PANA Stefano M. Faccin
INTERNET-DRAFT Franck Le
Date: February 2002 Nokia Research Center
Expires: August 2002
Local Security Association (LSA): The Temporary Shared Key (TSK)
Status of This Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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Abstract
This document describes a mechanism to set up a Local Security
Association (LSA) between a user and the local network where the user
is attaching to the Internet. It defines all the required related
functionalities such as the key generation, distribution and update
procedures; it also describes the reasons and the benefits of the
adoption of such LSA.
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Table of Contents
Status of This Memo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. The model and assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The Temporary Shared Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Use of the TSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. TSK sharing option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Creation and Distribution of Temporary Shared Key at
Initial Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Temporary Shared Key Update Function . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.1. TSK Update procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2.2. Distribution of previously established TSK . . . . . . 10
4.3. Entity authentication and key distribution using the TSK
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3.1. User authentication using TSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3.2. Network authentication using TSK . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3.3. Key distribution using TSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Extensions to Diameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Extensions to EAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. TSK Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2. Extensions to CHAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Applicability to CHAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. TSK establishment at initial registration . . . . . . . . . 16
7.2. TSK update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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1. Introduction
In order to get access to the local resources, a user generally needs
to get authorized and authenticated by the local network: This
implies that the user presents some credentials to a local attendant
which invokes the AAA infrastructure to verify the validity of the
user.
In addition, many security associations may need to be set up between
the user and agents of the local domain:
E.g. an SA may be needed between the user and the access router to
protect data (confidentiality and integrity protection) over the
access link.
As another example, in the context of Mobile IP, an SA may be
needed between the Mobile Node (MN) and the Home Agent (HA) when
the Home Agent is assigned in the visited network, or between the
MN and Mobility Agents when a Localized Mobility Management
solution such as [1] or [2] is deployed).
These security associations typically have a restricted lifetime, and
when expired, they need to be refreshed.
And, in order to avoid frauds, service providers need the ability to
force a user to provide authentication information anytime during a
session. The local service provider needs to have this capability.
In the same way, to achieve better overall security the mobile node
may want to challenge the network at any time e.g. to avoid network
impersonation attacks, man in the middle attacks, etc.
All these procedures require the involvement of the home AAA server,
AAAH, since only the user and its home domain share a long-term key.
Several message round trips are therefore needed between the local
and home domains in order to support the above mentioned
authorization/authentication and key distribution procedures.
But these message exchanges between the home and visited networks may
create an excessive signaling load between the AAAH and AAAL, and may
add delay in the procedure. As described in RFC 2977, messages round
trips between the AAAH and AAAL SHOULD be avoided if possible: the
time taken for communications between the AAA servers, and more
particularly, the time taken to traverse the wide-area Internet that
is likely to separate the AAAL and the AAAH brings some extra delay
that SHOULD be reduced.
Although authentication/authorization procedures require in some
situation the involvement of home and local domains (e.g. when the
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user roams for the first time to a foreign ISP and tries to get
access - initial authentication), in several cases the adoption of an
LSA allows for optimizations and empowers the local service provider
to authenticate the user at any time and perform key distribution
without the involvement of the home domain, while still maintaining a
good level of security.
Thanks to an LSA, the authentication centers in the home network and
the local network manage the sharing of authentication
responsibilities for a roaming mobile node by creating a temporary
key that the mobile node and the local system will share. The sharing
of this key gives the local network significant local control over
the authentication of a roaming mobile node. Moreover, it introduces
optimizations in terms of signaling load towards the home system and
delay involved in the authentication procedure.
This document introduces the concept of a user specific LSA called
Temporary Shared Key (TSK) established between between the local
network and the user. The TSK is established between the user and the
local domain with the involvement of the home domain, and allows to
delegate functions such as entity authentication and key derivation
to the local domain, while performing such procedures securely
because the user-specific Temporary Shared Key was created under the
control of the home domain and securely distributed to the local
domain and the user.
