|Internet-Draft||Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Mode||May 2023|
|Jeong, et al.||Expires 16 November 2023||[Page]|
- I2NSF Working Group
- Intended Status:
- Standards Track
I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model
This document describes a YANG data model of the Consumer-Facing Interface of the Security Controller in an Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) system in a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environment. This document defines various types of managed objects and the relationship among them needed to build the flow policies from users' perspective. The YANG data model is based on the "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy defined by a capability YANG data model for I2NSF. The YANG data model enables different users of a given I2NSF system to define, manage, and monitor flow policies within an administrative domain (e.g., user group).¶
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In a framework of Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) [RFC8329], each vendor can register their Network Security Functions (NSFs) using a Developer's Management System (DMS). Then the I2NSF User (e.g., an application for a security administrator such as a web application) can configure the NSFs by defining high-level security policies. Most vendors provide various proprietary applications or tools to define security policies for their own NSFs. The Consumer-Facing Interface is required because the applications developed by each vendor need to have a standard interface specifying the data types used when the I2NSF User and Security Controller (i.e., Network Operator Management System) communicate with each other using this interface. Therefore, this document specifies the required YANG data model such as their data types and encoding schemes so that high-level security policies (or configuration information for security policies) can be transferred to the Security Controller through the Consumer-Facing Interface. Security Controller will use the given information to translate the high-level security policies into the corresponding low-level security policies. The Security Controller delivers the translated security policies to the NSFs according to their respective security capabilities for the required security enforcement.¶
The Consumer-Facing Interface would be built using a set of objects, with each object capturing a unique set of information from an I2NSF User [RFC8329] needed to express a Security Policy. An object may have relationship with various other objects to express a complete set of requirements. The YANG data model in this document captures the managed objects and relationship among these objects. This model is structured in accordance with the "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy.¶
An NSF Capability YANG data model is defined in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model] as the basic model for both the NSF-Facing interface and Consumer-Facing Interface security policy model of this document.¶
Data models are defined at a lower level of abstraction and provide many details. They provide details about the implementation of a protocol's specification, e.g., rules that explain how to map managed objects onto lower-level protocol constructs.¶
The efficient and flexible provisioning of network functions by a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) system supports rapid deployment of newly developed functions. As practical applications, Network Security Functions (NSFs), such as firewall, Intrusion Detection System (IDS)/Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), and attack mitigation, can also be provided as Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) in the NFV system. By the efficient virtualization technology, these VNFs might be automatically provisioned and dynamically migrated based on real-time security requirements. This document presents a YANG data model to implement security functions based on NFV.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document follows the guidelines of [RFC8407], uses the common YANG types defined in [RFC6991], and adopts the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].¶
A Policy object is a means to express a Security Policy set by an I2NSF User with the Consumer-Facing Interface. It is sent to the Security Controller which converts it into an NSF-specific configuration via the NSF-Facing Interface for enforcement of the NSF. Figure 2 shows the YANG tree of the Policy object. The Policy object SHALL have the following information:¶
- This field identifies the name of this object.¶
- The language field indicates the language tag that is used for the natural language text that is included in all of the 'description' attributes. The language field is encoded following the rules in Section 2.1 of [RFC5646]. The default language tag is "en-US".¶
- This field represents the type of the priority used in the policy. Two types are defined in this module, i.e., 'priority-by-order' and 'priority-by-number'. The 'priority-by-order' indicates that the sequence of the rules to be executed follows the input order by user. The 'priority-by-number' indicates that the sequence of the rules to be executed follows the priority values in the rules, where a higher priority value means a higher priority.¶
- This field represents how to resolve conflicts that occur between actions of the same or different policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular NSF. The resolution strategy is described in Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model] in detail. The default resolution strategy is "fmr" (First Matching Rule).¶
