LAMPS Working Group                                         H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft                                             D. von Oheimb
Obsoletes: 4210 (if approved)                                    Siemens
Updates: 5912 (if approved)                                 M. Ounsworth
Intended status: Standards Track                                 J. Gray
Expires: 12 February 2023                                        Entrust
                                                          11 August 2022


   Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate Management
                             Protocol (CMP)
                     draft-ietf-lamps-rfc4210bis-02

Abstract

   This document describes the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
   (PKI) Certificate Management Protocol (CMP).  Protocol messages are
   defined for X.509v3 certificate creation and management.  CMP
   provides interactions between client systems and PKI components such
   as a Registration Authority (RA) and a Certification Authority (CA).

   This document includes the updates on RFC 4210 specified by CMP
   Updates [RFCAAAA] Section 2 and Appendix A.2 maintaining backward
   compatibility with CMP version 2 wherever possible and obsoleted both
   documents.  Updates to CMP version 2 are: improving crypto agility,
   extending the polling mechanism, adding new general message types,
   and adding extended key usages to identify special CMP server
   authorizations.  Introducing version 3 to be used only for changes to
   the ASN.1 syntax, which are: support of EnvelopedData instead of
   EncryptedValue and hashAlg for indicating a hash AlgorithmIdentifier
   in certConf messages.

   Appendix F of this document contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module
   originating from RFC 5912.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.







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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 12 February 2023.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.1.  Changes Since RFC 2510  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.2.  Changes Since RFC 4210  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.3.  Changes Made by This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   2.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  PKI Management Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  PKI Management Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.1.1.  Definitions of PKI Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
         3.1.1.1.  Subjects and End Entities . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
         3.1.1.2.  Certification Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
         3.1.1.3.  Registration Authority  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
         3.1.1.4.  Key Generation Authority  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.1.2.  PKI Management Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.1.3.  PKI Management Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   4.  Assumptions and Restrictions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.1.  End Entity Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.2.  Initial Registration/Certification  . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.2.1.  Criteria Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
         4.2.1.1.  Initiation of Registration/Certification  . . . .  18
         4.2.1.2.  End Entity Message Origin Authentication  . . . .  18
         4.2.1.3.  Location of Key Generation  . . . . . . . . . . .  19
         4.2.1.4.  Confirmation of Successful Certification  . . . .  19
       4.2.2.  Mandatory Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
         4.2.2.1.  Centralized Scheme  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
         4.2.2.2.  Basic Authenticated Scheme  . . . . . . . . . . .  20



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     4.3.  Proof-of-Possession (POP) of Private Key  . . . . . . . .  21
       4.3.1.  Signature Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       4.3.2.  Encryption Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       4.3.3.  Key Agreement Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     4.4.  Root CA Key Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       4.4.1.  CA Operator Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       4.4.2.  Verifying Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
         4.4.2.1.  Verification in Cases 1, 4, 5, and 8  . . . . . .  25
         4.4.2.2.  Verification in Case 2  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
         4.4.2.3.  Verification in Case 3  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
         4.4.2.4.  Failure of Verification in Case 6 . . . . . . . .  27
         4.4.2.5.  Failure of Verification in Case 7 . . . . . . . .  27
       4.4.3.  Revocation - Change of CA Key . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     4.5.  Extended Key Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   5.  Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     5.1.  Overall PKI Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       5.1.1.  PKI Message Header  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
         5.1.1.1.  ImplicitConfirm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
         5.1.1.2.  ConfirmWaitTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
         5.1.1.3.  OrigPKIMessage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
         5.1.1.4.  CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       5.1.2.  PKI Message Body  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       5.1.3.  PKI Message Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
         5.1.3.1.  Shared Secret Information . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
         5.1.3.2.  Key Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
         5.1.3.3.  Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
         5.1.3.4.  Multiple Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     5.2.  Common Data Structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       5.2.1.  Requested Certificate Contents  . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       5.2.2.  Encrypted Values  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       5.2.3.  Status codes and Failure Information for PKI
               Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
       5.2.4.  Certificate Identification  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       5.2.5.  Out-of-band root CA Public Key  . . . . . . . . . . .  41
       5.2.6.  Archive Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
       5.2.7.  Publication Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       5.2.8.  Proof-of-Possession Structures  . . . . . . . . . . .  42
         5.2.8.1.  Inclusion of the Private Key  . . . . . . . . . .  42
         5.2.8.2.  Indirect Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
         5.2.8.3.  Challenge-Response Protocol . . . . . . . . . . .  43
         5.2.8.4.  Summary of PoP Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       5.2.9.  GeneralizedTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
     5.3.  Operation-Specific Data Structures  . . . . . . . . . . .  46
       5.3.1.  Initialization Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
       5.3.2.  Initialization Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       5.3.3.  Certification Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       5.3.4.  Certification Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       5.3.5.  Key Update Request Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49



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       5.3.6.  Key Update Response Content . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       5.3.7.  Key Recovery Request Content  . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       5.3.8.  Key Recovery Response Content . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       5.3.9.  Revocation Request Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       5.3.10. Revocation Response Content . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       5.3.11. Cross Certification Request Content . . . . . . . . .  50
       5.3.12. Cross Certification Response Content  . . . . . . . .  51
       5.3.13. CA Key Update Announcement Content  . . . . . . . . .  51
       5.3.14. Certificate Announcement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
       5.3.15. Revocation Announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
       5.3.16. CRL Announcement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
       5.3.17. PKI Confirmation Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
       5.3.18. Certificate Confirmation Content  . . . . . . . . . .  52
       5.3.19. PKI General Message Content . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
         5.3.19.1.  CA Protocol Encryption Certificate . . . . . . .  53
         5.3.19.2.  Signing Key Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
         5.3.19.3.  Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types  . . . .  54
         5.3.19.4.  Preferred Symmetric Algorithm  . . . . . . . . .  54
         5.3.19.5.  Updated CA Key Pair  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
         5.3.19.6.  CRL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
         5.3.19.7.  Unsupported Object Identifiers . . . . . . . . .  54
         5.3.19.8.  Key Pair Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
         5.3.19.9.  Revocation Passphrase  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
         5.3.19.10. ImplicitConfirm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
         5.3.19.11. ConfirmWaitTime  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
         5.3.19.12. Original PKIMessage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
         5.3.19.13. Supported Language Tags  . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
         5.3.19.14. CA Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
         5.3.19.15. Root CA Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
         5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template . . . . . . . . . .  57
         5.3.19.17. CRL Update Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
       5.3.20. PKI General Response Content  . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
       5.3.21. Error Message Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
       5.3.22. Polling Request and Response  . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
   6.  Mandatory PKI Management Functions  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     6.1.  Root CA Initialization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     6.2.  Root CA Key Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
     6.3.  Subordinate CA Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
     6.4.  CRL production  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
     6.5.  PKI Information Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
     6.6.  Cross Certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
       6.6.1.  One-Way Request-Response Scheme:  . . . . . . . . . .  66
     6.7.  End Entity Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
       6.7.1.  Acquisition of PKI Information  . . . . . . . . . . .  68
       6.7.2.  Out-of-Band Verification of Root-CA Key . . . . . . .  68
     6.8.  Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     6.9.  Key Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
   7.  Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69



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     7.1.  Supporting RFC 2510 Implementations . . . . . . . . . . .  70
       7.1.1.  Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers . . . . . . . . .  70
       7.1.2.  Servers Receiving Version cmp1999 PKIMessages . . . .  70
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
     8.1.  Proof-Of-Possession with a Decryption Key . . . . . . . .  70
     8.2.  Proof-Of-Possession by Exposing the Private Key . . . . .  71
     8.3.  Attack Against Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange  . . . . . . .  71
     8.4.  Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message
           Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
     8.5.  Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret
           Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
     8.6.  Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages  . . . . . .  73
     8.7.  Authorizing Requests for Certificates with Specific
           EKUs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
   Appendix A.  Reasons for the Presence of RAs  . . . . . . . . . .  77
   Appendix B.  The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . . . . . . . . .  78
   Appendix C.  Request Message Behavioral Clarifications  . . . . .  80
   Appendix D.  PKI Management Message Profiles (REQUIRED) . . . . .  82
     D.1.  General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles. . . .  82
     D.2.  Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
     D.3.  Proof-of-Possession Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
     D.4.  Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated
           Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
     D.5.  Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90
     D.6.  Key Update Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91
   Appendix E.  PKI Management Message Profiles (OPTIONAL) . . . . .  91
     E.1.  General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles. . . .  92
     E.2.  Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92
     E.3.  Self-Signed Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92
     E.4.  Root CA Key Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92
     E.5.  PKI Information Request/Response  . . . . . . . . . . . .  93
     E.6.  Cross Certification Request/Response (1-way)  . . . . . .  95
     E.7.  In-Band Initialization Using External Identity
           Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  99
   Appendix F.  Compilable ASN.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
   Appendix G.  History of Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

1.  Introduction

   [RFC Editor: please delete:





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   During IESG telechat the CMP Updates document was approved on
   condition that LAMPS provides a RFC4210bis document.  Version -00 of
   this document shall be identical to RFC 4210 and version -01
   incorporates the changes specified in CMP Updates Section 2 and
   Appendix A.2.

   A history of changes is available in Appendix G of this document.

   The authors of this document wish to thank Carlisle Adams, Stephen
   Farrell, Tomi Kause, and Tero Mononen, the original authors of
   RFC4210, for their work and invite them, next to further volunteers,
   to join the -bis activity as co-authors.

   ]

   [RFC Editor:

   Please perform the following substitution.

   *  RFCXXXX --> the assigned numerical RFC value for this draft

   *  RFCAAAA --> the assigned numerical RFC value for
      [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-updates]

      Add this RFC number to the list of obsoleted RFCs.

   *  RFCBBBB --> the assigned numerical RFC value for
      [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]

   *  RFCCCCC --> the assigned numerical RFC value for
      [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]

   *  RFCDDDD --> the assigned numerical RFC value for
      [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis]

   *  RFCEEEE --> the assigned numerical RFC value for
      [I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport]

   ]

   This document describes the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
   (PKI) Certificate Management Protocol (CMP).  Protocol messages are
   defined for certificate creation and management.  The term
   "certificate" in this document refers to an X.509v3 Certificate as
   defined in [ITU.X509.2000].






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1.1.  Changes Since RFC 2510

   RFC 4210 [RFC4210] differs from RFC 2510 [RFC2510] in the following
   areas:

   *  The PKI management message profile section is split to two
      appendices: the required profile and the optional profile.  Some
      of the formerly mandatory functionality is moved to the optional
      profile.

   *  The message confirmation mechanism has changed substantially.

   *  A new polling mechanism is introduced, deprecating the old polling
      method at the CMP transport level.

   *  The CMP transport protocol issues are handled in a separate
      document [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis], thus the Transports section
      is removed.

   *  A new implicit confirmation method is introduced to reduce the
      number of protocol messages exchanged in a transaction.

   *  The new specification contains some less prominent protocol
      enhancements and improved explanatory text on several issues.

1.2.  Changes Since RFC 4210

   CMP Updates [RFCAAAA] and CMP Algorithms [RFCCCCC] updated RFC 4210
   [RFC4210], supporting the PKI management operations specified in the
   Lightweight CMP Profile [RFCBBBB], in the following areas:

   *  Add new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g.,
      registration authority and certification authority, to express the
      authorization of the certificate holder to act as the indicated
      type of PKI management entity.

   *  Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional
      use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.

   *  Use the type EnvelopedData as the preferred choice next to
      EncryptedValue to better support crypto agility in CMP.










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      For reasons of completeness and consistency the type
      EncryptedValue has been exchanged in all occurrences.  This
      includes the protection of centrally generated private keys,
      encryption of certificates, and protection of revocation
      passphrases.  To properly differentiate the support of
      EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is
      introduced in case a transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData.

      Note: According to RFC 4211 [RFC4211] Section 2.1. point 9 the use
      of the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of
      the EnvelopedData structure.  RFC 4211 [RFC4211] offers the
      EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and
      EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData.

   *  Offer an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting case that
      a certificate needs to be confirmed that has a signature algorithm
      that does not indicate a specific hash algorithm to use for
      computing the certHash.

   *  Add new general message types to request CA certificates, a root
      CA update, a certificate request template, or CRL updates.

   *  Extend the use of polling to p10cr, certConf, rr, genm, and error
      messages.

   *  Delete the mandatory algorithm profile in Appendix D.2 and refer
      instead to CMP Algorithms Section 7 [RFCCCCC].

1.3.  Changes Made by This Document

   This document obsoletes RFC 4210 [RFC4210].  It includes the changes
   specified by CMP Updates [RFCAAAA] Section 2 and Appendix D.2 as
   described in Section 1.2.

2.  Requirements

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.










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3.  PKI Management Overview

   The PKI must be structured to be consistent with the types of
   individuals who must administer it.  Providing such administrators
   with unbounded choices not only complicates the software required,
   but also increases the chances that a subtle mistake by an
   administrator or software developer will result in broader
   compromise.  Similarly, restricting administrators with cumbersome
   mechanisms will cause them not to use the PKI.

   Management protocols are REQUIRED to support on-line interactions
   between Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) components.  For example, a
   management protocol might be used between a Certification Authority
   (CA) and a client system with which a key pair is associated, or
   between two CAs that issue cross-certificates for each other.

3.1.  PKI Management Model

   Before specifying particular message formats and procedures, we first
   define the entities involved in PKI management and their interactions
   (in terms of the PKI management functions required).  We then group
   these functions in order to accommodate different identifiable types
   of end entities.

3.1.1.  Definitions of PKI Entities

   The entities involved in PKI management include the end entity (i.e.,
   the entity to whom the certificate is issued) and the certification
   authority (i.e., the entity that issues the certificate).  A
   registration authority MAY also be involved in PKI management.

3.1.1.1.  Subjects and End Entities

   The term "subject" is used here to refer to the entity to whom the
   certificate is issued, typically named in the subject or
   subjectAltName field of a certificate.  When we wish to distinguish
   the tools and/or software used by the subject (e.g., a local
   certificate management module), we will use the term "subject
   equipment".  In general, the term "end entity" (EE), rather than
   "subject", is preferred in order to avoid confusion with the field
   name.  It is important to note that the end entities here will
   include not only human users of applications, but also applications
   themselves (e.g., for IP security) or devices (e.g., routers or
   industrial control systems).  This factor influences the protocols
   that the PKI management operations use; for example, application
   software is far more likely to know exactly which certificate
   extensions are required than are human users.  PKI management
   entities are also end entities in the sense that they are sometimes



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   named in the subject or subjectAltName field of a certificate or
   cross-certificate.  Where appropriate, the term "end entity" will be
   used to refer to end entities who are not PKI management entities.

   All end entities require secure local access to some information --
   at a minimum, their own name and private key, the name of a CA that
   is directly trusted by this entity, and that CA's public key (or a
   fingerprint of the public key where a self-certified version is
   available elsewhere).  Implementations MAY use secure local storage
   for more than this minimum (e.g., the end entity's own certificates
   or application-specific information).  The form of storage will also
   vary -- from files to tamper-resistant cryptographic tokens.  The
   information stored in such local, trusted storage is referred to here
   as the end entity's Personal Security Environment (PSE).

   Though PSE formats are beyond the scope of this document (they are
   very dependent on equipment, et cetera), a generic interchange format
   for PSEs is defined here: a certification response message MAY be
   used.

3.1.1.2.  Certification Authority

   The certification authority (CA) may or may not actually be a real
   "third party" from the end entity's point of view.  Quite often, the
   CA will actually belong to the same organization as the end entities
   it supports.

   Again, we use the term "CA" to refer to the entity named in the
   issuer field of a certificate.  When it is necessary to distinguish
   the software or hardware tools used by the CA, we use the term "CA
   equipment".

   The CA equipment will often include both an "off-line" component and
   an "on-line" component, with the CA private key only available to the
   "off-line" component.  This is, however, a matter for implementers
   (though it is also relevant as a policy issue).

   We use the term "root CA" to indicate a CA that is directly trusted
   by an end entity; that is, securely acquiring the value of a root CA
   public key requires some out-of-band step(s).  This term is not meant
   to imply that a root CA is necessarily at the top of any hierarchy,
   simply that the CA in question is trusted directly.

   A "subordinate CA" is one that is not a root CA for the end entity in
   question.  Often, a subordinate CA will not be a root CA for any
   entity, but this is not mandatory.





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3.1.1.3.  Registration Authority

   In addition to end-entities and CAs, many environments call for the
   existence of a Registration Authority (RA) separate from the
   Certification Authority.  The functions that the registration
   authority may carry out will vary from case to case but MAY include
   personal authentication, token distribution, checking certificate
   requests and authentication of their origin, revocation reporting,
   name assignment, key generation, archival of key pairs, et cetera.

   This document views the RA as an OPTIONAL component: when it is not
   present, the CA is assumed to be able to carry out the RA's functions
   so that the PKI management protocols are the same from the end-
   entity's point of view.

   Again, we distinguish, where necessary, between the RA and the tools
   used (the "RA equipment").

   Note that an RA is itself an end entity.  We further assume that all
   RAs are in fact certified end entities and that RAs have private keys
   that are usable for signing.  How a particular CA equipment
   identifies some end entities as RAs is an implementation issue (i.e.,
   this document specifies no special RA certification operation).  We
   do not mandate that the RA is certified by the CA with which it is
   interacting at the moment (so one RA may work with more than one CA
   whilst only being certified once).

   In some circumstances, end entities will communicate directly with a
   CA even where an RA is present.  For example, for initial
   registration and/or certification, the end entity may use its RA, but
   communicate directly with the CA in order to refresh its certificate.

3.1.1.4.  Key Generation Authority

   A Key Generation Authority (KGA) is a PKI management entity
   generating key pairs on behalf of an end entity.  Typically, such
   central key generation is performed by the CA itself.  The KGA knows
   the private key that it generated for the end entity.  The CA may
   delegate its authorization for generating key pairs on behalf of an
   end entity to another PKI management entity, such as an RA or a
   separate entity (see Section 4.5 for respective extended key usages).

   Note: When doing central generation of key pairs, implementers should
   consider the implications of server-side retention on the overall
   security of the system; in some case retention is good, for example
   for escrow reasons, but in other cases the server should clear its
   copy after delivery to the end entity.




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3.1.2.  PKI Management Requirements

   The protocols given here meet the following requirements on PKI
   management

   1.   PKI management must conform to the ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU-T X.509
        standards.

   2.   It must be possible to regularly update any key pair without
        affecting any other key pair.

   3.   The use of confidentiality in PKI management protocols must be
        kept to a minimum in order to ease acceptance in environments
        where strong confidentiality might cause regulatory problems.

   4.   PKI management protocols must allow the use of different
        industry-standard cryptographic algorithms, see CMP Algorithms
        [RFCCCCC].  This means that any given CA, RA, or end entity may,
        in principle, use whichever algorithms suit it for its own key
        pair(s).

   5.   PKI management protocols must not preclude the generation of key
        pairs by the end entity concerned, by a KGA, by an RA, or by a
        CA.  Key generation may also occur elsewhere, but for the
        purposes of PKI management we can regard key generation as
        occurring wherever the key is first present at an end entity,
        RA, or CA.

   6.   PKI management protocols must support the publication of
        certificates by the end entity concerned, by an RA, or by a CA.
        Different implementations and different environments may choose
        any of the above approaches.

   7.   PKI management protocols must support the production of
        Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) by allowing certified end
        entities to make requests for the revocation of certificates.
        This must be done in such a way that the denial-of-service
        attacks, which are possible, are not made simpler.

   8.   PKI management protocols must be usable over a variety of
        "transport" mechanisms, specifically including mail, HTTP, TCP/
        IP, CoAP, and off-line file-based.

   9.   Final authority for certification creation rests with the CA.
        No RA or end entity equipment can assume that any certificate
        issued by a CA will contain what was requested; a CA may alter
        certificate field values or may add, delete, or alter extensions
        according to its operating policy.  In other words, all PKI



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        entities (end-entities, RAs, and CAs) must be capable of
        handling responses to requests for certificates in which the
        actual certificate issued is different from that requested (for
        example, a CA may shorten the validity period requested).  Note
        that policy may dictate that the CA must not publish or
        otherwise distribute the certificate until the requesting entity
        has reviewed and accepted the newly-created certificate
        (typically through use of the certConf message).