This draft describes all the entities behaviours as well as the
required functionalities in order to set up, distribute, refresh and
withdraw the TSK. Instead of defining the protocol overview and the
extensions in separate documents, all the mechanisms and protocol
extensions are described in this single document: as the experience
has shown, this allows any party interested in this feature to have
all the required information to inplement it in this document instead
of having to collect the information from different documents which
may lead in some cases to ambiguity and make it more difficult.
After a presentation of the model and the assumptions (section 2),
section 3 introduces the Temporary Shared Key (TSK usage, benefits)
before section 4 describes the protocol overview (TSK establishment,
TSK update, etc.). The following sections describe the extensions to
the protocols (section 5: extensions to Diameter and section 6:
extensions to EAP). Finally a last section (section 7) will present
how the TSK can be applied to different scenarios.
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2. The model and assumptions
The security model for the TSK is represented in Figure 1 and is
based on a set of key entities:
The AAA Client (AAAc) is the function that allows the user to be
authenticated and authorized by the local network service provider in
order to gain access to IP connectivity in the local domain. In order
to achieve this, the user provides its identity and authentication
data to the AAAc in the local network, which then uses an AAA
infrastructure to authenticate and authorize the user for usage of
resources, and eventually transport other information. The specific
details of the exchange between the user and the AAAc of
authentication data (e.g. type of data, number of exchanges) is based
on the specific authentication algorithm adopted. The AAAc can be an
attendant, e.g. located in the default router or access router (the
first router visible to the user in the network), the PANA Agent as
defined in [12], [13], or can be any server located in the network.
The mechanism defined in this draft applies to all these cases. In
the rest of the document, this entity will be referred to AAAc for
sake of generality.
Local Domain Home Domain
+--------+ +--------+
|abc.com | (SA1) |xyz.com |
| AAAL |<------------------->| AAAH |
+->| server | server-server | server |
| +--------+ communication +--------+
| ^
(SA2)| | (SA4)
| |
v v
+---------+ (SA4)+---------+
| AAA |<---->| Agent |
| Client | |(peer-entity)
+---------+ +---------+
^
|
|
v
+--------+
| Mobile |
| Node | mn@xyz.com
+--------+
Figure 1. The Security Model
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The AAA infrastructure assumed in this draft is based on a network of
AAA servers, and in particular the model considers the AAAL, i.e. the
AAA server in the local network, and the AAAH, i.e. the AAA server in
the home network of the MN.
Number of protocols also locates an "agent" (peer entity) in the
network in order to deliver data packets to, or exchange protocol-
specific signaling messages with, the user terminal. Mobile IP, IP
Paging and SIP are examples of such protocols. Any of those agent-
based protocols have a requirement or a recommendation to have a
security key between a user terminal and an agent, which is used by
the agent and the user terminal to authenticate and/or encrypt
signaling messages exchanged between them. This shared key, between
the user terminal and the agent of each protocol in the local domain,
usually cannot be pre-established but must be dynamically
established. Authentication may be required before the key
distribution is performed.
The security model is based on a set of security associations between
the entities in the model. Some of these security associations are
pre-established and constitute the basis of the security model:
* it is assumed that the home and the local domains share a security
association (shown in Figure 1 as SA1) that is not specific to any
particular user. This SA can either be dynamically set up or
established off line as a result of a roaming agreement between
the two networks. The mechanism adopted to set up such SA is
outside the scope of this draft. In this document it is assumed in
particular that SA1 exists between AAAH and AAAL. This security
association is used by the AAA servers in the two networks to
exchange information in a secure and mutually authenticated
fashion;
* it is assumed that each network has its own security mechanism and
security associations (shown in Figure 1 as SA2 and SA4) allowing
entities in the same network to communicate in a secure and
mutually authenticated way (e.g. using IPSEC and a local Public
Key Infrastructure);
* it is assumed that each user, as a result of a subscription
agreement with a home domain, has a long-term security
association(SA3) with her/his home domain. Such security
association allows the mutual authentication between the user and
the home domain. SA3 can also be used to derive other dynamic
security associations as described in [4] and [7], and this
document describes the Temporary shared Key set up and update
based on SA3.
