InternetDraft  kyber  January 2024 
Schwabe & Westerbaan  Expires 5 July 2024  [Page] 
 Workgroup:
 None
 InternetDraft:
 draftcfrgschwabekyber04
 Published:
 Intended Status:
 Informational
 Expires:
Kyber PostQuantum KEM
Abstract
This memo specifies a preliminary version ("draft00", "v3.02") of Kyber, an INDCCA2 secure Key Encapsulation Method.¶
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://bwesterb.github.io/draftschwabecfrgkyber/draftcfrgschwabekyber.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draftcfrgschwabekyber/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/bwesterb/draftschwabecfrgkyber.¶
Status of This Memo
This InternetDraft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
InternetDrafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as InternetDrafts. The list of current InternetDrafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
InternetDrafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use InternetDrafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This InternetDraft will expire on 5 July 2024.¶
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/licenseinfo) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
1. Introduction
Kyber is NIST's pick for a postquantum key agreement [NISTR3].¶
Kyber is not a DiffieHellman (DH) style noninteractive key agreement, but instead, Kyber is a Key Encapsulation Method (KEM). A KEM is a threetuple of algorithms (KeyGen, Encapsulate, Decapsulate):¶
 KeyGen takes no inputs and generates a private key and a public key;¶
 Encapsulate takes as input a public key and produces as output a ciphertext and a shared secret;¶
 Decapsulate takes as input a ciphertext and a private key and produces a shared secret.¶
Like DH, a KEM can be used as an unauthenticated keyagreement protocol, for example in TLS [HYBRID] [XYBERTLS]. However, unlike DH, a KEMbased key agreement is interactive, because the party executing Encapsulate can compute its protocol message (the ciphertext) only after having received the input (public key) from the party running KeyGen and Decapsulate.¶
A KEM can be transformed into a PKE scheme using HPKE [RFC9180] [XYBERHPKE].¶
1.1. Warning on stability and relation to MLKEM
NOTE This draft is not stable and does not (yet) match the final NIST standard MLKEM (FIPS 203) expected in 2024. It also does not match the draft for MLKEM published by NIST August 2023. [MLKEM]¶
Currently it matches Kyber as submitted to round 3 of the NIST PQC process [KYBERV302].¶
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
3. Overview
Kyber is an INDCCA2 secure KEM. It is constructed by applying a FujisakiOkamato style transformation on InnerPKE, which is the underlying INDCPA secure Public Key Encryption scheme. We cannot use InnerPKE directly, as its ciphertexts are malleable.¶
F.O. transform InnerPKE > Kyber INDCPA INDCCA2¶
Kyber is a latticebased scheme. More precisely, its security is based on the learningwitherrorsandrounding problem in module lattices (MLWER). The underlying polynomial ring R (defined in Section 5) is chosen such that multiplication is very fast using the number theoretic transform (NTT, see Section 5.1.3.1).¶
An InnerPKE private key is a vector s over R of length k which is
small in a particular way. Here k
is a security parameter akin to the
size of a prime modulus. For Kyber512, which targets AES128's security level,
the value of k is 2, for Kyber768 (AES192 security level) k is 3,
and for Kyber1024 (AES256 security level) k is 4.¶
The public key consists of two values:¶
 A a kbyk matrix over R sampled uniformly at random and¶