   10.  A graceful, scheduled change-over from one non-compromised CA
        key pair to the next (CA key update) must be supported (note
        that if the CA key is compromised, re-initialization must be
        performed for all entities in the domain of that CA).  An end
        entity whose PSE contains the new CA public key (following a CA
        key update) must also be able to verify certificates verifiable
        using the old public key.  End entities who directly trust the
        old CA key pair must also be able to verify certificates signed
        using the new CA private key (required for situations where the
        old CA public key is "hardwired" into the end entity's
        cryptographic equipment).

   11.  The functions of an RA may, in some implementations or
        environments, be carried out by the CA itself.  The protocols
        must be designed so that end entities will use the same protocol
        regardless of whether the communication is with an RA or CA.
        Naturally, the end entity must use the correct RA or CA public
        key to protect the communication.

   12.  Where an end entity requests a certificate containing a given
        public key value, the end entity must be ready to demonstrate
        possession of the corresponding private key value.  This may be
        accomplished in various ways, depending on the type of
        certification request.  See Section 4.3 for details of the in-
        band methods defined for the PKIX-CMP (i.e., Certificate
        Management Protocol) messages.

3.1.3.  PKI Management Operations

   The following diagram shows the relationship between the entities
   defined above in terms of the PKI management operations.  The letters
   in the diagram indicate "protocols" in the sense that a defined set
   of PKI management messages can be sent along each of the lettered
   lines.








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     +---+     cert. publish        +------------+      j
     |   |  <---------------------  | End Entity | <-------
     | C |             g            +------------+      "out-of-band"
     | e |                            | ^                loading
     | r |                            | |      initial
     | t |                          a | | b     registration/
     |   |                            | |       certification
     | / |                            | |      key pair recovery
     |   |                            | |      key pair update
     | C |                            | |      certificate update
     | R |  PKI "USERS"               V |      revocation request
     | L | -------------------+-+-----+-+------+-+-------------------
     |   |  PKI MANAGEMENT    | ^              | ^
     |   |    ENTITIES      a | | b          a | | b
     | R |                    V |              | |
     | e |             g   +------+    d       | |
     | p |   <------------ | RA   | <-----+    | |
     | o |      cert.      |      | ----+ |    | |
     | s |       publish   +------+   c | |    | |
     | i |                              | |    | |
     | t |                              V |    V |
     | o |          g                 +------------+   i
     | r |   <------------------------|     CA     |------->
     | y |          h                 +------------+  "out-of-band"
     |   |      cert. publish              | ^         publication
     |   |      CRL publish                | |
     +---+                                 | |    cross-certification
                                         e | | f  cross-certificate
                                           | |       update
                                           | |
                                           V |
                                         +------+
                                         | CA-2 |
                                         +------+

                           Figure 1: PKI Entities

   At a high level, the set of operations for which management messages
   are defined can be grouped as follows.

   1.  CA establishment: When establishing a new CA, certain steps are
       required (e.g., production of initial CRLs, export of CA public
       key).

   2.  End entity initialization: this includes importing a root CA
       public key and requesting information about the options supported
       by a PKI management entity.




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   3.  Certification: various operations result in the creation of new
       certificates:

       1.  initial registration/certification: This is the process
           whereby an end entity first makes itself known to a CA or RA,
           prior to the CA issuing a certificate or certificates for
           that end entity.  The end result of this process (when it is
           successful) is that a CA issues a certificate for an end
           entity's public key, and returns that certificate to the end
           entity and/or posts that certificate in a public repository.
           This process may, and typically will, involve multiple
           "steps", possibly including an initialization of the end
           entity's equipment.  For example, the end entity's equipment
           must be securely initialized with the public key of a CA, to
           be used in validating certificate paths.  Furthermore, an end
           entity typically needs to be initialized with its own key
           pair(s).

       2.  key pair update: Every key pair needs to be updated regularly
           (i.e., replaced with a new key pair), and a new certificate
           needs to be issued.

       3.  certificate update: As certificates expire, they may be
           "refreshed" if nothing relevant in the environment has
           changed.

       4.  CA key pair update: As with end entities, CA key pairs need
           to be updated regularly; however, different mechanisms are
           required.

       5.  cross-certification request: One CA requests issuance of a
           cross-certificate from another CA.  For the purposes of this
           standard, the following terms are defined.  A "cross-
           certificate" is a certificate in which the subject CA and the
           issuer CA are distinct and SubjectPublicKeyInfo contains a
           verification key (i.e., the certificate has been issued for
           the subject CA's signing key pair).  When it is necessary to
           distinguish more finely, the following terms may be used: a
           cross-certificate is called an "inter-domain cross-
           certificate" if the subject and issuer CAs belong to
           different administrative domains; it is called an "intra-
           domain cross-certificate" otherwise.

           1.  Note 1.  The above definition of "cross-certificate"
               aligns with the defined term "CA-certificate" in X.509.
               Note that this term is not to be confused with the X.500
               "cACertificate" attribute type, which is unrelated.




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           2.  Note 2.  In many environments, the term "cross-
               certificate", unless further qualified, will be
               understood to be synonymous with "inter-domain cross-
               certificate" as defined above.

           3.  Note 3.  Issuance of cross-certificates may be, but is
               not necessarily, mutual; that is, two CAs may issue
               cross-certificates for each other.

       6.  cross-certificate update: Similar to a normal certificate
           update, but involving a cross-certificate.

   4.  Certificate/CRL discovery operations: some PKI management
       operations result in the publication of certificates or CRLs:

       1.  certificate publication: Having gone to the trouble of
           producing a certificate, some means for publishing it is
           needed.  The "means" defined in PKIX MAY involve the messages
           specified in Sections 5.3.13 to 5.3.16, or MAY involve other
           methods (LDAP, for example) as described in [RFC4510],
           [RFC4510] (the "Operational Protocols" documents of the PKIX
           series of specifications).

       2.  CRL publication: As for certificate publication.

   5.  Recovery operations: some PKI management operations are used when
       an end entity has "lost" its PSE:

       1.  key pair recovery: As an option, user client key materials
           (e.g., a user's private key used for decryption purposes) MAY
           be backed up by a CA, an RA, or a key backup system
           associated with a CA or RA.  If an entity needs to recover
           these backed up key materials (e.g., as a result of a
           forgotten password or a lost key chain file), a protocol
           exchange may be needed to support such recovery.

   6.  Revocation operations: some PKI management operations result in
       the creation of new CRL entries and/or new CRLs:

       1.  revocation request: An authorized person advises a CA of an
           abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation.

   7.  PSE operations: whilst the definition of PSE operations (e.g.,
       moving a PSE, changing a PIN, etc.) are beyond the scope of this
       specification, we do define a PKIMessage (CertRepMessage) that
       can form the basis of such operations.





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   Note that on-line protocols are not the only way of implementing the
   above operations.  For all operations, there are off-line methods of
   achieving the same result, and this specification does not mandate
   use of on-line protocols.  For example, when hardware tokens are
   used, many of the operations MAY be achieved as part of the physical
   token delivery.

   Later sections define a set of standard messages supporting the above
   operations.  Transport protocols for conveying these exchanges in
   different environments (e.g., off-line: file-based, on-line: mail,
   HTTP [RFCDDDD], and CoAP [RFCEEEE]) are beyond the scope of this
   document and are specified separately.

4.  Assumptions and Restrictions

4.1.  End Entity Initialization

   The first step for an end entity in dealing with PKI management
   entities is to request information about the PKI functions supported
   and to securely acquire a copy of the relevant root CA public key(s).

4.2.  Initial Registration/Certification

   There are many schemes that can be used to achieve initial
   registration and certification of end entities.  No one method is
   suitable for all situations due to the range of policies that a CA
   may implement and the variation in the types of end entity which can
   occur.

   However, we can classify the initial registration/certification
   schemes that are supported by this specification.  Note that the word
   "initial", above, is crucial: we are dealing with the situation where
   the end entity in question has had no previous contact with the PKI.
   Where the end entity already possesses certified keys, then some
   simplifications/alternatives are possible.

   Having classified the schemes that are supported by this
   specification we can then specify some as mandatory and some as
   optional.  The goal is that the mandatory schemes cover a sufficient
   number of the cases that will arise in real use, whilst the optional
   schemes are available for special cases that arise less frequently.
   In this way, we achieve a balance between flexibility and ease of
   implementation.

   We will now describe the classification of initial registration/
   certification schemes.





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4.2.1.  Criteria Used

4.2.1.1.  Initiation of Registration/Certification

   In terms of the PKI messages that are produced, we can regard the
   initiation of the initial registration/certification exchanges as
   occurring wherever the first PKI message relating to the end entity
   is produced.  Note that the real-world initiation of the
   registration/certification procedure may occur elsewhere (e.g., a
   personnel department may telephone an RA operator).

   The possible locations are at the end entity, an RA, or a CA.

4.2.1.2.  End Entity Message Origin Authentication

   The on-line messages produced by the end entity that requires a
   certificate may be authenticated or not.  The requirement here is to
   authenticate the origin of any messages from the end entity to the
   PKI (CA/RA).

   In this specification, such authentication is achieved by two
   different means:

   *  symmetric: The PKI (CA/RA) issuing the end entity with a secret
      value (initial authentication key) and reference value (used to
      identify the secret value) via some out-of-band means.  The
      initial authentication key can then be used to protect relevant
      PKI messages.

   *  asymmetric: Using a private key and certificate issued by another
      PKI trusted for initial authentication, e.g., an IDevID
      IEEE 802.1AR [IEEE_802.1AR_2018].  The trust establishment in this
      external PKI is out of scope of this document.

   Thus, we can classify the initial registration/certification scheme
   according to whether or not the on-line end entity -> PKI messages
   are authenticated or not.

   Note 1: We do not discuss the authentication of the PKI -> end entity
   messages here, as this is always REQUIRED.  In any case, it can be
   achieved simply once the root-CA public key has been installed at the
   end entity's equipment or it can be based on the initial
   authentication key.

   Note 2: An initial registration/certification procedure can be secure
   where the messages from the end entity are authenticated via some
   out-of-band means (e.g., a subsequent visit).




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4.2.1.3.  Location of Key Generation

   In this specification, "key generation" is regarded as occurring
   wherever either the public or private component of a key pair first
   occurs in a PKIMessage.  Note that this does not preclude a
   centralized key generation service by a KGA; the actual key pair MAY
   have been generated elsewhere and transported to the end entity, RA,
   or CA using a (proprietary or standardized) key generation request/
   response protocol (outside the scope of this specification).

   Thus, there are three possibilities for the location of "key
   generation": the end entity, an RA, or a CA.

4.2.1.4.  Confirmation of Successful Certification

   Following the creation of an initial certificate for an end entity,
   additional assurance can be gained by having the end entity
   explicitly confirm successful receipt of the message containing (or
   indicating the creation of) the certificate.  Naturally, this
   confirmation message must be protected (based on the initial
   symmetric or asymmetric authentication key or other means).

   This gives two further possibilities: confirmed or not.

4.2.2.  Mandatory Schemes

   The criteria above allow for a large number of initial registration/
   certification schemes.  This specification mandates that conforming
   CA equipment, RA equipment, and EE equipment MUST support the second
   scheme listed below (Section 4.2.2.2).  Any entity MAY additionally
   support other schemes, if desired.

4.2.2.1.  Centralized Scheme

   In terms of the classification above, this scheme is, in some ways,
   the simplest possible, where:

   *  initiation occurs at the certifying CA;

   *  no on-line message authentication is required;

   *  "key generation" occurs at the certifying CA (see
      Section 4.2.1.3);

   *  no confirmation message is required.






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   In terms of message flow, this scheme means that the only message
   required is sent from the CA to the end entity.  The message must
   contain the entire PSE for the end entity.  Some out-of-band means
   must be provided to allow the end entity to authenticate the message
   received and to decrypt any encrypted values.

4.2.2.2.  Basic Authenticated Scheme

   In terms of the classification above, this scheme is where:

   *  initiation occurs at the end entity;

   *  message authentication is REQUIRED;

   *  "key generation" occurs at the end entity (see Section 4.2.1.3);

   *  a confirmation message is REQUIRED.

   Note: An Initial Authentication Key (IAK) can be either a symmetric
   key or an asymmetric private key with a certificate issued by another
   PKI trusted for this purpose.  The establishment of such trust is out
   of scope of this document.

   In terms of message flow, the basic authenticated scheme is as
   follows:

      End entity                                          RA/CA
     ==========                                      =============
          out-of-band distribution of Initial Authentication
          Key (IAK) and reference value (RA/CA -> EE)
     Key generation
     Creation of certification request
     Protect request with IAK
                   -->>-- certification request -->>--
                                                    verify request
                                                    process request
                                                    create response
                   --<<-- certification response --<<--
     handle response
     create confirmation
                   -->>-- cert conf message      -->>--
                                                    verify confirmation
                                                    create response
                   --<<-- conf ack (optional)    --<<--
     handle response






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   (Where verification of the cert confirmation message fails, the RA/CA
   MUST revoke the newly issued certificate if it has been published or
   otherwise made available.)

4.3.  Proof-of-Possession (POP) of Private Key

   In order to prevent certain attacks and to allow a CA/RA to properly
   check the validity of the binding between an end entity and a key
   pair, the PKI management operations specified here make it possible
   for an end entity to prove that it has possession of (i.e., is able
   to use) the private key corresponding to the public key for which a
   certificate is requested.  A given CA/RA is free to choose how to
   enforce POP (e.g., out-of-band procedural means versus PKIX-CMP in-
   band messages) in its certification exchanges (i.e., this may be a
   policy issue).  However, it is REQUIRED that CAs/RAs MUST enforce POP
   by some means because there are currently many non-PKIX operational
   protocols in use (various electronic mail protocols are one example)
   that do not explicitly check the binding between the end entity and
   the private key.  Until operational protocols that do verify the
   binding (for signature, encryption, and key agreement key pairs)
   exist, and are ubiquitous, this binding can only be assumed to have
   been verified by the CA/RA.  Therefore, if the binding is not
   verified by the CA/RA, certificates in the Internet Public-Key
   Infrastructure end up being somewhat less meaningful.

   POP is accomplished in different ways depending upon the type of key
   for which a certificate is requested.  If a key can be used for
   multiple purposes (e.g., an RSA key) then any appropriate method MAY
   be used (e.g., a key that may be used for signing, as well as other
   purposes, SHOULD NOT be sent to the CA/RA in order to prove
   possession).

   This specification explicitly allows for cases where an end entity
   supplies the relevant proof to an RA and the RA subsequently attests
   to the CA that the required proof has been received (and validated!).
   For example, an end entity wishing to have a signing key certified
   could send the appropriate signature to the RA, which then simply
   notifies the relevant CA that the end entity has supplied the
   required proof.  Of course, such a situation may be disallowed by
   some policies (e.g., CAs may be the only entities permitted to verify
   POP during certification).

4.3.1.  Signature Keys

   For signature keys, the end entity can sign a value to prove
   possession of the private key.





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4.3.2.  Encryption Keys

   For encryption keys, the end entity can provide the private key to
   the CA/RA, or can be required to decrypt a value in order to prove
   possession of the private key (see Section 5.2.8).  Decrypting a
   value can be achieved either directly or indirectly.

   The direct method is for the RA/CA to issue a random challenge to
   which an immediate response by the EE is required.

   The indirect method is to issue a certificate that is encrypted for
   the end entity (and have the end entity demonstrate its ability to
   decrypt this certificate in the confirmation message).  This allows a
   CA to issue a certificate in a form that can only be used by the
   intended end entity.

   This specification encourages use of the indirect method because it
   requires no extra messages to be sent (i.e., the proof can be
   demonstrated using the {request, response, confirmation} triple of
   messages).

4.3.3.  Key Agreement Keys

   For key agreement keys, the end entity and the PKI management entity
   (i.e., CA or RA) must establish a shared secret key in order to prove
   that the end entity has possession of the private key.

   Note that this need not impose any restrictions on the keys that can
   be certified by a given CA.  In particular, for Diffie-Hellman keys
   the end entity may freely choose its algorithm parameters provided
   that the CA can generate a short-term (or one-time) key pair with the
   appropriate parameters when necessary.

   < ToDo: Possibly add a section describing a POP mechanism for KEM
   keys. >

4.4.  Root CA Key Update

   This discussion only applies to CAs that are directly trusted by some
   end entities.  Self-signed CAs SHALL be considered as directly
   trusted CAs.  Recognizing whether a non-self-signed CA is supposed to
   be directly trusted for some end entities is a matter of CA policy
   and is thus beyond the scope of this document.








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   The basis of the procedure described here is that the CA protects its
   new public key using its previous private key and vice versa.  Thus,
   when a CA updates its key pair it must generate two extra
   cACertificate attribute values if certificates are made available
   using an X.500 directory (for a total of four: OldWithOld,
   OldWithNew, NewWithOld, and NewWithNew).

   When a CA changes its key pair, those entities who have acquired the
   old CA public key via "out-of-band" means are most affected.  It is
   these end entities who will need access to the new CA public key
   protected with the old CA private key.  However, they will only
   require this for a limited period (until they have acquired the new
   CA public key via the "out-of-band" mechanism).  This will typically
   be easily achieved when these end entities' certificates expire.

   The data structure used to protect the new and old CA public keys is
   a standard certificate (which may also contain extensions).  There
   are no new data structures required.

   Note 1: This scheme does not make use of any of the X.509 v3
   extensions as it must be able to work even for version 1
   certificates.  The presence of the KeyIdentifier extension would make
   for efficiency improvements.

   Note 2:.  While the scheme could be generalized to cover cases where
   the CA updates its key pair more than once during the validity period
   of one of its end entities' certificates, this generalization seems
   of dubious value.  Not having this generalization simply means that
   the validity periods of certificates issued with the old CA key pair
   cannot exceed the end of the OldWithNew validity period.

   Note 3: This scheme ensures that end entities will acquire the new CA
   public key, at the latest by the expiry of the last certificate they
   owned that was signed with the old CA private key (via the "out-of-
   band" means).  Certificate and/or key update operations occurring at
   other times do not necessarily require this (depending on the end
   entity's equipment).

   Note 4: In practice, a new root CA may have a slightly different
   subject DN, e.g., indicating a generation identifier like the year of
   issuance or a version number, for instance in an OU element.  How to
   bridge trust to the new root CA certificate in a CA DN change or a
   cross-certificate scenario is out of scope for this document.

4.4.1.  CA Operator Actions

   To change the key of the CA, the CA operator does the following:




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   1.  Generate a new key pair;

   2.  Create a certificate containing the old CA public key signed with
       the new private key (the "old with new" certificate);

   3.  Create a certificate containing the new CA public key signed with
       the old private key (the "new with old" certificate);

   4.  Create a certificate containing the new CA public key signed with
       the new private key (the "new with new" certificate);

   5.  Publish these new certificates via the repository and/or other
       means (perhaps using a CAKeyUpdAnn message or
       RootCaKeyUpdateContent);

   6.  Export the new CA public key so that end entities may acquire it
       using the "out-of-band" mechanism (if required).

   The old CA private key is then no longer required.  However, the old
   CA public key will remain in use for some time.  The old CA public
   key is no longer required (other than for non-repudiation) when all
   end entities of this CA have securely acquired the new CA public key.

   The "old with new" certificate must have a validity period starting
   at the generation time of the old key pair and ending at the expiry
   date of the old public key.

   The "new with old" certificate must have a validity period starting
   at the generation time of the new key pair and ending at the time by
   which all end entities of this CA will securely possess the new CA
   public key (at the latest, the expiry date of the old public key).

   The "new with new" certificate must have a validity period starting
   at the generation time of the new key pair and ending at or before
   the time by which the CA will next update its key pair.

   < ToDo: The previous paragraph needs to be checked.  The "ending AT
   OR BEFORE the time by which the CA will NEXT update its key pair"
   reads wrong. >

4.4.2.  Verifying Certificates

   Normally when verifying a signature, the verifier verifies (among
   other things) the certificate containing the public key of the
   signer.  However, once a CA is allowed to update its key there are a
   range of new possibilities.  These are shown in the table below.