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3. The Temporary Shared Key
3.1. Use of the TSK
The Temporary Shared Key (TSK) is established between the user and
the local domain with the involvement of the home domain. This means
that, during the user authentication, a TSK can be generated and
distributed as described in the following sections. Once the TSK is
available to the local domain and the user, TSK is used for:
* authentication of the user by the local domain, at any time;
* authentication of the local domain by the user, at any time;
* control by the local domain of key distribution between the user
and agents in the local domain. Usage scenarios include (but are
not limited to):
- key distribution between the user and an agent in the local
domain (e.g. Access Router) to protect the data (e.g.
encryption and integrity protection) exchanged over the access
link;
- key distribution between the user and mobility agents in the
local domain. In the context of Mobile IP, if a Local Mobility
Management scheme is adopted (e.g. as in [1] and [2]), a
session key is required to authenticate the Binding
Update/Binding Acknowledgement messages
Through the use of TSK, the above functionalities are performed
without the involvement of the home domain, yet such procedures are
performed securely because the user-specific Temporary Shared Key is
created under the control of the home domain and securely distributed
to the local domain and the user.
The agent in the local domain to which the TSK is distributed to,
could be the AAAL server, or a AAA client such as the PANA Agent as
the one defined in PANA [x].
3.2. TSK sharing option
The TSK should be considered as an optional feature, so that the use
of an LSA based on TSK can depend on network policies and roaming
agreements. In fact, in order to maximize the security there may be
cases in which the home domain will not be willing to share the TSK
with the local domain. This may happen when, as an example, the user
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moves to a local domain that the home domain does not trust
sufficiently.
The TSK is a possible and suggested optimization to the security
procedures in particularly when considering the time delay of these
procedures and the signaling involved between the local and the home
domains, but whether an LSA is used (i.e. the Temporary Shared Key is
provided to the local domain) should depend on the home network
policies.
4. Protocol Overview
When the user enters a new visited domain and first registers, its
AAAH server is invoked to verify the validity of the user
([10],[11])and if the local and home domains policies allow and
suggest the use of the Temporary Shared Key, the TSK must be:
* generated: if no TSK had been previously established and
distributed, a new TSK must be generated by the home domain;
* updated: if a TSK previously established and distributed to the
user and visited domain is expired (e.g. limited lifetime) or it
was previously used in a different local domain and for sake of
security it is policy of the home domain to generate a new TSK;
*
It is opinion of the authors that the AAAH SHOULD update the
Temporary Shared Key update process at least every time the MN is
entering a new local domain, otherwise the previous local domain has
the value of the Temporary Shared Key and could act on behalf of the
user and carry out undesirable actions. The final choice should
anyway be left to network policies.
4.1. Creation and Distribution of Temporary Shared Key at Initial
Authentication
The TSK computation and distribution can be integrated to the
authentication procedure at the initial registration as indicated in
the following sections. This reduces the number of round trip
messages.
The TSK establishment procedure is independent of the authentication
mechanism used to authenticate the user. Different EAP types or
protocols can be adopted for authentication and are not described in
this draft. For illustration of the concept, the TSK establishment is
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first described with a Mutual Challenge Response authentication.
In section 7, the TSK applicability will be described with other
authentication schemes such as CHAP [RFC 1994].
User AAA client AAAL AAAH
| LC, VN_ID | | |
|<--------------------| | |
| ID, AUTHU, LC, HC | | |
|-------------------->| | |
| | LC,ID,AUTHU,HC,VN_ID
| |------------->| |
| | |------>|
| | RANDTSK,TSK,AUTHNET,HC
| | |<------|
| RANDTSK,TSK,AUTHNET,HC |
| |<-------------| |
| | | |
| RANDTSK,AUTHNET,HC | | |
|<--------------------| | |
| | | |
LC = Local Challenge
HC = Host Challenge
AUTHU = User authentication data
ID = User Identifier
VN_ID = Visited Network Identifier
AUTHNET = Network authentication data
Figure 2: TSK establishment with a Mutual Challenge Response
Authentication based on Local Challenge
This flow illustrates the TSK generation and distribution when a
mutual authentication based on challenge response is used.
