Internet Engineering Task Force S. Huque
Internet-Draft Verisign Labs
Intended status: Standards Track V. Dukhovni
Expires: July 11, 2016 Two Sigma
January 08, 2016
TLS Extension for DANE Client Identity
draft-huque-tls-dane-clientid-00
Abstract
This document specifies a TLS and DTLS extension to convey a DNS-
Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Client Identity to a
TLS or DTLS server. This is useful for applications that perform TLS
client authentication via DANE TLSA records.
Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. DANE Client Identity Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Open Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
This document specifies a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension
[RFC6066] to convey a DANE [RFC6698] Client Identity to the TLS
server. This is useful for applications that perform TLS client
authentication via DANE TLSA records, as described in [DANECLIENT].
The conveyed identity is in the form of a domain name associated with
the client that is expected to have a corresponding DANE TLSA record
published in the DNS.
This extension supports both TLS and DTLS [RFC6347], and the term TLS
in this document is used generically to describe both protocols.
2. Overview
When TLS clients use X.509 client certificates or raw public keys
that are authenticated via DANE TLSA records, they need a mechanism
to convey their DANE identity to the server. The TLS extension
defined in this document is used to accomplish this. Upon receipt of
this extension, a TLS server learns the client's identity and the
fact that the client expects that the server can authenticate it via
a corresponding DNSSEC-validated TLSA record.
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In the case of X.509 client certificates, a TLS server can learn the
client's identity by examining subject alternative names included in
the certificate itself. However, without a mechanism such as the one
defined in this extension, the TLS server cannot know apriori that
the client has a published TLSA record, and thus may unnecessarily
issue DNS queries for DANE TLSA records in-band with the TLS
handshake even in cases where the client has no TLSA record
associated with it. When multiple identities are present in the
certificate, a client can use this extension to specify exactly which
one the server should use. An additional situation in which this
extension helps is where some TLS servers may need to selectively
prompt for client certificate credentials only for clients that are
equipped to provide certificates.
When TLS raw public keys [RFC7250] are being used to authenticate the
client, the client uses this extension to explicitly indicate to the
server what its domain name identity is.
Detailed protocol behavior of TLS clients and servers is described in
[DANECLIENT].
3. DANE Client Identity Extension
The DANE Client Identity Extension type, "dane_clientid", will have a
value assigned and registered in the IANA TLS Extensions registry.
A TLS client implementing this specification SHOULD send an extension
of type "dane_clientid" in the ClientHello handshake message to TLS
servers it intends to perform DANE client authentication with.
The "extension_data" field of the extension MUST contain a
"DaneClientName" data structure defined in the following format:
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enum {
dns_name(0), srv_name(1), (255)
} NameType;
opaque dNSName<1..2^16-1>;
opaque SRVName<1..2^16-1>;
struct {
NameType name_type;
select (name_type) {
case dns_name: dNSName;
case srv_name: SRVName;
} name;
} DaneClientName;
The opaque dNSName or SRVName field contains the domain name of the
client in textual presentation format, as described in RFC 1035
[RFC1035].
4. Open Questions
Should multiple client names be supported in the extension?
Is the dNSName/SRVName distinction useful, or can we just simplify
and use only dNSName? These two name forms are analogous to the two
recommended for use in X.509 certificates in the DANE client
authentication draft, so the server could use this to additionally
check against the corresponding certificate fields (but does it need
to?). If the server needs a hint of whether to construct an
application specific ID, then this might be useful, but this could
also be inferred from the structure of the name and the client could
just specify an application specific identity in the dNSName type.
The extension is defined in terms of a DANE specific identity. Is
there a need for a more general purpose client name indication
extension? If so, this extension could be renamed and augmented to
have an additional usage field containing values denoting DANE or
alternative application usages.
5. Security Considerations
To prevent unnecessary privacy leakage of the client's name in
cleartext, a TLS client implementing this specification should be
configured to only send this extension to TLS servers it intends to
perform client authentication with.
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6. IANA Considerations
This extension requires the registration of a new value in the TLS
ExtensionsType registry. If the draft is adopted by the WG, the
authors expect to make an early allocation request as specified in
[RFC7120]
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[DANECLIENT]
Huque, S., James, D., and V. Dukhovni, "TLS Client
Authentication via DANE TLSA Records", , <https://
tools.ietf.org/html/draft-huque-dane-client-cert>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC6066] Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, January 2011.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, August 2012.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Tschofenig, H., Gilmore, J., Weiler, S., and
T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", RFC 7250, June 2014.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, July
2003.
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Authors' Addresses
Shumon Huque
Verisign Labs
Email: shuque@verisign.com
Viktor Dukhovni
Two Sigma
Email: ietf-dane@dukhovni.org
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