| Internet-Draft | Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Mode | May 2023 |
| Jeong, et al. | Expires 16 November 2023 | [Page] |
- Workgroup:
- I2NSF Working Group
- Internet-Draft:
- draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-31
- Published:
- Intended Status:
- Standards Track
- Expires:
I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model
Abstract
This document describes a YANG data model of the Consumer-Facing Interface of the Security Controller in an Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) system in a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environment. This document defines various types of managed objects and the relationship among them needed to build the flow policies from users' perspective. The YANG data model is based on the "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy defined by a capability YANG data model for I2NSF. The YANG data model enables different users of a given I2NSF system to define, manage, and monitor flow policies within an administrative domain (e.g., user group).¶
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 November 2023.¶
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
1. Introduction
In a framework of Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) [RFC8329], each vendor can register their Network Security Functions (NSFs) using a Developer's Management System (DMS). Then the I2NSF User (e.g., an application for a security administrator such as a web application) can configure the NSFs by defining high-level security policies. Most vendors provide various proprietary applications or tools to define security policies for their own NSFs. The Consumer-Facing Interface is required because the applications developed by each vendor need to have a standard interface specifying the data types used when the I2NSF User and Security Controller (i.e., Network Operator Management System) communicate with each other using this interface. Therefore, this document specifies the required YANG data model such as their data types and encoding schemes so that high-level security policies (or configuration information for security policies) can be transferred to the Security Controller through the Consumer-Facing Interface. Security Controller will use the given information to translate the high-level security policies into the corresponding low-level security policies. The Security Controller delivers the translated security policies to the NSFs according to their respective security capabilities for the required security enforcement.¶
The Consumer-Facing Interface would be built using a set of objects, with each object capturing a unique set of information from an I2NSF User [RFC8329] needed to express a Security Policy. An object may have relationship with various other objects to express a complete set of requirements. The YANG data model in this document captures the managed objects and relationship among these objects. This model is structured in accordance with the "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy.¶
An NSF Capability YANG data model is defined in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model] as the basic model for both the NSF-Facing interface and Consumer-Facing Interface security policy model of this document.¶
+-----------------+
| Consumer-Facing |
| Interface |
+--------+--------+
^
|
+-------------+------------+
| | |
+-----+----+ +-----+----+ +----+---+
| Policy | | Endpoint | | Threat |
| | | groups | | feed |
+-----+----+ +----------+ +--------+
^
|
+------+------+
| Rule |
+------+------+
^
|
+----------------+----------------+
| | |
+------+------+ +------+------+ +------+------+
| Event | | Condition | | Action |
+-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+
Data models are defined at a lower level of abstraction and provide many details. They provide details about the implementation of a protocol's specification, e.g., rules that explain how to map managed objects onto lower-level protocol constructs.¶
The efficient and flexible provisioning of network functions by a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) system supports rapid deployment of newly developed functions. As practical applications, Network Security Functions (NSFs), such as firewall, Intrusion Detection System (IDS)/Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), and attack mitigation, can also be provided as Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) in the NFV system. By the efficient virtualization technology, these VNFs might be automatically provisioned and dynamically migrated based on real-time security requirements. This document presents a YANG data model to implement security functions based on NFV.¶
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses the terminology described in [RFC8329].¶
This document follows the guidelines of [RFC8407], uses the common YANG types defined in [RFC6991], and adopts the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].¶
3. YANG Tree Diagram of Policy
A Policy object is a means to express a Security Policy set by an I2NSF User with the Consumer-Facing Interface. It is sent to the Security Controller which converts it into an NSF-specific configuration via the NSF-Facing Interface for enforcement of the NSF. Figure 2 shows the YANG tree of the Policy object. The Policy object SHALL have the following information:¶
- Name:
- This field identifies the name of this object.¶
- Language:
- The language field indicates the language tag that is used for the natural language text that is included in all of the 'description' attributes. The language field is encoded following the rules in Section 2.1 of [RFC5646]. The default language tag is "en-US".¶
- Priority-usage:
- This field represents the type of the priority used in the policy. Two types are defined in this module, i.e., 'priority-by-order' and 'priority-by-number'. The 'priority-by-order' indicates that the sequence of the rules to be executed follows the input order by user. The 'priority-by-number' indicates that the sequence of the rules to be executed follows the priority values in the rules, where a higher priority value means a higher priority.¶
- Resolution-strategy:
- This field represents how to resolve conflicts that occur between actions of the same or different policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular NSF. The resolution strategy is described in Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model] in detail. The default resolution strategy is "fmr" (First Matching Rule).¶
- Rules:
- This field contains a list of rules. These rules are defined for implementing business requirements such as 1) supporting communication between two Endpoint Groups (see Section 4), 2) preventing communication with externally or internally identified threats, and 3) controlling access to internal or external resources for meeting regulatory compliance. An organization may restrict certain communication between a set of users and applications for example. The threats may be identified from threat feeds obtained from external sources. Note that rule conflict analysis should be performed by a monitoring service for policy rule conflicts in Security Controller to detect such rule conflicts among the policy rules installed into network security functions.¶
module: ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface
+--rw i2nsf-cfi-policy* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw language? string
| +--rw priority-usage? identityref
| +--rw resolution-strategy? identityref
| +--rw rules* [name]
| ...
+--rw endpoint-groups
| ...
+--rw threat-prevention
...
A policy contains a list of rules. In order to express a Rule, the Rule must have complete information such as where and when a policy needs to be applied. This is done by defining a set of managed objects and relationship among them. A Policy Rule defined in this module is a set of management guidelines that defines a desired behavior based on the Event-Condition-Action policy model (Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]), but that is independent of a specific device and implementation. Figure 3 shows the YANG data tree of the Rule object. The rule object SHALL have the following information:¶
- Name:
- This field identifies the name of this object.¶
- Priority:
- This field identifies the priority of the rule. This field can be given when the policy's 'priority-usage' is priority-by-number.¶
- Event:
- This field includes the information to determine whether the Rule Condition can be evaluated or not (see the definition of Event in Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]). See details of the Event Object in Section 3.1.¶
- Condition:
- This field contains a set of attributes, features, and/or values that are to be matched with the attributes of a packet or traffic flow to determine whether the Rule Action can be executed or not (see Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]). See details of the Condition Object in Section 3.2.¶
- Action:
- This field identifies the action taken when a rule is matched (see Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]). There is always an implicit action to drop traffic if no rule is matched for a traffic type. See details of the Action Object in Section 3.3.¶
+--rw rules* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw priority? uint8
| +--rw event
| | ...
| +--rw condition
| | ...
| +--rw action
| ...
3.1. Event Sub-model
The Event Object contains information related to scheduling a Rule. The Event Object activates the evaluation of the Condition Object based on a security event (i.e., system event or system alarm). Note that an empty Event Object means that the event will always be evaluated as true and start the evaluation of the Condition Object. Figure 4 shows the YANG tree of the Event object. Event object SHALL have the following information:¶
- System-event (also called alert):
- is defined as a warning about any changes of configuration, any access violation, the information of sessions and traffic flows.¶
- System-alarm:
- is defined as a warning related to service degradation in system hardware.¶
+--rw event | +--rw system-event* identityref | +--rw system-alarm* identityref
3.2. Condition Sub-model
The Condition object describes the network traffic pattern or fields that must be matched against the observed network traffic for the rule to trigger. The fields used to express the required conditions to trigger the rule are organized around the class of NSFs expected to be able to observe or compute them. Figure 5 shows the YANG tree of the Condition object. The Condition Sub-model SHALL have the following information:¶
- firewall:
- This field represents the layer-2 header (e.g., MAC addresses), layer-3 header (e.g., IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, ICMPv4 or ICMPv6 parameters, and transport layer protocol) and layer-4 header (e.g., port numbers) of the network traffic. Note that the YANG module only provides high-level ICMP messages that are concretely specified by either ICMPv4 or ICMPv6 messages (e.g., Destination Unreachable: Port Unreachable which is ICMPv4's type 3 and code 3 or ICMPv6's type 1 and code 4). Also note that QUIC protocol [RFC9000] is excluded in the data model as it is not considered in the initial I2NSF documents [RFC8329]. The QUIC traffic should not be treated as UDP traffic. The data model should be extended or augmented appropriately to support the handling of QUIC traffic according to the needs of the implementer.¶
- ddos:
- This field represents the threshold limit for the rate of the network traffic to mitigate a DDoS attack. The threshold configuration can be given in packet rate, byte rate, and flow rate. Definition of packet rate, byte rate, and flow rate are defined in Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model].¶
- anti-virus:
- This field represents the configuration for an Antivirus service. A specific security profile can be added to Security Controller in order to update the configuration of the Antivirus service. Also, either a filename or path for such a profile can be configured for the Antivirus service.¶
- payload:
- This field represents the payload information of the network traffic. The configuration is given in a high-level form that maps into the corresponding binary form registered with the Threat Prevention object (see Section 5.2).¶
