Network Working Group                                          A. Bittau
Internet-Draft                                                    Google
Intended status: Informational                                  D. Boneh
Expires: December 31, 2018                                     D. Giffin
                                                     Stanford University
                                                              M. Handley
                                               University College London
                                                             D. Mazieres
                                                     Stanford University
                                                                E. Smith
                                                       Kestrel Institute
                                                           June 29, 2018

             Interface Extensions for TCP-ENO and tcpcrypt


   TCP-ENO and tcpcrypt perform encryption at the transport layer.  They
   also define a few parameters that are intended to be used or
   configured by applications.  This document specifies operating system
   interfaces for access to these parameters.  We describe the
   interfaces in terms of socket options, the de facto standard API for
   adjusting per-connection behavior in TCP/IP, and sysctl, a popular
   mechanism for setting global defaults.  Operating systems that lack
   socket or sysctl functionality can implement similar interfaces in
   their native frameworks, but should ideally adapt their interfaces
   from those presented in this document.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2018.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  TCP-ENO API extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Per-connection options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  System-wide options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  tcpcrypt API extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Per-connection options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  System-wide options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Example API mappings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Socket options for per-connection settings  . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Setting System-wide options with sysctl . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Cookie-based authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  Signature-based authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   The TCP Encryption Negotiation Option (TCP-ENO)
   [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno] permits hosts to negotiate encryption of a
   TCP connection.  One of TCP-ENO's use cases is to encrypt traffic
   transparently, unbeknownst to legacy applications.  Transparent
   encryption requires no changes to existing APIs.  However, other use
   cases require applications to interact with TCP-ENO.  In particular:

   o  Transparent encryption protects only against passive
      eavesdroppers.  Stronger security requires applications to

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      authenticate a _Session ID_ value associated with each encrypted

   o  Applications that have been updated to authenticate Session IDs
      must somehow advertise this fact to peers in a backward-compatible
      way.  TCP-ENO carries an "application-aware" bit for this purpose,
      but the bit is not accessible through existing interfaces.

   o  Applications employing TCP's simultaneous open feature need a way
      to configure a passive-role bit to break symmetry for TCP-ENO.

   o  System administrators and applications may wish to set and examine
      negotiation preferences, such as which TCP encryption protocols
      (TEPs) to enable and disable.

   o  Applications that perform their own encryption may wish to disable
      TCP-ENO entirely.

   The tcpcrypt protocol [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt] may be negotiated
   via TCP-ENO, and can operate without configuration.  But users may
   wish to control a few operational details of the protocol:

   o  Users or system administrators may wish to specify which symmetric
      ciphers they accept or prefer, or to inspect which cipher has been
      negotiated for a particular connection.  (The key-exchange schemes
      used by tcpcrypt may be configured via the TCP-ENO API.)

   o  If connection tampering has been detected via session
      authentication failure, it may be prudent to purge cached session

   The remainder of this document describes APIs through which systems
   can meet the above needs.  The API extensions relate back to
   quantities defined by TCP-ENO and tcpcrypt.

2.  TCP-ENO API extensions

   This section describes an API for per-connection options, followed by
   a discussion of system-wide configuration options.

2.1.  Per-connection options

   Table 1 summarizes a set of options that TCP-ENO implementations
   should provide on a per-socket basis.  For each option, the table
   lists whether it is read-only (R) or read-write (RW), as well as the
   type of the option's value.  Read-write options, when read, always
   return the previously successfully written value or the default if
   they have not been written.  Options of type "bytes" consist of a

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   variable-length array of bytes, while options of type "int" consist
   of a small integer with the exact range indicated in parentheses.  We
   discuss each option in more detail below.

          | Option name           | RW | Type                  |
          | TCP_ENO_ENABLED       | RW | int (-1, 0, or 1)     |
          | TCP_ENO_SESSID        | R  | bytes                 |
          | TCP_ENO_NEGTEP        | R  | int (32-127, 160-255) |
          | TCP_ENO_TEPS          | RW | bytes                 |
          | TCP_ENO_SELF_GOPT     | RW | int (0-31)            |
          | TCP_ENO_PEER_GOPT     | R  | int (0-31)            |
          | TCP_ENO_AA_MANDATORY  | RW | int (0 or 1)          |
          | TCP_ENO_TEP_MANDATORY | RW | int (0 or 1)          |
          | TCP_ENO_ROLE          | R  | int (0 or 1)          |
          | TCP_ENO_SELF_NAME     | R  | bytes                 |
          | TCP_ENO_PEER_NAME     | R  | bytes                 |
          | TCP_ENO_RAW           | RW | bytes                 |
          | TCP_ENO_TRANSCRIPT    | R  | bytes                 |

