|Internet-Draft||NSF-Facing Interface YANG Data Model||January 2022|
|Kim, et al.||Expires 30 July 2022||[Page]|
- I2NSF Working Group
- Intended Status:
- Standards Track
I2NSF Network Security Function-Facing Interface YANG Data Model
This document defines a YANG data model for configuring security policy rules on Network Security Functions (NSF) in the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) framework. The YANG data model in this document corresponds to the information model for NSF-Facing Interface in the I2NSF framework.¶
Status of This Memo
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This document defines a YANG [RFC6020][RFC7950] data model for security policy rule configuration of Network Security Functions (NSF). The YANG data model in this document is based on the information and data model in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model] for the NSF-Facing Interface in the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) architecture [RFC8329]. The YANG data model in this document focuses on security policy configuration for the NSFs discussed in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model], i.e., generic NSF (operate on packet header for layer 2, layer3, and layer 4) and advanced NSF (Intrusion Prevention System, URL-Filtering, anti-DDoS, Antivirus, and VoIP/VoLTE Filter).¶
This YANG data model uses an "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy model that is used as the basis for the design of I2NSF Policy described in [RFC8329] and [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model].¶
The "ietf-i2nsf-policy-rule-for-nsf" YANG module defined in this document provides the configuration of the following features.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses the terminology described in [RFC8329].¶
This document follows the guidelines of [RFC8407], uses the common YANG types defined in [RFC6991], and adopts the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA). The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].¶
3. YANG Tree Diagram
This section shows a YANG tree diagram of policy for network security functions. [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model].¶
3.1. General I2NSF Security Policy Rule
This section shows a YANG tree diagram for a general I2NSF security policy rule for generic network security functions.¶
A security policy is used by one virtual instance of an NSF/device as a set of security rules to protect assets from major risk factors that threaten the system. There can be multiple security policies in a single NSF to provide the necessary protection. The security policy includes its name, priority usage, resolution strategy, default action, and rules.¶
A resolution strategy is used to decide how to resolve conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different policy rules that are matched and contained in a particular NSF. The resolution strategy is defined as First Matching Rule (FMR), Last Matching Rule (LMR), Prioritized Matching Rule (PMR) with Errors (PMRE), and Prioritized Matching Rule with No Errors (PMRN). The resolution strategy can be extended according to specific vendor action features. The resolution strategy is described in detail in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model].¶
A default action is used to execute I2NSF policy rule when no rule matches a packet. The default action is defined as pass, drop, rate-limit, and mirror. The default action can be extended according to specific vendor action features. The default action is described in detail in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model].¶
The rules include rule name, rule description, rule priority, rule enable, event, condition, and action.¶
3.2. Event Clause
This section shows a YANG tree diagram for an event clause for a general I2NSF security policy rule for generic network security functions.¶
An event clause is any important occurrence at a specific time of a change in the system being managed, and/or in the environment of the system being managed. An event clause is used to trigger the evaluation of the condition clause of the I2NSF Policy Rule. The event clause is defined as a system event, system alarm [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] and time. The event clause can be extended according to specific vendor event features. The event clause is described in detail in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model].¶
3.3. Condition Clause
This section shows a YANG tree diagram for a condition clause for a general I2NSF security policy rule for generic network security functions.¶
A condition clause is defined as a set of attributes, features, and/or values that are to be compared with a set of known attributes, features, and/or values in order to determine whether or not the set of actions in that (imperative) I2NSF policy rule can be executed or not. A condition clause is classified as a condition of generic network security functions, advanced network security functions, or context. A condition clause of generic network security functions is defined as IPv4 condition, IPv6 condition, TCP condition, UDP condition, SCTP condition, DCCP condition, or ICMP (ICMPv4 and ICMPv6) condition.¶
Note that the data model in this document does not focus on only IP addresses, but focuses on all the fields of IPv4 and IPv6 headers. The IPv4 and IPv6 headers have similarity with some different fields. In this case, it is better to handle separately the IPv4 and IPv6 headers such that the different fields can be used to handle IPv4 and IPv6 packets.¶
A condition clause of advanced network security functions is defined as url category condition, voice condition, DDoS condition, or payload condition. A condition clause of context is defined as application condition, target condition, users condition, and geography condition.¶
