerson, L., Durst,
R., Scott, K., Fall, K., and H. Weiss, "Delay-Tolerant
Networking Architecture", RFC 4838, DOI 10.17487/RFC4838,
April 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4838>.
[RFC4924] Aboba, B., Ed. and E. Davies, "Reflections on Internet
Transparency", RFC 4924, DOI 10.17487/RFC4924, July 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4924>.
[RFC6294] Hu, Q. and B. Carpenter, "Survey of Proposed Use Cases for
the IPv6 Flow Label", RFC 6294, DOI 10.17487/RFC6294, June
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6294>.
[RFC7045] Carpenter, B. and S. Jiang, "Transmission and Processing
of IPv6 Extension Headers", RFC 7045,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7045, December 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7045>.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.
[RFC7368] Chown, T., Ed., Arkko, J., Brandt, A., Troan, O., and J.
Weil, "IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles",
RFC 7368, DOI 10.17487/RFC7368, October 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7368>.
[RFC7556] Anipko, D., Ed., "Multiple Provisioning Domain
Architecture", RFC 7556, DOI 10.17487/RFC7556, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7556>.
[RFC7663] Trammell, B., Ed. and M. Kuehlewind, Ed., "Report from the
IAB Workshop on Stack Evolution in a Middlebox Internet
(SEMI)", RFC 7663, DOI 10.17487/RFC7663, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7663>.
[RFC7665] Halpern, J., Ed. and C. Pignataro, Ed., "Service Function
Chaining (SFC) Architecture", RFC 7665,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7665, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7665>.
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[RFC7788] Stenberg, M., Barth, S., and P. Pfister, "Home Networking
Control Protocol", RFC 7788, DOI 10.17487/RFC7788, April
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7788>.
[RFC7872] Gont, F., Linkova, J., Chown, T., and W. Liu,
"Observations on the Dropping of Packets with IPv6
Extension Headers in the Real World", RFC 7872,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7872, June 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7872>.
[RFC8151] Yong, L., Dunbar, L., Toy, M., Isaac, A., and V. Manral,
"Use Cases for Data Center Network Virtualization Overlay
Networks", RFC 8151, DOI 10.17487/RFC8151, May 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8151>.
[RFC8300] Quinn, P., Ed., Elzur, U., Ed., and C. Pignataro, Ed.,
"Network Service Header (NSH)", RFC 8300,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8300, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8300>.
Appendix A. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]
draft-carpenter-limited-domains-00, 2018-06-11:
Initial version
draft-carpenter-limited-domains-01, 2018-07-01:
Minor terminology clarifications
draft-carpenter-limited-domains-02, 2018-08-03:
Additions following IETF102 discussions
Updated authorship/contributors
draft-carpenter-limited-domains-03, 2018-09-12:
First draft of taxonomy
Editorial improvements
Authors' Addresses
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Brian Carpenter
Department of Computer Science
University of Auckland
PB 92019
Auckland 1142
New Zealand
Email: brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com
Bing Liu
Huawei Technologies
Q14, Huawei Campus
No.156 Beiqing Road
Hai-Dian District, Beijing 100095
P.R. China
Email: leo.liubing@huawei.com
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