                 Table 1: Suggested per-connection options

   The socket options must return errors under certain circumstances.
   These errors are mapped to three suggested error codes shown in
   Table 2.  Systems based on sockets already have constants for these
   errors.  Non-socket systems should use error codes corresponding to
   the same conditions.  "EINVAL" is the existing error returned when
   attempting to set options or otherwise operate on a socket that has
   been shut down or is otherwise no longer valid.  "EISCONN"
   corresponds to calling connect a second time, while "ENOTCONN"
   corresponds to requesting the peer address of an unconnected socket.

   | Symbol   | Description                                            |
   | EINVAL   | General error signifying bad parameters                |
   | EISCONN  | Option no longer valid because connection established  |
   | ENOTCONN | Option not (yet) valid because no connection           |
   |          | established                                            |

                      Table 2: Suggested error codes

   With ENO, a connection can be in one of three high-level states:
   negotiating or ready to negotiate encryption, encrypting, or
   disabled.  Unless otherwise specified, all of the read-only options

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   (R) succeed only when a connection is in the encrypting state.
   Specifically, attempts to read options should return "ENOTCONN" while
   the connection is in the negotiating state and "EINVAL" if ENO is

      When set to 0, completely disables TCP-ENO regardless of any other
      socket option settings except "TCP_ENO_RAW".  When set to 1,
      enables TCP-ENO.  When set to -1, uses a system-wide default
      determined at the time of an "accept" or "connect" system call, as
      described in Section 2.2.  Attempts to set this option must return
      an error ("EISCONN") after a SYN segment has already been sent.

      Returns the session ID of the connection, as defined by the
      encryption spec in use.

      Returns a byte in which the lower 7 bits correspond to the TEP
      identifier of the negotiated TEP for the current connection, and
      the high bit is 1 if the "v" bit was set (i.e., there was
      suboption data present) in the suboption of the SYN segment sent
      by host "B".

      Allows the application to specify an ordered list of TEPs to
      negotiate different from the system default list.  If the list is
      empty, TCP-ENO is disabled for the connection.  Each byte in the
      list specifies one ENO suboption type from 0x20-0x7f (32-127).
      For future extensibility, the high bit ("v") in these bytes should
      be set to 0 by applications and ignored by implementations.  The
      order of the list matters only for the host playing the "B" role.
      Implementations must return an error ("EISCONN") if an application
      attempts to set this option after the SYN segment has been sent.
      Implementations should return an error ("EINVAL") if any of the
      bytes are below 0x20, are between 0x80-0xa0, or are not
      implemented by the TCP stack.

      Gets or sets the 5-bit value of the local host's global suboption.
      The default value should initially be 0.  In accordance the ENO
      specification, regardless of any value set by the application, the
      least significant bit--termed the _passive role bit_--is forced to
      1 when a connection is configured for passive open (i.e.,
      following a "listen" call).  Implementations must return an error
      ("EISCONN") if an application attempts to set this option after a
      SYN segment has been sent.

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      Returns an integer from 0-31 reporting the value of the global
      suboption in the peer's SYN segment.

      If set to 1, enables mandatory application-aware mode in which the
      local host will disable TCP-ENO unless the remote host has set the
      application-aware bit (the second-least significant bit in its
      global suboption).  The default value is 0.  Implementations must
      return an error ("EISCONN") if an application attempts to set this
      option after a SYN segment has been sent.

      If set to 1, enables mandatory encryption mode in which the local
      host will abort the entire TCP connection if TCP-ENO fails to
      negotiate encryption.  The default value is 0.  Setting this
      option to 1 may permit optimizations (such as SYN data) that could
      prevent falling back transparently to unencrypted TCP.
      Immediately aborts the connection if set to 1 on an established
      unencrypted connection.

      Returns 0 on host "A" and 1 on host "B", according to the roles
      defined by TCP-ENO.  When successful, the value is always equal to
      the least significant bit of the value returned by

      Returns the concatenation of one byte containing the value of
      TCP_ENO_ROLE (0 or 1) and the TCP_ENO_SESSID, thereby providing a
      unique name for the local end of the connection.