1) The user takes the advertised Local Challenge and Visited Network
Identifier, with the long-term key shared with its home network to
compute the authentication data, AUTHU. The user also generates a
Host challenge, HC, to require network authentication.
2) The AAAc forwards the message to the AAAH including the Local
Challenge and the Visited Network ID. From the Local Challenge,
the Visited Network ID and the user specific shared long-term key
retrieved thanks to the user's NAI, the AAAH verifies the validity
of the user.
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Then, if the AAAH and AAAc decide to use the Temporary Shared Key,
the AAAH generates a new random number called the the
RandomVariableTSK (RANDTSK) and executes an algorithm shared with
the MN using the long term shared key (SA3) to compute the new
"pending" TSK. The AAAH sends the RANDTSK to the MN and sends the
corresponding Temporary Shared Key to the AAAc.
The AAAH MUST use inter-AAA servers security to protect the
message to the foreign domain.
AAAH also computes the network authentication data AUTHNET from
the Host Challenge, the long term key and optionally other
information. Actually, if present the RANDTSK SHOULD also be taken
as an input. This will allow the MN to make sure that no one has
modified its value.
3) The MN verifies the authenticity of the network thanks to the
network authentication data, AUTHNET, computed from the Host
Challenge.
If RANDTSK is provided to the MN, the MN derives, from the long-
term key and the common algorithm shared with its AAAH server, the
corresponding TSK to use for subsequent agent authentication and
key distribution procedures.
4.2. Temporary Shared Key Update Function
The previous sections described the TSK generation and distribution
but the Home network MUST also be able to update the TSK at any time
when the MN is in a local domain and the TSK is shared: As an
example, the TSK may get corrupted and the Home network MUST be able
to revocate the TSK by performing a new TSK update.
The Temporary Shared Key (TSK) Update function encompasses the
process by which the current TSK used by a user and the local domain
is changed to a new value under the direction of the AAAH.
TSK Update applies also to the case where a user and the local domain
do not share a TSK and a new TSK needs to be generated. Only the AAAH
may initiate the update of the current value of TSK, and the AAAH can
do this at any time during a session according to the home domain
policies.
On the network side, a user authentication process SHOULD be executed
immediately after the TSK Update to confirm that the target User has
successfully changed its TSK: the network sends a challenge to the MN
and based on the expected received authentication data that MUST be
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from the TSK, the network can make sure the TSK update had been
successful and the User is having the new TSK value. This would
ensure that the User will be able to authenticate itself and the
network in the future.
On the User side, the User SHOULD initiate a network authentication
procedure when the User is directed by the network to change its TSK.
This authentication procedure allows the User to authenticate the
network issuing the TSK Update, thus preventing a fraudulent network
from disrupting the normal network operation by forcing the User's
TSK out of alignment with the legitimate network TSK.
4.2.1. TSK Update procedure
The AAAH may initiate the TSK update process at any moment when the
User is in a visited domain and is sharing TSK. The decision on when
the TSK is updated is based on home domain policies. TSK should not
be changed too often; otherwise the benefits of TSK disappear. At the
same time, TSK must have a lifetime to ensure that the same TSK is
not used for too long. The first step in the TSK update process is
for the AAAH to execute the algorithm shared with the User using the
long term shared key and a random number, called the
RandomVariableTSK (RANDTSK). The result is the new "pending" TSK.
The AAAH then sends the RANDTSK and the new TSK to the AAAL. With
those information, the AAAL can:
- update the TSK in the MN
- respond to the network authentication request from the MN
- verify the update by issuing a user specific authentication
procedure to the MN
The local system begins the TSK update process when it receives the
RANDTSK parameter from the AAAH. The message also contains the new
TSK Key.