t = A s + e, where
e
is a suitably small masking vector.¶
Distinguishing between such A s + e and a uniformly sampled t is the decision module learningwitherrors (MLWE) problem. If that is hard, then it is also hard to recover the private key from the public key as that would allow you to distinguish between those two.¶
To save space in the public key, A is recomputed deterministically from a 256bit seed rho. Strictly speaking, A is not uniformly random anymore, but it's computationally indistuinguishable from it.¶
A ciphertext for a message m under this public key is a pair (c_1, c_2) computed roughly as follows:¶
c_1 = Compress(A^T r + e_1, d_u) c_2 = Compress(t^T r + e_2 + Decompress(m, 1), d_v)¶
where¶
 e_1, e_2 and r are small blinds;¶
 Compress(, d) removes some information, leaving d bits per coefficient and Decompress is an "approximate inverse" of Compress;¶
 d_u, d_v are scheme parameters; and¶
 superscript T denotes transposition, so A^T is the transpose of A, see Section 8.3 and t^T r is the dot product of t and r, see Section 8.2.¶
Distinguishing such a ciphertext and uniformly sampled (c_1, c_2) is an example of the full MLWER problem, see Section 4.4 of [KYBERV302].¶
To decrypt the ciphertext, one computes¶
m = Compress(Decompress(c_2, d_v)  s^T Decompress(c_1, d_u), 1).¶
It it not straightforward to see that this formula is correct.
In fact, there is negligable but nonzero probability that a ciphertext
does not decrypt correctly given by the DFP column in Table 4.
This failure probability can be computed by a careful automated
analysis of the probabilities involved, see kyber_failure.py
of [SECEST].¶
To define all these operations precisely, we first define the field of coefficients for our polynomial ring; what it means to be small; and how to compress. Then we define the polynomial ring R; its operations and in particular the NTT. We continue with the different methods of sampling and (de)serialization. Then, we first define InnerPKE and finally Kyber proper.¶
4. The field GF(q)
Kyber is defined over GF(q) = Z/qZ, the integers modulo q = 13*2^8+1 = 3329.¶
4.1. Size
To define the size of a field element, we need a signed modulo. For any odd m, we write¶
a smod m¶
for the unique integer b with (m1)/2 < b <= (m1)/2 and b = a modulo m.¶
To avoid confusion, for the more familiar modulo we write umod; that is¶
a umod m¶
is the unique integer b with 0 <= b < m and b = a modulo m.¶
Now we can define the norm of a field element:¶
 a  = abs(a smod q)¶
Examples:¶
3325 smod q = 4  3325  = 4 3320 smod q = 9  3320  = 9¶
TODO (#23) Should we define smod and umod at all, since we don't use it.Bas¶
4.2. Compression
In several parts of the algorithm, we will need a method to compress fied elements down into d bits. To do this, we use the following method.¶
For any positive integer d, integer x and integer 0 <= y < 2^d, we define¶
Compress(x, d) = Round( (2^d / q) x ) umod 2^d Decompress(y, d) = Round( (q / 2^d) y )¶
where Round(x) rounds any fraction to the nearest integer going up with ties.¶
Note that in Section 8.1 we extend Compress and Decompress to polynomials and vectors of polynomials.¶
These two operations have the following properties:¶