      Like TCP_ENO_SELF_NAME, but logically negates the first byte,
      thereby providing a unique name for the remote end of the
      connection.  (When successful, TCP_ENO_SELF_NAME at one end of a
      connection should always equal TCP_ENO_PEER_NAME at the other, and
      vice versa.)

      This option is for use by library-level TEP implementations.  It
      allows applications to make use of the TCP-ENO option for TEPs not
      supported by the transport layer and then entirely bypass any TCP-
      level encryption so as to encrypt above the transport layer.  The
      default value of this option is a 0-byte vector, which disables
      RAW mode.  If the option is set to any other value, it disables
      all other socket options described in this section except for

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      The value of the option is a raw ENO option contents (without the
      kind and length) to be included in the host's SYN segment.  In raw
      mode, the TCP layer considers negotiation successful when the two
      SYN segments both contain a suboption with the same TEP identifier
      "cs" >= 0x20.  For an active opener in raw mode, the TCP layer
      automatically sends a two-byte minimal ENO option when negotiation
      is successful.  Note that raw mode performs no sanity checking on
      the "v" bits or any suboption data, and hence provides slightly
      less flexibility than a true TCP-level implementation.

      Returns the negotiation transcript as specified by TCP-ENO.
      Unlike any of the other read-only options, this option also works
      in conjunction with "TCP_ENO_RAW" to allow application-layer
      encryption to determine what was negotiated.

2.2.  System-wide options

   In addition to these per-socket options, implementations should use a
   system-wide configuration mechanism to allow administrators to
   configure a default value for "TCP_ENO_TEPS", as well as default
   behavior for when "TCP_ENO_ENABLED" is -1.  These defaults can be
   truly system-wide, or else scoped to a network namespace on systems
   that provide network namespaces.

   Table 3 provides a table of suggested parameters.  The type "words"
   corresponds to a list of 16-bit unsigned words representing TCP port
   numbers (similar to the "baddynamic" sysctls that, on some operating
   systems, blacklist automatic assignment of particular port numbers).

                  | Name                  | Type        |
                  | eno_teps              | bytes       |
                  | eno_enable_connect    | int (0 - 1) |
                  | eno_enable_listen     | int (0 - 1) |
                  | eno_bad_connect_ports | words       |
                  | eno_bad_listen_ports  | words       |

                 Table 3: Suggested system-wide parameters

   "eno_teps" is simply a string of bytes; it provides the default value
   for the "TCP_ENO_TEPS" socket option.  If "TCP_ENO_TEPS" is non-
   empty, the remaining sysctls determine whether to attempt TCP-ENO
   negotiation when the "TCP_ENO_ENABLED" option is -1 (the default),
   using the following rules.

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   o  On active openers: If "eno_enable_connect" is 0, then TCP-ENO is
      disabled.  If the remote port number is in
      "eno_bad_connect_ports", then TCP-ENO is disabled.  Otherwise, the
      host attempts to use TCP-ENO.

   o  On passive openers: If "eno_enable_listen" is 0, then TCP-ENO is
      disabled.  Otherwise, if the local port is in
      "eno_bad_listen_ports", then TCP-ENO is disabled.  Otherwise, if
      the host receives an SYN segment with an ENO option containing
      compatible TEP identifiers, it attempts negotiation.

   Because initial deployment may run into issues with middleboxes or
   incur slowdown for unnecessary double-encryption, sites may wish to
   blacklist particular ports.  For example setting
   "eno_bad_connect_ports" to 443,993 would disable ENO encryption on
   outgoing connections to ports 443 and 993 (which use application-
   layer encryption for HTTP and IMAP, respectively).  If the per-socket
   "TCP_ENO_ENABLED" is not -1, it overrides the sysctl values.

   Similarly, on a server, setting "eno_bad_listen_ports" to 443 makes
   it possible to disable TCP-ENO for incoming HTTPS connection without
   modifying the web server to set "TCP_ENO_ENABLED" to 0.

3.  tcpcrypt API extensions

   This section recommends further extensions to the API set forth in
   Section 2 that are specific to the tcpcrypt TEP.  Future TEPs may
   similarly provide TEP-specific options.

