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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04                                   Informational
          draft-ietf-spfbis-experiment                                  
SPFBIS Working Group                                        M. Kucherawy
Internet-Draft                                                 Cloudmark
Intended status: Informational                             March 6, 2012
Expires: September 7, 2012


                      The SPF/Sender-ID Experiment
                  draft-kucherawy-spfbis-experiment-03

Abstract

   In 2006 the IETF published a suite of protocol documents comprising
   SPF and Sender-ID, two proposed email authentication protocols.
   Because of interoperability concerns created by simultaneous use of
   the two protocols by a receiver, and some concerns with Sender-ID and
   compatibility with existing standards, the IESG required them to have
   Experimental status and invited the community to observe their
   deployments for a period of time, hoping convergence would be
   possible later.

   After six years, sufficient experience and evidence have been
   collected that the experiment thus created can be considered
   concluded, and a common path forward can be selected.  This memo
   presents those findings.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 7, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal



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   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  The Need For Consensus  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Evidence of Deployment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   4.  Evidence of Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   5.  Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   8.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7





























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1.  Introduction

   In April, 2006, the IETF published the [SPF] and [SUBMITTER]/
   [SENDER-ID]/[PRA] email authentication protocols.  Both of these
   enabled one to publish via the Domain Name System a policy declaring
   which mail servers were authorized to send email on behalf of a
   specific domain name.  The two protocols made use of this policy
   statement and some specific (but different) logic to evaluate whether
   or not the email client sending or relaying a message was authorized
   to do so.

   Because Sender-ID could use the same policy statement as SPF, the
   IESG at the time was concerned that an implementation of Sender-ID
   might erroneously apply that statement to a message and, depending on
   selected recipient actions, could improperly interfere with message
   delivery.  As a result, the IESG required the publication of all of
   these documents as Experimental, and requested that the community
   observe deployment and operation of the protocols over a period of
   two years from publication in order to determine a reasonable path
   forward.  (For further details about the IESG's concern, see the IESG
   Note prepended to all of those documents.)

   Accordingly, this working group has convened to resolve this
   experiment and propose advancement of a single protocol going
   forward.  This memo presents evidence on both deployment and efficacy
   of the two protocols, and further discusses the increasing need for
   consensus.  At the end it presents conclusions and recommends a path
   forward, as the IESG requested.


2.  The Need For Consensus

   These two protocols fall into a family of protocols that provide
   domain-level email authentication services.  Another prominent one is
   [DKIM].  Various efforts exist that use these as building blocks to
   increased abuse filtering capabilties, and indeed this sort of work
   has spawned another working group in the Applications area, with
   still more of these incubating in associations and trade groups
   outside of the IETF.

   There is thus some palpable interest in having a path authorization
   scheme, as well as a domain-level signing scheme, on the Standards
   Track so that these newer technologies can develop with confidence.
   This is, in part, why the community has decided to expend the effort
   to bring this experiment to a conclusion and document the results,
   and then advance a single path authorization technology.





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3.  Evidence of Deployment

   Two participants ran large-scale DNS surveys looking for SPF policy
   records.

   One data source for this report requested SPF records from
   approximately 287,000 domains that had a TXT (type 16) policy record.
   Of these, 4,613 (1.6%) also publish SPF (type 99) resource records.

   [pending: updated TDP report numbers go in here] Another source
   requested SPF records from 239,000 domains.  Of these, # returned
   type 16 answers, # returned type 99 answers, # returned both types,
   and # returned neither.  Of those answers retrieved, # included
   records that start with the string "spf2.0/pra" which are specific
   requests for Sender-ID processing by receivers.

   During this second survey, some domains were observed to provide
   immediate answers for type 16 queries, but would time out waiting for
   replies to type 99 queries.

   It is likely impossible to determine from a survey which MTAs have
   SPF and/or Sender-ID checking enabled at message ingress since it
   does not appear, for example, in the reply to the EHLO command from
   extended [SMTP].  We therefore rely on evidence found via web
   searches, and observed the following:

   o  A web site [SID-IMPL] dedicated to highlighting Sender-ID
      implementations last updated in late 2007 listed 13
      implementations, which we assume means they implement the PRA
      checks.  At least one of them is known no longer to be supported
      by its vendor.

   o  The [OPENSPF] web site maintains a list of known implementations
      of SPF.  At the time of this memo's writing it listed six
      libraries, 22 MTAs with built-in SPF implementations, and numerous
      patches for MTAs and mail clients.