Note that this document deals only with conditions of several advanced network security functions such as url filter (i.e., web filter), VoIP/VoLTE security, and DDoS-attack mitigator. A condition clause of other advanced network security functions such as Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) and Data Loss Prevention (DLP) can be defined as an extension in future. A condition clause can be extended according to specific vendor condition features. A condition clause is described in detail in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model].¶
3.4. Action Clause
This section shows a YANG tree diagram for an action clause for a general I2NSF security policy rule for generic network security functions.¶
An action is used to control and monitor aspects of flow-based NSFs when the policy rule event and condition clauses are satisfied. NSFs provide security services by executing various actions. The action clause is defined as ingress action, egress action, or log action for packet action, flow action, and advanced action for additional inspection. The packet action is an action for an individual packet such as an IP datagram as a stateless process that uses the packet's header and payload. The flow action is an action of a traffic flow such as the packets of a TCP session (e.g., an HTTP/HTTPS session) as a stateful process that uses the traffic flow information such as 5-tuple information, packet counts, and byte counts. The advanced action is an action for an advanced security service (e.g., url filter, DDoS-attack mitigator, and VoIP/VoLTE filter) for either a packet or a traffic flow according to the intention of such an advanced security service. The action clause can be extended according to specific vendor action features. The action clause is described in detail in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model].¶
4. YANG Data Model of NSF-Facing Interface
The main objective of this data model is to provide both an information model and the corresponding YANG data model of I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface. This interface can be used to deliver control and management messages between Security Controller and NSFs for the I2NSF low-level security policies.¶
This data model is designed to support the I2NSF framework that can be extended according to the security needs. In other words, the model design is independent of the content and meaning of specific policies as well as the implementation approach.¶
With the YANG data model of I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface, this document suggests use cases for security policy rules such as time-based firewall, web filter, VoIP/VoLTE security service, and DDoS-attack mitigation in Section 5.¶
4.1. YANG Module of NSF-Facing Interface
This section describes a YANG module of NSF-Facing Interface. This document provides identities in the data model for the configuration of an NSF. The identity has the same concept with the corresponding identity in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm]. This YANG module imports from [RFC6991] and [RFC8519]. It makes references to [RFC0768] [RFC0791] [RFC0792] [RFC3261] [RFC4340] [RFC4443] [RFC4732] [RFC4987] [RFC4960] [RFC5595] [RFC6335] [RFC8075] [RFC8200] [RFC8329] [RFC8335] [IEEE-802.3] [ISO-3166] [I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis] [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model] [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] [I-D.ietf-netmod-geo-location].¶
5. XML Configuration Examples of Low-Level Security Policy Rules
This section shows XML configuration examples of low-level security policy rules that are delivered from the Security Controller to NSFs over the NSF-Facing Interface. For security requirements, we assume that the NSFs (i.e., General firewall, Time-based firewall, URL filter, VoIP/VoLTE filter, and http and https flood mitigation) described in Appendix A of [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model] are registered with the I2NSF framework. With the registered NSFs, we show configuration examples for security policy rules of network security functions according to the following three security requirements: (i) Block Social Networking Service (SNS) access during business hours, (ii) Block malicious VoIP/VoLTE packets coming to the company, and (iii) Mitigate http and https flood attacks on company web server.¶
5.1. Example Security Requirement 1: Block Social Networking Service (SNS) Access during Business Hours
This section shows a configuration example for blocking SNS access during business hours in IPv4 networks or IPv6 networks.¶
Figure 6 (or Figure 7) and Figure 8 show the configuration XML documents for time-based firewall and web filter to block SNS access during business hours in IPv4 networks (or IPv6 networks). For the security requirement, two NSFs (i.e., a time-based firewall and a web filter) were used because one NSF cannot meet the security requirement. The instances of XML documents for the time-based firewall and the web filter are as follows: Note that a detailed data model for the configuration of the advanced network security function (i.e., web filter) can be defined as an extension in future.¶
Time-based Firewall is as follows:¶
- The name of the security policy is sns_access.¶
- The name of the rule is block_sns_access_during_operation_time.¶
- The rule is started from 2021-03-11 at 9 a.m. to 2021-12-31 at 6 p.m.¶
- The rule is operated weekly every weekday (i.e., Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday) during the business hours (i.e., from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.) .¶