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                Repository contains NEW    Repository contains only OLD
                  and OLD public keys       public key (due to, e.g.,
                                              delay in publication)
                   PSE      PSE Contains  PSE Contains    PSE Contains
                Contains     OLD public    NEW public      OLD public
               NEW public       key            key            key
                   key

    Signer's   Case 1:      Case 3:       Case 5:        Case 7:
    certifi-   This is      In this case  Although the   In this case
    cate is    the          the verifier  CA operator    the CA
    protected  standard     must access   has not        operator  has
    using NEW  case where   the           updated the    not updated
    key pair   the          repository in repository the the repository
               verifier     order to get  verifier can   and so the
               can          the value of  verify the     verification
               directly     the NEW       certificate    will FAIL
               verify the   public key    directly -
               certificate                this is thus
               without                    the same as
               using the                  case 1.
               repository

    Signer's   Case 2:      Case 4:       Case 6:        Case 8:
    certifi-   In this      In this case  The verifier   Although the
    cate is    case the     the verifier  thinks this    CA operator
    protected  verifier     can directly  is the         has not
    using OLD  must         verify the    situation of   updated the
    key pair   access the   certificate   case 2 and     repository the
               repository   without       will access    verifier can
               in order     using the     the            verify the
               to get the   repository    repository;    certificate
               value of                   however, the   directly -
               the OLD                    verification   this is thus
               public key                 will FAIL      the same as
                                                         case 4.

   Note: Instead of using a repository, the end entity can use the root
   CA update general message to request the respective certificates from
   a PKI management entity, see Section 5.3.19.15, and follow the
   required validation steps.

4.4.2.1.  Verification in Cases 1, 4, 5, and 8

   In these cases, the verifier has a local copy of the CA public key
   that can be used to verify the certificate directly.  This is the
   same as the situation where no key change has occurred.




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   Note that case 8 may arise between the time when the CA operator has
   generated the new key pair and the time when the CA operator stores
   the updated attributes in the repository.  Case 5 can only arise if
   the CA operator has issued both the signer's and verifier's
   certificates during this "gap" (the CA operator SHOULD avoid this as
   it leads to the failure cases described below)

4.4.2.2.  Verification in Case 2

   In case 2, the verifier must get access to the old public key of the
   CA.  The verifier does the following:

   1.  Look up the caCertificate attribute in the repository and pick
       the OldWithNew certificate (determined based on validity periods;
       note that the subject and issuer fields must match);

   2.  Verify that this is correct using the new CA key (which the
       verifier has locally);

   3.  If correct, check the signer's certificate using the old CA key.

   Case 2 will arise when the CA operator has issued the signer's
   certificate, then changed the key, and then issued the verifier's
   certificate; so it is quite a typical case.

4.4.2.3.  Verification in Case 3

   In case 3, the verifier must get access to the new public key of the
   CA.  In case a repository is used, the verifier does the following:

   1.  Look up the cACertificate attribute in the repository and pick
       the NewWithOld certificate (determined based on validity periods;
       note that the subject and issuer fields must match);

   2.  Verify that this is correct using the old CA key (which the
       verifier has stored locally);

   3.  If correct, check the signer's certificate using the new CA key.

   Case 3 will arise when the CA operator has issued the verifier's
   certificate, then changed the key, and then issued the signer's
   certificate; so it is also quite a typical case.

   Note: Alternatively, the verifier can use the root CA update general
   message to request the respective certificates from a PKI management
   entity, see Section 5.3.19.15, and follow the required validation
   steps.




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4.4.2.4.  Failure of Verification in Case 6

   In this case, the CA has issued the verifier's PSE, which contains
   the new key, without updating the repository attributes.  This means
   that the verifier has no means to get a trustworthy version of the
   CA's old key and so verification fails.

   Note that the failure is the CA operator's fault.

4.4.2.5.  Failure of Verification in Case 7

   In this case, the CA has issued the signer's certificate protected
   with the new key without updating the repository attributes.  This
   means that the verifier has no means to get a trustworthy version of
   the CA's new key and so verification fails.

   Note that the failure is again the CA operator's fault.

4.4.3.  Revocation - Change of CA Key

   As we saw above, the verification of a certificate becomes more
   complex once the CA is allowed to change its key.  This is also true
   for revocation checks as the CA may have signed the CRL using a newer
   private key than the one within the user's PSE.

   The analysis of the alternatives is the same as for certificate
   verification.

4.5.  Extended Key Usage

   The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
   which the certified key pair may be used.  It therefore restricts the
   use of a certificate to specific applications.

   A CA may want to delegate parts of its duties to other PKI management
   entities.  This section provides a mechanism to both prove this
   delegation and enable automated means for checking the authorization
   of this delegation.  Such delegation may also be expressed by other
   means, e.g., explicit configuration.

   To offer automatic validation for the delegation of a role by a CA to
   another entity, the certificates used for CMP message protection or
   signed data for central key generation MUST be issued by the
   delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs.  This proves the
   authorization of this entity by the delegating CA to act in the given
   role as described below.

   The OIDs to be used for these EKUs are:



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     id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 27 }

     id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 28 }

     id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 32 }

   Note: RFC 6402 section 2.10 [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a CMC CA and
   a CMC RA.  As the functionality of a CA and RA is not specific to
   using CMC or CMP as the certificate management protocol, these EKUs
   are re-used by CMP.

   The meaning of the id-kp-cmKGA EKU is as follows:

   CMP KGA:  CMP Key Generation Authorities are CAs or are identified by
             the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage.  The CMP KGA knows the
             private key it generated on behalf of the end entity.  This
             is a very sensitive service and needs specific
             authorization, which by default is with the CA certificate
             itself.  The CA may delegate its authorization by placing
             the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage in the certificate used
             to authenticate the origin of the generated private key.
             The authorization may also be determined through local
             configuration of the end entity.

5.  Data Structures

   This section contains descriptions of the data structures required
   for PKI management messages.  Section 6 describes constraints on
   their values and the sequence of events for each of the various PKI
   management operations.

5.1.  Overall PKI Message

   All of the messages used in this specification for the purposes of
   PKI management use the following structure:










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     PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
        header           PKIHeader,
        body             PKIBody,
        protection   [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
        extraCerts   [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                          OPTIONAL
     }

     PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage

   The PKIHeader contains information that is common to many PKI
   messages.

   The PKIBody contains message-specific information.

   The PKIProtection, when used, contains bits that protect the PKI
   message.

   The extraCerts field can contain certificates that may be useful to
   the recipient.  For example, this can be used by a CA or RA to
   present an end entity with certificates that it needs to verify its
   own new certificate (if, for example, the CA that issued the end
   entity's certificate is not a root CA for the end entity).  Note that
   this field does not necessarily contain a certification path; the
   recipient may have to sort, select from, or otherwise process the
   extra certificates in order to use them.

5.1.1.  PKI Message Header

   All PKI messages require some header information for addressing and
   transaction identification.  Some of this information will also be
   present in a transport-specific envelope.  However, if the PKI
   message is protected, then this information is also protected (i.e.,
   we make no assumption about secure transport).

   The following data structure is used to contain this information:















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     PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
        pvno                INTEGER     { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
                                          cmp2021(3) },
        sender              GeneralName,
        recipient           GeneralName,
        messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL,
        protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
                            OPTIONAL,
        senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
        recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
        transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
        senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
        recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
        freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
        generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                            InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
     }

     PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String

   The usage of pvno values is described in Section 7.

   The sender field contains the name of the sender of the PKIMessage.
   This name (in conjunction with senderKID, if supplied) should be
   sufficient to indicate the key to use to verify the protection on the
   message.  If nothing about the sender is known to the sending entity
   (e.g., in the init. req. message, where the end entity may not know
   its own Distinguished Name (DN), e-mail name, IP address, etc.), then
   the "sender" field MUST contain a "NULL" value; that is, the SEQUENCE
   OF relative distinguished names is of zero length.  In such a case,
   the senderKID field MUST hold an identifier (i.e., a reference
   number) that indicates to the receiver the appropriate shared secret
   information to use to verify the message.

   The recipient field contains the name of the recipient of the
   PKIMessage.  This name (in conjunction with recipKID, if supplied)
   should be usable to verify the protection on the message.

   The protectionAlg field specifies the algorithm used to protect the
   message.  If no protection bits are supplied (note that PKIProtection
   is OPTIONAL) then this field MUST be omitted; if protection bits are
   supplied, then this field MUST be supplied.









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   senderKID and recipKID are usable to indicate which keys have been
   used to protect the message (recipKID will normally only be required
   where protection of the message uses Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys).
   These fields MUST be used if required to uniquely identify a key
   (e.g., if more than one key is associated with a given sender name).
   The senderKID SHOULD be used in any case.

   Note: The recommendation of using senderKID was changed since
   [RFC4210], where it was recommended to be omitted if not needed to
   identify the protection key.

   < ToDo: Possibly add a protection mechanism using KEM keys. >

   The transactionID field within the message header is to be used to
   allow the recipient of a message to correlate this with an ongoing
   transaction.  This is needed for all transactions that consist of
   more than just a single request/response pair.  For transactions that
   consist of a single request/response pair, the rules are as follows.
   A client MAY populate the transactionID field of the request.  If a
   server receives such a request that has the transactionID field set,
   then it MUST set the transactionID field of the response to the same
   value.  If a server receives such request with a missing
   transactionID field, then it MAY set transactionID field of the
   response.

   For transactions that consist of more than just a single request/
   response pair, the rules are as follows.  Clients SHOULD generate a
   transactionID for the first request.  If a server receives such a
   request that has the transactionID field set, then it MUST set the
   transactionID field of the response to the same value.  If a server
   receives such request with a missing transactionID field, then it
   MUST populate the transactionID field of the response with a server-
   generated ID.  Subsequent requests and responses MUST all set the
   transactionID field to the thus established value.  In all cases
   where a transactionID is being used, a given client MUST NOT have
   more than one transaction with the same transactionID in progress at
   any time (to a given server).  Servers are free to require uniqueness
   of the transactionID or not, as long as they are able to correctly
   associate messages with the corresponding transaction.  Typically,
   this means that a server will require the {client, transactionID}
   tuple to be unique, or even the transactionID alone to be unique, if
   it cannot distinguish clients based on transport-level information.
   A server receiving the first message of a transaction (which requires
   more than a single request/response pair) that contains a
   transactionID that does not allow it to meet the above constraints
   (typically because the transactionID is already in use) MUST send
   back an ErrorMsgContent with a PKIFailureInfo of transactionIdInUse.
   It is RECOMMENDED that the clients fill the transactionID field with



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   128 bits of (pseudo-) random data for the start of a transaction to
   reduce the probability of having the transactionID in use at the
   server.

   The senderNonce and recipNonce fields protect the PKIMessage against
   replay attacks.  The senderNonce will typically be 128 bits of
   (pseudo-) random data generated by the sender, whereas the recipNonce
   is copied from the senderNonce of the previous message in the
   transaction.

   The messageTime field contains the time at which the sender created
   the message.  This may be useful to allow end entities to correct/
   check their local time for consistency with the time on a central
   system.

   The freeText field may be used to send a human-readable message to
   the recipient (in any number of languages).  The first language used
   in this sequence indicates the desired language for replies.

   The generalInfo field may be used to send machine-processable
   additional data to the recipient.  The following generalInfo
   extensions are defined and MAY be supported.

5.1.1.1.  ImplicitConfirm

   This is used by the EE to inform the CA that it does not wish to send
   a certificate confirmation for issued certificates.

     id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
     ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL

   If the CA grants the request to the EE, it MUST put the same
   extension in the PKIHeader of the response.  If the EE does not find
   the extension in the response, it MUST send the certificate
   confirmation.

5.1.1.2.  ConfirmWaitTime

   This is used by the CA to inform the EE how long it intends to wait
   for the certificate confirmation before revoking the certificate and
   deleting the transaction.

     id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
     ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime







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5.1.1.3.  OrigPKIMessage

   An RA MAY include the original PKIMessage from the EE in this
   generalInfo field of the PKIHeader of a PKIMessage.  This is used by
   the RA to inform the CA of the original PKIMessage that it received
   from the EE and modified in some way (e.g., added or modified
   particular field values or added new extensions) before forwarding
   the new PKIMessage.  If the changes made by the RA to the original
   PKIMessage break the POP of a certificate request, the RA MUST set
   the popo field to RAVerified, see Section 5.2.8.4.  This
   accommodates, for example, cases in which the CA wishes to check POP
   or other information on the original EE message.

   Although the infoValue is PKIMessages, it MUST contain exactly one
   PKIMessage.

     id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
     OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages

5.1.1.4.  CertProfile

   This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles,
   e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request
   template, see Section 5.3.19.16.

     id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
     CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String

   When used in an ir/cr/kur/genm, the value MUST NOT contain more
   elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elements
   and the certificate profile names refer to the elements in the given
   order.

   When used in a p10cr, the value MUST NOT contain multiple certificate
   profile names.

5.1.2.  PKI Message Body














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     PKIBody ::= CHOICE {
        ir       [0]  CertReqMessages,       --Initialization Req
        ip       [1]  CertRepMessage,        --Initialization Resp
        cr       [2]  CertReqMessages,       --Certification Req
        cp       [3]  CertRepMessage,        --Certification Resp
        p10cr    [4]  CertificationRequest,  --PKCS #10 Cert.  Req.
        popdecc  [5]  POPODecKeyChallContent --pop Challenge
        popdecr  [6]  POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
        kur      [7]  CertReqMessages,       --Key Update Request
        kup      [8]  CertRepMessage,        --Key Update Response
        krr      [9]  CertReqMessages,       --Key Recovery Req
        krp      [10] KeyRecRepContent,      --Key Recovery Resp
        rr       [11] RevReqContent,         --Revocation Request
        rp       [12] RevRepContent,         --Revocation Response
        ccr      [13] CertReqMessages,       --Cross-Cert.  Request
        ccp      [14] CertRepMessage,        --Cross-Cert.  Resp
        ckuann   [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent,    --CA Key Update Ann.
        cann     [16] CertAnnContent,        --Certificate Ann.
        rann     [17] RevAnnContent,         --Revocation Ann.
        crlann   [18] CRLAnnContent,         --CRL Announcement
        pkiconf  [19] PKIConfirmContent,     --Confirmation
        nested   [20] NestedMessageContent,  --Nested Message
        genm     [21] GenMsgContent,         --General Message
        genp     [22] GenRepContent,         --General Response
        error    [23] ErrorMsgContent,       --Error Message
        certConf [24] CertConfirmContent,    --Certificate confirm
        pollReq  [25] PollReqContent,        --Polling request
        pollRep  [26] PollRepContent         --Polling response
     }

   The specific types are described in Section 5.3 below.

5.1.3.  PKI Message Protection

   Some PKI messages will be protected for integrity.

   Note If an asymmetric algorithm is used to protect a message and the
   relevant public component has been certified already, then the origin
   of the message can also be authenticated.  On the other hand, if the
   public component is uncertified, then the message origin cannot be
   automatically authenticated, but may be authenticated via out-of-band
   means.

   When protection is applied, the following structure is used:

     PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING





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   The input to the calculation of PKIProtection is the DER encoding of
   the following data structure:

     ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
        header    PKIHeader,
        body      PKIBody
     }

   There MAY be cases in which the PKIProtection BIT STRING is
   deliberately not used to protect a message (i.e., this OPTIONAL field
   is omitted) because other protection, external to PKIX, will be
   applied instead.  Such a choice is explicitly allowed in this
   specification.  Examples of such external protection include CMS
   [RFC5652] and Security Multiparts [RFC1847] encapsulation of the
   PKIMessage (or simply the PKIBody (omitting the CHOICE tag), if the
   relevant PKIHeader information is securely carried in the external
   mechanism).  It is noted, however, that many such external mechanisms
   require that the end entity already possesses a public-key
   certificate, and/or a unique Distinguished Name, and/or other such
   infrastructure-related information.  Thus, they may not be
   appropriate for initial registration, key-recovery, or any other
   process with "boot-strapping" characteristics.  For those cases it
   may be necessary that the PKIProtection parameter be used.  In the
   future, if/when external mechanisms are modified to accommodate boot-
   strapping scenarios, the use of PKIProtection may become rare or non-
   existent.

   Depending on the circumstances, the PKIProtection bits may contain a
   Message Authentication Code (MAC) or signature.  Only the following
   cases can occur:

5.1.3.1.  Shared Secret Information

   In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with
   sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means).
   PKIProtection will contain a MAC value and the protectionAlg MAY be
   one of the options described in CMP Algorithms [RFCCCCC].

5.1.3.2.  Key Agreement

   Where the sender and receiver possess finite-field or elliptic-curve-
   based Diffie-Hellman certificates with compatible DH parameters, in
   order to protect the message the end entity must generate a symmetric
   key based on its private DH key value and the DH public key of the
   recipient of the PKI message.  PKIProtection will contain a MAC value
   keyed with this derived symmetric key and the protectionAlg will be
   the following:




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     id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}

     DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
        owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
        -- AlgId for a One-Way Function
        mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier
        -- the MAC AlgId
     }

   In the above protectionAlg, OWF is applied to the result of the
   Diffie-Hellman computation.  The OWF output (called "BASEKEY" for
   ease of reference, with a size of "H") is what is used to form the
   symmetric key.  If the MAC algorithm requires a K-bit key and K <= H,
   then the most significant K bits of BASEKEY are used.  If K > H, then
   all of BASEKEY is used for the most significant H bits of the key,
   OWF("1" || BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H bits of
   the key, OWF("2" || BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H
   bits of the key, and so on, until all K bits have been derived.
   [Here "N" is the ASCII byte encoding the number N and "||" represents
   concatenation.]

   Note: Hash algorithms that can be used as one-way functions are
   listed in CMP Algortihms [RFCCCCC] Section 2.

5.1.3.3.  Signature

   In this case, the sender possesses a signature key pair and simply
   signs the PKI message.  PKIProtection will contain the signature
   value and the protectionAlg will be an AlgorithmIdentifier for a
   digital signature (e.g., md5WithRSAEncryption or dsaWithSha-1).

   < ToDo: Possibly add a protection mechanism using KEM keys.  >

5.1.3.4.  Multiple Protection

   When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity such
   as an RA MAY forward that message adding its own protection (which is
   a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and certificates
   shared between the RA and the CA).  Additionally, multiple PKI
   messages MAY be aggregated.  There are several use cases for such
   messages.

   *  The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and
      forwards the original message unchanged.

   *  A PKI management entity collects several messages that are to be
      forwarded in the same direction and forwards them in a batch.
      Request messages can be transferred as batch upstream (towards the



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      CA); response or announce messages can be transferred as batch
      downstream (towards an RA, but not to the EE).  This can for
      instance be used when bridging an off-line connection between two
      PKI management entities.

   These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new
   PKI message.  The structure used is as follows:

     NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages

5.2.  Common Data Structures

   Before specifying the specific types that may be placed in a PKIBody,
   we define some data structures that are used in more than one case.

5.2.1.  Requested Certificate Contents

   Various PKI management messages require that the originator of the
   message indicate some of the fields that are required to be present
   in a certificate.  The CertTemplate structure allows an end entity or
   RA to specify as much as it wishes about the certificate it requires.
   CertTemplate is identical to a Certificate, but with all fields
   optional.

   Note: Even if the originator completely specifies the contents of a
   certificate it requires, a CA is free to modify fields within the
   certificate actually issued.  If the modified certificate is
   unacceptable to the requester, the requester MUST send back a
   certConf message that either does not include this certificate (via a
   CertHash), or does include this certificate (via a CertHash) along
   with a status of "rejected".  See Section 5.3.18 for the definition
   and use of CertHash and the certConf message.

   Note: Before requesting a new certificate, an end entity can request
   a certTemplate structure as a kind of certificate request template,
   in order to learn which data the CA expects to be present in the
   certificate request, see Section 5.3.19.16.

   See Appendix C and [RFC4211] for CertTemplate syntax.

5.2.2.  Encrypted Values

   Where encrypted data (in this specification, private keys,
   certificates, or revocation passphrase) are sent in PKI messages, the
   EncryptedKey data structure is used.