0 <= Compress(x, d) < 2^d
¶ 
0 <= Decompress(y, d) < q
¶ 
Compress(Decompress(y, d), d) = y
¶  If
Decompress(Compress(x, d), d) = x'
, then x'  x  <= Round(q/2^(d+1))
¶  If
x = x' modulo q
, thenCompress(x, d) = Compress(x', d)
¶
For implementation efficiency, these can be computed as follows.¶
Compress(x, d) = Div( (x << d) + q/2), q ) & ((1 << d)  1) Decompress(y, d) = (q*y + (1 << (d1))) >> d¶
where Div(x, q) = Floor(x / q). TODO Do we want to include the proof that this is correct? Do we need to define >> and <<?Bas To prevent leaking the secret key, this must be computed in constant time [KYBERSLASH]. On platforms where Div is not constanttime, the following equation is useful, which holds for those x that appear in the previous formula for 0 < d < 12.¶
Div(x, q) = (20642679 * x) >> 36¶
5. The ring Rq
Kyber is defined over a polynomial ring Rq = GF(q)[x]/(x^n+1) where n=256 (and q=3329). Elements of Rq are tuples of 256 integers modulo q. We will call them polynomials or elements interchangeably.¶
A tuple a = (a_0, ..., a_255) represents the polynomial¶
a_0 + a_1 x + a_2 x^2 + ... + a_255 x^255.¶
With polynomial coefficients, vector and matrix indices, we will start counting at zero.¶
5.1. Operations
5.1.1. Size of polynomials
For a polynomial a = (a_0, ..., a_255) in R, we write:¶
 a  = max_i  a_i ¶
Thus a polynomial is considered large if one of its components is large.¶
5.1.2. Addition and subtraction
Addition and subtraction of elements is componentwise. Thus¶
(a_0, ..., a_255) + (b_0, ..., b_255) = (a_0 + b_0, ..., a_255 + b_255),¶
and¶
(a_0, ..., a_255)  (b_0, ..., b_255) = (a_0  b_0, ..., a_255  b_255),¶
where addition/subtractoin in each component is computed modulo q.¶
5.1.3. Multiplication
Multiplication is that of polynomials (convolution) with the additional rule that x^256=1. To wit¶
(a_0, ..., a_255) \* (b_0, ..., b_255) = (a_0 * b_0  a_255 * b_1  ...  a_1 * b_255, a_0 * b_1 + a_1 * b_0  a_255 * b_2  ...  a_2 * b_255, ... a_0 * b_255 + ... + a_255 * b_0)¶
We will not use this schoolbook multiplication to compute the product. Instead we will use the more efficient, number theoretic transform (NTT), see Section 5.1.3.1.¶
5.1.3.1. Background on the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT)
The modulus q was chosen such that 256 divides into q1. This means that there are zeta with¶
zeta^128 = 1 modulo q¶
With such a zeta, we can almost completely split the polynomial x^256+1 used to define R over GF(q):¶
x^256 + 1 = x^256  zeta^128 = (x^128  zeta^64)(x^128 + zeta^64) = (x^128  zeta^64)(x^128  zeta^192) = (x^64  zeta^32)(x^64 + zeta^32) (x^64  zeta^96)(x^64 + zeta^96) ... = (x^2  zeta)(x^2 + zeta)(x^2  zeta^65)(x^2 + zeta^65) ... (x^2  zeta^127)(x^2 + zeta^127)¶
Note that the powers of zeta that appear in the second, fourth, ..., and final lines are in binary:¶
0100000 1100000 0010000 1010000 0110000 1110000 0001000 1001000 0101000 1101000 0011000 1011000 0111000 1111000 ... 0000001 1000001 0100001 1100001 0010001 1010001 0110001 ... 1111111¶
That is: brv(2), brv(3), brv(4), ..., where brv(x) denotes the 7bit bitreversal of x. The final line is brv(64), brv(65), ..., brv(127).¶
These polynomials x^2 + zeta^i are irreducible and coprime, hence by the Chinese Remainder Theorem for commutative rings, we know¶
R = GF(q)[x]/(x^256+1) > GF(q)[x]/(x^2zeta) x ... x GF(q)[x]/(x^2+zeta^127)¶
given by a > ( a mod x^2  zeta, ..., a mod x^2 + zeta^127 ) is an isomorphism. This is the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT). Multiplication on the right is much easier: it's almost componentwise, see Section 5.1.3.3.¶
A propos, the the constant factors that appear in the moduli in order can be computed efficiently as follows (all modulo q):¶
zeta = zeta^brv(64) = zeta^{1 + 2 brv(0)} zeta = zeta^brv(64) = zeta^{1 + 2 brv(1)} zeta^65 = zeta^brv(65) = zeta^{1 + 2 brv(2)} zeta^65 = zeta^brv(65) = zeta^{1 + 2 brv(3)} zeta^33 = zeta^brv(66) = zeta^{1 + 2 brv(4)} zeta^33 = zeta^brv(66) = zeta^{1 + 2 brv(5)} ... zeta^127 = zeta^brv(127) = zeta^{1 + 2 brv(126)} zeta^127 = zeta^brv(127) = zeta^{1 + 2 brv(127)}¶
