Operations and Management Area Working Group                     T. Dahm
Internet-Draft
Updates: RFC8907 (if approved)                                   D. Gash
Intended status: Informational                       Cisco Systems, Inc.
Expires: 4 December 2022                                          A. Ota

                                                              J. Heasley
                                                                     NTT
                                                             2 June 2022


                  TACACS+ Security and SSH Public Keys
                  draft-dahm-opsawg-tacacs-security-00

Abstract

   The TACACS+ Protocol [RFC8907] provides device administration for
   routers, network access servers and other networked computing devices
   via one or more centralized servers.  This document, a companion to
   the TACACS+ protocol [RFC8907], adds new packet formats to improve
   security and function and support for SSH [RFC4716] public keys.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [BCP14] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
   here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 December 2022.





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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Technical Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Empty Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.3.  Peer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  TACACS+ Extended Authentication Packet Types  . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  The Extended Authentication START Packet Body . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  The Extension Authentication REPLY Packet Body  . . . . .   6
     3.3.  The Extended Authentication CONTINUE Packet Body  . . . .   6
   4.  SSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  New Enumerated TACACS+ Protocol Values and well-known
           AVPs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  SSH Public Key Support  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.3.  SSH Authorization and Accounting  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Protocol Deprecations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.1.  SSH Public Key Caching  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   The TACACS+ Protocol [RFC8907] provides device administration for
   routers, network access servers and other networked computing devices
   via one or more centralized servers.  The protocol provides
   authentication, authorization and accounting services for TACACS+
   clients.






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   Authors of [RFC8907] and network operators have expressed interest in
   deprecating a few antiquated protocol features, addressing a
   limitation of authentication policy, and adding support for SSH
   public keys.  These are addressed herein.

   To improve security and functionality of applying policy to the
   authentication process in a TACACS+ Session, new authentication
   packet formats are introduced that are uniform to authorization and
   accounting.  For SSH authentication using public keys, highly desired
   by the operator community, this document introduces a method to
   support sending public keys to a TACACS+ client, allowing centralized
   management.

2.  Technical Definitions

   The Technical Definitions section of the TACACS+ Protocol [RFC8907]
   is fully applicable here and will not be repeated, though may be
   augmented.  The following terms are also used in this document.


2.1.  AVP

   An Attribute-Value Pair or AVP is another name a TACACS+ argument as
   defined in [RFC8907] Sections 6.1 and 8.

2.2.  Empty Value

   An empty or zero-length value of an AVP as defined in [RFC8907]
   Sections 8.1.

2.3.  Peer

   This refers to a TACACS+ Server or Client.

3.  TACACS+ Extended Authentication Packet Types

   Versions 1 and 2 of the TACACS+ Protocol, as defined in [RFC8907],
   specify the TACACS+ Authentication Packets for START, REPLY and
   CONTINUE which support the credential validation use case but does
   not accommodate any further augmentation which may be used to give
   context to the request.

   Further, advanced use cases (such as SSH key distribution) would
   otherwise rely on embedding structured information into the single
   data fields, thus obfuscating the content of the protocol, can
   instead augment the arguments.





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   To support these use cases, and allow clients to add environment
   information to the request, the Extended Authentication Packets
   brings the Authentication phase of the protocol inline with the
   Authorization and Accounting Phase by incorporating extensible
   argument s.

   The server should expect Extended Authentication Packet Bodies if the
   minor version in the Packet Header is: 0x2

3.1.  The Extended Authentication START Packet Body

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    action      |    priv_lvl    |  authen_type   | authen_service |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    user_len    |    port_len    |  rem_addr_len  |    data_len    |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_cnt                                                        |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_1_len                                                      |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |      ...                                                          |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_N_len                                                      |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    user ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    port ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    rem_addr ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    data...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_1 ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_2 ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_N ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+

                                  Figure 1

   The action, priv_level, authen_type, authen_service, user_len,
   port_len, rem_addr_len, data_len, user, port, rem_addr and data
   fields are used exactly as defined in the Authentication START Packet
   Body in [RFC8907].



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   The following fields contain the arguments that may be used to extend
   the authentication process.  These are common to the Extended
   Authentication START, Extended Authentication REPLY, and Extended
   Authentication CONTINUE packet bodies; these fields represent the
   sole update from the previous START, REPLY and CONTINUE packet
   bodies.

   The new fields are as follows:

   arg_cnt

   This represents the number of arguments in the packet.

   arg_1_len ... arg_N_len, arg_1 ... arg_N

   Each argument is encoded in the packet as a single arg field (arg_1
   ... arg_N) with a corresponding length field that indicates the
   length of each argument in bytes.