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     EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
        encryptedValue       EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
        envelopedData    [0] EnvelopedData }

   See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and CMS
   [RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax.  Using the EncryptedKey data
   structure offers the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for
   backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData.  The use of the
   EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
   EnvelopedData structure.  Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED to use
   EnvelopedData.

   Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF [RFC4211] is used
   here, which makes the update backward compatible.  Using the new
   syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bits-on-
   the-wire compatible with the old syntax.

   To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 has been
   introduced.  Details on the usage of pvno values is described in
   Section 7.

   The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to transport a private
   key, certificate, or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.

   EnvelopedData is used as follows:

   *  It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content
      is encrypted only for one recipient.

   *  It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure
      as defined in RFC 5958 [RFC5958] wrapped in a SignedData structure
      as specified in CMS section 5 [RFC5652] and [RFC8933] signed by
      the Key Generation Authority.

   *  It may contain a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in
      the encryptedContent field.

   The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS
   section 6 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated
   symmetric content-encryption key.  This content-encryption key MUST
   be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key
   management techniques.

   The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender
   depends on the credential available at the recipient:






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   *  Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
      asserting keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the key agreement key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 6.2.2 [RFC5652].  This is the preferred
      technique.

   *  Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
      asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the key transport key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652].

   *  A password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the password-based key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652].

5.2.3.  Status codes and Failure Information for PKI Messages

   All response messages will include some status information.  The
   following values are defined.

     PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
        accepted               (0),
        grantedWithMods        (1),
        rejection              (2),
        waiting                (3),
        revocationWarning      (4),
        revocationNotification (5),
        keyUpdateWarning       (6)
     }

   Responders may use the following syntax to provide more information
   about failure cases.



















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     PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
        badAlg                 (0),
        badMessageCheck        (1),
        badRequest             (2),
        badTime                (3),
        badCertId              (4),
        badDataFormat          (5),
        wrongAuthority         (6),
        incorrectData          (7),
        missingTimeStamp       (8),
        badPOP                 (9),
        certRevoked            (10),
        certConfirmed          (11),
        wrongIntegrity         (12),
        badRecipientNonce      (13),
        timeNotAvailable       (14),
        unacceptedPolicy       (15),
        unacceptedExtension    (16),
        addInfoNotAvailable    (17),
        badSenderNonce         (18),
        badCertTemplate        (19),
        signerNotTrusted       (20),
        transactionIdInUse     (21),
        unsupportedVersion     (22),
        notAuthorized          (23),
        systemUnavail          (24),
        systemFailure          (25),
        duplicateCertReq       (26)
     }

     PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        status        PKIStatus,
        statusString  PKIFreeText     OPTIONAL,
        failInfo      PKIFailureInfo  OPTIONAL
     }

5.2.4.  Certificate Identification

   In order to identify particular certificates, the CertId data
   structure is used.

   See [RFC4211] for CertId syntax.









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5.2.5.  Out-of-band root CA Public Key

   Each root CA must be able to publish its current public key via some
   "out-of-band" means.  While such mechanisms are beyond the scope of
   this document, we define data structures that can support such
   mechanisms.

   There are generally two methods available: either the CA directly
   publishes its self-signed certificate, or this information is
   available via the Directory (or equivalent) and the CA publishes a
   hash of this value to allow verification of its integrity before use.

     OOBCert ::= Certificate

   The fields within this certificate are restricted as follows:

   *  The certificate MUST be self-signed (i.e., the signature must be
      verifiable using the SubjectPublicKeyInfo field);

   *  The subject and issuer fields MUST be identical;

   *  If the subject field is NULL, then both subjectAltNames and
      issuerAltNames extensions MUST be present and have exactly the
      same value;

   *  The values of all other extensions must be suitable for a self-
      signed certificate (e.g., key identifiers for subject and issuer
      must be the same).

     OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
        hashAlg     [0] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL,
        certId      [1] CertId                  OPTIONAL,
        hashVal         BIT STRING
     }

   The intention of the hash value is that anyone who has securely
   received the hash value (via the out-of-band means) can verify a
   self-signed certificate for that CA.

5.2.6.  Archive Options

   Requesters may indicate that they wish the PKI to archive a private
   key value using the PKIArchiveOptions structure.

   See [RFC4211] for PKIArchiveOptions syntax.






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5.2.7.  Publication Information

   Requesters may indicate that they wish the PKI to publish a
   certificate using the PKIPublicationInfo structure.

   See [RFC4211] for PKIPublicationInfo syntax.

5.2.8.  Proof-of-Possession Structures

   If the certification request is for a signing key pair (i.e., a
   request for a verification certificate), then the proof-of-possession
   of the private signing key is demonstrated through use of the
   POPOSigningKey structure.

   See Appendix C and [RFC4211] for POPOSigningKey syntax, but note that
   POPOSigningKeyInput has the following semantic stipulations in this
   specification.

     POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE {
        authInfo             CHOICE {
           sender              [0] GeneralName,
           publicKeyMAC            PKMACValue
        },
        publicKey            SubjectPublicKeyInfo
     }

   On the other hand, if the certification request is for an encryption
   key pair (i.e., a request for an encryption certificate), then the
   proof-of-possession of the private decryption key may be demonstrated
   in one of three ways.

5.2.8.1.  Inclusion of the Private Key

   By the inclusion of the private key (encrypted) in the CertRequest
   (in the thisMessage field of POPOPrivKey (see Appendix C) or in the
   PKIArchiveOptions control structure, depending upon whether or not
   archival of the private key is also desired).

5.2.8.2.  Indirect Method

   By having the CA return not the certificate, but an encrypted
   certificate (i.e., the certificate encrypted under a randomly-
   generated symmetric key, and the symmetric key encrypted under the
   public key for which the certification request is being made) -- this
   is the "indirect" method mentioned previously in Section 4.3.2.  The
   end entity proves knowledge of the private decryption key to the CA
   by providing the correct CertHash for this certificate in the
   certConf message.  This demonstrates POP because the EE can only



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   compute the correct CertHash if it is able to recover the
   certificate, and it can only recover the certificate if it is able to
   decrypt the symmetric key using the required private key.  Clearly,
   for this to work, the CA MUST NOT publish the certificate until the
   certConf message arrives (when certHash is to be used to demonstrate
   POP).  See Section 5.3.18 for further details.

5.2.8.3.  Challenge-Response Protocol

   By having the end entity engage in a challenge-response protocol
   (using the messages POPODecKeyChall and POPODecKeyResp; see below)
   between CertReqMessages and CertRepMessage -- this is the "direct"
   method mentioned previously in Section 4.3.2.  (This method would
   typically be used in an environment in which an RA verifies POP and
   then makes a certification request to the CA on behalf of the end
   entity.  In such a scenario, the CA trusts the RA to have done POP
   correctly before the RA requests a certificate for the end entity.)
   The complete protocol then looks as follows (note that req' does not
   necessarily encapsulate req as a nested message):

                   EE            RA            CA
                    ---- req ---->
                    <--- chall ---
                    ---- resp --->
                                  ---- req' --->
                                  <--- rep -----
                                  ---- conf --->
                                  <--- ack -----
                    <--- rep -----
                    ---- conf --->
                    <--- ack -----

   This protocol is obviously much longer than the 3-way exchange given
   in Section 5.2.8.2 above, but allows a local Registration Authority
   to be involved and has the property that the certificate itself is
   not actually created until the proof-of-possession is complete.  In
   some environments, a different order of the above messages may be
   required, such as the following (this may be determined by policy):













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                   EE            RA            CA
                    ---- req ---->
                    <--- chall ---
                    ---- resp --->
                                  ---- req' --->
                                  <--- rep -----
                    <--- rep -----
                    ---- conf --->
                                  ---- conf --->
                                  <--- ack -----
                    <--- ack -----

   If the cert. request is for a key agreement key (KAK) pair, then the
   POP can use any of the 3 ways described above for enc. key pairs,
   with the following changes: (1) the parenthetical text of
   Section 5.2.8.2 is replaced with "(i.e., the certificate encrypted
   under the symmetric key derived from the CA's private KAK and the
   public key for which the certification request is being made)"; (2)
   the first parenthetical text of the challenge field of "Challenge"
   below is replaced with "(using PreferredSymmAlg (see Section 5.3.19.4
   and Appendix E.5) and a symmetric key derived from the CA's private
   KAK and the public key for which the certification request is being
   made)".  Alternatively, the POP can use the POPOSigningKey structure
   given in [RFC4211] (where the alg field is DHBasedMAC and the
   signature field is the MAC) as a fourth alternative for demonstrating
   POP if the CA already has a D-H certificate that is known to the EE.

   The challenge-response messages for proof-of-possession of a private
   decryption key are specified as follows (see [MvOV97], p.404 for
   details).  Note that this challenge-response exchange is associated
   with the preceding cert. request message (and subsequent cert.
   response and confirmation messages) by the transactionID used in the
   PKIHeader and by the protection (MACing or signing) applied to the
   PKIMessage.

     POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge

     Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
        owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier  OPTIONAL,
        witness             OCTET STRING,
        challenge           OCTET STRING
     }

     Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
        int                 INTEGER,
        sender              GeneralName
     }




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   Note that the size of Rand needs to be appropriate for encryption
   under the public key of the requester.  Given that "int" will
   typically not be longer than 64 bits, this leaves well over 100 bytes
   of room for the "sender" field when the modulus is 1024 bits.  If, in
   some environment, names are so long that they cannot fit (e.g., very
   long DNs), then whatever portion will fit should be used (as long as
   it includes at least the common name, and as long as the receiver is
   able to deal meaningfully with the abbreviation).

     POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER

5.2.8.4.  Summary of PoP Options

   The text in this section provides several options with respect to POP
   techniques.  Using "SK" for "signing key", "EK" for "encryption key",
   and "KAK" for "key agreement key", the techniques may be summarized
   as follows:

      RAVerified;
      SKPOP;
      EKPOPThisMessage;
      KAKPOPThisMessage;
      KAKPOPThisMessageDHMAC;
      EKPOPEncryptedCert;
      KAKPOPEncryptedCert;
      EKPOPChallengeResp; and
      KAKPOPChallengeResp.

   Given this array of options, it is natural to ask how an end entity
   can know what is supported by the CA/RA (i.e., which options it may
   use when requesting certificates).  The following guidelines should
   clarify this situation for EE implementers.

   RAVerified.  This is not an EE decision; the RA uses this if and only
   if it has verified POP before forwarding the request on to the CA, so
   it is not possible for the EE to choose this technique.

   SKPOP.  If the EE has a signing key pair, this is the only POP method
   specified for use in the request for a corresponding certificate.

   EKPOPThisMessage and KAKPOPThisMessage.  Whether or not to give up
   its private key to the CA/RA is an EE decision.  If the EE decides to
   reveal its key, then these are the only POP methods available in this
   specification to achieve this (and the key pair type will determine
   which of these two methods to use).






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   KAKPOPThisMessageDHMAC.  The EE can only use this method if (1) the
   CA has a DH certificate available for this purpose, and (2) the EE
   already has a copy of this certificate.  If both these conditions
   hold, then this technique is clearly supported and may be used by the
   EE, if desired.

   EKPOPEncryptedCert, KAKPOPEncryptedCert, EKPOPChallengeResp,
   KAKPOPChallengeResp.  The EE picks one of these (in the
   subsequentMessage field) in the request message, depending upon
   preference and key pair type.  The EE is not doing POP at this point;
   it is simply indicating which method it wants to use.  Therefore, if
   the CA/RA replies with a "badPOP" error, the EE can re-request using
   the other POP method chosen in subsequentMessage.  Note, however,
   that this specification encourages the use of the EncryptedCert
   choice and, furthermore, says that the challenge-response would
   typically be used when an RA is involved and doing POP verification.
   Thus, the EE should be able to make an intelligent decision regarding
   which of these POP methods to choose in the request message.

   < ToDo: Possibly add a section describing a POP mechanism for KEM
   keys. >

5.2.9.  GeneralizedTime

   GeneralizedTime is a standard ASN.1 type and SHALL be used as
   specified in RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.5.2 [RFC5280].

5.3.  Operation-Specific Data Structures

5.3.1.  Initialization Request

   An Initialization request message contains as the PKIBody a
   CertReqMessages data structure, which specifies the requested
   certificate(s).  Typically, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, KeyId, and Validity
   are the template fields which may be supplied for each certificate
   requested (see the profiles defined in [RFCBBBB] Section 4.1.1,
   Appendix D.4 and Appendix E.7 for further information).  This message
   is intended to be used for entities when first initializing into the
   PKI.

   See Appendix C and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax.










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5.3.2.  Initialization Response

   An Initialization response message contains as the PKIBody an
   CertRepMessage data structure, which has for each certificate
   requested a PKIStatusInfo field, a subject certificate, and possibly
   a private key (normally encrypted using EnvelopedData, see [RFCBBBB]
   Section 4.1.6 for further information).

   See Section 5.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax.  Note that if the PKI
   Message Protection is "shared secret information" (see
   Section 5.1.3), then any certificate transported in the caPubs field
   may be directly trusted as a root CA certificate by the initiator.

5.3.3.  Certification Request

   A Certification request message contains as the PKIBody a
   CertReqMessages data structure, which specifies the requested
   certificates (see the profiles defined in [RFCBBBB] Section 4.1.2 and
   Appendix D.2 for further information).  This message is intended to
   be used for existing PKI entities who wish to obtain additional
   certificates.

   See Appendix C and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax.

   Alternatively, the PKIBody MAY be a CertificationRequest (this
   structure is fully specified by the ASN.1 structure
   CertificationRequest given in [RFC2986], see the profiles defined in
   [RFCBBBB] Section 4.1.4 for further information).  This structure may
   be required for certificate requests for signing key pairs when
   interoperation with legacy systems is desired, but its use is
   strongly discouraged whenever not absolutely necessary.

5.3.4.  Certification Response

   A Certification response message contains as the PKIBody a
   CertRepMessage data structure, which has a status value for each
   certificate requested, and optionally has a CA public key, failure
   information, a subject certificate, and an encrypted private key.













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     CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
        caPubs          [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                            OPTIONAL,
        response            SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
     }

     CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
        certReqId           INTEGER,
        status              PKIStatusInfo,
        certifiedKeyPair    CertifiedKeyPair     OPTIONAL,
        rspInfo             OCTET STRING         OPTIONAL
        -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
        -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
     }

     CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
        certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
        privateKey      [0] EncryptedKey         OPTIONAL,
        -- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding
        publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo   OPTIONAL
     }

     CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
        certificate     [0] CMPCertificate,
        encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedKey
     }

   A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data
   structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certReqId.
   Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding certification response
   (cp) message MUST be set to -1.

   Only one of the failInfo (in PKIStatusInfo) and certificate (in
   CertifiedKeyPair) fields can be present in each CertResponse
   (depending on the status).  For some status values (e.g., waiting),
   neither of the optional fields will be present.

   Given an EncryptedCert and the relevant decryption key, the
   certificate may be obtained.  The purpose of this is to allow a CA to
   return the value of a certificate, but with the constraint that only
   the intended recipient can obtain the actual certificate.  The
   benefit of this approach is that a CA may reply with a certificate
   even in the absence of a proof that the requester is the end entity
   that can use the relevant private key (note that the proof is not
   obtained until the certConf message is received by the CA).  Thus,
   the CA will not have to revoke that certificate in the event that
   something goes wrong with the proof-of-possession (but MAY do so
   anyway, depending upon policy).



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   The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.

   Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is
   introduced by this document.  Details on the usage of different pvno
   values are described in Section 7.

5.3.5.  Key Update Request Content

   For key update requests the CertReqMessages syntax is used.
   Typically, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, KeyId, and Validity are the template
   fields that may be supplied for each key to be updated (see the
   profiles defined in [RFCBBBB] Section 4.1.3 and Appendix D.6 for
   further information).  This message is intended to be used to request
   updates to existing (non-revoked and non-expired) certificates
   (therefore, it is sometimes referred to as a "Certificate Update"
   operation).  An update is a replacement certificate containing either
   a new subject public key or the current subject public key (although
   the latter practice may not be appropriate for some environments).

   SeeAppendix C and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax.

5.3.6.  Key Update Response Content

   For key update responses, the CertRepMessage syntax is used.  The
   response is identical to the initialization response.

   See Section 5.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax.

5.3.7.  Key Recovery Request Content

   For key recovery requests the syntax used is identical to the
   initialization request CertReqMessages.  Typically,
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo and KeyId are the template fields that may be
   used to supply a signature public key for which a certificate is
   required (see Appendix D profiles for further information).

   See Appendix C and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax.  Note that
   if a key history is required, the requester must supply a Protocol
   Encryption Key control in the request message.

5.3.8.  Key Recovery Response Content

   For key recovery responses, the following syntax is used.  For some
   status values (e.g., waiting) none of the optional fields will be
   present.






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     KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
        status            PKIStatusInfo,
        newSigCert    [0] Certificate                 OPTIONAL,
        caCerts       [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                     Certificate      OPTIONAL,
        keyPairHist   [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                     CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
     }

5.3.9.  Revocation Request Content

   When requesting revocation of a certificate (or several
   certificates), the following data structure is used (see the profiles
   defined in [RFCBBBB] Section 4.2 for further information).  The name
   of the requester is present in the PKIHeader structure.

     RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails

     RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
        certDetails         CertTemplate,
        crlEntryDetails     Extensions       OPTIONAL
     }

5.3.10.  Revocation Response Content

   The revocation response is the response to the above message.  If
   produced, this is sent to the requester of the revocation.  (A
   separate revocation announcement message MAY be sent to the subject
   of the certificate for which revocation was requested.)

     RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
        status        SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
        revCerts  [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL,
        crls      [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList
                      OPTIONAL
     }

5.3.11.  Cross Certification Request Content

   Cross certification requests use the same syntax (CertReqMessages) as
   normal certification requests, with the restriction that the key pair
   MUST have been generated by the requesting CA and the private key
   MUST NOT be sent to the responding CA (see the profiles defined in
   Appendix E.6 for further information).  This request MAY also be used
   by subordinate CAs to get their certificates signed by the parent CA.

   See Appendix C and [RFC4211] for CertReqMessages syntax.




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5.3.12.  Cross Certification Response Content

   Cross certification responses use the same syntax (CertRepMessage) as
   normal certification responses, with the restriction that no
   encrypted private key can be sent.

   See Section 5.3.4 for CertRepMessage syntax.

5.3.13.  CA Key Update Announcement Content

   When a CA updates its own key pair, the following data structure MAY
   be used to announce this event.

     CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
        oldWithNew         Certificate,
        newWithOld         Certificate,
        newWithNew         Certificate
     }

5.3.14.  Certificate Announcement

   This structure MAY be used to announce the existence of certificates.

   Note that this message is intended to be used for those cases (if
   any) where there is no pre-existing method for publication of
   certificates; it is not intended to be used where, for example, X.500
   is the method for publication of certificates.

     CertAnnContent ::= Certificate

5.3.15.  Revocation Announcement

   When a CA has revoked, or is about to revoke, a particular
   certificate, it MAY issue an announcement of this (possibly upcoming)
   event.

     RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
        status              PKIStatus,
        certId              CertId,
        willBeRevokedAt     GeneralizedTime,
        badSinceDate        GeneralizedTime,
        crlDetails          Extensions  OPTIONAL
     }

   A CA MAY use such an announcement to warn (or notify) a subject that
   its certificate is about to be (or has been) revoked.  This would
   typically be used where the request for revocation did not come from
   the subject concerned.



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   The willBeRevokedAt field contains the time at which a new entry will
   be added to the relevant CRLs.

5.3.16.  CRL Announcement

   When a CA issues a new CRL (or set of CRLs) the following data
   structure MAY be used to announce this event.

     CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList

5.3.17.  PKI Confirmation Content

   This data structure is used in the protocol exchange as the final
   PKIMessage.  Its content is the same in all cases -- actually there
   is no content since the PKIHeader carries all the required
   information.

     PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL

   Use of this message for certificate confirmation is NOT RECOMMENDED;
   certConf SHOULD be used instead.  Upon receiving a PKIConfirm for a
   certificate response, the recipient MAY treat it as a certConf with
   all certificates being accepted.