- This field contains a list of rules. These rules are defined for implementing business requirements such as 1) supporting communication between two Endpoint Groups (see Section 4), 2) preventing communication with externally or internally identified threats, and 3) controlling access to internal or external resources for meeting regulatory compliance. An organization may restrict certain communication between a set of users and applications for example. The threats may be identified from threat feeds obtained from external sources. Note that rule conflict analysis should be performed by a monitoring service for policy rule conflicts in Security Controller to detect such rule conflicts among the policy rules installed into network security functions.¶
A policy contains a list of rules. In order to express a Rule, the Rule must have complete information such as where and when a policy needs to be applied. This is done by defining a set of managed objects and relationship among them. A Policy Rule defined in this module is a set of management guidelines that defines a desired behavior based on the Event-Condition-Action policy model (Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]), but that is independent of a specific device and implementation. Figure 3 shows the YANG data tree of the Rule object. The rule object SHALL have the following information:¶
- This field identifies the name of this object.¶
- This field identifies the priority of the rule. This field can be given when the policy's 'priority-usage' is priority-by-number.¶
- This field includes the information to determine whether the Rule Condition can be evaluated or not (see the definition of Event in Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]). See details of the Event Object in Section 3.1.¶
- This field contains a set of attributes, features, and/or values that are to be matched with the attributes of a packet or traffic flow to determine whether the Rule Action can be executed or not (see Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]). See details of the Condition Object in Section 3.2.¶
- This field identifies the action taken when a rule is matched (see Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]). There is always an implicit action to drop traffic if no rule is matched for a traffic type. See details of the Action Object in Section 3.3.¶
The Event Object contains information related to scheduling a Rule. The Event Object activates the evaluation of the Condition Object based on a security event (i.e., system event or system alarm). Note that an empty Event Object means that the event will always be evaluated as true and start the evaluation of the Condition Object. Figure 4 shows the YANG tree of the Event object. Event object SHALL have the following information:¶
- System-event (also called alert):
- is defined as a warning about any changes of configuration, any access violation, the information of sessions and traffic flows.¶
- is defined as a warning related to service degradation in system hardware.¶
The Condition object describes the network traffic pattern or fields that must be matched against the observed network traffic for the rule to trigger. The fields used to express the required conditions to trigger the rule are organized around the class of NSFs expected to be able to observe or compute them. Figure 5 shows the YANG tree of the Condition object. The Condition Sub-model SHALL have the following information:¶
- This field represents the layer-2 header (e.g., MAC addresses), layer-3 header (e.g., IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, ICMPv4 or ICMPv6 parameters, and transport layer protocol) and layer-4 header (e.g., port numbers) of the network traffic. Note that the YANG module only provides high-level ICMP messages that are concretely specified by either ICMPv4 or ICMPv6 messages (e.g., Destination Unreachable: Port Unreachable which is ICMPv4's type 3 and code 3 or ICMPv6's type 1 and code 4). Also note that QUIC protocol [RFC9000] is excluded in the data model as it is not considered in the initial I2NSF documents [RFC8329]. The QUIC traffic should not be treated as UDP traffic. The data model should be extended or augmented appropriately to support the handling of QUIC traffic according to the needs of the implementer.¶
- This field represents the threshold limit for the rate of the network traffic to mitigate a DDoS attack. The threshold configuration can be given in packet rate, byte rate, and flow rate. Definition of packet rate, byte rate, and flow rate are defined in Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model].¶
- This field represents the configuration for an Antivirus service. A specific security profile can be added to Security Controller in order to update the configuration of the Antivirus service. Also, either a filename or path for such a profile can be configured for the Antivirus service.¶
- This field represents the payload information of the network traffic. The configuration is given in a high-level form that maps into the corresponding binary form registered with the Threat Prevention object (see Section 5.2).¶
- This field represents the URL category to be filtered. The URLs can be categorized into a group with the URL-Group defined in Section 4.4, such as "sns-websites" for URLs that provide Social Networking Services (SNS). This information can be used to block or allow a certain URL or website.¶
- This field contains the call source-id, call destination-id, and user-agent. This information describes a caller identification or receiver identification in order to prevent any exploits or attacks (e.g., voice phishing) of Voice over IP (VoIP) or Voice over Cellular Network (VoCN). Note that VoCN can be either Voice over LTE (VoLTE) [TR-29.949-3GPP] or Voice over 5G (Vo5G) [TR-21.915-3GPP].¶
- This field represents the extra information for the condition such as time, application, device type, user condition, and geographic location (see Section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]).¶
- This field contains the information obtained from threat-feeds. This field is used when security rule condition is based on the existing threat reports gathered from other sources.¶