- url-category:
- This field represents the URL category to be filtered. The URLs can be categorized into a group with the URL-Group defined in Section 4.4, such as "sns-websites" for URLs that provide Social Networking Services (SNS). This information can be used to block or allow a certain URL or website.¶
- voice:
- This field contains the call source-id, call destination-id, and user-agent. This information describes a caller identification or receiver identification in order to prevent any exploits or attacks (e.g., voice phishing) of Voice over IP (VoIP) or Voice over Cellular Network (VoCN). Note that VoCN can be either Voice over LTE (VoLTE) [TR-29.949-3GPP] or Voice over 5G (Vo5G) [TR-21.915-3GPP].¶
- context:
- This field represents the extra information for the condition such as time, application, device type, user condition, and geographic location (see Section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]).¶
- threat-feed:
- This field contains the information obtained from threat-feeds. This field is used when security rule condition is based on the existing threat reports gathered from other sources.¶
Note that due to the exclusion of QUIC protocol in the I2NSF documents, HTTP/3 is also excluded in the document along with the QUIC protocol. HTTP/3 should neither be interpreted as HTTP/1.1 nor HTTP/2. The data model should be extended or augmented appropriately to support the handling of HTTP/3 traffic according to the needs of the implementer.¶
Note that the identities for ICMP messages provided in the YANG module are combined for ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 such as echo/echo-reply for ICMPv4 and echo-request/echo-reply for ICMPv6. For more information about the comparison between ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 messages, refer to [IANA-ICMP-Parameters] and [IANA-ICMPv6-Parameters].¶
+--rw condition | +--rw firewall | | +--rw source* union | | +--rw destination* union | | +--rw transport-layer-protocol? identityref | | +--rw range-port-number* [start end] | | | +--rw start inet:port-number | | | +--rw end inet:port-number | | +--rw icmp | | +--rw message* identityref | +--rw ddos | | +--rw rate-limit | | +--rw packet-rate-threshold? uint64 | | +--rw byte-rate-threshold? uint64 | | +--rw flow-rate-threshold? uint64 | +--rw anti-virus | | +--rw profile* string | | +--rw exception-files* string | +--rw payload | | +--rw content* -> /threat-prevention/payload-content/name | +--rw url-category | | +--rw url-name? -> /endpoint-groups/url-group/name | +--rw voice | | +--rw source-id* -> /endpoint-groups/voice-group/name | | +--rw destination-id* -> /endpoint-groups/voice-group/name | | +--rw user-agent* string | +--rw context | | +--rw time | | | +--rw start-date-time? yang:date-and-time | | | +--rw end-date-time? yang:date-and-time | | | +--rw period | | | | +--rw start-time? time | | | | +--rw end-time? time | | | | +--rw day* day | | | | +--rw date* int8 | | | | +--rw month* [start end] | | | | +--rw start string | | | | +--rw end string | | | +--rw frequency? enumeration | | +--rw application | | | +--rw protocol* identityref | | +--rw device-type | | | +--rw device* identityref | | +--rw users | | | +--rw user* [id] | | | | +--rw id uint32 | | | | +--rw name? string | | | +--rw group* [id] | | | +--rw id uint32 | | | +--rw name? string | | +--rw geographic-location | | +--rw source | | | +--rw country? -> /endpoint-groups/location-group/country | | | +--rw region? -> /endpoint-groups/location-group/region | | | +--rw city? -> /endpoint-groups/location-group/city | | +--rw destination | | +--rw country? -> /endpoint-groups/location-group/country | | +--rw region? -> /endpoint-groups/location-group/region | | +--rw city? -> /endpoint-groups/location-group/city | +--rw threat-feed | +--rw name* -> /threat-prevention/threat-feed-list/name
3.3. Action Sub-model
This object represents actions that Security Admin wants to perform based on certain traffic class. Figure 6 shows the YANG tree of the Action object. The Action object SHALL have the following information:¶
- Primary-action:
- This field identifies the action when a rule is matched by an NSF. The action could be one of "pass", "drop", "reject", "rate-limit", "mirror", "invoke-signaling", "tunnel-encapsulation", "forward", and "transform". This action is related to the ingress-action-capability and egress-action-capability in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]. Note that if the action is "rate-limit", the limit value should be given to Security Controller in order to determine the threshold of the traffic rate.¶
- Secondary-action:
- This field identifies the action when a rule is matched by an NSF. The action could be one of "rule-log" and "session-log". This action is related to the log-action in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model].¶
+--rw action
+--rw primary-action
| +--rw action identityref
| +--rw limit? decimal64
+--rw secondary-action
+--rw log-action? identityref
4. YANG Tree Diagram of Policy Endpoint Groups
The Policy Endpoint Group is the collection of network nodes that are labeled and placed together into a group. As shown in Figure 7, endpoint groups include User-Group (Section 4.1), Device-Group (Section 4.2), Location-Group (Section 4.3), URL-Group (Section 4.4), and Voice-Group (Section 4.5). An I2NSF User can create and use these objects to represent a logical entity in their business environment, where a security policy is to be applied. Figure 8 shows the YANG tree of the Endpoint-Groups object.¶
The endpoint group information delivered by the I2NSF User should be stored into a secure database available to the Security Controller for the translation from a high-level security policy to the corresponding low-level security policy. The information should be synchronized with other systems in real-time for accurate translation.¶
+-------------------+
| Endpoint Groups |
+---------+---------+
^
|
+-------------+---------------+--------------+-----------+
0..n | 0..n | 0..n | 0..n | 0..n |
+-----+----+ +------+-----+ +-------+------+ +-----+---+ +-----+-----+
|User-group| |Device-group| |Location-group| |URL-group| |Voice-group|
+----------+ +------------+ +--------------+ +---------+ +-----------+
+--rw endpoint-groups | +--rw user-group* [name] | | ... | +--rw device-group* [name] | | ... | +--rw location-group* [country region city] | | ... | +--rw url-group* [name] | | ... | +--rw voice-group* [name] | ...
4.1. User-Group
The User-Group object represents the MAC addresses and IP (IPv4 or IPv6) addresses that are labeled as a group of users (e.g., employees). Figure 9 shows the YANG tree of the User-Group object. The User-Group object SHALL have the following information:¶
- Name:
- This field identifies the name of the user-group.¶
- mac-address:
- This represents the MAC address(es) for the user-group.¶
- ipv4:
- This represents the IPv4 addresses as an IPv4 prefix or IPv4 address range for the user-group.¶
- ipv6:
- This represents the IPv6 addresses as an IPv6 prefix or IPv6 address range for the user-group.¶
+--rw user-group* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw mac-address* yang:mac-address | +--rw (match-type) | +--:(ipv4) | | +--rw (ipv4-range-or-prefix)? | | +--:(prefix) | | | +--rw ipv4-prefix* inet:ipv4-prefix | | +--:(range) | | +--rw range-ipv4-address* [start end] | | +--rw start inet:ipv4-address-no-zone | | +--rw end inet:ipv4-address-no-zone | +--:(ipv6) | +--rw (ipv6-range-or-prefix)? | +--:(prefix) | | +--rw ipv6-prefix* inet:ipv6-prefix | +--:(range) | +--rw range-ipv6-address* [start end] | +--rw start inet:ipv6-address-no-zone | +--rw end inet:ipv6-address-no-zone
4.2. Device-Group
The Device-Group object represents the labeled network devices that provide services (e.g., servers) hosted on the IP (IPv4 or IPv6) addresses and application protocol. Figure 10 shows the YANG tree of the Device-group object. The Device-Group object SHALL have the following information:¶
- Name:
- This field identifies the name of this object.¶
- ipv4:
- This represents the IPv4 addresses as an IPv4 prefix or IPv4 address range for the device-group.¶
- ipv6:
- This represents the IPv6 addresses as an IPv6 prefix or IPv6 address range for the device-group.¶
- Application-protocol:
- This represents the application layer protocols of devices for the device-group.¶
+--rw device-group* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw (match-type) | | +--:(ipv4) | | | +--rw (ipv4-range-or-prefix)? | | | +--:(prefix) | | | | +--rw ipv4-prefix* inet:ipv4-prefix | | | +--:(range) | | | +--rw range-ipv4-address* [start end] | | | +--rw start inet:ipv4-address-no-zone | | | +--rw end inet:ipv4-address-no-zone | | +--:(ipv6) | | +--rw (ipv6-range-or-prefix)? | | +--:(prefix) | | | +--rw ipv6-prefix* inet:ipv6-prefix | | +--:(range) | | +--rw range-ipv6-address* [start end] | | +--rw start inet:ipv6-address-no-zone | | +--rw end inet:ipv6-address-no-zone | +--rw application-protocol* identityref
4.3. Location-Group
The Location-Group object represents the IP (IPv4 or IPv6) addresses labeled as a geographic location (i.e., country, region, and city). Figure 11 shows the YANG tree of the Location-Group object. The Location-Group object SHALL have the following information:¶
- Country:
- This field represents the 2-letter ISO country code conforming to ISO3166-1 alpha 2, e.g., 'US' for United States, 'JP' for Japan, and 'PL' for Poland.¶
- Region:
- This field represents the region code conforming to ISO 3166-2. Examples include 'ID-RI' for Riau province of Indonesia and 'NG-RI' for the Rivers province in Nigeria.¶
- City:
- This field represents the city of a region, e.g., 'Dublin', 'New York', and 'Sao Paulo'.¶
- ipv4:
- This represents the IPv4 addresses as an IPv4 prefix or IPv4 address range for the location-group.¶
- ipv6:
- This represents the IPv6 addresses as an IPv6 prefix or IPv6 address range for the location-group.¶
+--rw location-group* [country region city] | +--rw country string | +--rw region string | +--rw city string | +--rw (match-type) | +--:(ipv4) | | +--rw (ipv4-range-or-prefix)? | | +--:(prefix) | | | +--rw ipv4-prefix* inet:ipv4-prefix | | +--:(range) | | +--rw range-ipv4-address* [start end] | | +--rw start inet:ipv4-address-no-zone | | +--rw end inet:ipv4-address-no-zone | +--:(ipv6) | +--rw (ipv6-range-or-prefix)? | +--:(prefix) | | +--rw ipv6-prefix* inet:ipv6-prefix | +--:(range) | +--rw range-ipv6-address* [start end] | +--rw start inet:ipv6-address-no-zone | +--rw end inet:ipv6-address-no-zone
4.4. URL-Group
The URL-Group object represents the collection of Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) labeled into a group (e.g., sns-websites). Figure 12 shows the YANG tree of the URL-Group object. The URL-Group object SHALL have the following information:¶
+--rw url-group* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw url* inet:uri
4.5. Voice-Group
The Voice-Group object represents the collection of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) identities labeled into a group. Figure 13 shows the YANG tree of the Voice-Group object. The Voice-Group object SHALL have the following information:¶
- Name:
- This field identifies the name of this object.¶
- SIP-id:
- This field represents the SIP identities in SIP URI scheme (Section 19.1.1 of [RFC3261]).¶
+--rw voice-group* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw sip-id* inet:uri
5. YANG Tree Diagram of Threat Prevention
The Threat Prevention model describes information obtained from threat feeds (i.e., sources for obtaining the threat information). The presented information contains the features or attributes that identify a well-known threat (e.g., signatures or payload) to prevent malicious activity entering the secured network. There are multiple managed objects that constitute this category as shown in Figure 14. Figure 15 shows the YANG tree of a Threat-Prevention object.¶
+-------------------+
| Threat Prevention |
+---------+---------+
^
|
+---------+---------+
0..n | 0..n |
+------+------+ +--------+--------+
| Threat-feed | | Payload-content |
+-------------+ +-----------------+
+--rw threat-prevention
+--rw threat-feed-list* [name]
| ...