- The rule inspects a source IPv4 address (i.e., 192.0.2.0/24). For the case of IPv6 networks, the rule inspects a source IPv6 address (i.e., from 2001:db8:0:1::0/120).¶
- If the outgoing packets match the rules above, the time-based firewall sends the packets to url filtering for additional inspection because the time-based firewall can not inspect contents of the packets for the SNS URL.¶
Web Filter is as follows:¶
5.2. Example Security Requirement 2: Block Malicious VoIP/VoLTE Packets Coming to a Company
This section shows a configuration example for blocking malicious VoIP/VoLTE packets coming to a company.¶
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the configuration XML documents for general firewall and VoIP/VoLTE filter to block malicious VoIP/VoLTE packets coming to a company. For the security requirement, two NSFs (i.e., a general firewall and a VoIP/VoLTE filter) were used because one NSF can not meet the security requirement. The instances of XML documents for the general firewall and the VoIP/VoLTE filter are as follows: Note that a detailed data model for the configuration of the advanced network security function (i.e., VoIP/VoLTE filter) can be described as an extension in future.¶
General Firewall is as follows:¶
- The name of the security policy is voip_volte_inspection.¶
- The name of the rule is block_malicious_voip_volte_packets.¶
- The rule inspects a destination IPv4 address (i.e., from 192.0.2.0/24).¶
- The rule inspects a port number (i.e., 5060 and 5061) to inspect VoIP/VoLTE packet.¶
- If the incoming packets match the rules above, the general firewall sends the packets to VoIP/VoLTE filter for additional inspection because the general firewall can not inspect contents of the VoIP/VoLTE packets.¶
VoIP/VoLTE Filter is as follows:¶
- The name of the security policy is malicious_voice_id.¶
- The name of the rule is block_malicious_voice_id.¶
- The rule inspects the voice id of the VoIP/VoLTE packets to block the malicious VoIP/VoLTE packets (i.e., firstname.lastname@example.org and email@example.com).¶
- If the incoming packets match the rules above, the packets are blocked.¶
5.3. Example Security Requirement 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS Flood Attacks on a Company Web Server
This section shows a configuration example for mitigating http and https flood attacks on a company web server.¶
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the configuration XML documents for general firewall and http and https flood attack mitigation to mitigate http and https flood attacks on a company web server. For the security requirement, two NSFs (i.e., a general firewall and a http and https flood attack mitigation) were used because one NSF can not meet the security requirement. The instances of XML documents for the general firewall and http and https flood attack mitigation are as follows: Note that a detailed data model for the configuration of the advanced network security function (i.e., http and https flood attack mitigation) can be defined as an extension in future.¶
General Firewall is as follows:¶
- The name of the security policy is flood_attack_mitigation.¶
- The name of the rule is mitigate_http_and_https_flood_attack.¶
- The rule inspects a destination IPv4 address (i.e., 192.0.2.0/24) to inspect the access packets coming into the company web server.¶
- The rule inspects a port number (i.e., 80 and 443) to inspect http and https packet.¶
- If the packets match the rules above, the general firewall sends the packets to anti-DDoS for additional inspection because the general firewall can not control the amount of packets for http and https packets.¶
Anti DDoS for HTTP and HTTPS Flood Attack Mitigation is as follows:¶
- The name of the security policy is flood_attack_mitigation.¶
- The name of the rule is mitigate_http_and_https_flood_attack.¶
- The rule controls the http and https packets according to the amount of incoming packets (1000 packets per second).¶
- If the incoming packets match the rules above, the packets are blocked.¶
6. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:¶
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-policy-rule-for-nsf Registrant Contact: The IESG. XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.¶
This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950][RFC8525]:¶
name: ietf-i2nsf-policy-rule-for-nsf namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-policy-rule-for-nsf prefix: nsfintf reference: RFC XXXX¶
7. Security Considerations
The YANG module specified in this document defines a data schema designed to be accessed through network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the required secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the required secure transport is TLS [RFC8446].¶
The NETCONF access control model [RFC8341] provides a means of restricting access to specific NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content.¶
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:¶
- ietf-i2nsf-policy-rule-for-nsf: Writing to almost any element of this YANG module would directly impact on the configuration of NSFs, e.g., completely turning off security monitoring and mitigation capabilities; altering the scope of this monitoring and mitigation; creating an overwhelming logging volume to overwhelm downstream analytics or storage capacity; creating logging patterns which are confusing; or rendering useless trained statistics or artificial intelligence models.¶
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:¶
- ietf-i2nsf-policy-rule-for-nsf: The attacker may gather the security policy information of any target NSFs and misuse the security policy information for subsequent attacks.¶