5.3.18.  Certificate Confirmation Content

   This data structure is used by the client to send a confirmation to
   the CA/RA to accept or reject certificates.

     CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
        certHash    OCTET STRING,
        certReqId   INTEGER,
        statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
        hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
                    OPTIONAL
     }

   The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
   signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not
   specify a hash algorithm in the OID or in the parameters or does not
   define a hash algorithm to use with CMP, e.g., for EdDSA in [RFCCCCC]
   Section 3.3).  Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be computed using
   the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify the certificate
   signature.  If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the
   certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).






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   For any particular CertStatus, omission of the statusInfo field
   indicates ACCEPTANCE of the specified certificate.  Alternatively,
   explicit status details (with respect to acceptance or rejection) MAY
   be provided in the statusInfo field, perhaps for auditing purposes at
   the CA/RA.

   Within CertConfirmContent, omission of a CertStatus structure
   corresponding to a certificate supplied in the previous response
   message indicates REJECTION of the certificate.  Thus, an empty
   CertConfirmContent (a zero-length SEQUENCE) MAY be used to indicate
   rejection of all supplied certificates.  See Section 5.2.8, item (2),
   for a discussion of the certHash field with respect to proof-of-
   possession.

5.3.19.  PKI General Message Content

     InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
        infoType               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
        infoValue              ANY DEFINED BY infoType  OPTIONAL
     }

     -- where {id-it} = {id-pkix 4} = {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4}
     GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue

5.3.19.1.  CA Protocol Encryption Certificate

   This MAY be used by the EE to get a certificate from the CA to use to
   protect sensitive information during the protocol.

     GenMsg:    {id-it 1}, < absent >
     GenRep:    {id-it 1}, Certificate | < absent >

   EEs MUST ensure that the correct certificate is used for this
   purpose.

5.3.19.2.  Signing Key Pair Types

   This MAY be used by the EE to get the list of signature algorithm
   whose subject public key values the CA is willing to certify.

     GenMsg:    {id-it 2}, < absent >
     GenRep:    {id-it 2}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                             AlgorithmIdentifier

   Note: For the purposes of this exchange, rsaEncryption and
   rsaWithSHA1, for example, are considered to be equivalent; the
   question being asked is, "Is the CA willing to certify an RSA public
   key?"



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   Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
   elements as defined in RFC 5480 [RFC5480] need to be given, one per
   named curve.

5.3.19.3.  Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types

   This MAY be used by the client to get the list of encryption/key
   agreement algorithms whose subject public key values the CA is
   willing to certify.

     GenMsg:    {id-it 3}, < absent >
     GenRep:    {id-it 3}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                             AlgorithmIdentifier

   Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
   elements as defined in RFC 5480 [RFC5480] need to be given, one per
   named curve.

5.3.19.4.  Preferred Symmetric Algorithm

   This MAY be used by the client to get the CA-preferred symmetric
   encryption algorithm for any confidential information that needs to
   be exchanged between the EE and the CA (for example, if the EE wants
   to send its private decryption key to the CA for archival purposes).

     GenMsg:    {id-it 4}, < absent >
     GenRep:    {id-it 4}, AlgorithmIdentifier

5.3.19.5.  Updated CA Key Pair

   This MAY be used by the CA to announce a CA key update event.

     GenMsg:    {id-it 5}, CAKeyUpdAnnContent

5.3.19.6.  CRL

   This MAY be used by the client to get a copy of the latest CRL.

     GenMsg:    {id-it 6}, < absent >
     GenRep:    {id-it 6}, CertificateList

5.3.19.7.  Unsupported Object Identifiers

   This is used by the server to return a list of object identifiers
   that it does not recognize or support from the list submitted by the
   client.

     GenRep:    {id-it 7}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER



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5.3.19.8.  Key Pair Parameters

   This MAY be used by the EE to request the domain parameters to use
   for generating the key pair for certain public-key algorithms.  It
   can be used, for example, to request the appropriate P, Q, and G to
   generate the DH/DSA key, or to request a set of well-known elliptic
   curves.

     GenMsg:    {id-it 10}, OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- (Algorithm object-id)
     GenRep:    {id-it 11}, AlgorithmIdentifier | < absent >

   An absent infoValue in the GenRep indicates that the algorithm
   specified in GenMsg is not supported.

   EEs MUST ensure that the parameters are acceptable to it and that the
   GenRep message is authenticated (to avoid substitution attacks).

5.3.19.9.  Revocation Passphrase

   This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the
   purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case
   that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to
   authenticate the request).  See Appendix B for further details on the
   use of this mechanism.

     GenMsg:    {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
     GenRep:    {id-it 12}, < absent >

   The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.

5.3.19.10.  ImplicitConfirm

   See Section 5.1.1.1 for the definition and use of {id-it 13}.

5.3.19.11.  ConfirmWaitTime

   See Section 5.1.1.2 for the definition and use of {id-it 14}.

5.3.19.12.  Original PKIMessage

   See Section 5.1.1.3 for the definition and use of {id-it 15}.










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5.3.19.13.  Supported Language Tags

   This MAY be used to determine the appropriate language tag to use in
   subsequent messages.  The sender sends its list of supported
   languages (in order, most preferred to least); the receiver returns
   the one it wishes to use.  (Note: each UTF8String MUST include a
   language tag.)  If none of the offered tags are supported, an error
   MUST be returned.

     GenMsg:    {id-it 16}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
     GenRep:    {id-it 16}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1) OF UTF8String

5.3.19.14.  CA Certificates

   This MAY be used by the client to get CA certificates.

     GenMsg:    {id-it 17}, < absent >
     GenRep:    {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                              CMPCertificate | < absent >

5.3.19.15.  Root CA Update

   This MAY be used by the client to get an update of a root CA
   certificate, which is provided in the body of the request message.
   In contrast to the ckuann message this approach follows the request/
   response model.

     GenMsg:    {id-it 20}, RootCaCertValue | < absent >
     GenRep:    {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent >

     RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate

     RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent

     RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
        newWithNew              CMPCertificate,
        newWithOld          [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
        oldWithNew          [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
     }

   Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting
   newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the
   needs of the EE.








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5.3.19.16.  Certificate Request Template

   This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing
   requirements for certificate request attributes and extensions.  The
   controls id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen MAY contain
   details on the types of subject public keys the CA is willing to
   certify.

   The id-regCtrl-algId control MAY be used to identify a cryptographic
   algorithm, see RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.7 [RFC5280], other than
   rsaEncryption.  The algorithm field SHALL identify a cryptographic
   algorithm.  The contents of the optional parameters field will vary
   according to the algorithm identified.  For example, when the
   algorithm is set to id-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the
   elliptic curve to be used, see [RFC5480].

   Note: The client may specify a profile name in the certProfile field,
   see Section 5.1.1.4.

   The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen control SHALL be used for algorithm
   rsaEncryption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of
   the RSA key.


     GenMsg:    {id-it 19}, < absent >
     GenRep:    {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent >

     CertReqTemplateValue  ::= CertReqTemplateContent

     CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
        certTemplate           CertTemplate,
        keySpec                Controls OPTIONAL }

     Controls  ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue

     id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
        identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
        mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 }

     AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}

     id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
        identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
        mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 }

     RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)





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   The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be
   used for a future certificate request.  The publicKey field in the
   certTemplate MUST NOT be used.  In case the PKI management entity
   wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field
   MUST be used.  One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or
   RSA key length MUST be used.

   Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211]

5.3.19.17.  CRL Update Retrieval

   This MAY be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source
   of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already
   has, if available.  A CRL source is given either by a
   DistributionPointName or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA.  The
   DistributionPointName should be treated as an internal pointer to
   identify a CRL that the server already has and not as a way to ask
   the server to fetch CRLs from external locations.  The server SHALL
   provide only those CRLs that are more recent than the ones indicated
   by the client.

     GenMsg:    {id-it 22}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CRLStatus
     GenRep:    {id-it 23}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                              CertificateList  |  < absent >

     CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
        dpn          [0] DistributionPointName,
        issuer       [1] GeneralNames }

     CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
        source       CRLSource,
        thisUpdate   Time OPTIONAL }

5.3.20.  PKI General Response Content

     GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue

   Examples of GenReps that MAY be supported include those listed in the
   subsections of Section 5.3.19.

5.3.21.  Error Message Content

   This data structure MAY be used by EE, CA, or RA to convey error info
   and by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed delivery of
   responses.






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     ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
        pKIStatusInfo          PKIStatusInfo,
        errorCode              INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
        errorDetails           PKIFreeText       OPTIONAL
     }

   This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction.
   If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a
   PKIConfirm response, or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is
   not valid.

   In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to the EE with
   the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting", the EE
   SHOULD initiate polling as described in Section 5.3.22.  If the EE
   does not initiate polling, both sides MUST treat this message as the
   end of the transaction (if a transaction is in progress).

   If protection is desired on the message, the client MUST protect it
   using the same technique (i.e., signature or MAC) as the starting
   message of the transaction.  The CA MUST always sign it with a
   signature key.

5.3.22.  Polling Request and Response

   This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the
   client needs to poll the server to determine the status of an
   outstanding response (i.e., when the "waiting" PKIStatus has been
   received).

     PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
        certReqId    INTEGER }

     PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
        certReqId    INTEGER,
        checkAfter   INTEGER,  -- time in seconds
        reason       PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }

   In response to an ir, cr, p10cr, or kur request message, polling is
   initiated with an ip, cp, or kup response message containing status
   "waiting".  For any type of request message, polling can be initiated
   with an error response messages with status "waiting".  The following
   clauses describe how polling messages are used.  It is assumed that
   multiple certConf messages can be sent during transactions.  There
   will be one sent in response to each ip, cp, or kup that contains a
   CertStatus for an issued certificate.






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   1  In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send a
      certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf for each
      certConf.  An EE will send a pollReq message in response to each
      CertResponse element of an ip, cp, or kup message with status
      "waiting" and in response to an error message with status
      "waiting".  Its certReqId MUST be either the index of a
      CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or -1 referring
      to the complete response.

   2  In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if
      one or more of still pending requested certificates are ready or
      the final response to some other type of request is available;
      otherwise, it will return a pollRep.

   3  If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the number
      of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another
      pollReq.

   4  If the EE receives an ip, cp, or kup, then it will be treated in
      the same way as the initial response; if it receives any other
      response, then this will be treated as the final response to the
      original request.

   The following client-side state machine describes polling for
   individual CertResponse elements.


























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                               START
                                 |
                                 v
                              Send ir
                                 | ip
                                 v
                            Check status
                            of returned <------------------------+
                               certs                             |
                                 |                               |
       +------------------------>|<------------------+           |
       |                         |                   |           |
       |        (issued)         v       (waiting)   |           |
     Add to <----------- Check CertResponse ------> Add to       |
    conf list           for each certificate      pending list   |
                                 /                               |
                                /                                |
                   (conf list) /     (empty conf list)           |
                              /                     ip           |
                             /                 +-----------------+
      (empty pending list)  /                  |    pollRep
        END <---- Send certConf        Send pollReq---------->Wait
                         |                 ^   ^               |
                         |                 |   |               |
                         +-----------------+   +---------------+
                            (pending list)

   In the following exchange, the end entity is enrolling for two
   certificates in one request.






















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    Step  End Entity                       PKI
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
    1   Format ir
    2                    -> ir      ->
    3                                    Handle ir
    4                                    Manual intervention is
                                         required for both certs.
    5                    <- ip      <-
    6   Process ip
    7   Format pollReq
    8                    -> pollReq  ->
    9                                    Check status of cert requests
    10                                   Certificates not ready
    11                                   Format pollRep
    12                   <- pollRep  <-
    13  Wait
    14  Format pollReq
    15                   -> pollReq  ->
    16                                   Check status of cert requests
    17                                   One certificate is ready
    18                                   Format ip
    19                   <- ip       <-
    20  Handle ip
    21  Format certConf
    22                   -> certConf ->
    23                                   Handle certConf
    24                                   Format ack
    25                   <- pkiConf   <-
    26  Format pollReq
    27                   -> pollReq  ->
    28                                   Check status of certificate
    29                                   Certificate is ready
    30                                   Format ip
    31                   <- ip       <-
    31  Handle ip
    32  Format certConf
    33                   -> certConf ->
    34                                   Handle certConf
    35                                   Format ack
    36                   <- pkiConf  <-

   The following client-side state machine describes polling for a
   complete response message.








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                                   Start
                                     |
                                     | Send request
                                     |
                +----------- Receive response ------------+
                |                                         |
                | ip/cp/kup/error with                    | other
                | status "waiting"                        | response
                |                                         |
                v                                         |
    +------> Polling                                      |
    |           |                                         |
    |           | Send pollReq                            |
    |           | Receive response                        |
    |           |                                         |
    |   pollRep | other response                          |
    +-----------+------------------->+<-------------------+
                                     |
                                     v
                               Handle response
                                     |
                                     v
                                    End

   In the following exchange, the end entity is sending a general
   message request, and the response is delayed by the server.

























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    Step  End Entity                       PKI
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
    1   Format genm
    2                  -> genm     ->
    3                                 Handle genm
    4                                 delay in response is necessary
    5                                 Format error message "waiting"
                                        with certReqId set to -1
    6                   <- error   <-
    7   Process error
    8   Format pollReq
    9                   -> pollReq ->
    10                                Check status of original request
                                      general message response not ready
    11                                Format pollRep
    12                  <- pollRep <-
    13  Wait
    14  Format pollReq
    15                  -> pollReq ->
    16                                Check status of original request
                                      general message response is ready
    17                                Format genp
    18                  <- genp    <-
    19  Handle genp

6.  Mandatory PKI Management Functions

   Some of the PKI management functions outlined in Section 3.1 above
   are described in this section.

   This section deals with functions that are "mandatory" in the sense
   that all end entity and CA/RA implementations MUST be able to provide
   the functionality described.  This part is effectively the profile of
   the PKI management functionality that MUST be supported.  Note,
   however, that the management functions described in this section do
   not need to be accomplished using the PKI messages defined in
   Section 5 if alternate means are suitable for a given environment
   (see [RFCBBBB] Section 7 and Appendix D for profiles of the
   PKIMessages that MUST be supported).

6.1.  Root CA Initialization

   [See Section 3.1.1.2 for this document's definition of "root CA".]

   A newly created root CA must produce a "self-certificate", which is a
   Certificate structure with the profile defined for the "newWithNew"
   certificate issued following a root CA key update.




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   In order to make the CA's self certificate useful to end entities
   that do not acquire the self certificate via "out-of-band" means, the
   CA must also produce a fingerprint for its certificate.  End entities
   that acquire this fingerprint securely via some "out-of-band" means
   can then verify the CA's self-certificate and, hence, the other
   attributes contained therein.

   The data structure used to carry the fingerprint is the OOBCertHash,
   see Section 5.2.5.

6.2.  Root CA Key Update

   CA keys (as all other keys) have a finite lifetime and will have to
   be updated on a periodic basis.  The certificates NewWithNew,
   NewWithOld, and OldWithNew (see Section 4.4.1) MAY be issued by the
   CA to aid existing end entities who hold the current self-signed CA
   certificate (OldWithOld) to transition securely to the new self-
   signed CA certificate (NewWithNew), and to aid new end entities who
   will hold NewWithNew to acquire OldWithOld securely for verification
   of existing data.

6.3.  Subordinate CA Initialization

   [See Section 3.1.1.2 for this document's definition of "subordinate
   CA".]

   From the perspective of PKI management protocols, the initialization
   of a subordinate CA is the same as the initialization of an end
   entity.  The only difference is that the subordinate CA must also
   produce an initial revocation list.

6.4.  CRL production

   Before issuing any certificates, a newly established CA (which issues
   CRLs) must produce "empty" versions of each CRL which are to be
   periodically produced.

6.5.  PKI Information Request

   When a PKI entity (CA, RA, or EE) wishes to acquire information about
   the current status of a CA, it MAY send that CA a request for such
   information.

   The CA MUST respond to the request by providing (at least) all of the
   information requested by the requester.  If some of the information
   cannot be provided, then an error must be conveyed to the requester.





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   If PKIMessages are used to request and supply this PKI information,
   then the request MUST be the GenMsg message, the response MUST be the
   GenRep message, and the error MUST be the Error message.  These
   messages are protected using a MAC based on shared secret information
   (i.e., password-based MAC, see CMP Algorithms [RFCCCCC] Section 6.1)
   or a signature(if the end entity has an existing certificate).

6.6.  Cross Certification

   The requester CA is the CA that will become the subject of the cross-
   certificate; the responder CA will become the issuer of the cross-
   certificate.

   The requester CA must be "up and running" before initiating the
   cross-certification operation.

6.6.1.  One-Way Request-Response Scheme:

   The cross-certification scheme is essentially a one way operation;
   that is, when successful, this operation results in the creation of
   one new cross-certificate.  If the requirement is that cross-
   certificates be created in "both directions", then each CA, in turn,
   must initiate a cross-certification operation (or use another
   scheme).

   This scheme is suitable where the two CAs in question can already
   verify each other's signatures (they have some common points of
   trust) or where there is an out-of-band verification of the origin of
   the certification request.

   Detailed Description:

   Cross certification is initiated at one CA known as the responder.
   The CA administrator for the responder identifies the CA it wants to
   cross certify and the responder CA equipment generates an
   authorization code.  The responder CA administrator passes this
   authorization code by out-of-band means to the requester CA
   administrator.  The requester CA administrator enters the
   authorization code at the requester CA in order to initiate the on-
   line exchange.

   The authorization code is used for authentication and integrity
   purposes.  This is done by generating a symmetric key based on the
   authorization code and using the symmetric key for generating Message
   Authentication Codes (MACs) on all messages exchanged.
   (Authentication may alternatively be done using signatures instead of
   MACs, if the CAs are able to retrieve and validate the required
   public keys by some means, such as an out-of-band hash comparison.)



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   The requester CA initiates the exchange by generating a cross-
   certification request (ccr) with a fresh random number (requester
   random number).  The requester CA then sends the ccr message to the
   responder CA.  The fields in this message are protected from
   modification with a MAC based on the authorization code.

   Upon receipt of the ccr message, the responder CA validates the
   message and the MAC, saves the requester random number, and generates
   its own random number (responder random number).  It then generates
   (and archives, if desired) a new requester certificate that contains
   the requester CA public key and is signed with the responder CA
   signature private key.  The responder CA responds with the cross
   certification response (ccp) message.  The fields in this message are
   protected from modification with a MAC based on the authorization
   code.

   Upon receipt of the ccp message, the requester CA validates the
   message (including the received random numbers) and the MAC.  The
   requester CA responds with the certConf message.  The fields in this
   message are protected from modification with a MAC based on the
   authorization code.  The requester CA MAY write the requester
   certificate to the Repository as an aid to later certificate path
   construction.

   Upon receipt of the certConf message, the responder CA validates the
   message and the MAC, and sends back an acknowledgement using the
   PKIConfirm message.  It MAY also publish the requester certificate as
   an aid to later path construction.

   Notes:

   1.  The ccr message must contain a "complete" certification request;
       that is, all fields except the serial number (including, e.g., a
       BasicConstraints extension) must be specified by the requester
       CA.

   2.  The ccp message SHOULD contain the verification certificate of
       the responder CA; if present, the requester CA must then verify
       this certificate (for example, via the "out-of-band" mechanism).

   (A simpler, non-interactive model of cross-certification may also be
   envisioned, in which the issuing CA acquires the subject CA's public
   key from some repository, verifies it via some out-of-band mechanism,
   and creates and publishes the cross-certificate without the subject
   CA's explicit involvement.  This model may be perfectly legitimate
   for many environments, but since it does not require any protocol
   message exchanges, its detailed description is outside the scope of
   this specification.)



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6.7.  End Entity Initialization

   As with CAs, end entities must be initialized.  Initialization of end
   entities requires at least two steps:

   *  acquisition of PKI information

   *  out-of-band verification of one root-CA public key

   (other possible steps include the retrieval of trust condition
   information and/or out-of-band verification of other CA public keys).