+--rw payload-content* [name]
...
5.1. Threat Feed
This object represents a threat feed which provides the signatures of malicious activities. Figure 16 shows the YANG tree of a Threat-feed-list. The Threat-Feed object SHALL have the following information:¶
- Name:
- This field identifies the name of this object.¶
- IOC:
- This field represents the Indicators of Compromise (IOC), i.e., the critical information of patterns or characteristics in the threat feed that identifies malicious activities. The format of the information given in this field is based on the format field (e.g., STIX, MISP, OpenIOC, and IODEF).¶
- Format:
- This field represents the format or structure of the IOC field for the threat-feed such as Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) [STIX], MISP Core [MISPCORE], OpenIOC [OPENIOC], and Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) [RFC8727]. This can be extended depending on the implementation of the existing threat-feed.¶
It is assumed that the I2NSF User obtains the threat signatures (i.e., threat content patterns) from a threat-feed server (i.e., feed provider), which is a server providing threat signatures. With the obtained threat signatures, the I2NSF User can deliver them to the Security Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface. The retrieval of the threat signatures by the I2NSF User is out of the scope of this document.¶
Note that the information of a threat feed (i.e., a pair of IOC and Format) is used as information to alert or block traffic that matches IOCs identified in the threat feed. This information is used to update the NSFs that have various content security control capabilities (e.g., IPS, URL-Filtering, Antivirus, and VoIP/VoCN Filter) derived in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]. Those capabilities derive specific content security controls such as signature-set, exception-signature, and detect.¶
It is noted that DDoS Open Threat Signaling (dots) can be used to collect threat feeds in the form of signatures [RFC8811].¶
+--rw threat-feed-list* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw ioc* string
| +--rw format identityref
5.2. Payload Content
This object represents a list of raw binary patterns of a packet payload content (i.e., data after a transport layer header) to describe a threat. Figure 17 shows the YANG tree of a Payload-content list. The Payload-content object SHALL have the following information:¶
- Name:
- This field identifies the name of this object. It is recommended to use short and simple words that describe the content. For example, the name "backdoor" indicates the payload content is related to a backdoor attack.¶
- Description:
- This represents the description to further describe the content field in detail. This field is not mandatory, but it is recommended to use this field as it is helpful for future usage.¶
- Content:
- This represents the payload content patterns (i.e., data after a transport layer header), which are involved in a security attack, in binary. If multiple instances of contents are defined, all defined contents must be matched somewhere in the session stream. The content pattern should be matched based on the order given by the user. The scope of the payload to be matched can be defined by the depth and offset/distance fields.¶
- Depth:
- This field specifies how far a packet should be searched for the specified content pattern defined in the content field. If this field is undefined, then the content pattern should be searched within the whole payload.¶
- Starting-point:
- This field specifies the starting point of matching the content pattern to the payload. If this field is undefined, then the content pattern should be searched from the beginning of the payload. The starting point can be defined by either the offset value or distance value. The offset keyword specifies where to start searching for the specified content pattern. The offset is calculated from the beginning of the payload. The distance keyword specifies how far a payload should be ignored before starting to search for the specified content pattern relative to the end of the previous specified content pattern match. This can be thought of as exactly the same thing as offset, except it is relative to the end of the last pattern match instead of the beginning of the packet. Note that this field cannot be used if the content is the first order of the list.¶
+--rw payload-content* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw description? string
+--rw contents* [content]
+--rw content binary
+--rw depth? uint16
+--rw (starting-point)?
+--:(offset)
| +--rw offset? int32
+--:(distance)
+--rw distance? int32
6. YANG Data Model of Consumer-Facing Interface
The main objective of this document is to provide the YANG data model of the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface. This interface can be used to deliver control and management messages between an I2NSF User and Security Controller for the I2NSF User's high-level security policies.¶
The semantics of the data model is aligned with the information model of the Consumer-Facing Interface. This data model is designed to support the I2NSF framework that can be extended according to the security needs. In other words, the model design is independent of the content and meaning of specific policies as well as the implementation approach.¶
With the YANG data model of I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface, this document provides examples for security policy rules such as time-based firewall, VoIP/VoCN security service, and DDoS-attack mitigation in Section 7.¶
6.1. YANG Module of Consumer-Facing Interface
This section describes a YANG module of Consumer-Facing Interface. This document provides identities in the data model to be used for configuration of an NSF. Each identity is used for a different type of configuration. The details are explained in the description of each identity. This YANG module imports from [RFC6991] and [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model]. It makes references to [RFC0768] [RFC0792] [RFC0854] [RFC0959] [RFC1939] [RFC2595] [RFC3022] [RFC3261] [RFC3986] [RFC4250] [RFC4340] [RFC4443] [RFC5321] [RFC5646] [RFC8075] [RFC8335] [RFC8727] [RFC9051] [RFC9110] [RFC9112] [RFC9113] [RFC9260] [RFC9293] [GLOB] [IANA-ICMP-Parameters] [IANA-ICMPv6-Parameters] [ISO-3166-1alpha2] [ISO-3166-2] [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model] [MISPCORE] [OPENIOC] [STIX]¶
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface@2023-05-15.yang"
module ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface";
prefix
i2nsfcfi;
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix inet;
reference "RFC 6991";
}
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference "RFC 6991";
}
import ietf-i2nsf-monitoring-interface {
prefix i2nsfmi;
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-20";
// RFC Ed.: replace with an actual RFC number and remove
// this note.
}
organization
"IETF I2NSF (Interface to Network Security Functions)
Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/i2nsf>
WG List: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
Editor: Jaehoon Paul Jeong
<mailto:pauljeong@skku.edu>
Editor: Patrick Lingga
<mailto:patricklink@skku.edu>";
description
"This module is a YANG module for Consumer-Facing Interface.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
(RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear
in all capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself
for full legal notices.";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove
// this note.
revision "2023-05-15" {
description "Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove
// this note.
}
identity priority-usage {
description
"Base identity for priority usage type to define the type of
priority to be implemented in a security policy rule, such
as priority by order and priority by number.";
}
identity priority-by-order {
base priority-usage;
description
"This indicates that the priority of a security policy rule
follows the user's input order of the configuration. The earlier
the configuration is, the higher the priority is.";
}
identity priority-by-number {
base priority-usage;
description
"This indicates the priority of a security policy rule follows
the priority number or value of the configuration. The higher
the value is, the higher the priority is.";
}
identity resolution-strategy {
description
"Base identity for resolution strategy.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Resolution Strategy";
}
identity fmr {
base resolution-strategy;
description
"Conflict resolution with First Matching Rule (FMR).";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Resolution Strategy";
}
identity lmr {
base resolution-strategy;
description
"Conflict resolution with Last Matching Rule (LMR).";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Resolution Strategy";
}
identity pmre {
base resolution-strategy;
description
"Conflict resolution with Prioritized Matching Rule with
Errors (PMRE).";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Resolution Strategy";
}
identity pmrn {
base resolution-strategy;
description
"Conflict resolution with Prioritized Matching Rule with
No Errors (PMRN).";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Resolution Strategy";
}
identity action {
description
"Base identity for action.";
}
identity primary-action {
base action;
description
"Base identity for primary action. Primary action is an action
that handles the forwarding of the packets or flows in an
NSF.";
}
identity secondary-action {
base action;
description
"Base identity for secondary action. Secondary action is an
action in the background that does not affect the network,
such as logging.";
}
identity ingress-action {
base primary-action;
description
"Base identity for ingress action. This action is to handle the
network traffic that is entering the secured network.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Ingress Action";
}
identity egress-action {
base primary-action;
description
"Base identity for egress action. This action is to handle the
network traffic that is exiting the secured network.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Egress Action";
}
identity pass {
base ingress-action;
base egress-action;
description
"The pass action allows traffic that matches
the rule to proceed through the NSF to reach the
destination.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Actions and
Default Action";
}
identity drop {
base ingress-action;
base egress-action;
description
"The drop action denies the traffic that
matches the rule. The drop action should do a silent drop,
which does not give any response to the source.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Actions and
Default Action";
}
identity reject {
base ingress-action;
base egress-action;
description
"The reject action denies a packet to go through the NSF
entering or exiting the internal network and sends a response
back to the source. The response depends on the packet and
implementation. For example, a packet may be rejected with
an ICMPv4 Type 3 Code 13 or ICMPv6 Type 1 Code 1 reply message
(i.e., Destination Unreachable: Communication Administratively
Prohibited) by an administrative purpose (e.g., firewall
filter).";
}
identity mirror {
base ingress-action;
base egress-action;
description
"The mirror action copies a packet and sends the packet's copy
to the monitoring entity while still allowing the packet or
flow to go through the NSF.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Actions and
Default Action";
}
identity rate-limit {
base ingress-action;
base egress-action;
description
"The rate limit action limits the number of packets or flows
that can go through the NSF by dropping packets or flows
(randomly or systematically). The drop mechanism, e.g., silent
drop and unreachable drop (i.e., reject), is up to the
implementation.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Actions and
Default Action";
}
identity invoke-signaling {
base egress-action;
description
"The invoke-signaling action is used to convey information of
the event triggering this action to a monitoring entity.";
}
identity tunnel-encapsulation {
base egress-action;
description
"The tunnel encapsulation action is used to encapsulate the
packet to be tunneled across the network to enable a secure
connection.";
}
identity forwarding {
base egress-action;
description
"The forwarding action is used to relay the packet from one
network segment to another node in the network.";
}
identity transformation {
base egress-action;
description
"The transformation action is used to transform a packet by
modifying it (e.g., HTTP-to-CoAP packet translation).
