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Versions: (draft-klensin-email-core-as) 00 01 02         Standards Track
          03 04 05                                                      
EMAILCORE                                              J.C. Klensin, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track                       K. Murchison, Ed.
Expires: 24 November 2022                                       Fastmail
                                                             E. Sam, Ed.
                                                             23 May 2022

         Applicability Statement for IETF Core Email Protocols


   Electronic mail is one of the oldest Internet applications that is
   still in very active use.  While the basic protocols and formats for
   mail transport and message formats have evolved slowly over the
   years, events and thinking in more recent years have supplemented
   those core protocols with additional features and suggestions for
   their use.  This Applicability Statement describes the relationship
   among many of those protocols and provides guidance and makes
   recommendations for the use of features of the core protocols.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 November 2022.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights

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   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Applicability of Some SMTP Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Handling of the Domain Argument to the EHLO Command . . .   4
     2.2.  Use of Address Literals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Use of Addresses in Top-Level Domains . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.4.  Use of SMTP Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Applicability of Message Format Provisions  . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Use of Empty Quoted Strings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  MIME and Its Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Confidentiality and Authentication with SMTP  . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Optional Confidentiality  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Required Confidentiality, with Receiving Server
           Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.3.  Message-Level Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.4.  SMTP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.5.  Message-Level Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     A.1.  Changes from draft-klensin-email-core-as-00 (2020-03-30) to
           draft-ietf-emailcore-as-00  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     A.2.  Changes from draft-ietf-emailcore-as-00 (2020-10-06) to
           -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     A.3.  Changes from draft-ietf-emailcore-as-01 (2021-04-09) to
           -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     A.4.  Changes from draft-ietf-emailcore-as-02 (2021-08-06) to
           -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     A.5.  Changes from draft-ietf-emailcore-as-03 (2022-01-31) to
           -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     A.6.  Changes from draft-ietf-emailcore-as-04 (2022-05-21) to
           -05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

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1.  Introduction

   In its current form, this draft is a placeholder and beginning of an
   outline for the Applicability Statement that has been discussed as a
   complement for proposed revisions of the base protocol specifications
   for SMTP [RFC5321] (being revised as [I-D.ietf-emailcore-rfc5321bis])
   and Internet Message Format [RFC5322] (being revised as
   [I-D.ietf-emailcore-rfc5322bis]).  Among other things, it is expected
   to capture topics that a potential WG concludes are important but
   that should not become part of those core documents.

   As discussed in [RFC2026],

      "An Applicability Statement specifies how, and under what
      circumstances, one or more TSs may be applied to support a
      particular Internet capability."

   That form of a standards track document is appropriate because one of
   the roles of such a document is to explain the relationship among
   technical specifications, describe how they are used together, and
   make statements about what is "required, recommended, or elective".

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] and

2.  Applicability of Some SMTP Provisions

   Over the years since RFC 5321 was published in October 2008, usage of
   SMTP has evolved, machines and network speeds have increased, and the
   frequency with which SMTP senders and receivers have to be prepared
   to deal with systems that are disconnected from the Internet for long
   periods or that require many hops to reach has decreased.  During the
   same period, the IETF has become much more sensitive to privacy and
   security issues and the need to be more resistant or robust against
   spam and other attacks.  In addition SMTP (and Message Format)
   extensions have been introduced that are expected to evolve the
   Internet's mail system to better accommodate environments in which
   Basic Latin Script is not the norm.

   This section describes adjustments that may be appropriate for SMTP
   under various circumstances and discusses the applicability of other
   protocols that represent newer work or that are intended to deal with
   relatively newer issues.

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2.1.  Handling of the Domain Argument to the EHLO Command

   If the Domain argument to the EHLO command does not have an address
   record in the DNS that matches the IP address of the client, the SMTP
   server may refuse any mail from the client as part of established
   anti-abuse practice.  Operational experience has demonstrated that
   the lack of a matching address record for the the domain name
   argument is at best an indication of a poorly-configured MTA, and at
   worst that of an abusive host.