To compute a multiplication in R efficiently, one can first use the NTT, to go to the right "into the NTT domain"; compute the multiplication there and move back with the inverse NTT.¶
The NTT can be computed efficiently by performing each binary split of the polynomial separately as follows:¶
a > ( a mod x^128  zeta^64, a mod x^128 + zeta^64 ), > ( a mod x^64  zeta^32, a mod x^64 + zeta^32, a mod x^64  zeta^96, a mod x^64 + zeta^96 ), et cetera¶
If we concatenate the resulting coefficients, expanding the definitions, for the first step we get:¶
a > ( a_0 + zeta^64 a_128, a_1 + zeta^64 a_129, ... a_126 + zeta^64 a_254, a_127 + zeta^64 a_255, a_0  zeta^64 a_128, a_1  zeta^64 a_129, ... a_126  zeta^64 a_254, a_127  zeta^64 a_255)¶
We can see this as 128 applications of the linear map CT_64, where¶
CT_i: (a, b) > (a + zeta^i b, a  zeta^i b) modulo q¶
for the appropriate i in the following order, pictured in the case of n=16:¶
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx¶
For n=16 there are 3 levels with 1, 2 and 4 row groups respectively. For the full n=256, there are 7 levels with 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 and 64 row groups respectively. The appropriate power of zeta in the first level is brv(1)=64. The second level has brv(2) and brv(3) as powers of zeta for the top and bottom row group respectively, and so on.¶
The CT_i is known as a CooleyTukey butterfly. Its inverse is given by the GentlemanSande butterfly:¶
GS_i: (a, b) > ( (a+b)/2, zeta^i (ab)/2 ) modulo q¶
The inverse NTT can be computed by replacing CS_i by GS_i and flipping the diagram horizontally. TODO (#8) This section gives background not necessary for the implementation. Should we keep it?Bas¶
5.1.3.1.1. Optimization notes
The modular divisions by two in the InvNTT can be collected into a single modular division by 128.¶
zeta^i can be computed as zeta^(128i), which allows one to use the same precomputed table of powers of zeta for both the NTT and InvNTT.¶
TODO Add hints on lazy Montgomery reduction? Including https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1377.pdfBas¶
5.1.3.2. NTT and InvNTT
As primitive 256th root of unity we use zeta=17.¶
As before, brv(i) denotes the 7bit bitreversal of i, so brv(1)=64 and brv(91)=109.¶
The NTT is a linear bijection R > R given by the matrix:¶
[ zeta^{ (2 brv(i>>1) + 1) (j>>1) } if i=j mod 2 (NTT)_{ij} = [ [ 0 otherwise¶
Recall that we start counting rows and columns at zero. The NTT can be computed more efficiently as described in section Section 5.1.3.1.¶
The inverse of the NTT is called InvNTT. It is given by the matrix:¶
[ zeta^{ 256  (2 brv(j>>1) + 1) (i>>1) } if i=j mod 2 128 (InvNTT)_{ij} = [ [ 0 otherwise¶
Examples:¶
NTT(1, 1, 0, ..., 0) = (1, 1, ..., 1, 1) NTT(0, 1, 2, ..., 255) = (2429, 2845, 425, 1865, ..., 2502, 2134, 2717, 2303)¶
5.1.3.3. Multiplication in NTT domain
For elements a, b in R, we write a o b for multiplication in the NTT domain. That is: a * b = InvNTT(NTT(a) o NTT(b)). Concretely:¶
[ a_i b_i + zeta^{2 brv(i >> 1) + 1} a_{i+1} b_{i+1} if i even (a o b)_i = [ [ a_{i1} b_i + a_i b_{i1} otherwise¶
6. Symmetric cryptographic primitives
Kyber makes use of various symmertic primitives PRF, XOF, KDF, H and G, where¶
XOF(seed) = SHAKE128(seed) PRF(seed, counter) = SHAKE256(seed  counter) KDF(prekey) = SHAKE256(msg)[:32] H(msg) = SHA3256(msg) G(msg) = (SHA3512(msg)[:32], SHA3512(msg)[32:])¶
Here counter
is an octet; seed
is 32 octets; prekey
is 64 octets;
and the length of msg
varies.¶
On the surface, they look different, but they are all based on the same flexible Keccak XOF that uses the f1600 permutation, see [FIPS202]:¶
XOF(seed) = Keccak[256](seed  1111, .) PRF(seed, ctr) = Keccak[512](seed  ctr  1111, .) KDF(prekey) = Keccak[512](prekey  1111, 256) H(msg) = Keccak[512](msg  01, 256) G(msg) = (Keccak[1024](msg  01, 512)[:32], Keccak[1024](msg  01, 512)[32:]) Keccak[c] = Sponge[Keccakf[1600], pad10*1, 1600c]¶
The reason five different primitives are used is to ensure domain separation, which is crucial for security, cf. [H2CURVE] §2.2.5. Additionally, a smaller sponge capacity is used for performance where permissable by the security requirements.¶
7. Sampling of polynomials
7.1. Uniformly