Note that due to the exclusion of QUIC protocol in the I2NSF documents, HTTP/3 is also excluded in the document along with the QUIC protocol. HTTP/3 should neither be interpreted as HTTP/1.1 nor HTTP/2. The data model should be extended or augmented appropriately to support the handling of HTTP/3 traffic according to the needs of the implementer.¶
Note that the identities for ICMP messages provided in the YANG module are combined for ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 such as echo/echo-reply for ICMPv4 and echo-request/echo-reply for ICMPv6. For more information about the comparison between ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 messages, refer to [IANA-ICMP-Parameters] and [IANA-ICMPv6-Parameters].¶
This object represents actions that Security Admin wants to perform based on certain traffic class. Figure 6 shows the YANG tree of the Action object. The Action object SHALL have the following information:¶
- This field identifies the action when a rule is matched by an NSF. The action could be one of "pass", "drop", "reject", "rate-limit", "mirror", "invoke-signaling", "tunnel-encapsulation", "forward", and "transform". This action is related to the ingress-action-capability and egress-action-capability in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]. Note that if the action is "rate-limit", the limit value should be given to Security Controller in order to determine the threshold of the traffic rate.¶
- This field identifies the action when a rule is matched by an NSF. The action could be one of "rule-log" and "session-log". This action is related to the log-action in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model].¶
The Policy Endpoint Group is the collection of network nodes that are labeled and placed together into a group. As shown in Figure 7, endpoint groups include User-Group (Section 4.1), Device-Group (Section 4.2), Location-Group (Section 4.3), URL-Group (Section 4.4), and Voice-Group (Section 4.5). An I2NSF User can create and use these objects to represent a logical entity in their business environment, where a security policy is to be applied. Figure 8 shows the YANG tree of the Endpoint-Groups object.¶
The endpoint group information delivered by the I2NSF User should be stored into a secure database available to the Security Controller for the translation from a high-level security policy to the corresponding low-level security policy. The information should be synchronized with other systems in real-time for accurate translation.¶
The User-Group object represents the MAC addresses and IP (IPv4 or IPv6) addresses that are labeled as a group of users (e.g., employees). Figure 9 shows the YANG tree of the User-Group object. The User-Group object SHALL have the following information:¶
- This field identifies the name of the user-group.¶
- This represents the MAC address(es) for the user-group.¶
- This represents the IPv4 addresses as an IPv4 prefix or IPv4 address range for the user-group.¶
- This represents the IPv6 addresses as an IPv6 prefix or IPv6 address range for the user-group.¶
The Device-Group object represents the labeled network devices that provide services (e.g., servers) hosted on the IP (IPv4 or IPv6) addresses and application protocol. Figure 10 shows the YANG tree of the Device-group object. The Device-Group object SHALL have the following information:¶
- This field identifies the name of this object.¶
- This represents the IPv4 addresses as an IPv4 prefix or IPv4 address range for the device-group.¶
- This represents the IPv6 addresses as an IPv6 prefix or IPv6 address range for the device-group.¶
- This represents the application layer protocols of devices for the device-group.¶
The Location-Group object represents the IP (IPv4 or IPv6) addresses labeled as a geographic location (i.e., country, region, and city). Figure 11 shows the YANG tree of the Location-Group object. The Location-Group object SHALL have the following information:¶
- This field represents the 2-letter ISO country code conforming to ISO3166-1 alpha 2, e.g., 'US' for United States, 'JP' for Japan, and 'PL' for Poland.¶
- This field represents the region code conforming to ISO 3166-2. Examples include 'ID-RI' for Riau province of Indonesia and 'NG-RI' for the Rivers province in Nigeria.¶
- This field represents the city of a region, e.g., 'Dublin', 'New York', and 'Sao Paulo'.¶
- This represents the IPv4 addresses as an IPv4 prefix or IPv4 address range for the location-group.¶
- This represents the IPv6 addresses as an IPv6 prefix or IPv6 address range for the location-group.¶
The URL-Group object represents the collection of Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) labeled into a group (e.g., sns-websites). Figure 12 shows the YANG tree of the URL-Group object. The URL-Group object SHALL have the following information:¶
The Voice-Group object represents the collection of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) identities labeled into a group. Figure 13 shows the YANG tree of the Voice-Group object. The Voice-Group object SHALL have the following information:¶
- This field identifies the name of this object.¶
- This field represents the SIP identities in SIP URI scheme (Section 19.1.1 of [RFC3261]).¶
The Threat Prevention model describes information obtained from threat feeds (i.e., sources for obtaining the threat information). The presented information contains the features or attributes that identify a well-known threat (e.g., signatures or payload) to prevent malicious activity entering the secured network. There are multiple managed objects that constitute this category as shown in Figure 14. Figure 15 shows the YANG tree of a Threat-Prevention object.¶
This object represents a threat feed which provides the signatures of malicious activities. Figure 16 shows the YANG tree of a Threat-feed-list. The Threat-Feed object SHALL have the following information:¶
- This field identifies the name of this object.¶