2.2.  Use of Address Literals

   The address-literal ABNF non-terminal is used in various places in
   [I-D.ietf-emailcore-rfc5321bis] grammar however, for SMTP connections
   over the public internet, an address-literal as the argument to EHLO
   command or the Domain part of the Mailbox argument to the MAIL FROM
   command is quite likely to result in the message being rejected as a
   matter of policy at many sites, since they are deemed to be signs of
   at best a misconfigured server, and at worst either a compromised
   host or a server that's intentionally configured to hide its

2.3.  Use of Addresses in Top-Level Domains

   While addresses in top-level domains (TLDs) are syntactically valid,
   mail to these addresses has never worked reliably.  A handful of
   country code TLDs have top level MX records but they have never been
   widely used nor well supported.  In 2013 [RFC7085] found 18 TLDs with
   MX records, which dropped to 17 in 2021 despite many new TLDs having
   been added.

   Mail sent to addresses with single label domains has typically
   expected the address to be an abbreviation to be completed by a
   search list, so mail to bob@sales would be completed to
   bob@sales.example.com.  This shortcut has led to unfortunate
   consequnces; in one famous case, in 1991 when the .CS domain was
   added to the root, mail in computer science departments started to
   fail as mail to bob@cs was now treated as mail to Czechoslovakia.
   Hence, for reliable service, mail SHOULD NOT use addreses that
   contain single label domains.

2.4.  Use of SMTP Extensions

   As SMTP has evolved over the years, several extensions have become
   ubiquitous.  As a result, the following extensions MUST be supported
   by SMTP senders and receivers:

   *  8-bit MIME [RFC6152]

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   *  Deliver Status Notifications [RFC3461]

   Similarly, the following extensions SHOULD be supported by SMTP
   senders and receivers:

   *  Command Pipelining [RFC2920]

   *  Internationalized Email [RFC6531]

   Furthermore, while Enhanced Mail System Status Codes ([RFC3463],
   [RFC5248]) are widely supported, they are not ubiquitous.
   Nevertheless, they have been found to be useful to SMTP senders in
   determining the exact reason for a transmission failure in a machine-
   readable, language-independent manner, thus allowing them to present
   more detailed and language-specific error messages to users.  Given
   the usefulness of these enhanced codes, SMTP receivers are
   RECOMMENDED to implement the SMTP Service Extension for Returning
   Enhanced Error Codes [RFC2034] utilizing the codes registered in

3.  Applicability of Message Format Provisions

   This section describes adjustments to the Internet Message Format
   that may be appropriate under various circumstances.

3.1.  Use of Empty Quoted Strings

   The quoted-string ABNF non-terminal is used in various places in
   rfc5322bis grammar.  While it allows for empty quoted string, such
   construct is going to cause interoperability issues when used in
   certain header fields.  In particular, use of empty quoted strings is
   NOT RECOMMENDED in "received-token" (a component of a Received header
   field), "keywords" (a component of a Keywords header field) and
   "local-part" (left hand side of email addresses).  Use of empty
   quoted strings is in particular problematic in the "local-part".  For
   example, all of the following email addresses are non interoperable:




   Use of empty quoted strings is fine in "display-name".

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4.  MIME and Its Implications

   When the work leading to the original version of the MIME
   specification was completed in 1992 [RFC1341], the intention was that
   it be kept separate from the specification for basic mail headers in
   RFC 822 [RFC0822].  That plan was carried forward into RFC 822's
   successors, [RFC2822] and [RFC5322] and the successors of that
   original MIME specification including [RFC2045].  The decision to do
   so was different from the one made for SMTP, for which the core
   specification was changed to allow for the extension mechanism
   [RFC1425] which was then incorporated into RFC 5321 and its
   predecessor [RFC2821].

   Various uses of MIME have become nearly ubiquitous in contemporary
   email while others may have fallen into disuse or been repurposed
   from the intent of their original design.

   It may be appropriate to make some clear statements about the
   applicability of MIME and its features.