The polynomials in the matrix A are sampled uniformly and deterministically from an octet stream (XOF) using rejection sampling as follows.¶
Three octets b_0, b_1, b_2 are read from the stream at a time. These are interpreted as two 12bit unsigned integers d_1, d_2 via¶
d_1 + d_2 2^12 = b_0 + b_1 2^8 + b_2 2^16¶
This creates a stream of 12bit d
s. Of these, the elements >= q are
ignored. From the resultant stream, the coefficients of the polynomial
are taken in order. In Python:¶
def sampleUniform(stream): cs = [] while True: b = stream.read(3) d1 = b[0] + 256*(b[1] % 16) d2 = (b[1] >> 4) + 16*b[2] for d in [d1, d2]: if d >= q: continue cs.append(d) if len(cs) == n: return Poly(cs)¶
Example:¶
sampleUniform(SHAKE128('')) = (3199, 697, 2212, 2302, ..., 255, 846, 1)¶
7.1.1. sampleMatrix
Now, the k by k matrix A over R is derived deterministically from a 32octet seed rho using sampleUniform as follows.¶
sampleMatrix(rho)_{ij} = sampleUniform(XOF(rho  octet(j)  octet(i))¶
That is, to derive the polynomial at the ith row and jth column, sampleUniform is called with the 34octet seed created by first appending the octet j and then the octet i to rho. Recall that we start counting rows and columns from zero.¶
As the NTT is a bijection, it does not matter whether we interpret the polynomials of the sampled matrix in the NTT domain or not. For efficiency, we do interpret the sampled matrix in the NTT domain.¶
7.2. From a binomial distribution
Noise is sampled from a centered binomial distribution Binomial(2eta, 1/2)  eta deterministically as follows.¶
An octet array a of length 64*eta is converted to a polynomial CBD(a, eta)¶
CBD(a, eta)_i = b_{2i eta} + b_{2i eta + 1} + ... + b_{2i eta + eta1}  b_{2i eta + eta}  ...  b_{2i eta + 2eta  1},¶
where b = OctetsToBits(a).¶
Examples:¶
CBD((0, 1, 2, ..., 127), 2) = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, ..., 3328, 1, 0, 1) CBD((0, 1, 2, ..., 191), 3) = (0, 1, 3328, 0, 2, ..., 3328, 3327, 3328, 1)¶
7.2.1. sampleNoise
A k component small vector v is derived from a seed 32octet seed sigma, an offset offset and size eta as follows:¶
sampleNoise(sigma, eta, offset)_i = CBD(PRF(sigma, octet(i+offset)), eta)¶
Recall that we start counting vector indices at zero.¶
8. Vector and matrices
8.1. Operations on vectors
Recall that Compress(x, d) maps a field element x into {0, ..., 2^d1}. In Kyber d is at most 11 and so we can interpret Compress(x, d) as a field element again.¶
In this way, we can extend Compress(, d) to polynomials by applying to each coefficient separately and in turn to vectors by applying to each polynomial. That is, for a vector v and polynomial p:¶
Compress(p, d)_i = Compress(p_i, d) Compress(v, d)_i = Compress(v_i, d)¶
8.2. Dot product and matrix multiplication
We will also use "o", from section Section 5.1.3.3, to denote the dot product and matrix multiplication in the NTT domain. Concretely:¶
9. Serialization
9.1. OctetsToBits
For any list of octets a_0, ..., a_{s1}, we define OctetsToBits(a), which is a list of bits of length 8s, defined by¶
OctetsToBits(a)_i = ((a_(i>>3)) >> (i umod 8)) umod 2.¶
Example:¶
OctetsToBits(12,45) = (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0)¶
9.2. Encode and Decode
For an integer 0 < w <= 12, we define Decode(a, w), which converts any list a of w*l/8 octets into a list of length l with values in {0, ..., 2^w1} as follows.¶
Decode(a, w)_i = b_{wi} + b_{wi+1} 2 + b_{wi+2} 2^2 + ... + b_{wi+w1} 2^{w1},¶
where b = OctetsToBits(a).¶
Encode(, w) is the unique inverse of Decode(, w)¶
9.2.1. Polynomials
A polynomial p is encoded by passing its coefficients to Encode:¶
EncodePoly(p, w) = Encode(p_0, p_1, ..., p_{n1}, w)¶
DecodePoly(, w) is the unique inverse of EncodePoly(, w).¶
10. Inner malleable publickey encryption scheme
We are ready to define the INDCPA secure PublicKey Encryption scheme that underlies Kyber. It is unsafe to use this underlying scheme directly as its ciphertexts are malleable. Instead, a PublicKey Encryption scheme can be constructed on top of Kyber by using HPKE [RFC9180] [XYBERHPKE].¶
10.1. Parameters
We have already been introduced to the following parameters:¶
 q