- This field represents the Indicators of Compromise (IOC), i.e., the critical information of patterns or characteristics in the threat feed that identifies malicious activities. The format of the information given in this field is based on the format field (e.g., STIX, MISP, OpenIOC, and IODEF).¶
- This field represents the format or structure of the IOC field for the threat-feed such as Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) [STIX], MISP Core [MISPCORE], OpenIOC [OPENIOC], and Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) [RFC8727]. This can be extended depending on the implementation of the existing threat-feed.¶
It is assumed that the I2NSF User obtains the threat signatures (i.e., threat content patterns) from a threat-feed server (i.e., feed provider), which is a server providing threat signatures. With the obtained threat signatures, the I2NSF User can deliver them to the Security Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface. The retrieval of the threat signatures by the I2NSF User is out of the scope of this document.¶
Note that the information of a threat feed (i.e., a pair of IOC and Format) is used as information to alert or block traffic that matches IOCs identified in the threat feed. This information is used to update the NSFs that have various content security control capabilities (e.g., IPS, URL-Filtering, Antivirus, and VoIP/VoCN Filter) derived in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]. Those capabilities derive specific content security controls such as signature-set, exception-signature, and detect.¶
This object represents a list of raw binary patterns of a packet payload content (i.e., data after a transport layer header) to describe a threat. Figure 17 shows the YANG tree of a Payload-content list. The Payload-content object SHALL have the following information:¶
- This field identifies the name of this object. It is recommended to use short and simple words that describe the content. For example, the name "backdoor" indicates the payload content is related to a backdoor attack.¶
- This represents the description to further describe the content field in detail. This field is not mandatory, but it is recommended to use this field as it is helpful for future usage.¶
- This represents the payload content patterns (i.e., data after a transport layer header), which are involved in a security attack, in binary. If multiple instances of contents are defined, all defined contents must be matched somewhere in the session stream. The content pattern should be matched based on the order given by the user. The scope of the payload to be matched can be defined by the depth and offset/distance fields.¶
- This field specifies how far a packet should be searched for the specified content pattern defined in the content field. If this field is undefined, then the content pattern should be searched within the whole payload.¶
- This field specifies the starting point of matching the content pattern to the payload. If this field is undefined, then the content pattern should be searched from the beginning of the payload. The starting point can be defined by either the offset value or distance value. The offset keyword specifies where to start searching for the specified content pattern. The offset is calculated from the beginning of the payload. The distance keyword specifies how far a payload should be ignored before starting to search for the specified content pattern relative to the end of the previous specified content pattern match. This can be thought of as exactly the same thing as offset, except it is relative to the end of the last pattern match instead of the beginning of the packet. Note that this field cannot be used if the content is the first order of the list.¶
The main objective of this document is to provide the YANG data model of the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface. This interface can be used to deliver control and management messages between an I2NSF User and Security Controller for the I2NSF User's high-level security policies.¶
The semantics of the data model is aligned with the information model of the Consumer-Facing Interface. This data model is designed to support the I2NSF framework that can be extended according to the security needs. In other words, the model design is independent of the content and meaning of specific policies as well as the implementation approach.¶
With the YANG data model of I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface, this document provides examples for security policy rules such as time-based firewall, VoIP/VoCN security service, and DDoS-attack mitigation in Section 7.¶
This section describes a YANG module of Consumer-Facing Interface. This document provides identities in the data model to be used for configuration of an NSF. Each identity is used for a different type of configuration. The details are explained in the description of each identity. This YANG module imports from [RFC6991] and [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model]. It makes references to [RFC0768] [RFC0792] [RFC0854] [RFC0959] [RFC1939] [RFC2595] [RFC3022] [RFC3261] [RFC3986] [RFC4250] [RFC4340] [RFC4443] [RFC5321] [RFC5646] [RFC8075] [RFC8335] [RFC8727] [RFC9051] [RFC9110] [RFC9112] [RFC9113] [RFC9260] [RFC9293] [GLOB] [IANA-ICMP-Parameters] [IANA-ICMPv6-Parameters] [ISO-3166-1alpha2] [ISO-3166-2] [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model] [MISPCORE] [OPENIOC] [STIX]¶
This section shows XML configuration examples of high-level security policy rules that are delivered from the I2NSF User to the Security Controller over the Consumer-Facing Interface. The considered examples are: Database registration, time-based firewall for web filtering, VoIP/VoCN security service, and DDoS-attack mitigation.¶
The endpoint-group is used to register known network nodes and label them into a higher-level name (i.e., human recognizable language). If new endpoints are introduced to the network, it is necessary to first register their data to the database. For example, if new members are newly introduced in different groups (i.e., user-group, device-group, url-group, and voice-group), each of them should be registered as separate entities with their corresponding information.¶