5.  Confidentiality and Authentication with SMTP

   SMTP is specified without embedded mechanisms for authentication or
   confidentiality; its traffic is therefore "in the clear".  Years of
   operational experience have shown that such transmission exposes the
   message to easy compromise, including wiretapping and spoofing.  To
   mitigate these risks, operation of SMTP has evolved over the years so
   that it is used with the benefit of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   [RFC8446] to provide both confidentiality and authentication in the
   transmission of messages.  This section discusses those topics and
   their most common uses.

   It is important that the reader understand what is meant by the terms
   "Authentication" and "Confidentiality", and for that we will borrow
   directly from RFC8446.

   *  Authentication is the process of establishing the identity of one
      or more of the endpoints of a communication channel.  TLS only
      requires authentication of the server side of the communication
      channel; authentication of the client side is optional.

   *  The term "confidentiality" describes a state where the data (i.e.,
      the message) is transmitted in a way that it is only visible to
      the endpoints of a communication channel.

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   It is not uncommon for implementers to use the term "encryption" to
   mean "confidentiality", but this is not quite correct.  Rather,
   encryption using TLS is the current method by which confidentiality
   is achieved with SMTP, but that does not mean that future methods
   might not be developed.

   Note: With typical email use of TLS, authentication only is performed
   for the target receiving server and is not done for the sending
   client.  That is, it serves to validate that the connection has been
   made to the intended server, but does not validate who initiated it.

5.1.  Optional Confidentiality

   The most common implementation of message confidentiality is what's
   known as "opportunistic TLS", which is frequently referred to as
   "opportunistic encryption".  With this method, a receiving server
   announces in its greeting that it is capable of supporting TLS
   encryption through the presence of the "STARTTLS" keyword.  The
   sending client then attempts to negotiate an encrypted connection,
   and if successful, transmits the message in encrypted form; if
   negotiation fails, the client falls back to sending the message in
   clear text.

   Opportunistic TLS is confidentiality without authentication, because
   no effort is made to authenticate the receiving server, and it is
   optional confidentiality due to the ability to fall back to
   transmission in the clear if a secure connection cannot be
   established.  That said, most modern implementations of SMTP support
   this method, especially at the largest mailbox providers, and so the
   vast majority of email traffic is encrypted during its time
   transiting from the client to the server.

   Note: While TLS provides protection while the message is in transit,
   there is no guarantee that the message will be stored in encrypted
   fashion at its destination.  In fact, storage in plain text should be

5.2.  Required Confidentiality, with Receiving Server Authentication

   Two protocols exist that move message confidentiality from optional
   to required (with conditions as noted below) - MTA-STS [RFC8461] and
   DANE for SMTP [RFC7672].  While they differ in their implementation
   details, receiving servers relying on either protocol are stating
   that they only accept mail if the transmission can be encrypted with
   TLS, and a failure to negotiate a secure connection MUST result in
   the sending client refusing to transmit the message.  Support for
   both protocols is increasing, but is not yet mandatory.

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   These two protocols differ from Opportunistic TLS in that they
   require receiving server authentication and there is no fallback to
   sending in the clear if negotiation of an encrypted connection fails.

   Note: Both protocols mentioned in this section rely not only on the
   receiving server but also the sending client supporting the protocol
   intended to be used.  If the sending client does not implement or
   understand the protocol requested by the receiving server, the
   sending client will use Opportunistic TLS or clear-text to transmit
   the message.

5.3.  Message-Level Authentication

   Protocols exist to allow for authentication of different identities
   associated with an email message - SPF [RFC7208] and DKIM [RFC6376].
   A third protocol, DMARC [RFC7489], relies on SPF and DKIM to allow
   for validation of the domain in the visible From header, and a
   fourth, ARC [RFC8617], provides a way for each hop to record results
   of authentication checks performed at that hop.

   All of these are outside the scope of this document, as they are
   outside the scope of SMTP.  They deal with validating the authorized
   usage of one or more domains in an email message, and not with
   establishing the identity of the receiving server.