Order of field underlying R.¶
 n

Length of polynomials in R.¶
 zeta

Primitive root of unity in GF(q), used for NTT in R.¶
 XOF, H, G, PRF, KDF

Various symmetric primitives.¶
 k

Main security parameter: the number of rows and columns in the matrix A.¶
Additionally, Kyber takes the following parameters¶
 eta1, eta2

Size of small coefficients used in the private key and noise vectors.¶
 d_u, d_v

How many bits to retain per coefficient of the u and v components of the ciphertext.¶
The values of these parameters are given in Section 12.¶
10.2. Key generation
InnerKeyGen(seed) takes a 32 octet seed and deterministically produces a keypair as follows.¶
Note that in essence we're simply computing t = A s + e.¶
10.3. Encryption
InnerEnc(msg, publicKey, seed) takes a 32octet seed, and deterministically encrypts the 32octet msg for the InnerPKE public key publicKey as follows.¶
10.4. Decryption
InnerDec(cipherText, privateKey) takes an InnerPKE private key privateKey and decrypts a cipher text cipherText as follows.¶
11. Kyber
Now we are ready to define Kyber itself.¶
11.1. Key generation
A Kyber keypair is derived deterministically from a 64octet seed as follows.¶
11.2. Encapsulation
Kyber encapsulation takes a public key and generates a shared secret and ciphertext for the public key as follows.¶
11.3. Decapsulation
Kyber decapsulation takes a private key and a cipher text and returns a shared secret as follows.¶

Split privateKey into¶

Compute¶
 In constanttime, set K = K1 if cipherText == cipherText2 else set K = K2.¶

Return¶
 sharedSecret = K¶
For security, the implementation MUST NOT explicitly return
or otherwise leak via a sidechannel, decapsulation succeeded,
viz cipherText == cipherText2
.¶
12. Parameter sets
Name  Value  Description 

q  3329  Order of base field 
n  256  Degree of polynomials 
zeta  17  nth root of unity in base field 
Primitive  Instantiation 

XOF  SHAKE128 
H  SHA3256 
G  SHA3512 
PRF(s,b)  SHAKE256(s  b) 
KDF  SHAKE256 
Name  Description 

k  Dimension of module 
eta1, eta2  Size of "small" coefficients used in the private key and noise vectors. 
d_u  How many bits to retain per coefficient of u , the privatekey independent part of the ciphertext 
d_v  How many bits to retain per coefficient of v , the privatekey dependent part of the ciphertext. 
Parameter set  k  eta1  eta2  d_u  d_v  sec  DFP 