Note that a subset of transformation (e.g., HTTP-to-CoAP) is
handled in this YANG module, rather than all the existing
transformations. Specific algorithmic transformations can be
executed by a middlebox (e.g., NSF) for a given transformation
name.";
reference
"RFC 8075: Guidelines for Mapping Implementations: HTTP to the
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) - Translation between
HTTP and CoAP.";
}
identity log-action {
base secondary-action;
description
"Base identity for log action.";
}
identity rule-log {
base log-action;
description
"Log the policy rule that has been triggered by a packet or
flow.";
}
identity session-log {
base log-action;
description
"A session is a connection (i.e., traffic flow) of a data plane
that includes source and destination information of IP
addresses and transport port numbers with the protocol used.
Log the session that triggered a policy rule.";
}
identity icmp-message {
description
"Base identity for ICMP Message types. Note that this YANG
module only provides ICMP messages that are shared between
ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 (e.g., Destination Unreachable: Port
Unreachable which is ICMPv4 type 3 code 3 or ICMPv6 type 1
code 4).";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol
RFC 8335: PROBE: A Utility for Probing Interfaces
IANA: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
Parameters
IANA: Internet Control Message Protocol version 6
(ICMPv6) Parameters";
}
identity echo-reply {
base icmp-message;
description
"Identity for 'Echo Reply' ICMP message type 0 in ICMPv4 or
type 129 in ICMPv6.";
}
identity destination-unreachable {
base icmp-message;
description
"Identity for 'Destination Unreachable' ICMP message type 3 in
ICMPv4 or type 1 in ICMPv6.";
}
identity redirect {
base icmp-message;
description
"Identity for 'Redirect' ICMP message type 5 in ICMPv4
or type 137 in ICMPv6.";
}
identity echo {
base icmp-message;
description
"Identity for 'Echo' ICMP message type 8 in ICMPv4 or type 128
in ICMPv6.";
}
identity router-advertisement {
base icmp-message;
description
"Identity for 'Router Advertisement' ICMP message type 9 in
ICMPv4 or type 134 in ICMPv6.";
}
identity router-solicitation {
base icmp-message;
description
"Identity for 'Router Solicitation' ICMP message type 10 in
ICMPv4 or type 135 in ICMPv6.";
}
identity time-exceeded {
base icmp-message;
description
"Identity for 'Time exceeded' ICMP message type 11 in ICMPv4
or type 3 in ICMPv6.";
}
identity parameter-problem {
base icmp-message;
description
"Identity for 'Parameter Problem' ICMP message type 12 in
ICMPv4 or type 4 in ICMPv6.";
}
identity experimental-mobility-protocols {
base icmp-message;
description
"Identity for 'Experimental Mobility Protocols' ICMP message
type 41 in ICMPv4 or type 150 in ICMPv6.";
}
identity extended-echo-request {
base icmp-message;
description
"Identity for 'Extended Echo Request' ICMP message type 42
in ICMPv4 or type 160 in ICMPv6.";
}
identity extended-echo-reply {
base icmp-message;
description
"Identity for 'Extended Echo Reply' ICMP message type 43 in
ICMPv4 or type 161 in ICMPv6.";
}
identity port-unreachable {
base destination-unreachable;
description
"Identity for port unreachable in destination unreachable
message (i.e., ICMPv4 type 3 code 3 or ICMPv6 type 1 code 4).";
}
identity request-no-error {
base extended-echo-request;
description
"Identity for request with no error in extended echo request
message (i.e., ICMPv4 type 42 code 0 or ICMPv6 type 160
code 0).";
}
identity reply-no-error {
base extended-echo-reply;
description
"Identity for reply with no error in extended echo reply
message (i.e., ICMPv4 type 43 code 0 or ICMPv6 type 161
code 0).";
}
identity malformed-query {
base extended-echo-reply;
description
"Identity for malformed query in extended echo reply message
(i.e., ICMPv4 type 43 code 1 or ICMPv6 type 161 code 1).";
}
identity no-such-interface {
base extended-echo-reply;
description
"Identity for no such interface in extended echo reply message
(i.e., ICMPv4 type 43 code 2 or ICMPv6 type 161 code 2).";
}
identity no-such-table-entry {
base extended-echo-reply;
description
"Identity for no such table entry in extended echo reply
message (i.e., ICMPv4 type 43 code 3 or ICMPv6 type 161
code 3).";
}
identity multiple-interfaces-satisfy-query {
base extended-echo-reply;
description
"Identity for multiple interfaces satisfy query in extended
echo reply message (i.e., ICMPv4 type 43 code 4 or ICMPv6
type 161 code 4).";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol
RFC 8335: PROBE: A Utility for Probing Interfaces";
}
identity ioc-format {
description
"This represents the base identity for the format of the
Indicators of Compromise (IOC).";
}
identity stix {
base ioc-format;
description
"This represents the Structured Threat Information Expression
(STIX) format in JSON.";
reference
"STIX: Structured Threat Information Expression version 2.1 - JSON
format";
}
identity misp {
base ioc-format;
description
"This represents the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP)
Core format.";
reference
"MISPCORE: Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) Core
Format";
}
identity openioc {
base ioc-format;
description
"This represents the OpenIOC format.";
reference
"OPENIOC: OpenIOC 1.1 Schema document";
}
identity iodef {
base ioc-format;
description
"This represents the Incident Object Description Exchange Format
(IODEF) format.";
reference
"RFC 8727: JSON Binding of the Incident Object Description
Exchange Format";
}
identity device-type {
description
"Base identity for types of device. This identity is used for
type of the device for the source or destination of a packet
or traffic flow.";
}
identity computer {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for computer such as personal computer (PC)
and server.";
}
identity mobile-phone {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for mobile-phone such as smartphone and
cellphone.";
}
identity voip-vocn-phone {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) or VoCN
(Voice over Cellular Network, such as Voice over LTE or 5G)
phone.";
}
identity tablet {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for tablet devices.";
}
identity network-infrastructure-device {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for network infrastructure devices
such as switch, router, and access point";
}
identity iot-device {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for Internet of Things (IoT) devices
such as sensors, actuators, and low-power
low-capacity computing devices.";
}
identity ot {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for Operational Technology (OT) devices (also
known as industrial control systems) that interact
with the physical environment and detect or cause direct
change through the monitoring and control of devices,
processes, and events such as programmable logic
controllers (PLCs), digital oscilloscopes, building
management systems (BMS), and fire control systems.";
}
identity vehicle {
base device-type;
description
"Identity for transportation vehicles that connect to and
share data through the Internet over Vehicle-to-Everything
(V2X) communications.";
}
/*
* Typedefs
*/
typedef time {
type string {
pattern '(0[0-9]|1[0-9]|2[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]:[0-5][0-9](\.[0-9]+)?'
+ '(Z|[\+\-]((1[0-3]|0[0-9]):([0-5][0-9])|14:00))?';
}
description
"The time type represents an instance of time of zero-duration
in the specified timezone that recurs every day.";
}
typedef day {
type enumeration {
enum monday {
description
"This represents Monday.";
}
enum tuesday {
description
"This represents Tuesday.";
}
enum wednesday {
description
"This represents Wednesday";
}
enum thursday {
description
"This represents Thursday.";
}
enum friday {
description
"This represents Friday.";
}
enum saturday {
description
"This represents Saturday.";
}
enum sunday {
description
"This represents Sunday.";
}
}
description
"The type for representing the day of the week.";
}
/*
* Groupings
*/
grouping ip-address-info {
description
"There are two types to configure a security policy
for an IP address, such as IPv4 address and IPv6 address.";
choice match-type {
description
"User can choose between IPv4 and IPv6.";
case ipv4 {
choice ipv4-range-or-prefix {
description
"User can choose between IPv4 address range and
prefix type.";
case prefix {
leaf-list ipv4-prefix {
type inet:ipv4-prefix;
description
"The IPv4 addresses in a prefix type.";
}
}
case range {
list range-ipv4-address {
key "start end";
leaf start {
type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
mandatory true;
description
"A start IPv4 address for a range match.";
}
leaf end {
type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
mandatory true;
description
"An end IPv4 address for a range match.";
}
description
"A range match for IPv4 addresses is provided.
The ranges are inclusive, i.e., the range values
include the value of 'start' and 'end'.
Note that the start IPv4 address must be lower than
the end IPv4 address.";
}
}
}
}
case ipv6 {
choice ipv6-range-or-prefix {
description
"User can choose between IPv6 address range and
prefix type.";
case prefix {
leaf-list ipv6-prefix {
type inet:ipv6-prefix;
description
"The IPv6 addresses in a prefix type.";
}
}
case range {
list range-ipv6-address {
key "start end";
leaf start {
type inet:ipv6-address-no-zone;
mandatory true;
description
"A start IPv6 address for a range match.";
}
leaf end {
type inet:ipv6-address-no-zone;
mandatory true;
description
"An end IPv6 address for a range match.";
}
description
"A range match for IPv6 addresses is provided.
The ranges are inclusive, i.e., the range values
include the value of 'start' and 'end'.
Note that the start IPv6 address must be lower than
the end IPv6 address.";
}
}
}
}
}
}
grouping user-group {
description
"This group represents user group information to label MAC
addresses and IP (IPv4 or IPv6) addresses as a group of users.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"This represents the name of a user-group. A user-group name
is used to map a user-group's name (e.g., employees) to IP
address(es), MAC address(es).
It is dependent on implementation.";
}
leaf-list mac-address {
type yang:mac-address;
description
"Represent the MAC Address of a user-group. A user-group
can have multiple MAC Addresses.";
}
uses ip-address-info {
description
"This represents the IP addresses of a user-group.";
refine match-type {
mandatory true;
}
}
}
grouping device-group {
description
"This group represents device group information to label
IP (IPv4 or IPv6) addresses that provide services hosted
on the application protocol.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"This represents the name of a device-group.";
}
uses ip-address-info{
description
"This represents the IP addresses of a device-group.";
refine match-type{
mandatory true;
}
}
leaf-list application-protocol {
type identityref {
base i2nsfmi:application-protocol;
}
description
"This represents the application layer protocols of devices.