5.4.  SMTP Authentication

   SMTP Authentication [RFC4954], which is often abbreviated as SMTP
   AUTH, is an extension to SMTP.  While its name might suggest that it
   would be within scope for this section of the Applicability
   Statement, nothing could be further from the truth.

   SMTP AUTH defines a method for a client to identify itself to a
   Message Submission Agent (MSA) when presenting a message for
   transmission, usually using port 587 rather than the traditional port
   25.  The most common implementation of SMTP AUTH is for a person to
   present a username and password to their mailbox provider's outbound
   SMTP server when configuring their MUA for sending mail.

5.5.  Message-Level Confidentiality

   Protocols such as S/MIME [RFC8551] and OpenPGP [RFC4880] exist to
   allow for message confidentiality outside of the operation of SMTP.
   That is to say, using these protocols results in encryption of the
   message prior to its being submitted to the SMTP communications
   channel, and decryption of the message is the responsibility of the
   message recipient.  There are numerous implementations of these
   protocols, too many to list here.  As they operate fully independent

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   of SMTP, they are out of scope for this document.

6.  Acknowledgments

   The Emailcore group arose out of discussions on the ietf-smtp group
   over changes and additions that should be made to the core email
   protocols.  It was agreed upon that it was time to create a working
   group that would fix many potential errors and opportunities for
   misunderstandings within the RFCs.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no requests to or actions for IANA.  The IANA
   registries associated with the protocol specifications it references
   are specified in their respective documents.

8.  Security Considerations

   All drafts are required to have a security considerations section and
   this one eventually will.

   ... To be supplied ...

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2026]  Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
              3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, DOI 10.17487/RFC2026, October 1996,

   [RFC2045]  Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
              Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
              Bodies", RFC 2045, DOI 10.17487/RFC2045, November 1996,

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

9.2.  Informative References

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              Klensin, J. C., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-emailcore-rfc5321bis-
              10, 7 March 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-

              Resnick, P. W., "Internet Message Format", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-emailcore-rfc5322bis-
              03, 4 April 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-

              TEXT MESSAGES", STD 11, RFC 822, DOI 10.17487/RFC0822,
              August 1982, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc822>.

   [RFC1341]  Borenstein, N. and N. Freed, "MIME (Multipurpose Internet
              Mail Extensions): Mechanisms for Specifying and Describing
              the Format of Internet Message Bodies", RFC 1341,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1341, June 1992,

   [RFC1425]  Klensin, J., Freed, N., Ed., Rose, M., Stefferud, E., and
              D. Crocker, "SMTP Service Extensions", February 1993,

   [RFC2034]  Freed, N., "SMTP Service Extension for Returning Enhanced
              Error Codes", RFC 2034, DOI 10.17487/RFC2034, October
              1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2034>.

   [RFC2821]  Klensin, J., Ed., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol",
              RFC 2821, DOI 10.17487/RFC2821, April 2001,

   [RFC2822]  Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2822, April 2001,

   [RFC2920]  Freed, N., "SMTP Service Extension for Command
              Pipelining", STD 60, RFC 2920, DOI 10.17487/RFC2920,
              September 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2920>.

   [RFC3461]  Moore, K., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) Service
              Extension for Delivery Status Notifications (DSNs)",
              RFC 3461, DOI 10.17487/RFC3461, January 2003,

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   [RFC3463]  Vaudreuil, G., "Enhanced Mail System Status Codes",
              RFC 3463, DOI 10.17487/RFC3463, January 2003,

   [RFC4880]  Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
              Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4880, November 2007,

   [RFC4954]  Siemborski, R., Ed. and A. Melnikov, Ed., "SMTP Service
              Extension for Authentication", RFC 4954,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4954, July 2007,

   [RFC5248]  Hansen, T. and J. Klensin, "A Registry for SMTP Enhanced
              Mail System Status Codes", BCP 138, RFC 5248,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5248, June 2008,

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,

   [RFC5322]  Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008,

   [RFC6152]  Klensin, J., Freed, N., Rose, M., and D. Crocker, Ed.,
              "SMTP Service Extension for 8-bit MIME Transport", STD 71,
              RFC 6152, DOI 10.17487/RFC6152, March 2011,