   In a survey of numerous MTAs in current or recent use, only two
   (Santronics WinServer and McAfee MxLogic) were found to contain
   implementations of the SMTP SUBMITTER extension in server mode, which
   could act as an enabler to Sender-ID.  An unknown number of clients
   implement it; although there is substantial activity showing its use
   in logs, it is unclear whether these are separate implementations by
   legitimate senders, or merely instances of distributed automated
   malware seeking to improve their odds of reaching the end user.

   [pending: passive DNS query report from John Levine]




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   [pending: SPF query results from Hotmail]

   [other data TBD]


4.  Evidence of Differences

   It is plain from inspection of the two protocols that they have much
   in common: For a single message, both require the same number of DNS
   queries, and both require the same code to parse the result.  The PRA
   algorithm applied by Sender-ID is, however, more expensive than
   simply extracting the domain name from the omnipresent
   RFC5321.MailFrom.  Thus, SPF is cheaper to apply to a message.

   One set of specific data collected by a working group contributor
   shows that in more than 95.5% of cases, Sender-ID and SPF reach the
   same conclusion about a message, meaning either both protocols return
   a "pass" result or both return a "fail" result.  The data set
   yielding this response could not further characterize the cases in
   which the answers differed.

   [pending: MAIL FROM/PRA comparison report from Hotmail]

   [other data TBD]


5.  Conclusions

   It is standard procedure within the IETF to document as standard
   those protocols and practices that have come into sufficient common
   use as to become part of the basic infrastructure.

   Given the evidence above, the working group feels that the experiment
   allows the following conclusions:

   1.  [WG conclusions here]


6.  IANA Considerations

   This memo presents no actions for IANA.  [RFC Editor: Please remove
   this section prior to publication.]


7.  Security Considerations

   This memo contains information for the community only, akin to an
   implementation report, and does not introduce any new security



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   concerns.  Its implications could, in fact, resolve some.


8.  Informative References

   [DKIM]     Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed.,
              "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", RFC 6376,
              September 2011.

   [OPENSPF]  "Sender Policy Framework: Project Overview",
              <http://www.openspf.net>.

   [PRA]      Lyon, J., "Purported Responsible Address in E-Mail
              Messages", RFC 4407, April 2006.

   [SENDER-ID]
              Lyon, J. and M. Wong, "Sender ID: Authenticating E-Mail",
              RFC 4406, April 2006.

   [SID-IMPL]
              "Sender ID Framework Industry Support and Solutions",
              October 2007, <http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/safety/
              technologies/senderid/support.mspx>.

   [SMTP]     Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              October 2008.

   [SPF]      Wong, M. and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
              for Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail, Version 1",
              RFC 4408, April 2006.

   [SUBMITTER]
              Allman, E. and H. Katz, "SMTP Service Extension for
              Indicating the Responsible Submitter of an E-Mail
              Message", RFC 4405, April 2006.


Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   The following provided operational data that contributed to the
   findings presented above:

   Cisco:  contributed data about observed Sender-ID and SPF records in
      the DNS for a large number of domains







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   Hotmail:  contributed data about the difference between
      RFC5321.MailFrom and RFC5322.From domains across large mail
      volumes, and a survey of DNS queries observed in response to
      outgoing mail traffic

   Santronics:  contributed data about the use of the SUBMITTER
      extension in aggregate SMTP client traffic

   The Trusted Domain Project:  contributed data about the difference
      between Sender-ID and SPF results, and counts of unique domains
      appearing to publish different kinds of SPF and Sender-ID records

   The author would also like to thank the following for their
   contributions to the development of this memo: Dave Crocker, and
   Scott Kitterman


Author's Address

   Murray S. Kucherawy
   Cloudmark
   128 King St., 2nd Floor
   San Francisco, CA  94107
   USA

   Phone: +1 415 946 3800
   Email: msk@cloudmark.com
























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