If this is not set, it cannot support the appropriate
protocol.";
}
}
grouping location-group {
description
"This group represents location-group information to map
IPv4 or IPv6 address to the geographical location.";
leaf country {
type string {
length "2";
pattern "[a-zA-Z]{2}";
}
description
"This represents the 2-letter ISO country code conforming to
ISO3166-1 alpha 2. Examples include 'US' for United States,
'JP' for Japan, and 'PL' for Poland.";
reference
"ISO 3166-1: Decoding table alpha-2 country code";
}
leaf region {
type string {
length "5..6";
pattern "[a-zA-Z]{2}-[a-zA-Z0-9]{2,3}";
}
description
"This represents the ISO region code conforming to ISO 3166-2.
Examples include 'ID-RI' for Riau province of Indonesia and
'NG-RI' for the Rivers province in Nigeria.";
reference
"ISO 3166-2: 3166-2 subdivision code";
}
leaf city {
type string;
description
"This represents the city of a region in English. Examples
include 'Dublin', 'New York', and 'Sao Paulo'.";
}
uses ip-address-info{
refine match-type{
mandatory true;
description
"This represents the IP addresses of a location-group.";
}
}
}
grouping payload-string {
description
"The grouping for payload-string content. It contains
information such as name and string content.";
}
list i2nsf-cfi-policy {
key "name";
description
"This is a security policy list. Each policy in the list
contains a list of security policy rules, and is a policy
instance to have the information of where and when a policy
needs to be applied.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"The name which identifies the policy.";
}
leaf language {
type string {
pattern '((([A-Za-z]{2,3}(-[A-Za-z]{3}(-[A-Za-z]{3})'
+ '{0,2})?)|[A-Za-z]{4}|[A-Za-z]{5,8})(-[A-Za-z]{4})?'
+ '(-([A-Za-z]{2}|[0-9]{3}))?(-([A-Za-z0-9]{5,8}'
+ '|([0-9][A-Za-z0-9]{3})))*(-[0-9A-WYZa-wyz]'
+ '(-([A-Za-z0-9]{2,8}))+)*(-[Xx](-([A-Za-z0-9]'
+ '{1,8}))+)?|[Xx](-([A-Za-z0-9]{1,8}))+|'
+ '(([Ee][Nn]-[Gg][Bb]-[Oo][Ee][Dd]|[Ii]-'
+ '[Aa][Mm][Ii]|[Ii]-[Bb][Nn][Nn]|[Ii]-'
+ '[Dd][Ee][Ff][Aa][Uu][Ll][Tt]|[Ii]-'
+ '[Ee][Nn][Oo][Cc][Hh][Ii][Aa][Nn]'
+ '|[Ii]-[Hh][Aa][Kk]|'
+ '[Ii]-[Kk][Ll][Ii][Nn][Gg][Oo][Nn]|'
+ '[Ii]-[Ll][Uu][Xx]|[Ii]-[Mm][Ii][Nn][Gg][Oo]|'
+ '[Ii]-[Nn][Aa][Vv][Aa][Jj][Oo]|[Ii]-[Pp][Ww][Nn]|'
+ '[Ii]-[Tt][Aa][Oo]|[Ii]-[Tt][Aa][Yy]|'
+ '[Ii]-[Tt][Ss][Uu]|[Ss][Gg][Nn]-[Bb][Ee]-[Ff][Rr]|'
+ '[Ss][Gg][Nn]-[Bb][Ee]-[Nn][Ll]|[Ss][Gg][Nn]-'
+ '[Cc][Hh]-[Dd][Ee])|([Aa][Rr][Tt]-'
+ '[Ll][Oo][Jj][Bb][Aa][Nn]|[Cc][Ee][Ll]-'
+ '[Gg][Aa][Uu][Ll][Ii][Ss][Hh]|'
+ '[Nn][Oo]-[Bb][Oo][Kk]|[Nn][Oo]-'
+ '[Nn][Yy][Nn]|[Zz][Hh]-[Gg][Uu][Oo][Yy][Uu]|'
+ '[Zz][Hh]-[Hh][Aa][Kk][Kk][Aa]|[Zz][Hh]-'
+ '[Mm][Ii][Nn]|[Zz][Hh]-[Mm][Ii][Nn]-'
+ '[Nn][Aa][Nn]|[Zz][Hh]-[Xx][Ii][Aa][Nn][Gg])))';
}
default "en-US";
description
"The value in this field indicates the language tag
used for all of the 'leaf description' described in the
'i2nsf-cfi-policy'.
The attribute is encoded following the rules in Section 2.1
in RFC 5646. The default language tag is 'en-US'.";
reference
"RFC 5646: Tags for Identifying Languages";
}
leaf priority-usage {
type identityref {
base priority-usage;
}
default priority-by-order;
description
"Priority usage type for security policy rule:
priority by order and priority by number";
}
leaf resolution-strategy {
type identityref {
base resolution-strategy;
}
default fmr;
description
"The resolution strategies that can be used to
specify how to resolve conflicts that occur between
actions of the same or different policy rules that
are matched and contained in this particular NSF.";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Resolution strategy";
}
list rules {
key "name";
description
"There can be a single or multiple number of rules.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"This represents the name for a rule. Each rule name must
be unique. Note that since this name is a key in the
list of rules, its uniqueness is verified.";
}
leaf priority {
when "derived-from-or-self(../../priority-usage,"
+ "'priority-by-number')";
type uint8;
description
"The priority of the rule to indicate the order of the rules
to be matched. A higher value means a higher priority.
The packet or flow will be matched with the rule with
the highest priority value first and continues to a lower
priority value. Once a rule matches the packet or flow,
the NSF should execute the rule and terminate the matching
process. If multiple rules have an equal priority, the
actual order is undefined. The handling of the selection
of those rules depends on the implementer, e.g.,
an alphabetical order of the rules' names or a random rule
selection.";
}
container event {
description
"This represents an event (i.e., a security event), for
which a security rule is made.";
leaf-list system-event {
type identityref {
base i2nsfmi:system-event;
}
description
"The security policy rule according to
system events.";
}
leaf-list system-alarm {
type identityref {
base i2nsfmi:system-alarm;
}
description
"The security policy rule according to
system alarms.";
}
}
container condition {
description
"Conditions for general security policies. All configured
conditions must match for a rule to trigger.";
container firewall {
description
"A general firewall condition based on the packet
header.";
leaf-list source {
type union {
type leafref {
path "/endpoint-groups/user-group/name";
}
type leafref {
path "/endpoint-groups/device-group/name";
}
}
description
"This describes the path of the source.";
}
leaf-list destination {
type union {
type leafref {
path "/endpoint-groups/user-group/name";
}
type leafref {
path "/endpoint-groups/device-group/name";
}
}
description
"This describes the path to the destinations.";
}
leaf transport-layer-protocol {
type identityref {
base i2nsfmi:transport-protocol;
}
description
"The transport-layer protocol to be matched.";
}
list range-port-number {
key "start end";
leaf start {
type inet:port-number;
description
"A start port number for a range match.";
}
leaf end {
type inet:port-number;
must '. >= ../start' {
error-message
"An end port number MUST be equal to or greater than
a start port number.";
}
description
"An end port number for a range match.";
}
description
"A range match for transport-layer port number.
The ranges are inclusive, i.e., the range values include
the value of 'start' and 'end'. Note that the start port
number value must be lower than the end port number
value.";
}
container icmp {
description
"Represents the ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 packet header
information to determine if the set of policy
actions in this ECA policy rule should be executed
or not.";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol
RFC 8335: PROBE: A Utility for Probing Interfaces";
leaf-list message {
type identityref {
base icmp-message;
}
description
"The security policy rule according to
ICMP message. The type is representing the
ICMP message corresponds to the ICMP type and
code.";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol
RFC 8335: PROBE: A Utility for Probing Interfaces
IANA: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
Parameters
IANA: Internet Control Message Protocol version 6
(ICMPv6) Parameters";
}
}
}
container ddos {
description
"A condition for a DDoS attack.";
container rate-limit {
description
"This describes the rate-limit.";
leaf packet-rate-threshold {
type uint64;
units "pps";
description
"This is a trigger value for a rate limit of packet
rate in packets per second (pps) for a
DDoS-attack mitigation.";
}
leaf byte-rate-threshold {
type uint64;
units "Bps";
description
"This is a trigger value for a rate limit of byte
rate in bytes per second (Bps) for a DDoS-attack
mitigation.";
}
leaf flow-rate-threshold {
type uint64;
description
"This is a trigger value for a rate limit of flow
creating request rate (e.g., new TCP connection
establishment) in flows per second for a DDoS-attack
mitigation.";
}
}
}
container anti-virus {
description
"A condition for Antivirus service";
leaf-list profile {
type string;
description
"The path or name of the file that contains a security
profile for the Antivirus service configuration. The
security profile is used to scan the viruses. The
absolute path and relative ones are to be interpreted as
globs.";
reference
"GLOB: The Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7 - glob";
}
leaf-list exception-files {
type string;
description
"The type or name of the files to be excluded by the
Antivirus service. This can be used to keep the known
harmless files. Absolute paths are filenames/paths
to be excluded, and relative ones are interpreted as
globs.";
reference
"GLOB: The Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7 - glob";
}
}
container payload {
description
"A condition based on a packet's content.";
leaf-list content {
type leafref {
path "/threat-prevention/payload-content/name";
}
description
"This describes the paths to a packet content's.";
}
}
container url-category {
description
"Condition for url category.";
leaf url-name {
type leafref {
path "/endpoint-groups/url-group/name";
}
description
"This is description for the condition of a URL's
category such as SNS sites, game sites, e-commerce
sites, company sites, and university sites.";
}
}
container voice {
description
"For the VoIP/VoCN security system, a VoIP/
VoCN security system can monitor each
VoIP/VoCN flow and manage VoIP/VoCN
security rules controlled by a centralized
server for VoIP/VoCN security service
(called VoIP IPS). The VoIP/VoCN security
system controls each switch for the
VoIP/VoCN call flow management by
manipulating the rules that can be added,
deleted, or modified dynamically.