   [RFC6376]  Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed.,
              "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76,
              RFC 6376, DOI 10.17487/RFC6376, September 2011,

   [RFC6531]  Yao, J. and W. Mao, "SMTP Extension for Internationalized
              Email", RFC 6531, DOI 10.17487/RFC6531, February 2012,

   [RFC7085]  Levine, J. and P. Hoffman, "Top-Level Domains That Are
              Already Dotless", RFC 7085, DOI 10.17487/RFC7085, December
              2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7085>.

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   [RFC7208]  Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for
              Authorizing Use of Domains in Email, Version 1", RFC 7208,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7208, April 2014,

   [RFC7489]  Kucherawy, M., Ed. and E. Zwicky, Ed., "Domain-based
              Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
              (DMARC)", RFC 7489, DOI 10.17487/RFC7489, March 2015,

   [RFC7672]  Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "SMTP Security via
              Opportunistic DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
              (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7672,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7672, October 2015,

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,

   [RFC8461]  Margolis, D., Risher, M., Ramakrishnan, B., Brotman, A.,
              and J. Jones, "SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security (MTA-
              STS)", RFC 8461, DOI 10.17487/RFC8461, September 2018,

   [RFC8551]  Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/
              Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0
              Message Specification", RFC 8551, DOI 10.17487/RFC8551,
              April 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8551>.

   [RFC8617]  Andersen, K., Long, B., Ed., Blank, S., Ed., and M.
              Kucherawy, Ed., "The Authenticated Received Chain (ARC)
              Protocol", RFC 8617, DOI 10.17487/RFC8617, July 2019,

Appendix A.  Change Log

   RFC Editor: Please remove this appendix before publication.

A.1.  Changes from draft-klensin-email-core-as-00 (2020-03-30) to draft-

   *  Change of filename, metadata, and date to reflect transition to WG
      document for new emailcore WG.  No other substantive changes

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A.2.  Changes from draft-ietf-emailcore-as-00 (2020-10-06) to -01

   *  Added co-authors (list is in alphabetical order for the present).

   *  Updated references to 5321bis and 5322bis.

   *  Added note at top, "This version is provided as a document
      management convenience to update the author list and make an un-
      expired version available to the WG.  There are no substantive
      changes from the prior version", which should be removed for
      version -02.

A.3.  Changes from draft-ietf-emailcore-as-01 (2021-04-09) to -02

   *  Added new editors and also added some issues the emailcore group
      will be dealing with.

   *  Added reference to RFC 6648.

A.4.  Changes from draft-ietf-emailcore-as-02 (2021-08-06) to -03

   *  Moved discussion of address-literals (issue #1) and domain names
      in EHLO (issue #19) under SMTP Provisions section

   *  Moved discussion of empty quoted-strings under Message Format
      Provisions section

   *  Added text on use of addresses in TLDs (issue #50)

   *  Marked all authors as editors.

   *  Miscellaneous editorial changes.

A.5.  Changes from draft-ietf-emailcore-as-03 (2022-01-31) to -04

   *  Added requirements for SMTP extensions (issue #40).

A.6.  Changes from draft-ietf-emailcore-as-04 (2022-05-21) to -05

   *  Added text addressing use ofx enhanced status codes.

   *  Added text addressing confidentiality and authentication (issue

Authors' Addresses

Klensin, et al.         Expires 24 November 2022               [Page 13]

Internet-Draft               Core Email A/S                     May 2022

   John C Klensin (editor)
   1770 Massachusetts Ave, Ste 322
   Cambridge, MA 02140
   United States of America
   Phone: +1 617 245 1457
   Email: john-ietf@jck.com

   Kenneth Murchison (editor)
   Fastmail US LLC
   1429 Walnut Street - Suite 1201
   Philadelphia, PA 19102
   United States of America
   Email: murch@fastmailteam.com

   E Sam (editor)
   Email: winshell64@gmail.com

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