3.1.  Per-connection options

               | Option name           | RW | Type        |
               | TCP_CRYPT_CONF        | R  | int (0-255) |
               | TCP_CRYPT_CACHE_FLUSH | W  | int (1)     |
               | TCP_CRYPT_ACONF       | RW | bytes       |
               | TCP_CRYPT_BCONF       | RW | bytes       |

        Table 4: Suggested per-connection tcpcrypt-specific options

   Table 4 summarizes the proposed tcpcrypt-specific per-connection

      Returns the one-byte specifier for the authenticated encryption
      algorithm in use by the connection.

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      Setting this option to the value 1 on an unconnected socket
      disables the use of cached session keys as specified in section
      "Session caching" of [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt].  Setting it to 1
      on an established connection flushes any cache state that was used
      in or resulted from establishing the connection.

      Set of allowed symmetric ciphers (AEAD algorithms) this host
      advertises in "Init1" messages.  These bytes are encoded exactly
      as the bytes "sym-cipher0 ... sym-cipherK" in section "Key
      exchange messages" of [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt]; that is, each is
      one of the "sym-cipher" bytes from the table of AEAD algorithms.
      The order of these bytes is immaterial.

      Order of preference of symmetric ciphers.  These bytes are encoded
      in the same way as for "TCP_CRYPT_ACONF" above, except they
      indicate the increasing order of preference used to determine
      which "sym-cipher" value to choose when sending an "Init2"

3.2.  System-wide options

                          | Name        | Type  |
                          | crypt_aconf | bytes |
                          | crypt_bconf | bytes |

           Table 5: Suggested tcrypt-specific global parameters

   System administrators should also be able to set defaults for the
   per-socket connection parameters.  Table 5 lists the system-wide
   parameters for doing so, which can exist alongside the system-wide
   ENO parameters described in Table 3.

4.  Example API mappings

   The previous sections presented abstract APIs for per-connection and
   global options.  One implementation strategy would be to map these
   APIs to existing per-socket and global configuration mechanisms.  By
   way of example, this section describes a way to map the per-
   connection settings to BSD socket options and the global
   configuration settings to the Unix "sysctl" interface.

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4.1.  Socket options for per-connection settings

   Systems with sockets can allow applications to configure TCP-ENO
   through the same mechanism they use for other TCP connection
   configuration such as "TCP_NODELAY" [RFC0896], namely the
   "getsockopt" and "setsockopt" system calls shown in Figure 1.

      int getsockopt(int socket, int level, int option_name,
                     void *option_value, socklen_t *option_len);

      int setsockopt(int socket, int level, int option_name,
                     const void *option_value, socklen_t option_len);

                        Figure 1: Socket option API

   Socket-based TCP-ENO implementations can define a set of new
   "option_name" values accessible at "level" "IPPROTO_TCP" (generally
   defined as 6, to match the IP protocol field), where each entry in
   Table 1 corresponds to a unique "option_name" constant.

4.2.  Setting System-wide options with sysctl

   User-level implementations of TCP-ENO can use a configuration file to
   set global options.  However, such an approach may be awkward for
   kernel-based implementations.  Instead, kernel-level implementations
   can use the "sysctl" configuration tool.  With this approach, TCP-ENO
   parameters should be placed alongside most TCP parameters.  For
   example, on BSD derived systems a suitable name would be
   "net.inet.tcp.eno.teps", while on Linux a more appropriate name would
   be "net.ipv4.tcp_eno_teps".

5.  Examples

   This section provides examples of how applications might authenticate
   session IDs.  Authentication requires exchanging messages over the
   TCP connection, and hence is not backwards compatible with existing
   application protocols.  To fall back to opportunistic encryption in
   the event that both applications have not been updated to
   authenticate the session ID, TCP-ENO provides the application-aware
   bit.  To signal it has been upgraded to support application-level
   authentication, an application should set the second-least
   significant bit of "TCP_ENO_SELF_GOPT" before opening a connection.
   An application should then check that "TCP_ENO_PEER_GOPT" has this
   bit set before attempting to send authenticators that would otherwise
   be misinterpreted as application data.