Note that VoIP is Voice over Internet Protocol
and VoCN is Voice over Cellular Network such as
Voice over LTE or 5G.";
reference
"RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol";
leaf-list source-id {
type leafref {
path "/endpoint-groups/voice-group/name";
}
description
"The security policy rule according to
the 'From' header field of the SIP.";
reference
"RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol
- Section 8.1.1.3 (From)";
}
leaf-list destination-id {
type leafref {
path "/endpoint-groups/voice-group/name";
}
description
"The security policy rule according to
the 'To' header field of the SIP.";
reference
"RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol
- Section 8.1.1.2 (To)";
}
leaf-list user-agent {
type string;
description
"The security policy rule according to
the 'user-agent' field of the SIP.";
reference
"RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol
- Section 20.41 (User-Agent)";
}
}
container context {
description
"Condition for matching the context of the packet, such
as geographic location, time, packet direction.";
container time {
description
"The time when a security policy rule should be
applied.";
leaf start-date-time {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"This is the start date and time for a security
policy rule.";
}
leaf end-date-time {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"This is the end date and time for a security policy
rule. The policy rule will stop working after the
specified end date and time.";
}
container period {
when
"../frequency!='only-once'";
description
"This represents the repetition time.";
leaf start-time {
type time;
description
"This is a period's start time for an event.";
}
leaf end-time {
type time;
description
"This is a period's end time for an event.";
}
leaf-list day {
when
"../../frequency='weekly'";
type day;
min-elements 1;
description
"This represents the repeated day of every week
(e.g., Monday and Tuesday). More than one day can
be specified.";
}
leaf-list date {
when
"../../frequency='monthly'";
type int8 {
range "1..31";
}
min-elements 1;
description
"This represents the repeated day of every month.
More than one date can be specified.";
}
list month {
when
"../../frequency='yearly'";
key "start end";
leaf start {
type string {
pattern '\d{2}-\d{2}';
}
description
"The starting range of the month and date of every
year. A pattern used here is Month and Date
(MM-DD).";
}
leaf end {
type string {
pattern '\d{2}-\d{2}';
}
description
"The ending range of the month and date of every
year. A pattern used here is Month and Date
(MM-DD). The 'end' value must be greater than or
equal to the 'start' value.";
}
min-elements 1;
description
"This represents the repeated month and date of
every year. More than one range can be specified.
If one specific month and date is needed, then set
both start and end to the same value.
Note that the ranges are inclusive, i.e., the range
values include the values of start and end.";
}
}
leaf frequency {
type enumeration {
enum only-once {
description
"This represents that the rule is immediately
enforced only once and not repeated. The policy
will continuously be active from the
start-date-time to the end-date-time.";
}
enum daily {
description
"This represents that the rule is enforced on a
daily basis. The policy will be repeated daily
until the end-date-time.";
}
enum weekly {
description
"This represents that the rule is enforced on a
weekly basis. The policy will be repeated weekly
until the end-date-time. The repeated days can
be specified.";
}
enum monthly {
description
"This represents that the rule is enforced on a
monthly basis. The policy will be repeated
monthly until the end-date-time.";
}
enum yearly {
description
"This represents that the rule is enforced on a
yearly basis. The policy will be repeated
yearly until the end-date-time.";
}
}
default only-once;
description
"This represents how frequently the rule should be
enforced.";
}
}
container application {
description
"Condition for application.";
leaf-list protocol {
type identityref {
base i2nsfmi:application-protocol;
}
description
"The condition based on the application layer
protocol";
}
}
container device-type {
description
"Condition for type of the destination device.";
leaf-list device {
type identityref {
base device-type;
}
description
"The device attribute that can identify a device (i.e.,
computer, mobile phone, smartphone, VoIP/VoCN phone,
tablet, network infrastructure device, IoT device,
OT device, and vehicle).";
}
}
container users {
description
"Condition for users.";
list user {
key "id";
description
"The user with which the traffic flow is associated
can be identified by either a user ID or username.
The user-to-IP address mapping is assumed to be
provided by the unified user management system via
network.";
leaf id {
type uint32;
description
"The ID of the user.";
}
leaf name {
type string;
description
"The name of the user.";
}
}
list group {
key "id";
description
"The user group with which the traffic flow is
associated can be identified by either a group ID
or group name. The group-to-IP address and
user-to-group mappings are assumed to be provided by
the unified user management system via network.";
leaf id {
type uint32;
description
"The ID of the group.";
}
leaf name {
type string;
description
"The name of the group.";
}
}
}
container geographic-location {
description
"A condition for a location-based connection.";
container source {
leaf country {
type leafref {
path "/endpoint-groups/location-group/country";
}
description
"The name of the country in the 2-letter ISO country
code conforming to ISO3166-1 alpha-2.";
reference
"ISO 3166-1: Decoding table alpha-2 country code";
}
leaf region {
type leafref {
path "/endpoint-groups/location-group/region";
}
description
"The region code conforming to ISO 3166-2.";
reference
"ISO 3166-2: 3166-2 subdivision code.";
}
leaf city {
type leafref {
path "/endpoint-groups/location-group/city";
}
description
"The name of the city of the location.";
}
description
"This describes the paths to a location's source.
The values in this field will be mapped into
either IPv4 or IPv6 addresses defined in
/endpoint-groups/location-group.";
}
container destination {
leaf country {
type leafref {
path "/endpoint-groups/location-group/country";
}
description
"The name of the country in the 2-letter ISO country
code conforming to ISO3166-1 alpha-2.";
reference
"ISO 3166-1: Decoding table alpha-2 country code";
}
leaf region {
type leafref {
path "/endpoint-groups/location-group/region";
}
description
"The region code conforming to ISO 3166-2.";
reference
"ISO 3166-2: 3166-2 subdivision code.";
}
leaf city {
type leafref {
path "/endpoint-groups/location-group/city";
}
description
"The name of the city of the location.";
}
description
"This describes the paths to a location's
destination. The values in this field will be
mapped into either IPv4 or IPv6 addresses defined in
/endpoint-groups/location-group.";
}
}
}
container threat-feed {
description
"A condition based on the threat-feed information.";
leaf-list name {
type leafref {
path "/threat-prevention/threat-feed-list/name";
}
description
"This describes the paths to a threat-feed's sources.";
}
}
}
container action {
description
"This is the action container.";
container primary-action {
description
"This represents primary actions (e.g., ingress and
egress actions) to be applied to a condition.
If this is not set, it cannot support the primary
actions.";
leaf action {
type identityref {
base primary-action;
}
mandatory true;
description
"Ingress actions: pass, drop, reject, rate-limit,
and mirror.
Egress actions: pass, drop, reject, rate-limit,
mirror, invoke-signaling, tunnel-encapsulation,
forward, and transform.";
}
leaf limit {
when "../action = 'i2nsfcfi:rate-limit'" {
description
"Rate-limit is valid only when rate-limit action is
used.";
}
type decimal64 {
fraction-digits 2;
}
units "bytes per second";
description
"Specifies how to rate-limit the traffic.";
}
}
container secondary-action {
description
"This represents secondary actions (e.g., log and syslog)
to be applied if they are needed. If this is not set,
it cannot support the secondary actions.";
leaf log-action {
type identityref {
base secondary-action;
}
description
"Log action: rule log and session log.";
}
}
}
}
}
container endpoint-groups {
description
"A logical entity in a business environment, where a security
policy is to be applied.";
list user-group{
uses user-group;
key "name";
description
"This represents a user group.";
}
list device-group {
key "name";
uses device-group;
description
"This represents a device group.";
}
list location-group{
key "country region city";
uses location-group;
description
"This represents a location group.";
}
list url-group {
key "name";
description
"This describes the list of URL.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"This is the name of URL group, e.g., SNS sites,
gaming sites, and e-commerce sites.";
}
leaf-list url {
type inet:uri;
description
"Specifies the URL to be added into the group.";
reference
"RFC 3986: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic
Syntax";
}
}
list voice-group {
key "name";
description
"This describes the list of Voice ID.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"This is the name of the voice group.";
}
leaf-list sip-id {
type inet:uri;
description
"Specifies the logical identity of the SIP user written in
SIP URI scheme.";
reference
"RFC3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol
- Section 19.1.1 (SIP and SIPS URI Components)";
}
}
}
container threat-prevention {
description
"The container for threat-prevention.";
list threat-feed-list {
key "name";
description
"There can be a single or multiple number of
threat-feeds.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"This represents the name of the threat-feed.";
}
leaf-list ioc {
type string;
description
"This field represents the Indicators of Compromise (IOC),
i.e., the critical information of patterns or characteristics
(signatures) in the threat feed that identifies malicious
activities. The format of the information given in this field
should be parsed based on the format field (e.g., STIX, MISP,
OpenIOC, and IODEF).";
}
leaf format {
type identityref {
base ioc-format;
}
mandatory true;
description
"This represents the format of the IOC information. This
field is mandatory to parse the IOC. The examples of the
format are STIX, MISP, OpenIOC, and IODEF.";
reference
"STIX: Structured Threat Information Expression version 2.1
MISPCORE: Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) Core
Format
OPENIOC: OpenIOC 1.1 Schema document
RFC 8727: JSON Binding of the Incident Object Description
Exchange Format";
}
}
list payload-content {
key "name";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"This represents the name of a packet's payload-content.
It should give an idea of why a specific payload content
is marked as a threat. For example, the name 'backdoor'
indicates the payload content is related to a backdoor
attack.";
}
leaf description {
type string;
description
"This represents the description of a payload. Describe
how the payload contents are related to a security
attack.";
}
list contents {
key "content";
ordered-by user;
leaf content {
type binary;
description
"This represents the pattern of the payload contents (i.e.,
the data after a transport layer header) to be matched.
Due to the types of threats, the type of the content is
defined as a binary to accommodate any kind of payload
type such as HTTP, HTTPS, and SIP.
If multiple instances of contents are defined, all
defined contents must be matched somewhere in the session
stream. The content pattern should be matched based on
the order given by the user. The scope of the payload to be
matched can be defined by the depth and offset/distance
fields.";
}
leaf depth {
type uint16 {
range "1..max";
}
units "bytes";
description
"The field specifies how far a packet should be searched
for the specified content pattern defined in the content
field. For example, a depth of 5 means to only look for
the specified content pattern within the first 5 bytes
of the payload. This field accepts values greater than or
equal to the content length being searched. If this
field is undefined, then the content pattern should be
searched within the whole payload.";
}
choice starting-point {
description
"Choice of how to specify the starting point of matching
the pattern to the payload. If this field is undefined,
then the content pattern should be searched from the
beginning of the payload.";
case offset {
leaf offset {
type int32;
units "bytes";
description
"The field specifies where to start searching for the
specified content pattern within the payload.