   The arguments are argument-value pairs.  The argument and the value
   are in a single string and are separated by either a "=" (0X3D) or a
   "*" (0X2A).  The equals sign indicates a mandatory argument.  The
   asterisk indicates an optional one.  For the rules regarding optional
   and mandatory arguments, refer to [RFC8907]

   Multiple arguments with the same name are permitted within a packet,
   a common example is cmd-arg.  The handling of repeated arguments is
   specific to the semantics of the argument and so are documented with
   that argument.  Order is significant when processing arguments.

   The addition of arguments to the authentication packets is intended
   to permit the flexibility for the TACACS+ authentication phase that
   has been available previously for authorization and accounting.
   These fields are intended to be used as needed in deployment, they
   are used in this document in the enhancements for SSH (Section 4):

   origin_client

   Contains the IP-Address of the originating TACACS+ client.  This is
   text encoded in line with the rest of the TACACS+ protocol, and may
   be IPv4 or IPv6.  This argument is optional and can be included in
   all TACACS+ protocol START packets, Authentication, Authorization,
   and Accounting.  IPv4 addresses are specified as quad-octet numeric
   values separated by dots ('.').  IPv6 address text representation is
   defined in [RFC5952].






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3.2.  The Extension Authentication REPLY Packet Body

   The TACACS+ server sends only one type of extended authentication
   packet to the client.

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |     status     |      flags     |        server_msg_len           |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |           data_len              |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_cnt                                                        |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_1_len                                                      |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |      ...                                                          |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_N_len                                                      |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    data ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    server_msg ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_1 ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_2 ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_N ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+

                                  Figure 2

   The status, flags, server_msg_len, data_len, server_msg, and data
   fields are used exactly as defined in the Authentication REPLY Packet
   Body in [RFC8907]].

   The new arg_cnt, arg_1 ... arg_N, and arg_1_len .... arg_N_len fields
   are used as defined in The Extended Authentication START Packet Body
   (Section 3.1).

3.3.  The Extended Authentication CONTINUE Packet Body

   This packet is sent from the client to the server following the
   receipt of an Extended REPLY packet.





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    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |             status              |           user_msg len          |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |            data_len             |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_cnt                                                        |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_1_len                                                      |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |      ...                                                          |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_N_len                                                      |
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |  user_msg ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    data ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_1 ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_2 ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
   |    arg_N ...
   +----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+

                                  Figure 3

   The user_msg len, data_len, user_msg, and data fields are used
   exactly as defined in the Authentication REPLY Packet Body in
   [RFC8907].  However, the status field replaces the flags field and
   has the following enumeration:

   *  TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_NONE := 00

   *  TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_PASS := 01

   *  TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_FAIL := 02

   *  TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_FRAGMENT := 03

   *  TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_ERROR := 04

   *  TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_ABORT := 05






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   TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_NONE or
   TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_ABORT MUST be used when the Extended
   Authentication Packets are used for the continuation of
   authentication flows documented in [RFC8907].

   The client may prematurely terminate a session by setting the
   TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_ABORT or
   TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_ERROR status in the CONTINUE message.
   The remainder are detailed in SSH (Section 4).

   The new arg_cnt, arg_1 ... arg_N, and arg_1_len .... arg_N_len fields
   are used as defined in The Extended Authentication START Packet Body
   (Section 3.1).

4.  SSH

   Most network equipment now support SSH [RFC4251] for Command Line
   Interface (CLI) and NETCONF [RFC6242].  Operators SHOULD use SSH
   public keys for authentication.  Some devices support public keys in
   native configuration, but there is desire to centrally manage keys
   and SSH subsystem authorization.

4.1.  New Enumerated TACACS+ Protocol Values and well-known AVPs

   The following new enumerated TACACS+ protocol values and well-known
   AVPs are needed to support SSH in the subsequent sections.  These new
   values augment those in [RFC8907] Sections 5.1 - 5.3, 6.1, and 8.2 as
   follows:

   TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_TYPE_SSHPK := 0x07
      Extended Authentication START Packet authen_type for SSH pubkeys.

   TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_GETSSHPKTYPE := 0x22
      Extended Authentication REPLY Packet status to solicit SSH pubkey
      type.

   TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_SSHPK := 0x23
      Extended Authentication REPLY Packet status to provide SSH
      pubkeys.

   TAC_PLUS_REPLY_FLAG_FRAGMENT := 0x02
      Extended Authentication REPLY Packet flag indicating the REPLY is
      incomplete.

   TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_PASS := 0x01
      Extended Authentication CONTINUE Packet flag indicating
      authentication success.




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   TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_FAIL := 0x08
      Extended Authentication CONTINUE Packet flag indicating
      authentication failure.

   TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_FRAGMENT := 0x03
      Extended Authentication CONTINUE Packet flag requesting the next
      REPLY packet of an incomplete REPLY.

   TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_ERROR := 0x04
      Extended Authentication CONTINUE Packet flag indicating
      authentication error.

   AVP ssh_pubkey_type (String)
      Attribute to carry SSH public key type names.

   AVP ssh_pubkey (String)
      Attribute to carry SSH public keys.

   TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_METH_SSHPK := 0x21
      Authorization REQUEST Packet authen_method for SSH pubkey
      authentication.

   AVP ssh_subsystem (String)
      Attribute to carry SSH subsystem name for authorization

4.2.  SSH Public Key Support

   To support central management of SSH public keys via TACACS+, the
   Authentication sequence of [RFC8907] Section 5.4 is extended using
   Extended Authentication Packet (Section 3) sequences to deliver SSH
   public keys to devices for local verification.

   Besides new header values and flags and AVPs for Extended
   Authentication Packets, the SSH public key authentication process
   differs from other TACACS+ authentication types in that there may be
   more Authentication Reply and Authentication Continue Packets pairs
   than previously.

   The process follows:

   1.  The client begins an authentication session with an Extended
       Authentication START Packet.  The START packet MUST include a
       non-zero-length username and the server MUST send an
       Authentication REPLY Packet with status
       TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR, if the client fails to do so.

       The client MAY include one or more instances of the
       ssh_pubkey_type AVP, indicating the SSH public key types that it



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       wants.  The set of permissible values for this AVP are the SSH
       public algorithm names defined in the IANA SSH Protocol
       Parameters Registry [SSHALGS], which are case-sensitive as
       specified and otherwise constrained by [RFC4250] Section 4.6.1.
       Multiple values MUST be separated by a comma, therefore multiple
       ssh_pubkey_type AVPs MUST include commas for separation when the
       Peer concatenates them and the Peer MUST be prepared to ignore a
       leading or trailing comma in the concatenated value.  The server
       MUST NOT reply with status TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR if it
       receives an algorithm name that it does not recognize.  If the
       client marks a ssh_pubkey_type AVP as mandatory, the server MUST
       reply with at least one key of that type for the given user or
       reply with status TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_SSHNOPK with the
       relevant ssh_pubkey_type AVP.

       The client MAY send an Empty Value for the algorithm name to
       request all types available for the given user.

       The process ends and the client MUST start a new authentication
       session if it receives status SSHNOPK or ERROR.

   2.  If a ssh_pubkey_type AVP was not provided in the START packet,
       the server replies with the status code
       TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_GETSSHPKTYPE.  The client MUST send a
       CONTINUE packet with one or more ssh_pubkey_type AVPs, else the
       server sends a REPLY packet with status
       TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR.

   3.  If the server has none of the requested ssh_pubkey_type(s) or any
       of the mandatory ssh_pubkey_types for the user or no pubkeys at
       all, the server MUST send a REPLY packet with status
       TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_SSHNOPK with the ssh_pubkey_type AVP(s)
       that it received.

       The process ends and the client MUST start a new authentication
       session if it receives status SSHNOPK or ERROR.

   4.  The server sends REPLY packets with status
       TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_SSHPK and includes one or more ssh_pubkey
       optional AVPs, each containing one or more keys.  The ssh_pubkey
       AVPs are formatted according to the rules of SSH Public Key File
       Format [RFC4716].  As such, the client MUST be prepared to accept
       keys with Key File Markers.  To address concatenation of multiple
       ssh_pubkey AVPs or multiple keys in a single AVP, the server MUST
       terminate each key file End Marker with a Line Termination
       sequence as specified in RFC4716 Section 3.1.

       Since it is possible to have more ssh_pubkey AVPs than fit in a



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       REPLY packet, the server SHOULD set the REPLY packet flag
       TAC_PLUS_REPLY_FLAG_FRAGMENT if two or more packets are required,
       indicating that the client SHOULD request the remainder.

       An AVP SHALL NOT span multiple fragments; each must be contained
       entirely in the fragment in which it begins.

   5.  If the TAC_PLUS_REPLY_FLAG_FRAGMENT flag is set, the client MAY
       reply with the same CONTINUE packet as before with the
       TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_FRAGMENT flag set.  The server
       replies with the next REPLY fragment as before, clearing the
       TAC_PLUS_REPLY_FLAG_FRAGMENT flag of the last REPLY fragment.
       This repeats until the last REPLY fragment is received, the
       client aborts the authentication process, or an error occurs.
       The client MUST NOT set TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_FRAGMENT
       if the REPLY packet did not have the TAC_PLUS_REPLY_FLAG_FRAGMENT
       flag set and the server MUST reply with
       TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR if it does so.