- The IPv4 addresses from 192.0.2.11 to 192.0.2.90 are labeled as a group of users called "employees".¶
- The IPv4 addresses from 198.51.100.11 to 198.51.100.20 provide services with HTTP and HTTPS application protocol labeled as "webservers".¶
- The "https://www.example.com/" and "https://www.example.net/" URLs are labeled as "sns-websites".¶
- The "sip:firstname.lastname@example.org" and "sip:email@example.com" SIP identities are labeled as "malicious-id".¶
- The IPv6 addresses from 2001:db8:0:1::11 to 2001:db8:0:1::90 are labeled as a group of users called "employees-v6".¶
- The IPv6 addresses from 2001:db8:0:2::11 to 2001:db8:0:2::20 provide services with HTTP and HTTPS application protocol labeled as "webservers-v6".¶
- The "sip:david@[2001:db8:2ef0::32b7]" SIP identity is labeled as "malicious-id-v6".¶
The first example scenario is to "block SNS access during office hours" using a time-based firewall policy. In this scenario, all users registered as "employees" in the user-group list are unable to access SNS during the office hours (weekdays). The XML instance is described below:¶
- The policy name is "security_policy_for_blocking_sns".¶
- The rule name is "block_access_to_sns_during_office_hours".¶
- The Source is "employees".¶
- The destination target is "sns-websites". "sns-websites" is the key which represents the list containing the information, such as URL, about sns-websites.¶
- The action required is to "drop" any attempt to connect to websites related to Social networking.¶
The second example scenario is to "block malicious VoIP/VoCN packets coming to a company" using a VoIP policy. In this scenario, the calls coming from VOIP and/or VoCN sources with VoCN IDs that are classified as malicious are dropped. The IP addresses of the employees and malicious VOIP IDs which should be blocked are stored in the database or datastore of the enterprise. Here and for the rest of the cases, it is assumed that the security administrators or someone responsible for the existing and newly generated policies, are not aware of which and/or how many NSFs are needed to meet the security requirements. Figure 22 represents the XML document generated from YANG discussed in previous sections. Once a high-level security policy is created by a security admin, it is delivered by the Consumer-Facing Interface, through RESTCONF server, to the security controller. The XML instance is described below:¶
- The policy name is "security_policy_for_blocking_malicious_voip_packets".¶
- The rule name is "Block_malicious_voip_and_vocn_packets".¶
- The source is "malicious-id". The "malicious-id" is the key, so that it maps to the SIP identities that are named as "malicious-id". This can be a single SIP identity or a list of SIP identities.¶
- The destination target is "employees". "employees" is the key which represents the list containing information about employees, such as IP addresses.¶
- The action required is "drop" when any incoming SIP packets are coming from "malicious-id" and targeting "employees".¶
The third example scenario is to "Mitigate flood attacks on a company web server" using a DDoS-attack mitigation policy. Here, the time information is not set because the service provided by the network should be maintained at all times. If the packets sent by any sources that target "webservers" are more than the set threshold, then the admin can set the percentage of the packets to be dropped to safely maintain the service. Once the rule is set and delivered and enforced to the NSFs by the security controller, the NSFs will monitor the incoming packet amounts to act according to the rule set. The XML instance is described below:¶
- The policy name is "security_policy_for_ddos_attacks".¶
- The rule name is "1000_packets_per_second".¶
- The destination is webservers.¶
- The rate limit exists to limit the incoming amount of packets per second. In this case the rate limit is "1000" packets per second. This amount depends on the packet receiving capacity of the server devices.¶
- The Source is all sources which send abnormal amount of packets. It is assumed that there is a counter per source IP address in this DDoS-condition Firewall. The rate of "1000" packets per second is set for each source to send packets toward the destinations as webservers.¶
- The action required is to "drop" when the packet reception is more than "1000" packets per second for each source that sends packets to the destinations.¶
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface Registrant Contact: The IESG. XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.¶
name: ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface prefix: i2nsfcfi reference: RFC XXXX // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove // this note.¶
The YANG module specified in this document defines a data schema designed to be accessed through network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the required secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the required secure transport is TLS [RFC8446].¶
The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides a means of restricting access to specific NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and contents. Thus, NACM SHOULD be used to restrict the NSF registration from unauthorized users.¶
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are writable, creatable, and deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations to these data nodes could have a negative effect on network and security operations. These data nodes have the following sensitivity/vulnerability:¶