6.7.1.  Acquisition of PKI Information

   The information REQUIRED is:

   *  the current root-CA public key

   *  (if the certifying CA is not a root-CA) the certification path
      from the root CA to the certifying CA together with appropriate
      revocation lists

   *  the algorithms and algorithm parameters that the certifying CA
      supports for each relevant usage

   Additional information could be required (e.g., supported extensions
   or CA policy information) in order to produce a certification request
   that will be successful.  However, for simplicity we do not mandate
   that the end entity acquires this information via the PKI messages.
   The end result is simply that some certification requests may fail
   (e.g., if the end entity wants to generate its own encryption key,
   but the CA doesn't allow that).

   The required information MAY be acquired as described in Section 6.5.

6.7.2.  Out-of-Band Verification of Root-CA Key

   An end entity must securely possess the public key of its root CA.
   One method to achieve this is to provide the end entity with the CA's
   self-certificate fingerprint via some secure "out-of-band" means.
   The end entity can then securely use the CA's self-certificate.

   See Section 6.1 for further details.








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6.8.  Certificate Request

   An initialized end entity MAY request an additional certificate at
   any time (for any purpose).  This request will be made using the
   certification request (cr) message.  If the end entity already
   possesses a signing key pair (with a corresponding verification
   certificate), then this cr message will typically be protected by the
   entity's digital signature.  The CA returns the new certificate (if
   the request is successful) in a CertRepMessage.

6.9.  Key Update

   When a key pair is due to expire, the relevant end entity MAY request
   a key update; that is, it MAY request that the CA issue a new
   certificate for a new key pair (or, in certain circumstances, a new
   certificate for the same key pair).  The request is made using a key
   update request (kur) message (referred to, in some environments, as a
   "Certificate Update" operation).  If the end entity already possesses
   a signing key pair (with a corresponding verification certificate),
   then this message will typically be protected by the entity's digital
   signature.  The CA returns the new certificate (if the request is
   successful) in a key update response (kup) message, which is
   syntactically identical to a CertRepMessage.

7.  Version Negotiation

   This section defines the version negotiation used to support older
   protocols between client and servers.

   If a client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the server
   (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of-band
   means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest version
   supported by both it and the server.  If a client does not know what
   version(s) the server supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using
   the highest version it supports, with the following exception.
   Version cmp2021 SHOULD only be used if cmp2021 syntax is needed for
   the request being sent or for the expected response.

   Note: Using cmp2000 as the default pvno is done to avoid extra
   message exchanges for version negotiation and to foster compatibility
   with cmp2000 implementations.  Version cmp2021 syntax is only needed
   if a message exchange uses hashAlg (in CertStatus) or EnvelopedData.

   If a server receives a message with a version that it supports, then
   the version of the response message MUST be the same as the received
   version.  If a server receives a message with a version higher or
   lower than it supports, then it MUST send back an ErrorMsg with the
   unsupportedVersion bit set (in the failureInfo field of the



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   pKIStatusInfo).  If the received version is higher than the highest
   supported version, then the version in the error message MUST be the
   highest version the server supports; if the received version is lower
   than the lowest supported version then the version in the error
   message MUST be the lowest version the server supports.

   If a client gets back an ErrorMsgContent with the unsupportedVersion
   bit set and a version it supports, then it MAY retry the request with
   that version.

7.1.  Supporting RFC 2510 Implementations

   RFC 2510 did not specify the behaviour of implementations receiving
   versions they did not understand since there was only one version in
   existence.  With the introduction of the revision in [RFC4210], the
   following versioning behaviour is recommended.

7.1.1.  Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers

   If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher
   than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of
   cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction.

   If a client receives a non-error PKIMessage with a version of
   cmp1999, then it MAY decide to continue the transaction (if the
   transaction hasn't finished) using RFC 2510 semantics.  If it does
   not choose to do so and the transaction is not finished, then it MUST
   abort the transaction and send an ErrorMsgContent with a version of
   cmp1999.

7.1.2.  Servers Receiving Version cmp1999 PKIMessages

   If a server receives a version cmp1999 message it MAY revert to RFC
   2510 behaviour and respond with version cmp1999 messages.  If it does
   not choose to do so, then it MUST send back an ErrorMsgContent as
   described above in Section 7.

8.  Security Considerations

8.1.  Proof-Of-Possession with a Decryption Key

   Some cryptographic considerations are worth explicitly spelling out.
   In the protocols specified above, when an end entity is required to
   prove possession of a decryption key, it is effectively challenged to
   decrypt something (its own certificate).  This scheme (and many
   others!) could be vulnerable to an attack if the possessor of the
   decryption key in question could be fooled into decrypting an
   arbitrary challenge and returning the cleartext to an attacker.



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   Although in this specification a number of other failures in security
   are required in order for this attack to succeed, it is conceivable
   that some future services (e.g., notary, trusted time) could
   potentially be vulnerable to such attacks.  For this reason, we re-
   iterate the general rule that implementations should be very careful
   about decrypting arbitrary "ciphertext" and revealing recovered
   "plaintext" since such a practice can lead to serious security
   vulnerabilities.

8.2.  Proof-Of-Possession by Exposing the Private Key

   Note also that exposing a private key to the CA/RA as a proof-of-
   possession technique can carry some security risks (depending upon
   whether or not the CA/RA can be trusted to handle such material
   appropriately).  Implementers are advised to:

      Exercise caution in selecting and using this particular POP
      mechanism

      When appropriate, have the user of the application explicitly
      state that they are willing to trust the CA/RA to have a copy of
      their private key before proceeding to reveal the private key.

8.3.  Attack Against Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

   A small subgroup attack during a Diffie-Hellman key exchange may be
   carried out as follows.  A malicious end entity may deliberately
   choose D-H parameters that enable him/her to derive (a significant
   number of bits of) the D-H private key of the CA during a key
   archival or key recovery operation.  Armed with this knowledge, the
   EE would then be able to retrieve the decryption private key of
   another unsuspecting end entity, EE2, during EE2's legitimate key
   archival or key recovery operation with that CA.  In order to avoid
   the possibility of such an attack, two courses of action are
   available.  (1) The CA may generate a fresh D-H key pair to be used
   as a protocol encryption key pair for each EE with which it
   interacts.  (2) The CA may enter into a key validation protocol (not
   specified in this document) with each requesting end entity to ensure
   that the EE's protocol encryption key pair will not facilitate this
   attack.  Option (1) is clearly simpler (requiring no extra protocol
   exchanges from either party) and is therefore RECOMMENDED.

8.4.  Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message Protection

   A CA should not reuse its certificate signing key for other purposes
   such as protecting CMP responses and TLS connections.  This way,
   exposure to other parts of the system and the number of uses of this
   particularly critical key is reduced to a minimum.



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8.5.  Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret
      Information

   Implementations must generate nonces and private keys from random
   input.  The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs)
   to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security.
   An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment
   that produced the keys and to search the resulting small set of
   possibilities than brute-force searching the whole key space.  As an
   example of predictable random numbers see [CVE-2008-0166];
   consequences of low-entropy random numbers are discussed in Mining
   Your Ps and Qs [MiningPsQs].  The generation of quality random
   numbers is difficult.  ISO/IEC 20543:2019 [ISO.20543-2019], NIST SP
   800-90A Rev.1 [NIST_SP_800_90Ar1], BSI AIS 31 V2.0 [AIS31], and
   others offer valuable guidance in this area.

   If shared secret information is generated by a cryptographically
   secure random-number generator (CSRNG) it is safe to assume that the
   entropy of the shared secret information equals its bit length.  If
   no CSRNG is used, the entropy of a shared secret information depends
   on the details of the generation process and cannot be measured
   securely after it has been generated.  If user-generated passwords
   are used as shared secret information, their entropy cannot be
   measured and are typically insufficient for protected delivery of
   centrally generated keys or trust anchors.

   If the entropy of a shared secret information protecting the delivery
   of a centrally generated key pair is known, it should not be less
   than the security strength of that key pair; if the shared secret
   information is re-used for different key pairs, the security of the
   shared secret information should exceed the security strength of each
   individual key pair.

   For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust
   anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs or genm (a) that is
   not concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret
   information is re-used for several key management operations, the
   entropy of the shared secret information, if known, should not be
   less than the security strength of the trust anchor being managed by
   the operation.  The shared secret information should have an entropy
   that at least matches the security strength of the key material being
   managed by the operation.  Certain use cases may require shared
   secret information that may be of a low security strength, e.g., a
   human generated password.  It is RECOMMENDED that such secret
   information be limited to a single PKI management operation.






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   Importantly for this section further information about algorithm use
   profiles and their security strength is available in CMP Algorithms
   [RFCCCC] Section 7.

8.6.  Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages

   A provider of trust anchors, which may be an RA involved in
   configuration management of its clients, MUST NOT include to-be-
   trusted CA certificates in a CMP message unless the specific
   deployment scenario can ensure that it is adequate that the receiving
   EE trusts these certificates, e.g., by loading them into its trust
   store.

   Whenever an EE receives in a CMP message, e.g., in the caPubs field
   of a certificate response or in a general response (genp), a CA
   certificate for use as a trust anchor, it MUST properly authenticate
   the message sender with existing trust anchors without requiring new
   trust anchors included in the message.

   Additionally, the EE MUST verify that the sender is an authorized
   source of trust anchors.  This authorization is governed by local
   policy and typically indicated using shared secret information or
   with a signature-based message protection using a certificate issued
   by a PKI that is explicitly authorized for this purpose.

8.7.  Authorizing Requests for Certificates with Specific EKUs

   When a CA issues a certificate containing extended key usage
   extensions as defined in Section 4.5, this expresses delegation of an
   authorization that originally is only with the CA certificate itself.
   Such delegation is a very sensitive action in a PKI and therefore
   special care must be taken when approving such certificate requests
   to ensure that only legitimate entities receive a certificate
   containing such an EKU.

9.  IANA Considerations

   The IANA has already registered what is specified in CMP Updates
   [RFCAAAA].

   No further action by the IANA is necessary for this document or any
   anticipated updates.

10.  Acknowledgements

   The authors of this document wish to thank Carlisle Adams, Stephen
   Farrell, Tomi Kause, and Tero Mononen, the original authors of
   [RFC4210], for their work.



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   We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
   feedback.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2985]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
              Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
              2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.

   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5480]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.






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   [RFC5958]  Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.

   [RFC6402]  Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
              Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8933]  Housley, R., "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax
              (CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8933>.

   [ITU.X509.2000]
              International Telecommunications Union, "Information
              technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
              Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks",
              ITU-T Recommendation X.509, ISO Standard 9594-8, March
              2000.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]
              Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
              "Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
              algorithms-15, 2 June 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
              cmp-algorithms-15>.

   [MvOV97]   Menezes, A., van Oorschot, P., and S. Vanstone, "Handbook
              of Applied Cryptography", CRC Press ISBN 0-8493-8523-7,
              1996.

11.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-updates]
              Brockhaus, H., Oheimb, D. V., and J. Gray, "Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP) Updates", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-23, 29 June
              2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
              lamps-cmp-updates-23>.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
              Brockhaus, H., Oheimb, D. V., and S. Fries, "Lightweight
              Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in



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              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-
              cmp-profile-13, 8 July 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
              lightweight-cmp-profile-13>.

   [I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport]
              Sahni, M. and S. Tripathi, "CoAP Transfer for the
              Certificate Management Protocol", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport-04, 8
              November 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport-04>.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis]
              Brockhaus, H., Oheimb, D. V., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
              "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer
              for the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis-01,
              11 August 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-lamps-rfc6712bis-01>.

   [RFC1847]  Galvin, J., Murphy, S., Crocker, S., and N. Freed,
              "Security Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and
              Multipart/Encrypted", RFC 1847, DOI 10.17487/RFC1847,
              October 1995, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1847>.

   [RFC2510]  Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols",
              RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>.

   [RFC4210]  Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
              "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.

   [RFC4510]  Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
              (LDAP): Technical Specification Road Map", RFC 4510,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4510, June 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4510>.

   [RFC5912]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.






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   [IEEE_802.1AR_2018]
              IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
              Networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802-1ar-2018,
              IEEE 802-1arĀ®-2018, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 31
              July 2018, <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>.

   [NIST_SP_800_90Ar1]
              Barker, E. B., Kelsey, J. M., and NIST, "Recommendation
              for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random
              Bit Generators", NIST Special Publications
              (General) 800-90Ar1, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1, June
              2015,
              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
              NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.

   [CVE-2008-0166]
              National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST),
              "National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008-0166", 13 May
              2008, <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0166>.

   [MiningPsQs]
              Security'12: Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on
              Security symposium, Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow,
              E., and J. A. Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection
              of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices", August 2012,
              <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/
              technical-sessions/presentation/heninger>.

   [ISO.20543-2019]
              International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
              "Information technology -- Security techniques -- Test and
              analysis methods for random bit generators within ISO/IEC
              19790 and ISO/IEC 15408", ISO Draft Standard 20543-2019,
              October 2019.

   [AIS31]    Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
              (BSI), Killmann, W., and W. Schindler, "A proposal for:
              Functionality classes for random number generators,
              version 2.0", 18 September 2011,
              <https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/
              Zertifizierung/Interpretationen/AIS_31_Functionality_class
              es_for_random_number_generators_e.pdf>.

Appendix A.  Reasons for the Presence of RAs

   The reasons that justify the presence of an RA can be split into
   those that are due to technical factors and those which are
   organizational in nature.  Technical reasons include the following.



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   *  If hardware tokens are in use, then not all end entities will have
      the equipment needed to initialize these; the RA equipment can
      include the necessary functionality (this may also be a matter of
      policy).

   *  Some end entities may not have the capability to publish
      certificates; again, the RA may be suitably placed for this.

   *  The RA will be able to issue signed revocation requests on behalf
      of end entities associated with it, whereas the end entity may not
      be able to do this (if the key pair is completely lost).

   Some of the organizational reasons that argue for the presence of an
   RA are the following.

   *  It may be more cost effective to concentrate functionality in the
      RA equipment than to supply functionality to all end entities
      (especially if special token initialization equipment is to be
      used).

   *  Establishing RAs within an organization can reduce the number of
      CAs required, which is sometimes desirable.

   *  RAs may be better placed to identify people with their
      "electronic" names, especially if the CA is physically remote from
      the end entity.

   *  For many applications, there will already be in place some
      administrative structure so that candidates for the role of RA are
      easy to find (which may not be true of the CA).

   Further reasons relevant for automated machine-to-machine certificate
   lifecycle management are available in the Lightweight CMP Profile
   [RFCBBBB].

Appendix B.  The Use of Revocation Passphrase

   A revocation request must incorporate suitable security mechanisms,
   including proper authentication, in order to reduce the probability
   of successful denial-of-service attacks.  A digital signature on the
   request -- REQUIRED to support within this specification if
   revocation requests are supported -- can provide the authentication
   required, but there are circumstances under which an alternative
   mechanism may be desirable (e.g., when the private key is no longer
   accessible and the entity wishes to request a revocation prior to re-
   certification of another key pair).  In order to accommodate such
   circumstances, a password-based MAC, see CMP Algorithms [RFCCCCC]
   Section 6.1, on the request is also REQUIRED to support within this



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   specification (subject to local security policy for a given
   environment) if revocation requests are supported and if shared
   secret information can be established between the requester and the
   responder prior to the need for revocation.

   A mechanism that has seen use in some environments is "revocation
   passphrase", in which a value of sufficient entropy (i.e., a
   relatively long passphrase rather than a short password) is shared
   between (only) the entity and the CA/RA at some point prior to
   revocation; this value is later used to authenticate the revocation
   request.

   In this specification, the following technique to establish shared
   secret information (i.e., a revocation passphrase) is OPTIONAL to
   support.  Its precise use in CMP messages is as follows.

   *  The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a
      GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be sent in the generalInfo
      field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time.  (In
      particular, the EncryptedKey structure as described in
      Section 5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message
      that confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an
      initialization request or certificate request message.)  This
      conveys a revocation passphrase chosen by the entity to the
      relevant CA/RA.  When EnvelopedData is used, this is in the
      decrypted bytes of encryptedContent field.  When EncryptedValue is
      used, this is in the decrypted bytes of the encValue field.
      Furthermore, the transfer is accomplished with appropriate
      confidentiality characteristics.

   *  If a CA/RA receives the revocation passphrase (OID and value
      specified in Section 5.3.19.9) in a GenMsg, it MUST construct and
      send a GenRep message that includes the OID (with absent value)
      specified in Section 5.3.19.9.  If the CA/RA receives the
      revocation passphrase in the generalInfo field of a PKIHeader of
      any PKIMessage, it MUST include the OID (with absent value) in the
      generalInfo field of the PKIHeader of the corresponding response
      PKIMessage.  If the CA/RA is unable to return the appropriate
      response message for any reason, it MUST send an error message
      with a status of "rejection" and, optionally, a failInfo reason
      set.

   *  Either the localKeyId attribute of EnvelopedData as specified in
      RFC 2985 [RFC2985] or the valueHint field of EncryptedValue MAY
      contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along with the
      passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct
      passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is constructed by
      the entity and received by the CA/RA).



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   *  The revocation request message is protected by a password-based
      MAC, see CMP Algorithms [RFCCCCC] Section 6.1, with the revocation
      passphrase as the key.  If appropriate, the senderKID field in the
      PKIHeader MAY contain the value previously transmitted in
      valueHint.

   Using the technique specified above, the revocation passphrase may be
   initially established and updated at any time without requiring extra
   messages or out-of-band exchanges.  For example, the revocation
   request message itself (protected and authenticated through a MAC
   that uses the revocation passphrase as a key) may contain, in the
   PKIHeader, a new revocation passphrase to be used for authenticating
   future revocation requests for any of the entity's other
   certificates.  In some environments this may be preferable to
   mechanisms that reveal the passphrase in the revocation request
   message, since this can allow a denial-of-service attack in which the
   revealed passphrase is used by an unauthorized third party to
   authenticate revocation requests on the entity's other certificates.
   However, because the passphrase is not revealed in the request
   message, there is no requirement that the passphrase must always be
   updated when a revocation request is made (that is, the same
   passphrase MAY be used by an entity to authenticate revocation
   requests for different certificates at different times).

   Furthermore, the above technique can provide strong cryptographic
   protection over the entire revocation request message even when a
   digital signature is not used.  Techniques that do authentication of
   the revocation request by simply revealing the revocation passphrase
   typically do not provide cryptographic protection over the fields of
   the request message (so that a request for revocation of one
   certificate may be modified by an unauthorized third party to a
   request for revocation of another certificate for that entity).

Appendix C.  Request Message Behavioral Clarifications

   < ToDo: This appendix needs more detailed review to decide if
   something needs to be changed. >

   In the case of updates to [RFC4211], which cause interpretation or
   interoperability issues, [RFC4211] SHALL be the normative document.

   The following definitions are from [RFC4211].  They are included here
   in order to codify behavioral clarifications to that request message;
   otherwise, all syntax and semantics are identical to [RFC4211].







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     CertRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
        certReqId     INTEGER,
        certTemplate  CertTemplate,
        controls      Controls OPTIONAL }

   -- If certTemplate is an empty SEQUENCE (i.e., all fields
   -- omitted), then controls MAY contain the
   -- id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate control, specifying a template
   -- for a certificate other than an X.509v3 public-key
   -- certificate.  Conversely, if certTemplate is not empty
   -- (i.e., at least one field is present), then controls MUST
   -- NOT contain id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate.  The new control is
   -- defined as follows:

     id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-regCtrl 7}
     AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue

     POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE {
        poposkInput           [0] POPOSigningKeyInput OPTIONAL,
        algorithmIdentifier   AlgorithmIdentifier,
        signature             BIT STRING }

   -- **********
   -- * For the purposes of this specification, the ASN.1 comment
   -- * given in [RFC4211] pertains not only to certTemplate, but
   -- * also to the altCertTemplate control.
   -- **********
   -- * The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the
   -- * DER-encoded value of poposkInput (i.e., the "value" OCTETs
   -- * of the POPOSigningKeyInput DER).  NOTE: If CertReqMsg
   -- * certReq certTemplate (or the altCertTemplate control)
   -- * contains the subject and publicKey values, then poposkInput
   -- * MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be computed on the
   -- * DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq (or the DER-
   -- * encoded value of AltCertTemplate).  If
   -- * certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain both the
   -- * subject and public key values (i.e., if it contains only
   -- * one of these, or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present
   -- * and MUST be signed.
   -- **********

     POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE {
        thisMessage       [0] BIT STRING,
   -- **********
   -- *  the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211
   -- *  [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with
   -- *  Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this
   -- *  document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying



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   -- *  that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as
   -- *  "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward
   -- *  compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING.  This
   -- *  allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the
   -- *  private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility
   -- *  with RFC4210 and [RFCAAAA].
   -- **********
        subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage,
        dhMAC             [2] BIT STRING
     }

Appendix D.  PKI Management Message Profiles (REQUIRED)

   This appendix contains detailed profiles for those PKIMessages that
   MUST be supported by conforming implementations (see Section 6).