   6.  Once the client has all of the pubkeys, it performs the ssh
       pubkey authentication with its ssh client.  The client MUST then
       reply to the server with the status of that authentication by
       sending a CONTINUE packet with one of the following new or
       existing CONTINUE flags: TAC_PLUS_CONTINUE_FLAG_ABORT,
       TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_PASS,
       TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_FAIL, or
       TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_CONTINUE_STATUS_ERROR.

   7.  The client MUST give the server the final consent, by waiting for
       a REPLY packet with one of the status:
       TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_PASS, TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_FAIL, or
       TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR, thus ending the authentication
       session.

4.3.  SSH Authorization and Accounting

   To support central management of SSH and SSH subsystem authorization
   and accounting via TACACS+, this document adds a new authen_method to
   RFC8907 Section 6.1 Authorization REQUEST [RFC8907] and a well-known
   AVP to Section 8.2 Authorization Arguments [RFC8907].

   The new authen_method TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_METH_SSHPUBKEY indicates that
   the user was authenticated with a SSH public key.

   The well-known ssh_subsystem AVP defines the SSH subsystem for which
   the authorization is requested and MUST be present any time the
   authorization is for a SSH connection.




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   The set of permissible values for this AVP are the SSH Subsystem
   Names defined in the IANA SSH Connection Protocol Subsystem Names
   Registry [SSHSUBSYS], which are case-sensitive as specified and
   otherwise constrained by [RFC4250] Section 4.6.1.  The client MAY
   send an Empty Value for the subsystem name to indicate no subsystem,
   also known as a shell or CLI.  The server MUST NOT reply with status
   TAC_PLUS_AUTHOR_STATUS_ERROR if it receives a subsystem name whose
   syntax is valid but whose value is not recognized.  Subsystems might
   need additional data for authorization or accounting that will be
   particular to that subsystem and are therefore out of scope for this
   document.

   These new authen_methods and AVPs apply equally to accounting.

5.  Protocol Deprecations

   This section deprecates features from the TACACS+ Protocol.

   MS-CHAPv1: has been replaced by MS-CHAPv2 in most deployments, the
   intent of this deprecation is to complete the transition.  MD4 is
   still required to support MS-CHAPv2 so cannot be deprecated at this
   point It should be noted that the use of MD4 is purely to allow
   compatible MS-CHAPv2 operation and not for security; the TLS
   transport is intended to provide that function.

   TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_SENDAUTH: the sendauth mechanism can not be
   supported, as it permits the leak of sensitive information.

6.  Security Considerations

6.1.  SSH Public Key Caching

   A Client MUST NOT cache SSH public keys received from a Server for
   future SSH client authentication.  Doing so would deny the Server the
   opportunity to deny authentication for other reasons than key
   validity or to revoke a key.  The Server has no method to revoke a
   key, except by not offering the key in future authentication
   sessions.

7.  Acknowledgments

   The author(s) would like to thank Russ Housley, Steven M.  Bellovin,
   Stephen Farrell, Alan DeKok, Warren Kumari, and Tom Petch for their
   support, insightful review, and/or comments.  [RFC5425] was also used
   as a basis for the approach to TLS.

8.  Normative References




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   [BCP14]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

              Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017.

              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14.txt>

   [RFC4250]  Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4250, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4250>.

   [RFC4716]  Galbraith, J. and R. Thayer, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Public Key File Format", RFC 4716, DOI 10.17487/RFC4716,
              November 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4716>.

   [RFC5425]  Miao, F., Ed., Ma, Y., Ed., and J. Salowey, Ed.,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Mapping for
              Syslog", RFC 5425, DOI 10.17487/RFC5425, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5425>.

   [RFC8907]  Dahm, T., Ota, A., Medway Gash, D.C., Carrel, D., and L.
              Grant, "The Terminal Access Controller Access-Control
              System Plus (TACACS+) Protocol", RFC 8907,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8907, September 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8907>.

   [SSHALGS]  IANA, "Public Key Algorithm Names",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-
              parameters.xhtml#ssh-parameters-19>.

   [SSHSUBSYS]
              IANA, "SSH Protocol Subsystem Names",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-
              parameters.xhtml#ssh-parameters-15>.

9.  Informative References

   [RFC4251]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, DOI 10.17487/RFC4251,
              January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251>.

   [RFC5952]  Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
              Address Text Representation", RFC 5952,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5952>.




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Internet-Draft              TACACS+ Security                   June 2022


   [RFC6242]  Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
              Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.

Authors' Addresses

   Thorsten Dahm
   Email: thorsten.dahm@gmail.com


   Douglas Gash
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Email: dcmgash@cisco.com


   Andrej Ota
   Email: andrej@ota.si


   John Heasley
   NTT
   Email: heas@shrubbery.net





























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