- list i2nsf-cfi-policy: Writing to almost any element of this YANG module would directly impact the configuration of NSFs implementing the security policy, e.g., completely turning off security monitoring and mitigation capabilities; altering the scope of this monitoring and mitigation; creating an overwhelming logging volume to overwhelm downstream analytics or storage capacity; creating logging patterns which are confusing; or reducing the efficacy of statistics or artificial models built on historical data.¶
- container endpoint-groups: Writing to any element in this container can alter the configuration of the security services and may cause vulnerabilities in the network, e.g., changing registered malicious endpoints can remove the defense against known hostile clients. The information given may also be considered private, hence it is strongly encouraged to inform affected users/customers of this fact and of the potential privacy-related consequences and trade-offs.¶
- container threat-prevention: Writing to any element in this container can alter the configuration of the security services and may cause vulnerabilities in the network, e.g., changing registered signature can let malicious content to get across the secured network without detection.¶
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes with their sensitivity/vulnerability:¶
- list i2nsf-cfi-policy: The leak of this node to an attacker could reveal the specific configuration of security controls to an attacker. An attacker can craft an attack path that avoids observation or mitigations; one may reveal topology information to inform additional targets or enable lateral movement; one enables the construction of an attack path that avoids observation or mitigations; one provides an indication that the operator has discovered the attack.¶
- container endpoint-groups: This node holds a list of endpoint data that may be considered private to the users. Disclosure of this information may expose sensitive details which can be used to define the identity and geographical location of a user. Malicious actors can leverage this information to threaten the user with cyber threat, e.g., voice phishing, or physical threat.¶
- container threat-prevention: The leak of this node to an attacker could reveal the specific detection system to an attacker. An attacker can use this information to design new unknown attack strategies to circumvent the existing detection or prevention system.¶
- Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>.
- Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>.
- Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, DOI 10.17487/RFC0854, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc854>.
- Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc959>.
- Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3", STD 53, RFC 1939, DOI 10.17487/RFC1939, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1939>.
- Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
- Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP", RFC 2595, DOI 10.17487/RFC2595, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2595>.
- Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
- Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
- Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
- Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, DOI 10.17487/RFC4250, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4250>.
- Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340, DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4340>.
- Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89, RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
- Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.
- Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>.
- Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
- Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
- Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
- Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
- Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
- Castellani, A., Loreto, S., Rahman, A., Fossati, T., and E. Dijk, "Guidelines for Mapping Implementations: HTTP to the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 8075, DOI 10.17487/RFC8075, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8075>.
- Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
- Bonica, R., Thomas, R., Linkova, J., Lenart, C., and M. Boucadair, "PROBE: A Utility for Probing Interfaces", RFC 8335, DOI 10.17487/RFC8335, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8335>.
- Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
- Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
- Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.
- Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407, DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.
- Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
- Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "YANG Library", RFC 8525, DOI 10.17487/RFC8525, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8525>.
- Takahashi, T., Danyliw, R., and M. Suzuki, "JSON Binding of the Incident Object Description Exchange Format", RFC 8727, DOI 10.17487/RFC8727, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8727>.
- Melnikov, A., Ed. and B. Leiba, Ed., "Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) - Version 4rev2", RFC 9051, DOI 10.17487/RFC9051, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9051>.
- Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.
- Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP/1.1", STD 99, RFC 9112, DOI 10.17487/RFC9112, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9112>.
- Thomson, M., Ed. and C. Benfield, Ed., "HTTP/2", RFC 9113, DOI 10.17487/RFC9113, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9113>.
- Stewart, R., Tüxen, M., and K. Nielsen, "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 9260, DOI 10.17487/RFC9260, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9260>.
- Eddy, W., Ed., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)", STD 7, RFC 9293, DOI 10.17487/RFC9293, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9293>.