- The AAAc sends a TSK Key update order, including RANDTSK, to the
MN.
- The MN responds with a network authentication request including
the challenge selected by the MN, RANDNET
- the AAAc executes the shared algorithm using as inputs the MN's
challenge RANDNET, and the new TSK. The result of the calculation
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is AUTHNET which is sent to the MN.
- Depending if AUTHNET equals to the expected corresponding result,
the MN indicates a successful or an unsuccessful TSKupdate in a
message to the AAAc
- If successful, the serving system executes the user specific
authentication procedure: It challenges the user sending it a
randomly generated number RANDU to authenticate him and make sure
the User now has the correct TSK value. The User takes RANDU and
the newly derived TSK as inputs to a shared algorithm with the
serving system and computes AUTHU. The AAAc performs the same
steps and can thus verify that the user has updated the TSK value.
Otherwise AAAc reports the failure to the AAAH.
User AAA Client/AAAL AAAH
| | |
| | RANDTSK, TSK |
| |<------------------|
| | Ack |
| |------------------>|
| | |
| RANDTSK | |
|<---------------| |
| | |
| RANDNET | |
|--------------->| |
| | |
| AUTHNET | |
|<---------------| |
| | |
| success | |
|--------------->| |
| | |
| RANDU | |
|<---------------| |
| | |
| AUTHU | |
|--------------->| |
4.2.2. Distribution of previously established TSK
As described previously, there may be the case where the User and its
Home network already have a TSK set up and want to re-use when
entering in the local domain. In that case:
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* the TSK needs to be distributed to the visited network (from AAAH
to AAAc)
* the TSK does not need to be sent to the user since he already has
knowledge of it. But an indication still needs to be provided to
the user to inform him to start using the TSK. This can e.g. be
achieved by setting a specific value in the RANDTSK field sent to
the user.
4.3. Entity authentication and key distribution using the TSK
This section describes how the TSK sharing enables the local domain
to perform entity authentication and key distribution without
involving the home network thus reducing the time delay and the
signaling between the two domains.
4.3.1. User authentication using TSK
In many current authentication mechanisms, the user computes the
authentication data based on a long-term key shared with its AAAH.
For Challenge Response based authentication mechanism, the user e.g.
takes the challenge and eventually some additional informational with
the long-term key to a hash function and thus compute the
authentication data.
The exact algorithm used to compute the AAA Credential depends on the
security association between the user and AAAH.
The authentication data is thus computed using a long-term key shared
between the user and the AAAH, some other information and an
algorithm.
When the TSK mechanism is used, the user takes the same inputs but
instead of using the long-term key it shares with its AAAH, the user
uses the TSK it shares with the AAAL. The local system having the TSK
can then authenticate the user without invoking its home network.
The applicability of the TSK to CHAP will be described in the next
sections.
4.3.2. Network authentication using TSK
The user may want to authenticate the network and thus generates a
random number, the Host Challenge, to challenge the network. In such
case, the user expects a network authentication data computed by the
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AAAH using the Host Challenge and currently, the long term shared
key. The exact algorithm used to compute the AAA Credential depends
on the security association between the user and AAAH.
If the TSK mechanism is used, the user sends the Host Challenge to
authenticate the network and the AAAc applies the common algorithm to
the Host Challenge and the TSK to compute the network authentication
data.
Network authentication is thus provided without involving the AAAH.
4.3.3. Key distribution using TSK
Without the use of an LSA, key distribution between the user and
agents in the local domain is usually based on the long-term security
association between the user and its AAAH. This security association
is used to create derivative security associations between the mobile
node and agents in the visited domain. [x]
When TSK is adopted, the user uses the TSK instead of the long-term
key to compute the keys. In this way, since the AAAc has knowledge of
the TSK as well, the keys will be available to the user and to AAAc;
and AAAH does not need to be involved in the procedure.