Policy rules identifying the specified users and user groups can be specified with "rules/condition/context/users". As with other data in this YANG module, this user information is provided by the Security Controller to the NSFs and is protected via the transport and access control mechanisms described above.¶
This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized Security Service Provisioning). This work was supported in part by the IITP (2020-0-00395, Standard Development of Blockchain based Network Management Automation Technology).¶
This document is made by the group effort of I2NSF working group. Many people actively contributed to this document, such as Acee Lindem and Roman Danyliw. The authors sincerely appreciate their contributions.¶
The following are co-authors of this document:¶
Patrick Lingga Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: firstname.lastname@example.org¶
Hyoungshick Kim Department of Computer Science and Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: email@example.com¶
Daeyoung Hyun Department of Computer Science and Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: firstname.lastname@example.org¶
Dongjin Hong Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: email@example.com¶
Liang Xia Huawei 101 Software Avenue Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012 China EMail: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com¶
Tae-Jin Ahn Korea Telecom 70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu Daejeon, 305-811 Republic of Korea EMail: firstname.lastname@example.org¶
Se-Hui Lee Korea Telecom 70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu Daejeon, 305-811 Republic of Korea EMail: email@example.com¶
10.1. Normative References
- Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>.
- Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.
- Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>.
- Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
- Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
- Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
- Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340, DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4340>.
- Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89, RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
- Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.
- Fairhurst, G., "The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) Service Codes", RFC 5595, DOI 10.17487/RFC5595, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5595>.
- Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
- Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
- Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
- Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S. Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.
- Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
- Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
- Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
- Castellani, A., Loreto, S., Rahman, A., Fossati, T., and E. Dijk, "Guidelines for Mapping Implementations: HTTP to the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 8075, DOI 10.17487/RFC8075, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8075>.
- Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
- Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
- Bonica, R., Thomas, R., Linkova, J., Lenart, C., and M. Boucadair, "PROBE: A Utility for Probing Interfaces", RFC 8335, DOI 10.17487/RFC8335, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8335>.
- Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
- Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
- Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407, DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.
- Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
- Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Huang, L., and D. Blair, "YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)", RFC 8519, DOI 10.17487/RFC8519, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8519>.
- Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "YANG Library", RFC 8525, DOI 10.17487/RFC8525, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8525>.
- Eddy, W. M., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25.txt>.
- Hares, S., Jeong, J. (., Kim, J. (., Moskowitz, R., and Q. Lin, "I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-22, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-22.txt>.
- Jeong, J. (., Lingga, P., Hares, S., Xia, L. (., and H. Birkholz, "I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-12, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-12.txt>.
- Hopps, C., "A YANG Grouping for Geographic Locations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netmod-geo-location-11, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-netmod-geo-location-11.txt>.
10.2. Informative References
- Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732, DOI 10.17487/RFC4732, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4732>.
- Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common Mitigations", RFC 4987, DOI 10.17487/RFC4987, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4987>.
- Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8329>.
- Jeong, J. (., Chung, C., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and S. Hares, "I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-15, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-15.txt>.
- "Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions", ISO 3166, , <https://www.iso.org/iso-3166-country-codes.html>.
- Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE Standard for Ethernet", , <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8457469/>.