   Note: Appendix D and E focus on PKI management operations managing
   certificates for human end entities.  In contrast, the Lightweight
   CMP Profile [RFCBBBB] focuses on typical use cases of industrial and
   IoT scenarios supporting highly automated certificate lifecycle
   management scenarios.

   Profiles for the PKIMessages used in the following PKI management
   operations are provided:

   *  initial registration/certification

   *  basic authenticated scheme

   *  certificate request

   *  key update

D.1.  General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles.

   1.  Where OPTIONAL or DEFAULT fields are not mentioned in individual
       profiles, they SHOULD be absent from the relevant message (i.e.,
       a receiver can validly reject a message containing such fields as
       being syntactically incorrect).  Mandatory fields are not
       mentioned if they have an obvious value (e.g., if not explicitly
       stated, pvno is cmp2000(2)).

   2.  Where structures occur in more than one message, they are
       separately profiled as appropriate.

   3.  The algorithmIdentifiers from PKIMessage structures are profiled
       separately.




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   4.  A "special" X.500 DN is called the "NULL-DN"; this means a DN
       containing a zero-length SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedNames
       (its DER encoding is then '3000'H).

   5.  Where a GeneralName is required for a field, but no suitable
       value is available (e.g., an end entity produces a request before
       knowing its name), then the GeneralName is to be an X.500 NULL-DN
       (i.e., the Name field of the CHOICE is to contain a NULL-DN).
       This special value can be called a "NULL-GeneralName".

   6.  Where a profile omits to specify the value for a GeneralName,
       then the NULL-GeneralName value is to be present in the relevant
       PKIMessage field.  This occurs with the sender field of the
       PKIHeader for some messages.

   7.  Where any ambiguity arises due to naming of fields, the profile
       names these using a "dot" notation (e.g., "certTemplate.subject"
       means the subject field within a field called certTemplate).

   8.  Where a "SEQUENCE OF types" is part of a message, a zero-based
       array notation is used to describe fields within the SEQUENCE OF
       (e.g., crm[0].certReq.certTemplate.subject refers to a subfield
       of the first CertReqMsg contained in a request message).

   9.  All PKI message exchanges in Appendix D.4 to D.6 require a
       certConf message to be sent by the initiating entity and a
       PKIConfirm to be sent by the responding entity.  The PKIConfirm
       is not included in some of the profiles given since its body is
       NULL and its header contents are clear from the context.  Any
       authenticated means can be used for the protectionAlg (e.g.,
       password-based MAC, if shared secret information is known, or
       signature).

D.2.  Algorithm Use Profile

   For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective
   conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP
   Algorithms Appendix 7.1 [RFCCCCC].

D.3.  Proof-of-Possession Profile

   POP fields for use (in signature field of pop field of
   ProofOfPossession structure) when proving possession of a private
   signing key that corresponds to a public verification key for which a
   certificate has been requested.






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   Field               Value         Comment

   algorithmIdentifier MSG_SIG_ALG   only signature protection is
                                     allowed for this proof

   signature           present       bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG

   Note: For examples of MSG_SIG_ALG OIDs see CMP Algorithms Section 3
   [RFCCCCC].

   Proof-of-possession of a private decryption key that corresponds to a
   public encryption key for which a certificate has been requested does
   not use this profile; the CertHash field of the certConf message is
   used instead.

   Not every CA/RA will do Proof-of-Possession (of signing key,
   decryption key, or key agreement key) in the PKIX-CMP in-band
   certification request protocol (how POP is done MAY ultimately be a
   policy issue that is made explicit for any given CA in its publicized
   Policy OID and Certification Practice Statement).  However, this
   specification mandates that CA/RA entities MUST do POP (by some
   means) as part of the certification process.  All end entities MUST
   be prepared to provide POP (i.e., these components of the PKIX-CMP
   protocol MUST be supported).

D.4.  Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated Scheme)

   An (uninitialized) end entity requests a (first) certificate from a
   CA.  When the CA responds with a message containing a certificate,
   the end entity replies with a certificate confirmation.  The CA sends
   a PKIConfirm back, closing the transaction.  All messages are
   authenticated.

   This scheme allows the end entity to request certification of a
   locally-generated public key (typically a signature key).  The end
   entity MAY also choose to request the centralized generation and
   certification of another key pair (typically an encryption key pair).

   Certification may only be requested for one locally generated public
   key (for more, use separate PKIMessages).

   The end entity MUST support proof-of-possession of the private key
   associated with the locally-generated public key.

   Preconditions:

   1.  The end entity can authenticate the CA's signature based on out-
       of-band means



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   2.  The end entity and the CA share a symmetric MACing key

   Message flow:

    Step# End entity                           PKI
      1   format ir
      2                      ->   ir      ->
      3                                        handle ir
      4                                        format ip
      5                      <-   ip      <-
      6   handle ip
      7   format certConf
      8                      ->   certConf ->
      9                                        handle certConf
     10                                        format PKIConf
     11                      <-   PKIConf  <-
     12   handle PKIConf

   For this profile, we mandate that the end entity MUST include all
   (i.e., one or two) CertReqMsg in a single PKIMessage, and that the
   PKI (CA) MUST produce a single response PKIMessage that contains the
   complete response (i.e., including the OPTIONAL second key pair, if
   it was requested and if centralized key generation is supported).
   For simplicity, we also mandate that this message MUST be the final
   one (i.e., no use of "waiting" status value).

   The end entity has an out-of-band interaction with the CA/RA.  This
   transaction established the shared secret, the referenceNumber and
   OPTIONALLY the distinguished name used for both sender and subject
   name in the certificate template.  See Section 8.5 for security
   considerations on quality of shared secret information.

   Initialization Request -- ir

   Field                Value

   recipient            CA name
     -- the name of the CA who is being asked to produce a certificate
   protectionAlg        MSG_MAC_ALG
     -- only MAC protection is allowed for this request, based
     -- on initial authentication key
   senderKID            referenceNum
     -- the reference number which the CA has previously issued
     -- to the end entity (together with the MACing key)
   transactionID        present
     -- implementation-specific value, meaningful to end
     -- entity.
     -- [If already in use at the CA, then a rejection message MUST



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     -- be produced by the CA]

   senderNonce          present
     -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits
   freeText             any valid value
   body                 ir (CertReqMessages)
                        only one or two CertReqMsg
                        are allowed
     -- if more certificates are required, requests MUST be
     -- packaged in separate PKIMessages

   CertReqMsg           one or two present
     -- see below for details, note: crm[0] means the first
     -- (which MUST be present), crm[1] means the second (which
     -- is OPTIONAL, and used to ask for a centrally-generated key)

   crm[0].certReq.      fixed value of zero
      certReqId
     -- this is the index of the template within the message
   crm[0].certReq       present
      certTemplate
     -- MUST include subject public key value, otherwise unconstrained
   crm[0].pop...        optionally present if public key
      POPOSigningKey    from crm[0].certReq.certTemplate is
                        a signing key
     -- proof-of-possession MAY be required in this exchange
     -- (see Appendix D.3 for details)
   crm[0].certReq.      optionally present
      controls.archiveOptions
     -- the end entity MAY request that the locally-generated
     -- private key be archived

   crm[0].certReq.      optionally present
      controls.publicationInfo
     -- the end entity MAY ask for publication of resulting cert.

   crm[1].certReq       fixed value of one
         certReqId
        -- the index of the template within the message
      crm[1].certReq       present
         certTemplate
         -- MUST NOT include actual public key bits, otherwise
         -- unconstrained (e.g., the names need not be the same as in
         -- crm[0]).  Note that subjectPublicKeyInfo MAY be present
         -- and contain an AlgorithmIdentifier followed by a
         -- zero-length BIT STRING for the subjectPublicKey if it is
         -- desired to inform the CA/RA of algorithm and parameter
         -- preferences regarding the to-be-generated key pair.



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      crm[1].certReq.      present [object identifier MUST be
                                    PROT_ENC_ALG]

         controls.protocolEncrKey
        -- if centralized key generation is supported by this CA,
        -- this short-term asymmetric encryption key (generated by
        -- the end entity) will be used by the CA to encrypt (a
        -- symmetric key used to encrypt) a private key generated by
        -- the CA on behalf of the end entity

   crm[1].certReq.      optionally present
      controls.archiveOptions
   crm[1].certReq.      optionally present
      controls.publicationInfo
   protection           present
     -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG

   Initialization Response -- ip

   Field                Value

   sender               CA name
     -- the name of the CA who produced the message
   messageTime          present
     -- time at which CA produced message
   protectionAlg        MSG_MAC_ALG
     -- only MAC protection is allowed for this response
   senderKID             referenceNum
     -- the reference number that the CA has previously issued to the
     -- end entity (together with the MACing key)
   transactionID        present
     -- value from corresponding ir message
   senderNonce          present
     -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits
   recipNonce           present
     -- value from senderNonce in corresponding ir message
   freeText             any valid value
   body                 ip (CertRepMessage)
                        contains exactly one response
                        for each request

        -- The PKI (CA) responds to either one or two requests as
        -- appropriate.  crc[0] denotes the first (always present);
        -- crc[1] denotes the second (only present if the ir message
        -- contained two requests and if the CA supports centralized
        -- key generation).
      crc[0].              fixed value of zero
         certReqId



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        -- MUST contain the response to the first request in the
        -- corresponding ir message

   crc[0].status.       present, positive values allowed:
      status               "accepted", "grantedWithMods"
                        negative values allowed:
                           "rejection"
   crc[0].status.       present if and only if
      failInfo          crc[0].status.status is "rejection"
   crc[0].              present if and only if
      certifiedKeyPair  crc[0].status.status is
                           "accepted" or "grantedWithMods"
   certificate          present unless end entity's public
                        key is an encryption key and POP
                        is done in this in-band exchange
   encryptedCert        present if and only if end entity's
                        public key is an encryption key and
                        POP done in this in-band exchange
   publicationInfo      optionally present

     -- indicates where certificate has been published (present
     -- at discretion of CA)

   crc[1].              fixed value of one
      certReqId
     -- MUST contain the response to the second request in the
     -- corresponding ir message
   crc[1].status.       present, positive values allowed:
      status               "accepted", "grantedWithMods"
                        negative values allowed:
                           "rejection"
   crc[1].status.       present if and only if
      failInfo          crc[0].status.status is "rejection"
   crc[1].              present if and only if
      certifiedKeyPair  crc[0].status.status is "accepted"
                        or "grantedWithMods"
   certificate          present
   privateKey           present
      -- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
      -- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue
   publicationInfo      optionally present
     -- indicates where certificate has been published (present
     -- at discretion of CA)

   protection           present
     -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG
   extraCerts           optionally present
     -- the CA MAY provide additional certificates to the end



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     -- entity

   Certificate confirm -- certConf

   Field                Value

   sender               present
     -- same as in ir
   recipient            CA name
     -- the name of the CA who was asked to produce a certificate
   transactionID        present
     -- value from corresponding ir and ip messages
   senderNonce          present
     -- 128 (pseudo-) random bits
   recipNonce           present
     -- value from senderNonce in corresponding ip message
   protectionAlg        MSG_MAC_ALG
     -- only MAC protection is allowed for this message.  The
     -- MAC is based on the initial authentication key shared
     -- between the EE and the CA.

   senderKID            referenceNum
     -- the reference number which the CA has previously issued
     -- to the end entity (together with the MACing key)

   body                 certConf
     -- see Section 5.3.18, "PKI Confirmation Content", for the
     -- contents of the certConf fields.
     -- Note: two CertStatus structures are required if both an
     -- encryption and a signing certificate were sent.

   protection           present
     -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG

   Confirmation -- PKIConf
















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   Field                Value

   sender               present
     -- same as in ip
   recipient            present
     -- sender name from certConf
   transactionID        present
     -- value from certConf message
   senderNonce          present
     -- 128 (pseudo-) random bits
   recipNonce           present
     -- value from senderNonce from certConf message
   protectionAlg        MSG_MAC_ALG
     -- only MAC protection is allowed for this message.
   senderKID            referenceNum
   body                 PKIConf
   protection           present
     -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG

D.5.  Certificate Request

   An (initialized) end entity requests a certificate from a CA (for any
   reason).  When the CA responds with a message containing a
   certificate, the end entity replies with a certificate confirmation.
   The CA replies with a PKIConfirm, to close the transaction.  All
   messages are authenticated.

   The profile for this exchange is identical to that given in
   Appendix D.4, with the following exceptions:

   *  sender name SHOULD be present

   *  protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY
      also be supported) in request, response, certConfirm, and
      PKIConfirm messages;

   *  senderKID and recipKID are only present if required for message
      verification;

   *  body is cr or cp;

   *  body may contain one or two CertReqMsg structures, but either
      CertReqMsg may be used to request certification of a locally-
      generated public key or a centrally-generated public key (i.e.,
      the position-dependence requirement of Appendix D.4 is removed);

   *  protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg
      field.



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D.6.  Key Update Request

   An (initialized) end entity requests a certificate from a CA (to
   update the key pair and/or corresponding certificate that it already
   possesses).  When the CA responds with a message containing a
   certificate, the end entity replies with a certificate confirmation.
   The CA replies with a PKIConfirm, to close the transaction.  All
   messages are authenticated.

   The profile for this exchange is identical to that given
   inAppendix D.4, with the following exceptions:

   1.  sender name SHOULD be present

   2.  protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be supported (MSG_MAC_ALG MAY
       also be supported) in request, response, certConfirm, and
       PKIConfirm messages;

   3.  senderKID and recipKID are only present if required for message
       verification;

   4.  body is kur or kup;

   5.  body may contain one or two CertReqMsg structures, but either
       CertReqMsg may be used to request certification of a locally-
       generated public key or a centrally-generated public key (i.e.,
       the position-dependence requirement of Appendix D.4 is removed);

   6.  protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg
       field;

   7.  regCtrl OldCertId SHOULD be used (unless it is clear to both
       sender and receiver -- by means not specified in this document --
       that it is not needed).

Appendix E.  PKI Management Message Profiles (OPTIONAL)

   This appendix contains detailed profiles for those PKIMessages that
   MAY be supported by implementations.

   Profiles for the PKIMessages used in the following PKI management
   operations are provided:

   *  root CA key update

   *  information request/response

   *  cross-certification request/response (1-way)



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   *  in-band initialization using external identity certificate

   Later versions of this document may extend the above to include
   profiles for the operations listed below (along with other
   operations, if desired).

   *  revocation request

   *  certificate publication

   *  CRL publication

E.1.  General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles.

   Identical to Appendix D.1.

E.2.  Algorithm Use Profile

   Identical to Appendix D.2.

E.3.  Self-Signed Certificates

   Profile of how a Certificate structure may be "self-signed".  These
   structures are used for distribution of CA public keys.  This can
   occur in one of three ways (see Section 4.4 above for a description
   of the use of these structures):

   Type          Function
   -----------------------------------------------------------------
   newWithNew a true "self-signed" certificate; the contained
              public key MUST be usable to verify the signature
              (though this provides only integrity and no
              authentication whatsoever)
   oldWithNew previous root CA public key signed with new private key
   newWithOld new root CA public key signed with previous private key

   Such certificates (including relevant extensions) must contain
   "sensible" values for all fields.  For example, when present,
   subjectAltName MUST be identical to issuerAltName, and, when present,
   keyIdentifiers must contain appropriate values, et cetera.

E.4.  Root CA Key Update

   A root CA updates its key pair.  It then produces a CA key update
   announcement message that can be made available (via some transport
   mechanism) to the relevant end entities.  A confirmation message is
   not required from the end entities.




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   ckuann message:

    Field        Value                        Comment
   --------------------------------------------------------------
    sender       CA name CA name
    body         ckuann(CAKeyUpdAnnContent)
    oldWithNew   present                  see Appendix E.3 above
    newWithOld   present                  see Appendix E.3 above
    newWithNew   present                  see Appendix E.3 above
    extraCerts   optionally present       can be used to "publish"
                                          certificates (e.g.,
                                          certificates signed using
                                          the new private key)

E.5.  PKI Information Request/Response

   The end entity sends a general message to the PKI requesting details
   that will be required for later PKI management operations.  RA/CA
   responds with a general response.  If an RA generates the response,
   then it will simply forward the equivalent message that it previously
   received from the CA, with the possible addition of certificates to
   the extraCerts fields of the PKIMessage.  A confirmation message is
   not required from the end entity.

   Message Flows:

   Step# End entity                        PKI

      1  format genm
      2                ->   genm   ->
      3                                    handle genm
      4                                    produce genp
      5                <-   genp   <-
      6  handle genp

   genM:















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   Field               Value

   recipient           CA name
     -- the name of the CA as contained in issuerAltName
     -- extensions or issuer fields within certificates
   protectionAlg       MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG
     -- any authenticated protection alg.
   SenderKID           present if required
     -- must be present if required for verification of message
     -- protection
   freeText            any valid value
   body                genr (GenReqContent)
   GenMsgContent       empty SEQUENCE
     -- all relevant information requested
   protection          present
     -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG

   genP:

































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   Field                Value

   sender               CA name
     -- name of the CA which produced the message
   protectionAlg        MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG
     -- any authenticated protection alg.
   senderKID            present if required
     -- must be present if required for verification of message
     -- protection
   body                 genp (GenRepContent)
   CAProtEncCert        present (object identifier one
                        of PROT_ENC_ALG), with relevant
                        value
     -- to be used if end entity needs to encrypt information for
     -- the CA (e.g., private key for recovery purposes)

   SignKeyPairTypes     present, with relevant value
     -- the set of signature algorithm identifiers that this CA will
     -- certify for subject public keys
   EncKeyPairTypes      present, with relevant value
     -- the set of encryption/key agreement algorithm identifiers that
     -- this CA will certify for subject public keys
   PreferredSymmAlg     present (object identifier one
                        of PROT_SYM_ALG) , with relevant
                        value
     -- the symmetric algorithm that this CA expects to be used
     -- in later PKI messages (for encryption)
   CAKeyUpdateInfo      optionally present, with
                        relevant value
     -- the CA MAY provide information about a relevant root CA
     -- key pair using this field (note that this does not imply
     -- that the responding CA is the root CA in question)
   CurrentCRL           optionally present, with relevant value
     -- the CA MAY provide a copy of a complete CRL (i.e.,
     -- fullest possible one)
   protection           present
     -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG
   extraCerts           optionally present
     -- can be used to send some certificates to the end
     -- entity. An RA MAY add its certificate here.

E.6.  Cross Certification Request/Response (1-way)

   Creation of a single cross-certificate (i.e., not two at once).  The
   requesting CA MAY choose who is responsible for publication of the
   cross-certificate created by the responding CA through use of the
   PKIPublicationInfo control.




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   Preconditions:

   1.  Responding CA can verify the origin of the request (possibly
       requiring out-of-band means) before processing the request.

   2.  Requesting CA can authenticate the authenticity of the origin of
       the response (possibly requiring out-of-band means) before
       processing the response

   The use of certificate confirmation and the corresponding server
   confirmation is determined by the generalInfo field in the PKIHeader
   (see Section 5.1.1).  The following profile does not mandate support
   for either confirmation.