- Hares, S., Jeong, J. P., Kim, J. T., Moskowitz, R., and Q. Lin, "I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32>.
- Jeong, J. P., Lingga, P., Hares, S., Xia, L., and H. Birkholz, "I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-20, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-20>.
- IEEE, "The Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7, 2018 Edition", IEEE Std 1003.1-2017, <https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/glob.html>.
- ISO, "ISO 3166-1 decoding table", <https://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/country_codes/iso-3166-1_decoding_table.htm>.
- ISO, "ISO 3166-2:2007", <https://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/country_codes.htm#2012_iso3166-2>.
- Jordan, B., Piazza, R., and T. Darley, "Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX)", STIX Version 2.1 https://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/stix/v2.1/os/stix-v2.1-os.html, .
- Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022, DOI 10.17487/RFC3022, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3022>.
- Huston, G., Lord, A., and P. Smith, "IPv6 Address Prefix Reserved for Documentation", RFC 3849, DOI 10.17487/RFC3849, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3849>.
- Arkko, J., Cotton, M., and L. Vegoda, "IPv4 Address Blocks Reserved for Documentation", RFC 5737, DOI 10.17487/RFC5737, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5737>.
- Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8329>.
- Mortensen, A., Ed., Reddy.K, T., Ed., Andreasen, F., Teague, N., and R. Compton, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", RFC 8811, DOI 10.17487/RFC8811, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8811>.
- Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000, DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
- Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers", , <https://www.iana.org/assignments/icmp-parameters/icmp-parameters.xhtml>.
- Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Internet Control Message Procotol version 6 (ICMPv6) Parameters", , <https://www.iana.org/assignments/icmpv6-parameters/icmpv6-parameters.xhtml>.
- Dulaunoy, A. and A. Iklody, "MISP Core", commit 051e33b6711a660faf81733d825f1015aa0d301b, , <https://github.com/MISP/misp-rfc/blob/051e33b6711a660faf81733d825f1015aa0d301b/misp-core-format/raw.md.html>.
- Gibb, W., "OpenIOC 1.1 DRAFT", commit d42a8777708e171f8bdd3c2c9f8590c83488285d, , <https://github.com/fireeye/OpenIOC_1.1/blob/d42a8777708e171f8bdd3c2c9f8590c83488285d/schemas/ioc.xsd>.
- 3GPP, "Study on technical aspects on roaming end-to-end scenarios with Voice over LTE (VoLTE) IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) and other networks", 3GPP TR 29.949/Version 16.0.0, .
- 3GPP, "Summary of Rel-15 Work Items", 3GPP TR 21.915/Version 15.0.0, .
This document is a product by the I2NSF Working Group (WG) including WG Chairs (i.e., Linda Dunbar and Yoav Nir) and Diego Lopez. This document took advantage of the review and comments from the following people: Roman Danyliw, Mahdi F. Dachmehchi, Daeyoung Hyun, Jan Lindblad (YANG doctor), Tom Petch, Charlie Kaufman, Penglin Yang, and Jung-Soo Park. The authors sincerely appreciate their sincere efforts and kind help.¶
This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized Security Service Provisioning). This work was supported in part by the IITP (2020-0-00395-003, Standard Development of Blockchain based Network Management Automation Technology).¶
The following are co-authors of this document:¶
Patrick Lingga - Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419, Republic of Korea. EMail: firstname.lastname@example.org¶
Jinyong Tim Kim - Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419, Republic of Korea. EMail: email@example.com¶
Hyoungshick Kim - Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419, Republic of Korea. EMail: firstname.lastname@example.org¶
Eunsoo Kim - Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419, Republic of Korea. EMail: email@example.com¶
Seungjin Lee - Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419, Republic of Korea. EMail: firstname.lastname@example.org¶
Anil Lohiya - Juniper Networks, 1133 Innovation Way, Sunnyvale, CA 94089, US. EMail: email@example.com¶
Dave Qi - Bloomberg, 731 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10022, US. EMail: DQI@bloomberg.net¶
Nabil Bitar - Nokia, 755 Ravendale Drive, Mountain View, CA 94043, US. EMail: firstname.lastname@example.org¶
Senad Palislamovic - Nokia, 755 Ravendale Drive, Mountain View, CA 94043, US. EMail: email@example.com¶
Liang Xia - Huawei, 101 Software Avenue, Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012, China. EMail: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com¶
The following changes are made from draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-30:¶