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5.1.  Cookie-based authentication

   In cookie-based authentication, a client and server both share a
   cryptographically strong random or pseudo-random pre-shared secret
   known as a "cookie".  Such a cookie is preferably at least 128 bits
   long.  To authenticate a session ID using a cookie, each host
   computes and sends the following value to the other side:

                  authenticator = PRF(cookie, local-name)

   Here "PRF" is a pseudo-random function such as HMAC-SHA-256
   [RFC6234].  "local-name" is the result of the "TCP_ENO_SELF_NAME"
   socket option.  Each side must verify that the other side's
   authenticator is correct.  To do so, software obtains the remote
   host's name via the "TCP_ENO_PEER_NAME" socket option.  Assuming the
   authenticators are correct, applications can rely on the TCP-layer
   encryption for resistance against active network attackers.

   Note that if the same cookie is used in other contexts besides
   session ID authentication, appropriate domain separation must be
   employed, such as prefixing "local-name" with a unique prefix to
   ensure "authenticator" cannot be used out of context.

   Establishing pre-shared secrets can involve a computational or
   administrative burden, while computing and verifying PRF-based
   authenticators is inexpensive.  Hence, applications with pre-shared
   secrets should whenever possible leverage those secrets to achieve
   mutual authentication by sending one authenticator in each direction.

5.2.  Signature-based authentication

   In signature-based authentication, one or both endpoints of a
   connection possess a private signature key the public half of which
   is known to or verifiable by the other endpoint.  To authenticate
   itself, a host uses its private key to compute the following

                 authenticator = Sign(PrivKey, local-name)

   The other end verifies this value using the corresponding public key.
   Whichever side validates an authenticator in this way knows that the
   other side belongs to a host that possesses the appropriate signature

   Once again, if the same signature key is used in other contexts
   besides session ID authentication, appropriate domain separation
   should be employed, such as prefixing "local-name" with a unique
   prefix to ensure "authenticator" cannot be used out of context.

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   Note that signature-based authentication can be either mutual, if
   both sides have public keys, or unidirectional, when one endpoint is

6.  Security considerations

   The TCP-ENO specification [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno] discusses several
   important security considerations that this document incorporates by
   reference.  The most important one, which bears reiterating, is that
   until and unless a session ID has been authenticated, TCP-ENO is
   vulnerable to an active network attacker, through either a downgrade
   or active man-in-the-middle attack.

   Because of this vulnerability to active network attackers, it is
   critical that implementations return appropriate errors as suggested
   in this document for socket options when TCP-ENO is not enabled.  An
   example of an API design with potentially catastrophic consequences
   would be to attempt to communicate TCP-ENO failure by successfully
   returning a zero-length or zero-valued session ID.  Equally critical
   is that applications must never use these socket options without
   checking for errors.

   Applications with high security requirements that rely on TCP-ENO for
   security must either fail or fall back to application-layer
   encryption if TCP-ENO fails or session ID authentication fails.

7.  Acknowledgments

   We are grateful for contributions, help, discussions, and feedback
   from the TCPINC working group, including Marcelo Bagnulo, David
   Black, Bob Briscoe, Jana Iyengar, Tero Kivinen, Mirja Kuhlewind, Yoav
   Nir, Christoph Paasch, Eric Rescorla, Kyle Rose, and Joe Touch.  This
   work was partially funded by DARPA CRASH and the Stanford Secure
   Internet of Things Project.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

              Bittau, A., Giffin, D., Handley, M., Mazieres, D., Slack,
              Q., and E. Smith, "Cryptographic protection of TCP Streams
              (tcpcrypt)", draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt-11 (work in
              progress), November 2017.

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              Bittau, A., Giffin, D., Handley, M., Mazieres, D., and E.
              Smith, "TCP-ENO: Encryption Negotiation Option", draft-
              ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno-18 (work in progress), November 2017.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC0896]  Nagle, J., "Congestion Control in IP/TCP Internetworks",
              RFC 896, DOI 10.17487/RFC0896, January 1984,

   [RFC6234]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,

Authors' Addresses

   Andrea Bittau
   345 Spear Street
   San Francisco, CA  94105


   Dan Boneh
   Stanford University
   353 Serra Mall, Room 475
   Stanford, CA  94305


   Daniel B. Giffin
   Stanford University
   353 Serra Mall, Room 288
   Stanford, CA  94305


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   Mark Handley
   University College London
   Gower St.
   London  WC1E 6BT


   David Mazieres
   Stanford University
   353 Serra Mall, Room 290
   Stanford, CA  94305


   Eric W. Smith
   Kestrel Institute
   3260 Hillview Avenue
   Palo Alto, CA  94304


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