   Message Flows:

   Step# Requesting CA                       Responding CA
     1   format ccr
     2                   ->    ccr    ->
     3                                       handle ccr
     4                                       produce ccp
     5                   <-    ccp    <-
     6   handle ccp

   ccr:

   Field                 Value

   sender                Requesting CA name
     -- the name of the CA who produced the message
   recipient             Responding CA name
     -- the name of the CA who is being asked to produce a certificate
   messageTime           time of production of message
     -- current time at requesting CA
   protectionAlg         MSG_SIG_ALG
     -- only signature protection is allowed for this request
   senderKID             present if required
     -- must be present if required for verification of message
     -- protection
   recipKID             present if required
     -- must be present if required for verification of message
     -- protection
   transactionID         present
     -- implementation-specific value, meaningful to requesting CA.
     -- [If already in use at responding CA then a rejection message
     -- MUST be produced by responding CA]
   senderNonce           present
     -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits



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   freeText              any valid value
   body                  ccr (CertReqMessages)
                         only one CertReqMsg
                         allowed
     -- if multiple cross certificates are required, they MUST be
     -- packaged in separate PKIMessages
   certTemplate          present
     -- details follow
   version               v1 or v3
     -- v3 STRONGLY RECOMMENDED
   signingAlg            present
     -- the requesting CA must know in advance with which algorithm it
     -- wishes the certificate to be signed

   subject               present
     -- may be NULL-DN only if subjectAltNames extension value proposed
   validity              present
     -- MUST be completely specified (i.e., both fields present)
   issuer                present
     -- may be NULL-DN only if issuerAltNames extension value proposed
   publicKey             present
     -- the key to be certified (which must be for a signing algorithm)
   extensions            optionally present
     -- a requesting CA must propose values for all extensions
     -- that it requires to be in the cross-certificate
   POPOSigningKey        present
     -- see Section D3: Proof-of-possession profile
   protection            present
     -- bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG
   extraCerts            optionally present
     -- MAY contain any additional certificates that requester wishes
     -- to include

   ccp:

   Field                 Value

   sender                Responding CA name
     -- the name of the CA who produced the message
   recipient             Requesting CA name
     -- the name of the CA who asked for production of a certificate
   messageTime           time of production of message
     -- current time at responding CA
   protectionAlg         MSG_SIG_ALG
     -- only signature protection is allowed for this message
   senderKID             present if required
     -- must be present if required for verification of message
     -- protection



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   recipKID              present if required
   transactionID         present
     -- value from corresponding ccr message
   senderNonce           present
     -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits
   recipNonce            present
   -- senderNonce from corresponding ccr message
   freeText              any valid value
   body                  ccp (CertRepMessage)
                         only one CertResponse allowed
     -- if multiple cross certificates are required they MUST be
     -- packaged in separate PKIMessages
   response              present
   status                present

   PKIStatusInfo.status  present
     -- if PKIStatusInfo.status is one of:
     --   accepted, or
     --   grantedWithMods,
     -- then certifiedKeyPair MUST be present and failInfo MUST
     -- be absent

   failInfo              present depending on
                         PKIStatusInfo.status
     -- if PKIStatusInfo.status is:
     --   rejection
     -- then certifiedKeyPair MUST be absent and failInfo MUST be
     -- present and contain appropriate bit settings

   certifiedKeyPair      present depending on
                         PKIStatusInfo.status
   certificate           present depending on
                         certifiedKeyPair
     -- content of actual certificate must be examined by requesting CA
     -- before publication
   protection            present
     -- bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG
   extraCerts            optionally present
     -- MAY contain any additional certificates that responder wishes
     -- to include











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E.7.  In-Band Initialization Using External Identity Certificate

   An (uninitialized) end entity wishes to initialize into the PKI with
   a CA, CA-1.  It uses, for authentication purposes, a pre-existing
   identity certificate issued by another (external) CA, CA-X.  A trust
   relationship must already have been established between CA-1 and CA-X
   so that CA-1 can validate the EE identity certificate signed by CA-X.
   Furthermore, some mechanism must already have been established within
   the Personal Security Environment (PSE) of the EE that would allow it
   to authenticate and verify PKIMessages signed by CA-1 (as one
   example, the PSE may contain a certificate issued for the public key
   of CA-1, signed by another CA that the EE trusts on the basis of out-
   of-band authentication techniques).

   The EE sends an initialization request to start the transaction.
   When CA-1 responds with a message containing the new certificate, the
   end entity replies with a certificate confirmation.  CA-1 replies
   with a PKIConfirm to close the transaction.  All messages are signed
   (the EE messages are signed using the private key that corresponds to
   the public key in its external identity certificate; the CA-1
   messages are signed using the private key that corresponds to the
   public key in a

   certificate that can be chained to a trust anchor in the EE's PSE).

   The profile for this exchange is identical to that given in
   Appendix D.4, with the following exceptions:

   *  the EE and CA-1 do not share a symmetric MACing key (i.e., there
      is no out-of-band shared secret information between these
      entities);

   *  sender name in ir MUST be present (and identical to the subject
      name present in the external identity certificate);

   *  protectionAlg of MSG_SIG_ALG MUST be used in all messages;

   *  external identity cert.  MUST be carried in ir extraCerts field

   *  senderKID and recipKID are not used;

   *  body is ir or ip;

   *  protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg
      field.






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Appendix F.  Compilable ASN.1 Definitions

   This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912].
   This module replaces the module in Section 9 of that document.  The
   module contains those changes to the normative ASN.1 module from
   RFC4210 Appendix F [RFC4210] that were to update to 2002 ASN.1
   standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made in this document.

   PKIXCMP-2021
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) }
   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN
   IMPORTS

   AttributeSet{}, SingleAttribute{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
   FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}

   AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
       DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM
   FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}

   Certificate, CertificateList, Time, id-kp
   FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}

   DistributionPointName, GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
   FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}

   CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
       CertReqMessages, Controls, RegControlSet, id-regCtrl
   FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }
       -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
       -- in CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]. EncryptedValue does not need to
       -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.




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   -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
   -- Appendix C of this specification

   CertificationRequest
   FROM PKCS-10
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)}
   -- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
   -- tags).  Alternatively, implementers may directly include
   -- the [RFC2986] syntax in this module

   localKeyId
   FROM PKCS-9
       {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
       -- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
       -- CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]

   EnvelopedData, SignedData
   FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
       {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)}
       -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
       -- the updates made in CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]
   ;

   -- the rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
   -- constructs

   CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... }
   -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
   -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
   -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
   -- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
   -- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
   -- should a need ever arise to support such generality.  Those
   -- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
   -- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
   -- above structure and "uncomment" the following one prior to
   -- compiling this ASN.1 module.  (Note that interoperability
   -- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
   -- this change.)

   -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate

   PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
       header           PKIHeader,
       body             PKIBody,



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       protection   [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
       extraCerts   [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                     OPTIONAL }

   PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage

   PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
       pvno                INTEGER     { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
                                         cmp2012(3) },
       sender              GeneralName,
       -- identifies the sender
       recipient           GeneralName,
       -- identifies the intended recipient
       messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL,
       -- time of production of this message (used when sender
       -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
       -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
       protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
                               OPTIONAL,
       -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
       senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       -- to identify specific keys used for protection
       transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
       -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
       -- messages
       senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
       -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
       -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
       -- the intended recipient of this message
       freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
       -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
       -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
       generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                           InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
       -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
       -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
   }

   PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
       -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629]

   PKIBody ::= CHOICE {       -- message-specific body elements
       ir       [0]  CertReqMessages,        --Initialization Request
       ip       [1]  CertRepMessage,         --Initialization Response



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       cr       [2]  CertReqMessages,        --Certification Request
       cp       [3]  CertRepMessage,         --Certification Response
       p10cr    [4]  CertificationRequest,   --imported from [RFC2986]
       popdecc  [5]  POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
       popdecr  [6]  POPODecKeyRespContent,  --pop Response
       kur      [7]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Update Request
       kup      [8]  CertRepMessage,         --Key Update Response
       krr      [9]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Recovery Request
       krp      [10] KeyRecRepContent,       --Key Recovery Response
       rr       [11] RevReqContent,          --Revocation Request
       rp       [12] RevRepContent,          --Revocation Response
       ccr      [13] CertReqMessages,        --Cross-Cert. Request
       ccp      [14] CertRepMessage,         --Cross-Cert. Response
       ckuann   [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent,     --CA Key Update Ann.
       cann     [16] CertAnnContent,         --Certificate Ann.
       rann     [17] RevAnnContent,          --Revocation Ann.
       crlann   [18] CRLAnnContent,          --CRL Announcement
       pkiconf  [19] PKIConfirmContent,      --Confirmation
       nested   [20] NestedMessageContent,   --Nested Message
       genm     [21] GenMsgContent,          --General Message
       genp     [22] GenRepContent,          --General Response
       error    [23] ErrorMsgContent,        --Error Message
       certConf [24] CertConfirmContent,     --Certificate confirm
       pollReq  [25] PollReqContent,         --Polling request
       pollRep  [26] PollRepContent          --Polling response
   }

   PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING

   ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
       header    PKIHeader,
       body      PKIBody }

   id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }
   PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       salt                OCTET STRING,
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function
       iterationCount      INTEGER,
       -- number of times the OWF is applied
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}



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       -- the MAC AlgId
   }

   id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 }
   DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
       -- the MAC AlgId
   }

   PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
       accepted               (0),
       -- you got exactly what you asked for
       grantedWithMods        (1),
       -- you got something like what you asked for; the
       -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
       rejection              (2),
       -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
       waiting                (3),
       -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
       -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
       -- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
       -- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
       -- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
       revocationWarning      (4),
       -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
       -- imminent
       revocationNotification (5),
       -- notification that a revocation has occurred
       keyUpdateWarning       (6)
       -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
       -- CertReqMsg
   }

   PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
   -- since we can fail in more than one way!
   -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
       badAlg              (0),
       -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
       badMessageCheck     (1),
       -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
       badRequest          (2),
       -- transaction not permitted or supported
       badTime             (3),
       -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
       -- as defined by local policy



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       badCertId           (4),
       -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
       badDataFormat       (5),
       -- the data submitted has the wrong format
       wrongAuthority      (6),
       -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
       -- one creating the response token
       incorrectData       (7),
       -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
       missingTimeStamp    (8),
       -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
       -- (by policy)
       badPOP              (9),
       -- the proof-of-possession failed
       certRevoked         (10),
       -- the certificate has already been revoked
       certConfirmed       (11),
       -- the certificate has already been confirmed
       wrongIntegrity      (12),
       -- not valid integrity, password based instead of signature or
       -- vice versa
       badRecipientNonce   (13),
       -- not valid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
       timeNotAvailable    (14),
       -- the TSA's time source is not available
       unacceptedPolicy    (15),
       -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
       unacceptedExtension (16),
       -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
       addInfoNotAvailable (17),
       -- the additional information requested could not be
       -- understood or is not available
       badSenderNonce      (18),
       -- not valid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
       badCertTemplate     (19),
       -- not valid cert. template or missing mandatory information
       signerNotTrusted    (20),
       -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
       transactionIdInUse  (21),
       -- the transaction identifier is already in use
       unsupportedVersion  (22),
       -- the version of the message is not supported
       notAuthorized       (23),
       -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
       -- request or perform the preceding action
       systemUnavail       (24),
       -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
       systemFailure       (25),



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       -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
       duplicateCertReq    (26)
       -- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
       -- certificate already exists
   }

   PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
       status        PKIStatus,
       statusString  PKIFreeText     OPTIONAL,
       failInfo      PKIFailureInfo  OPTIONAL }

   OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate

   OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
       hashAlg     [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
                           OPTIONAL,
       certId      [1] CertId                  OPTIONAL,
       hashVal         BIT STRING
       -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
       -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
   }

   POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
   -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).

   Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
                               OPTIONAL,
       -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
       -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
       -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
       -- Challenge is to be used).
       witness             OCTET STRING,
       -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
       -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A.  [Note that a different
       -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
       challenge           OCTET STRING
       -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
       -- request is being made) of Rand.
   }

   -- Added in CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]

   Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
   -- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge
   -- in POPODecKeyChallContent
      int                  INTEGER,



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      -- the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
      sender               GeneralName
      -- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
   }

   POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
   -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).  The
   -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
   -- corresponding Challenge.

   CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
       caPubs       [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                     OPTIONAL,
       response         SEQUENCE OF CertResponse }

   CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
       certReqId           INTEGER,
       -- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value
       -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
       -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
       status              PKIStatusInfo,
       certifiedKeyPair    CertifiedKeyPair    OPTIONAL,
       rspInfo             OCTET STRING        OPTIONAL
       -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
       -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
   }

   CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
       certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
       privateKey      [0] EncryptedKey      OPTIONAL,
       -- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding
       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
       publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL }

   CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
       certificate     [0] CMPCertificate,
       encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedKey
       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
   }



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   KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status                  PKIStatusInfo,
       newSigCert          [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       caCerts             [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                        CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       keyPairHist         [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                        CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL }

   RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails

   RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
       certDetails         CertTemplate,
       -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
       -- the cert. for which revocation is requested
       -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
       crlEntryDetails     Extensions{{...}}    OPTIONAL
       -- requested crlEntryExtensions
   }

   RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status       SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
       -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
       revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL,
       -- IDs for which revocation was requested
       -- (same order as status)
       crls     [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL
       -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
   }

   CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       oldWithNew   CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
       newWithOld   CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
       newWithNew   CMPCertificate  -- new pub signed with new priv
   }

   CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate

   RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status              PKIStatus,
       certId              CertId,
       willBeRevokedAt     GeneralizedTime,
       badSinceDate        GeneralizedTime,
       crlDetails          Extensions{{...}}  OPTIONAL
       -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
   }

   CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
   PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL



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   NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages

   -- CertReqTemplateContent, AttributeTypeAndValue,
   -- ExpandedRegControlSet, id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate,
   -- AltCertTemplate, regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, AlgIdCtrl,
   -- regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, and RsaKeyLenCtrl
   -- were added in CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]

   CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      certTemplate           CertTemplate,
      -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
      -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
      -- be used.
      keySpec                Controls OPTIONAL
      -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms.
      -- Controls  ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
      -- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211)
      }

   AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SingleAttribute{{ ... }}

   ExpandedRegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { RegControlSet |
      regCtrl-altCertTemplate | regCtrl-algId | regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, ... }

   regCtrl-altCertTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::=
      { TYPE AltCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate }

   id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 }

   AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue
      -- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3
      -- public-key certificate

   regCtrl-algId ATTRIBUTE ::=
      { TYPE AlgIdCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-algId }

   id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }

   AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
      -- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA

   regCtrl-rsaKeyLen ATTRIBUTE ::=
      { TYPE RsaKeyLenCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen }

   id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }

   RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
      -- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths



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   -- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in
   -- CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]

   RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      newWithNew       CMPCertificate,
      -- new root CA certificate
      newWithOld   [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
      -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
      -- signed with the old private root CA key
      oldWithNew   [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
      -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
      -- signed with the new private root CA key
      }

   CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
      dpn          [0] DistributionPointName,
      issuer       [1] GeneralNames }

   CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
      source       CRLSource,
      thisUpdate   Time OPTIONAL }

   INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

   InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
       infoType    INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
                       &id({SupportedInfoSet}),
       infoValue   INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
                       &Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) }

   SupportedInfoSet INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= { ... }

   -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
   -- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as
   -- appropriate for a given environment):
   --
   --   id-it-caProtEncCert    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
   --      CAProtEncCertValue      ::= CMPCertificate
   --   id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
   --      SignKeyPairTypesValue   ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                      AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-encKeyPairTypes  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
   --      EncKeyPairTypesValue    ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                      AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
   --      PreferredSymmAlgValue   ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
   --      CAKeyUpdateInfoValue    ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent



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   --   id-it-currentCRL       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
   --      CurrentCRLValue         ::= CertificateList
   --   id-it-unsupportedOIDs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
   --      UnsupportedOIDsValue    ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                          OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamReq  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
   --      KeyPairParamReqValue    ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamRep  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
   --      KeyPairParamRepValue    ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-revPassphrase    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
   --      RevPassphraseValue      ::= EncryptedKey
   --      - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
   --      - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
   --      - made in CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]
   --      - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to
   --      - the syntax without this change
   --   id-it-implicitConfirm  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
   --      ImplicitConfirmValue    ::= NULL
   --   id-it-confirmWaitTime  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
   --      ConfirmWaitTimeValue    ::= GeneralizedTime
   --   id-it-origPKIMessage   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
   --      OrigPKIMessageValue     ::= PKIMessages
   --   id-it-suppLangTags     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
   --      SuppLangTagsValue       ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
   --   id-it-caCerts          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
   --      CaCertsValue            ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                             CMPCertificate
   --      - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]
   --   id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
   --      RootCaKeyUpdateValue    ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
   --      - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]
   --   id-it-certReqTemplate  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
   --      CertReqTemplateValue    ::= CertReqTemplateContent
   --      - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]
   --   id-it-rootCaCert       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
   --      RootCaCertValue         ::= CMPCertificate
   --      - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]
   --   id-it-certProfile      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
   --      CertProfileValue        ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                                 UTF8String
   --      - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]
   --   id-it-crlStatusList    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 22}
   --   CRLStatusListValue         ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                                  CRLStatus
   --      - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]
   --   id-it-crls             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 23}
   --   CRLsValue                  ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                            CertificateList



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   --      - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]
   --
   -- where
   --
   --   id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
   --      iso(1) identified-organization(3)
   --      dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
   -- and
   --   id-it   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
   --
   --
   -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
   -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
   -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
   -- specific environments.

   GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue

   -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
   -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
   -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
   -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJECT IDs that it
   -- does not recognize.  If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
   -- indicates that the CA may send
   -- any/all information that it wishes.

   GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
   -- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
   -- recognize.

   ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       pKIStatusInfo          PKIStatusInfo,
       errorCode              INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
       -- implementation-specific error codes
       errorDetails           PKIFreeText       OPTIONAL
       -- implementation-specific error details
   }

   CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus

   CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
       certHash    OCTET STRING,
       -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
       -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
       certReqId   INTEGER,
       -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
       hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL



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       -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
       -- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
       -- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
      }

   PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER }

   PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER,
       checkAfter             INTEGER,  -- time in seconds
       reason                 PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }

   --
   -- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
   -- operations, added due to the changes made in
   -- CMP Updates [RFCAAAA]
   -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
   -- [RFC6402]
   --

   -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
   -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
   id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }

   END

Appendix G.  History of Changes

   Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
   document.

   From version 01 -> 02:

   *  Added Section 3.1.1.4 introducing the Key Generation Authority
   *  Added Section 5.1.1.3 containing description of origPKIMessage
      content moved here from Section 5.1.3.4
   *  Added ToDos on defining POP and message protection using KEM keys
   *  Added a ToDo to Section 4.4.3
   *  Added a ToDo to Appendix C to do a more detailed review
   *  Removed concrete algorithms and referred to CMP Algorithms instead
   *  Added references to Appendix D and E as well as the Lightweight
      CMP Profile for further information
   *  Broaden the scope from human users also to devices and services
   *  Addressed idnits feedback, specifically changing from historic
      LDAP V2 to LDAP V3 (RFC4510)
   *  Did some further editorial alignment to the XML




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   From version 00 -> 01:

   *  Performed all updates specified in CMP Updates Section 2 and
      Appendix A.2.
   *  Did some editorial allignment to the XML

   Version 00:

   This version consists of the text of RFC4210 with the following
   changes:

   *  Introduced the authors of this document and thanked the authors of
      RFC4210 for their work.
   *  Added a paragraph to the introduction explaining the background of
      this document.
   *  Added the change history to this appendix.

Authors' Addresses

   Hendrik Brockhaus
   Siemens
   Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1
   80333 Munich
   Germany
   Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
   URI:   https://www.siemens.com


   David von Oheimb
   Siemens
   Werner-von-Siemens-Strasse 1
   80333 Munich
   Germany
   Email: david.von.oheimb@siemens.com
   URI:   https://www.siemens.com


   Mike Ounsworth
   Entrust
   1187 Park Place
   Minneapolis, MN 55379
   United States of America
   Email: mike.ounsworth@entrust.com
   URI:   https://www.entrust.com







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   John Gray
   Entrust
   1187 Park Place
   Minneapolis, MN 55379
   United States of America
   Email: john.gray@entrust.com
   URI:   https://www.entrust.com












































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