For example, an offset of 5 means to start looking for
the specified content pattern after the first 5 bytes
of the payload. A negative value means to start from
the last bytes of the payload. For example, an offset
of -5 means to start looking for the specified content
pattern from the last 5 bytes of the payload.";
}
}
case distance {
leaf distance {
type int32;
units "bytes";
description
"The field specifies how far a payload should be
ignored before starting to search for the specified
content pattern relative to the end of the previous
specified content pattern match. This can be thought
of as exactly the same thing as offset, except it is
relative to the end of the last pattern match instead
of the beginning of the packet. For example, a distance
of 5 means to start looking for the specified content
pattern 5 bytes after the last byte of the matched
pattern. A negative value means to start looking before
the last byte of the previous matched pattern. For
example, a distance of -5 means to start looking for
the specified content pattern 5 bytes before the last
byte of the previous matched pattern.
Note that this field cannot be used if the content is
the first order of the list.";
}
}
}
description
"List of contents and their scopes for matching content
pattern with the payload.";
}
description
"This represents a payload-string group.";
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
7. XML Configuration Examples of High-Level Security Policy Rules
This section shows XML configuration examples of high-level security policy rules that are delivered from the I2NSF User to the Security Controller over the Consumer-Facing Interface. The considered examples are: Database registration, time-based firewall for web filtering, VoIP/VoCN security service, and DDoS-attack mitigation.¶
7.1. Database Registration: Information of Positions and Devices (Endpoint Group)
The endpoint-group is used to register known network nodes and label them into a higher-level name (i.e., human recognizable language). If new endpoints are introduced to the network, it is necessary to first register their data to the database. For example, if new members are newly introduced in different groups (i.e., user-group, device-group, url-group, and voice-group), each of them should be registered as separate entities with their corresponding information.¶
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<endpoint-groups
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface"
xmlns:i2nsfmi="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-monitoring-interface">
<user-group>
<name>employees</name>
<range-ipv4-address>
<start>192.0.2.11</start>
<end>192.0.2.90</end>
</range-ipv4-address>
</user-group>
<device-group>
<name>webservers</name>
<range-ipv4-address>
<start>198.51.100.11</start>
<end>198.51.100.20</end>
</range-ipv4-address>
<application-protocol>i2nsfmi:http</application-protocol>
<application-protocol>i2nsfmi:https</application-protocol>
</device-group>
<url-group>
<name>sns-websites</name>
<url>https://www.example.com/</url>
<url>https://www.example.net/</url>
</url-group>
<voice-group>
<name>malicious-id</name>
<sip-id>sip:alice@example.org</sip-id>
<sip-id>sip:bob@203.0.113.15</sip-id>
</voice-group>
</endpoint-groups>
Figure 19 shows an example XML representation of the registered information for the user-group, device-group, voice-group in IPv4 address [RFC5737], and url-group.¶
- The IPv4 addresses from 192.0.2.11 to 192.0.2.90 are labeled as a group of users called "employees".¶
- The IPv4 addresses from 198.51.100.11 to 198.51.100.20 provide services with HTTP and HTTPS application protocol labeled as "webservers".¶
- The "https://www.example.com/" and "https://www.example.net/" URLs are labeled as "sns-websites".¶
- The "sip:alice@example.org" and "sip:bob@203.0.113.15" SIP identities are labeled as "malicious-id".¶
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<endpoint-groups
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface"
xmlns:i2nsfmi="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-monitoring-interface">
<user-group>
<name>employees-v6</name>
<range-ipv6-address>
<start>2001:db8:0:1::11</start>
<end>2001:db8:0:1::90</end>
</range-ipv6-address>
</user-group>
<device-group>
<name>webservers-v6</name>
<range-ipv6-address>
<start>2001:db8:0:2::11</start>
<end>2001:db8:0:2::20</end>
</range-ipv6-address>
<application-protocol>i2nsfmi:http</application-protocol>
<application-protocol>i2nsfmi:https</application-protocol>
</device-group>
<voice-group>
<name>malicious-id-v6</name>
<sip-id>sip:david@2001:db8:2ef0::32b7</sip-id>
</voice-group>
</endpoint-groups>
Also, Figure 20 shows an example XML representation of the registered information for the user-group, device-group, and voice-group in IPv6 addresses [RFC3849].¶
- The IPv6 addresses from 2001:db8:0:1::11 to 2001:db8:0:1::90 are labeled as a group of users called "employees-v6".¶
- The IPv6 addresses from 2001:db8:0:2::11 to 2001:db8:0:2::20 provide services with HTTP and HTTPS application protocol labeled as "webservers-v6".¶
- The "sip:david@[2001:db8:2ef0::32b7]" SIP identity is labeled as "malicious-id-v6".¶
7.2. Scenario 1: Block SNS Access during Business Hours
The first example scenario is to "block SNS access during office hours" using a time-based firewall policy. In this scenario, all users registered as "employees" in the user-group list are unable to access SNS during the office hours (weekdays). The XML instance is described below:¶
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-cfi-policy
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface">
<name>security_policy_for_blocking_sns</name>
<rules>
<name>block_access_to_sns_during_office_hours</name>
<condition>
<firewall>
<source>employees</source>
</firewall>
<url-category>
<url-name>sns-websites</url-name>
</url-category>
<context>
<time>
<start-date-time>2021-03-11T09:00:00.00Z</start-date-time>
<end-date-time>2021-12-31T18:00:00.00Z</end-date-time>
<period>
<start-time>09:00:00Z</start-time>
<end-time>18:00:00Z</end-time>
<day>monday</day>
<day>tuesday</day>
<day>wednesday</day>
<day>thursday</day>
<day>friday</day>
</period>
<frequency>weekly</frequency>
</time>
</context>
</condition>
<action>
<primary-action>
<action>drop</action>
</primary-action>
</action>
</rules>
</i2nsf-cfi-policy>
Time-based-condition Firewall¶
- The policy name is "security_policy_for_blocking_sns".¶
- The rule name is "block_access_to_sns_during_office_hours".¶
- The Source is "employees".¶
- The destination target is "sns-websites". "sns-websites" is the key which represents the list containing the information, such as URL, about sns-websites.¶
- The action required is to "drop" any attempt to connect to websites related to Social networking.¶
7.3. Scenario 2: Block Malicious VoIP/VoCN Packets Coming to a Company
The second example scenario is to "block malicious VoIP/VoCN packets coming to a company" using a VoIP policy. In this scenario, the calls coming from VOIP and/or VoCN sources with VoCN IDs that are classified as malicious are dropped. The IP addresses of the employees and malicious VOIP IDs which should be blocked are stored in the database or datastore of the enterprise. Here and for the rest of the cases, it is assumed that the security administrators or someone responsible for the existing and newly generated policies, are not aware of which and/or how many NSFs are needed to meet the security requirements. Figure 22 represents the XML document generated from YANG discussed in previous sections. Once a high-level security policy is created by a security admin, it is delivered by the Consumer-Facing Interface, through RESTCONF server, to the security controller. The XML instance is described below:¶
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-cfi-policy
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface">
<name>
security_policy_for_blocking_malicious_voip_packets
</name>
<rules>
<name>Block_malicious_voip_and_vocn_packets</name>
<condition>
<voice>
<source-id>malicious-id</source-id>
</voice>
<firewall>
<destination>employees</destination>
</firewall>
</condition>
<action>
<primary-action>
<action>drop</action>
</primary-action>
</action>
</rules>
</i2nsf-cfi-policy>
Custom-condition Firewall¶
- The policy name is "security_policy_for_blocking_malicious_voip_packets".¶
- The rule name is "Block_malicious_voip_and_vocn_packets".¶
- The source is "malicious-id". The "malicious-id" is the key, so that it maps to the SIP identities that are named as "malicious-id". This can be a single SIP identity or a list of SIP identities.¶
- The destination target is "employees". "employees" is the key which represents the list containing information about employees, such as IP addresses.¶
- The action required is "drop" when any incoming SIP packets are coming from "malicious-id" and targeting "employees".¶
7.4. Scenario 3: Mitigate Flood Attacks on a Company Web Server
The third example scenario is to "Mitigate flood attacks on a company web server" using a DDoS-attack mitigation policy. Here, the time information is not set because the service provided by the network should be maintained at all times. If the packets sent by any sources that target "webservers" are more than the set threshold, then the admin can set the percentage of the packets to be dropped to safely maintain the service. Once the rule is set and delivered and enforced to the NSFs by the security controller, the NSFs will monitor the incoming packet amounts to act according to the rule set. The XML instance is described below:¶
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-cfi-policy
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface">
<name>security_policy_for_ddos_attacks</name>
<rules>
<name>1000_packets_per_second</name>
<condition>
<firewall>
<destination>webservers</destination>
</firewall>
<ddos>
<rate-limit>
<packet-rate-threshold>1000</packet-rate-threshold>
</rate-limit>
</ddos>
</condition>
<action>
<primary-action>
<action>drop</action>
</primary-action>
</action>
</rules>
</i2nsf-cfi-policy>
DDoS-condition Firewall¶
- The policy name is "security_policy_for_ddos_attacks".¶
- The rule name is "1000_packets_per_second".¶
- The destination is webservers.¶
- The rate limit exists to limit the incoming amount of packets per second. In this case the rate limit is "1000" packets per second. This amount depends on the packet receiving capacity of the server devices.¶
- The Source is all sources which send abnormal amount of packets. It is assumed that there is a counter per source IP address in this DDoS-condition Firewall. The rate of "1000" packets per second is set for each source to send packets toward the destinations as webservers.¶
- The action required is to "drop" when the packet reception is more than "1000" packets per second for each source that sends packets to the destinations.¶
8. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:¶
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface Registrant Contact: The IESG. XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.¶
This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950][RFC8525]:¶
name: ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cons-facing-interface prefix: i2nsfcfi reference: RFC XXXX // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove // this note.¶
9. Security Considerations
The YANG module specified in this document defines a data schema designed to be accessed through network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the required secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the required secure transport is TLS [RFC8446].¶
The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides a means of restricting access to specific NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and contents. Thus, NACM SHOULD be used to restrict the NSF registration from unauthorized users.¶
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are writable, creatable, and deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations to these data nodes could have a negative effect on network and security operations. These data nodes have the following sensitivity/vulnerability:¶
- list i2nsf-cfi-policy: Writing to almost any element of this YANG module would directly impact the configuration of NSFs implementing the security policy, e.g., completely turning off security monitoring and mitigation capabilities; altering the scope of this monitoring and mitigation; creating an overwhelming logging volume to overwhelm downstream analytics or storage capacity; creating logging patterns which are confusing; or reducing the efficacy of statistics or artificial models built on historical data.¶
- container endpoint-groups: Writing to any element in this container can alter the configuration of the security services and may cause vulnerabilities in the network, e.g., changing registered malicious endpoints can remove the defense against known hostile clients. The information given may also be considered private, hence it is strongly encouraged to inform affected users/customers of this fact and of the potential privacy-related consequences and trade-offs.¶
- container threat-prevention: Writing to any element in this container can alter the configuration of the security services and may cause vulnerabilities in the network, e.g., changing registered signature can let malicious content to get across the secured network without detection.¶
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes with their sensitivity/vulnerability:¶
- list i2nsf-cfi-policy: The leak of this node to an attacker could reveal the specific configuration of security controls to an attacker. An attacker can craft an attack path that avoids observation or mitigations; one may reveal topology information to inform additional targets or enable lateral movement; one enables the construction of an attack path that avoids observation or mitigations; one provides an indication that the operator has discovered the attack.¶
- container endpoint-groups: This node holds a list of endpoint data that may be considered private to the users. Disclosure of this information may expose sensitive details which can be used to define the identity and geographical location of a user. Malicious actors can leverage this information to threaten the user with cyber threat, e.g., voice phishing, or physical threat.¶
- container threat-prevention: The leak of this node to an attacker could reveal the specific detection system to an attacker. An attacker can use this information to design new unknown attack strategies to circumvent the existing detection or prevention system.¶
10. References
10.1. Normative References
- [RFC0768]
- Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>.