Kyber512  2  3  2  10  4  I  2^139 
Kyber768  3  2  2  10  4  III  2^164 
Kyber1024  4  2  2  11  5  V  2^174 
Parameter set  ss  pk  ct  sk 

Kyber512  32  800  768  1632 
Kyber768  32  1184  1088  2400 
Kyber1024  32  1568  1568  3168 
13. Machinereadable specification
# WARNING This is a specification of Kyber; not a production ready # implementation. It is slow and does not run in constant time. # Requires the CryptoDome for SHAKE. To install, run # # pip install pycryptodome pytest from Crypto.Hash import SHAKE128, SHAKE256 import io import hashlib import functools import collections from math import floor q = 3329 nBits = 8 zeta = 17 eta2 = 2 n = 2**nBits inv2 = (q+1)//2 # inverse of 2 params = collections.namedtuple('params', ('k', 'du', 'dv', 'eta1')) params512 = params(k = 2, du = 10, dv = 4, eta1 = 3) params768 = params(k = 3, du = 10, dv = 4, eta1 = 2) params1024 = params(k = 4, du = 11, dv = 5, eta1 = 2) def smod(x): r = x % q if r > (q1)//2: r = q return r # Rounds to nearest integer with ties going up def Round(x): return int(floor(x + 0.5)) def Compress(x, d): return Round((2**d / q) * x) % (2**d) def Decompress(y, d): assert 0 <= y and y <= 2**d return Round((q / 2**d) * y) def BitsToWords(bs, w): assert len(bs) % w == 0 return [sum(bs[i+j] * 2**j for j in range(w)) for i in range(0, len(bs), w)] def WordsToBits(bs, w): return sum([[(b >> i) % 2 for i in range(w)] for b in bs], []) def Encode(a, w): return bytes(BitsToWords(WordsToBits(a, w), 8)) def Decode(a, w): return BitsToWords(WordsToBits(a, 8), w) def brv(x): """ Reverses a 7bit number """ return int(''.join(reversed(bin(x)[2:].zfill(nBits1))), 2) class Poly: def __init__(self, cs=None): self.cs = (0,)*n if cs is None else tuple(cs) assert len(self.cs) == n def __add__(self, other): return Poly((a+b) % q for a,b in zip(self.cs, other.cs)) def __neg__(self): return Poly(qa for a in self.cs) def __sub__(self, other): return self + other def __str__(self): return f"Poly({self.cs}" def __eq__(self, other): return self.cs == other.cs def NTT(self): cs = list(self.cs) layer = n // 2 zi = 0 while layer >= 2: for offset in range(0, nlayer, 2*layer): zi += 1 z = pow(zeta, brv(zi), q) for j in range(offset, offset+layer): t = (z * cs[j + layer]) % q cs[j + layer] = (cs[j]  t) % q cs[j] = (cs[j] + t) % q layer //= 2 return Poly(cs) def RefNTT(self): # Slower, but simpler, version of the NTT. cs = [0]*n for i in range(0, n, 2): for j in range(n // 2): z = pow(zeta, (2*brv(i//2)+1)*j, q) cs[i] = (cs[i] + self.cs[2*j] * z) % q cs[i+1] = (cs[i+1] + self.cs[2*j+1] * z) % q return Poly(cs) def InvNTT(self): cs = list(self.cs) layer = 2 zi = n//2 while layer < n: for offset in range(0, nlayer, 2*layer): zi = 1 z = pow(zeta, brv(zi), q) for j in range(offset, offset+layer): t = (cs[j+layer]  cs[j]) % q cs[j] = (inv2*(cs[j] + cs[j+layer])) % q cs[j+layer] = (inv2 * z * t) % q layer *= 2 return Poly(cs) def MulNTT(self, other): """ Computes self o other, the multiplication of self and other in the NTT domain. """ cs = [None]*n for i in range(0, n, 2): a1 = self.cs[i] a2 = self.cs[i+1] b1 = other.cs[i] b2 = other.cs[i+1] z = pow(zeta, 2*brv(i//2)+1, q) cs[i] = (a1 * b1 + z * a2 * b2) % q cs[i+1] = (a2 * b1 + a1 * b2) % q return Poly(cs) def Compress(self, d): return Poly(Compress(c, d) for c in self.cs) def Decompress(self, d): return Poly(Decompress(c, d) for c in self.cs) def Encode(self, d): return Encode(self.cs, d) def sampleUniform(stream): cs = [] while True: b = stream.read(3) d1 = b[0] + 256*(b[1] % 16) d2 = (b[1] >> 4) + 16*b[2] assert d1 + 2**12 * d2 == b[0] + 2**8 * b[1] + 2**16*b[2] for d in [d1, d2]: if d >= q: continue cs.append(d) if len(cs) == n: return Poly(cs) def CBD(a, eta): assert len(a) == 64*eta b = WordsToBits(a, 8) cs = [] for i in range(n): cs.append((sum(b[:eta])  sum(b[eta:2*eta])) % q) b = b[2*eta:] return Poly(cs) def XOF(seed, j, i): h = SHAKE128.new() h.update(seed + bytes([j, i])) return h def PRF(seed, nonce): assert len(seed) == 32 h = SHAKE256.new() h.update(seed + bytes([nonce])) return h def G(seed): h = hashlib.sha3_512(seed).digest() return h[:32], h[32:] def H(msg): return hashlib.sha3_256(msg).digest() def KDF(msg): return hashlib.shake_256(msg).digest(length=32) class Vec: def __init__(self, ps): self.ps = tuple(ps) def NTT(self): return Vec(p.NTT() for p in self.ps) def InvNTT(self): return Vec(p.InvNTT() for p in self.ps) def DotNTT(self, other): """ Computes the dot product <self, other> in NTT domain. """ return sum((a.MulNTT(b) for a, b in zip(self.ps, other.ps)), Poly()) def __add__(self, other): return Vec(a+b for a,b in zip(self.ps, other.ps)) def Compress(self, d): return Vec(p.Compress(d) for p in self.ps) def Decompress(self, d): return Vec(p.Decompress(d) for p in self.ps) def Encode(self, d): return Encode(sum((p.cs for p in self.ps), ()), d) def __eq__(self, other): return self.ps == other.ps def EncodeVec(vec, w): return Encode(sum([p.cs for p in vec.ps], ()), w) def DecodeVec(bs, k, w): cs = Decode(bs, w) return Vec(Poly(cs[n*i:n*(i+1)]) for i in range(k)) def DecodePoly(bs, w): return Poly(Decode(bs, w)) class Matrix: def __init__(self, cs): """ Samples the matrix uniformly from seed rho """ self.cs = tuple(tuple(row) for row in cs) def MulNTT(self, vec): """ Computes matrix multiplication A*vec in the NTT domain. """ return Vec(Vec(row).DotNTT(vec) for row in self.cs) def T(self): """ Returns transpose of matrix """ k = len(self.cs) return Matrix((self.cs[j][i] for j in range(k)) for i in range(k)) def sampleMatrix(rho, k): return Matrix([[sampleUniform(XOF(rho, j, i)) for j in range(k)] for i in range(k)]) def sampleNoise(sigma, eta, offset, k): return Vec(CBD(PRF(sigma, i+offset).read(64*eta), eta) for i in range(k)) def constantTimeSelectOnEquality(a, b, ifEq, ifNeq): # WARNING! In production code this must be done in a # dataindependent constanttime manner, which this implementation # is not. In fact, many more lines of code in this # file are not constanttime. return ifEq if a == b else ifNeq def InnerKeyGen(seed, params): assert len(seed) == 32 rho, sigma = G(seed) A = sampleMatrix(rho, params.k) s = sampleNoise(sigma, params.eta1, 0, params.k) e = sampleNoise(sigma, params.eta1, params.k, params.k) sHat = s.NTT() eHat = e.NTT() tHat = A.MulNTT(sHat) + eHat pk = EncodeVec(tHat, 12) + rho sk = EncodeVec(sHat, 12) return (pk, sk) def InnerEnc(pk, msg, seed, params): assert len(msg) == 32 tHat = DecodeVec(pk[:32], params.k, 12) rho = pk[32:] A = sampleMatrix(rho, params.k) r = sampleNoise(seed, params.eta1, 0, params.k) e1 = sampleNoise(seed, eta2, params.k, params.k) e2 = sampleNoise(seed, eta2, 2*params.k, 1).ps[0] rHat = r.NTT() u = A.T().MulNTT(rHat).InvNTT() + e1 m = Poly(Decode(msg, 1)).Decompress(1) v = tHat.DotNTT(rHat).InvNTT() + e2 + m c1 = u.Compress(params.du).Encode(params.du) c2 = v.Compress(params.dv).Encode(params.dv) return c1 + c2 def InnerDec(sk, ct, params): split = params.du * params.k * n // 8 c1, c2 = ct[:split], ct[split:] u = DecodeVec(c1, params.k, params.du).Decompress(params.du) v = DecodePoly(c2, params.dv).Decompress(params.dv) sHat = DecodeVec(sk, params.k, 12) return (v  sHat.DotNTT(u.NTT()).InvNTT()).Compress(1).Encode(1) def KeyGen(seed, params): assert len(seed) == 64 z = seed[32:] pk, sk2 = InnerKeyGen(seed[:32], params) h = H(pk) return (pk, sk2 + pk + h + z) def Enc(pk, seed, params): assert len(seed) == 32 m = H(seed) Kbar, r = G(m + H(pk)) ct = InnerEnc(pk, m, r, params) K = KDF(Kbar + H(ct)) return (ct, K) def Dec(sk, ct, params): sk2 = sk[:12 * params.k * n//8] pk = sk[12 * params.k * n//8 : 24 * params.k * n//8 + 32] h = sk[24 * params.k * n//8 + 32 : 24 * params.k * n//8 + 64] z = sk[24 * params.k * n//8 + 64 : 24 * params.k * n//8 + 96] m2 = InnerDec(sk, ct, params) Kbar2, r2 = G(m2 + h) ct2 = InnerEnc(pk, m2, r2, params) return constantTimeSelectOnEquality( ct2, ct, KDF(Kbar2 + H(ct)), # if ct == ct2 KDF(z + H(ct)), # if ct != ct2 )¶
14. Security Considerations
Kyber512, Kyber768 and Kyber1024 are designed to be postquantum INDCCA2 secure KEMs, at the security levels of AES128, AES192 and AES256.¶
The designers of Kyber recommend Kyber768.¶
The inner public key encryption SHOULD NOT be used directly, as its ciphertexts are malleable. Instead, for public key encryption, HPKE can be used to turn Kyber into INDCCA2 secure PKE [RFC9180] [XYBERHPKE].¶
Any implementation MUST use implicit rejection as specified in Section 11.3.¶
15. References
15.1. Normative References
 [FIPS202]
 National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS PUB 202: SHA3 Standard: PermutationBased Hash and ExtendableOutput Functions", n.d., <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.202.pdf>.
 [RFC2119]
 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfceditor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
 [RFC8174]
 Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfceditor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
15.2. Informative References
 [H2CURVE]
 FazHernandez, A., Scott, S., Sullivan, N., Wahby, R. S., and C. A. Wood, "Hashing to Elliptic Curves", Work in Progress, InternetDraft, draftirtfcfrghashtocurve16, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draftirtfcfrghashtocurve16>.
 [HYBRID]
 Stebila, D., Fluhrer, S., and S. Gueron, "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3", Work in Progress, InternetDraft, draftstebilatlshybriddesign03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draftstebilatlshybriddesign03>.
 [KYBERSLASH]
 Bernstein, D. J., "KyberSlash: division timings depending on secrets in Kyber software", n.d., <https://kyberslash.cr.yp.to>.
 [KYBERV302]
 Avanzi, R., Bos, J., Ducas, L., Kiltz, E., Lepoint, T., Lyubashevsky, V., Schanck, J., Schwabe, P., Seiler, G., and D. Stehle, "CRYSTALSKyber, Algorithm Specification And Supporting Documentation (version 3.02)", , <https://pqcrystals.org/kyber/data/kyberspecificationround320210804.pdf>.
 [MLKEM]
 National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS 203 (Initial Draft): ModuleLatticeBased KeyEncapsulation Mechanism Standard", n.d., <https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/ipd>.
 [NISTR3]
 The NIST PQC Team, "PQC Standardization Process: Announcing Four Candidates to be Standardized, Plus Fourth Round Candidates", n.d., <https://csrc.nist.gov/News/2022/pqccandidatestobestandardizedandround4>.
 [RFC9180]
 Barnes, R., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. Wood, "Hybrid Public Key Encryption", RFC 9180, DOI 10.17487/RFC9180, , <https://www.rfceditor.org/rfc/rfc9180>.
 [SECEST]
 Ducas, L. and J. Schanck, "CRYSTALS security estimate scripts", n.d., <https://github.com/pqcrystals/securityestimates>.
 [XYBERHPKE]
 Westerbaan, B. and C. A. Wood, "X25519Kyber768Draft00 hybrid postquantum KEM for HPKE", Work in Progress, InternetDraft, draftwesterbaancfrghpkexyber768d0002, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draftwesterbaancfrghpkexyber768d0002>.
 [XYBERTLS]
 Westerbaan, B. and D. Stebila, "X25519Kyber768Draft00 hybrid postquantum key agreement", Work in Progress, InternetDraft, drafttlswesterbaanxyber768d0003, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/drafttlswesterbaanxyber768d0003>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank C. Wood, Florence D., I. Liusvaara, J. Crawford, J. Schanck, M. Thomson, and N. Sullivan for their input and assistance.¶
Appendix B. Change Log

RFC Editor's Note: Please remove this section prior to publication of a final version of this document.¶
B.1. Since draftschwabecfrgkyber03
 Add note on KyberSlash.¶
B.2. Since draftschwabecfrgkyber02
 Fix a typo in the machinereadable specification, and use a proper SHAKE implementation. #5¶
 Add table with sizes.¶
 Reordered sections.¶
 Add reference to Kyber in HPKE.¶
 Miscellaneous editorial changes.¶
 Remove encapsulation seed as an explicit parameter in the written specification.¶
 Write security recommendations. #18¶
 Explain relation with MLKEM.¶