- [RFC0792]
- Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>.
- [RFC0854]
- Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, DOI 10.17487/RFC0854, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc854>.
- [RFC0959]
- Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc959>.
- [RFC1939]
- Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3", STD 53, RFC 1939, DOI 10.17487/RFC1939, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1939>.
- [RFC2119]
- Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
- [RFC2595]
- Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP", RFC 2595, DOI 10.17487/RFC2595, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2595>.
- [RFC3261]
- Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
- [RFC3688]
- Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
- [RFC3986]
- Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
- [RFC4250]
- Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, DOI 10.17487/RFC4250, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4250>.
- [RFC4340]
- Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340, DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4340>.
- [RFC4443]
- Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89, RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
- [RFC5321]
- Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.
- [RFC5646]
- Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>.
- [RFC6241]
- Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
- [RFC6242]
- Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
- [RFC6991]
- Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
- [RFC7950]
- Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
- [RFC8040]
- Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
- [RFC8075]
- Castellani, A., Loreto, S., Rahman, A., Fossati, T., and E. Dijk, "Guidelines for Mapping Implementations: HTTP to the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 8075, DOI 10.17487/RFC8075, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8075>.
- [RFC8174]
- Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
- [RFC8335]
- Bonica, R., Thomas, R., Linkova, J., Lenart, C., and M. Boucadair, "PROBE: A Utility for Probing Interfaces", RFC 8335, DOI 10.17487/RFC8335, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8335>.
- [RFC8340]
- Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
- [RFC8341]
- Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
- [RFC8342]
- Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.
- [RFC8407]
- Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407, DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.
- [RFC8446]
- Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
- [RFC8525]
- Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "YANG Library", RFC 8525, DOI 10.17487/RFC8525, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8525>.
- [RFC8727]
- Takahashi, T., Danyliw, R., and M. Suzuki, "JSON Binding of the Incident Object Description Exchange Format", RFC 8727, DOI 10.17487/RFC8727, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8727>.
- [RFC9051]
- Melnikov, A., Ed. and B. Leiba, Ed., "Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) - Version 4rev2", RFC 9051, DOI 10.17487/RFC9051, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9051>.
- [RFC9110]
- Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.
- [RFC9112]
- Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP/1.1", STD 99, RFC 9112, DOI 10.17487/RFC9112, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9112>.
- [RFC9113]
- Thomson, M., Ed. and C. Benfield, Ed., "HTTP/2", RFC 9113, DOI 10.17487/RFC9113, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9113>.
- [RFC9260]
- Stewart, R., Tüxen, M., and K. Nielsen, "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 9260, DOI 10.17487/RFC9260, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9260>.
- [RFC9293]
- Eddy, W., Ed., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)", STD 7, RFC 9293, DOI 10.17487/RFC9293, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9293>.
- [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model]
- Hares, S., Jeong, J. P., Kim, J. T., Moskowitz, R., and Q. Lin, "I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-32>.
- [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model]
- Jeong, J. P., Lingga, P., Hares, S., Xia, L., and H. Birkholz, "I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-20, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-20>.
- [GLOB]
- IEEE, "The Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7, 2018 Edition", IEEE Std 1003.1-2017, <https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/glob.html>.
- [ISO-3166-1alpha2]
- ISO, "ISO 3166-1 decoding table", <https://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/country_codes/iso-3166-1_decoding_table.htm>.
- [ISO-3166-2]
- ISO, "ISO 3166-2:2007", <https://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/country_codes.htm#2012_iso3166-2>.
- [STIX]
- Jordan, B., Piazza, R., and T. Darley, "Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX)", STIX Version 2.1 https://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/stix/v2.1/os/stix-v2.1-os.html, .
10.2. Informative References
- [RFC3022]
- Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022, DOI 10.17487/RFC3022, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3022>.
- [RFC3849]
- Huston, G., Lord, A., and P. Smith, "IPv6 Address Prefix Reserved for Documentation", RFC 3849, DOI 10.17487/RFC3849, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3849>.
- [RFC5737]
- Arkko, J., Cotton, M., and L. Vegoda, "IPv4 Address Blocks Reserved for Documentation", RFC 5737, DOI 10.17487/RFC5737, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5737>.
- [RFC8329]
- Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8329>.
- [RFC8811]
- Mortensen, A., Ed., Reddy.K, T., Ed., Andreasen, F., Teague, N., and R. Compton, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", RFC 8811, DOI 10.17487/RFC8811, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8811>.
- [RFC9000]
- Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000, DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
- [IANA-ICMP-Parameters]
- Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers", , <https://www.iana.org/assignments/icmp-parameters/icmp-parameters.xhtml>.
- [IANA-ICMPv6-Parameters]
- Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Internet Control Message Procotol version 6 (ICMPv6) Parameters", , <https://www.iana.org/assignments/icmpv6-parameters/icmpv6-parameters.xhtml>.
- [MISPCORE]
- Dulaunoy, A. and A. Iklody, "MISP Core", commit 051e33b6711a660faf81733d825f1015aa0d301b, , <https://github.com/MISP/misp-rfc/blob/051e33b6711a660faf81733d825f1015aa0d301b/misp-core-format/raw.md.html>.
- [OPENIOC]
- Gibb, W., "OpenIOC 1.1 DRAFT", commit d42a8777708e171f8bdd3c2c9f8590c83488285d, , <https://github.com/fireeye/OpenIOC_1.1/blob/d42a8777708e171f8bdd3c2c9f8590c83488285d/schemas/ioc.xsd>.
- [TR-29.949-3GPP]
- 3GPP, "Study on technical aspects on roaming end-to-end scenarios with Voice over LTE (VoLTE) IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) and other networks", 3GPP TR 29.949/Version 16.0.0, .
- [TR-21.915-3GPP]
- 3GPP, "Summary of Rel-15 Work Items", 3GPP TR 21.915/Version 15.0.0, .
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
This document is a product by the I2NSF Working Group (WG) including WG Chairs (i.e., Linda Dunbar and Yoav Nir) and Diego Lopez. This document took advantage of the review and comments from the following people: Roman Danyliw, Mahdi F. Dachmehchi, Daeyoung Hyun, Jan Lindblad (YANG doctor), Tom Petch, Charlie Kaufman, Penglin Yang, and Jung-Soo Park. The authors sincerely appreciate their sincere efforts and kind help.¶
This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized Security Service Provisioning). This work was supported in part by the IITP (2020-0-00395-003, Standard Development of Blockchain based Network Management Automation Technology).¶
Appendix B. Contributors
The following are co-authors of this document:¶
Patrick Lingga - Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419, Republic of Korea. EMail: patricklink@skku.edu¶
Jinyong Tim Kim - Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419, Republic of Korea. EMail: timkim@skku.edu¶
Hyoungshick Kim - Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419, Republic of Korea. EMail: hyoung@skku.edu¶
Eunsoo Kim - Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419, Republic of Korea. EMail: eskim86@skku.edu¶
Seungjin Lee - Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419, Republic of Korea. EMail: jine33@skku.edu¶
Anil Lohiya - Juniper Networks, 1133 Innovation Way, Sunnyvale, CA 94089, US. EMail: alohiya@juniper.net¶
Dave Qi - Bloomberg, 731 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10022, US. EMail: DQI@bloomberg.net¶
Nabil Bitar - Nokia, 755 Ravendale Drive, Mountain View, CA 94043, US. EMail: nabil.bitar@nokia.com¶
Senad Palislamovic - Nokia, 755 Ravendale Drive, Mountain View, CA 94043, US. EMail: senad.palislamovic@nokia.com¶
Liang Xia - Huawei, 101 Software Avenue, Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012, China. EMail: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com¶
Appendix C. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-30
The following changes are made from draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-30:¶
- The usage of "hostnames" is removed from Section 4.4 as the URL cannot be given as a hostname. This update follows the comment of Lars Eggert.¶