5. Extensions to Diameter
This document extends the utilization of the NAS-Session-Key AVP (AVP
Code 408) defined in [x]: it specifies two more values to the NAS-
Key-Binding AVP (AVP Code 404) and suggests to reuse this AVP with
the Re-Auth-Request (RAR) (Command-Code 258) defined in [x] to
perform the TSK update procedure.
The NAS-Key-Binding AVP (AVP Code 404) is of type Enumerated, and
defined in [x]. It specifies the purpose for the key. The following
values are supported:
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DES 1
The key created is used to secure links using DES
3DES 2
The key created is used to secure links using Triple DES
RC4-40 3
The key created is used to secure links using RC4 using
40-bit keys
RC4-128 4
The key created is used to secure links using RC4 with
128-bit keys
This document defines two more values:
TSK 5
The key is carrying the Temporary Shared Key
RANDTSK 6
The keying material is used to derive the TSK
6. Extensions to EAP
This document defines one new type EAP Type used in Request/Response
exchanges and some extensions to CHAP [RFC 1994] to allow the
utilization of the TSK. If other authentication mechanisms want to
take advantage of the benefits of an LSA, more extensions MAY need to
be defined.
6.1. TSK Type
The current EAP Types are defined:
1 Identity
2 Notification
3 Nak (Response only)
4 MD5-Challenge
5 One-Time Password (OTP) (RFC 1938)
6 Generic Token Card
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This document suggests one new Type
7 TSK
Description
The TSK Type is used to perform the necessary procedures related to
the TSK utilization: it is more particularly used to notify the
client to use, to stop using, to update the TSK, and to report any
problem. A Response MUST be sent in reply to the Request with a Type
field of 7 to acknowledge the reception of the message.
Type
7
Type-Data
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Subtype | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Subtype
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1 RANDTSK - This can be used to update the TSK. The Length
indicates the length of the RANDTSK Value and the Value
field carries it. Two values are reserved and have
specific meanings
(0): This value is used to inform the Client to start
using the current TSK value
(1): This Value is used to ask the Client to stop using
the TSK.
2 TSK Identifier: the Local domain assigns the TSK an
Identifier and uses this field to inform the Client of
the assigned value. The TSK Identifier SHOULD be 32 bits
long.
3 Report: This is used to notify the other end that there
is some synchronization problem with the TSK. The Home
domain SHOULD then either issue a new TSK Update or
order to stop using it. The Value field is zero octets
in length.
6.2. Extensions to CHAP
This draft specifies the Message field of the Success and Failure
payloads. Currently, the Message content is implementation dependent.
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type:
1 RANDTSK - the Length indicates the length of the RANDTSK
and the value contains the RANDTSK
2 TSK Identifier - The AAAc assigns the user a TSK Identifier
the user will put in the NAME field when using the TSK
7. Applicability to CHAP
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7.1. TSK establishment at initial registration
User AAA Client/AAAL AAAH
+---------------------------------------------+
| |
+---------------------------------------------+
| | |
| | 1. Challenge |
| 2. Challenge |<------------------+
|<---------------+ |
| 3. Response | |
+--------------->| 4. Response |
| +------------------>|
| | |
| | 5. Success, RANDTSK, TSK
| |<------------------+
| Stores TSK |
| | |
| 6. Success, RANDTSK, TSK Id. |
|<---------------+ |
| | |
+- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --+
| | |
| 7. Challenge, TSK Id. |
|--------------->| |
| | |
| 8. Response, TSK Id. |
|<---------------| |
| | |
| 9. Success | |
|--------------->| |
| | |
| 10. Challenge, TSK Id. |
|<---------------| |
| | |
| 11. Response, TSK Id. |
|--------------->| |
| | |
| 12. Sucess | |
|<---------------| |
1: The Authenticator generates a Challenge and sends it to the AAAc
to authenticate the Client.
2: The AAAc transmits the Challenge in a EAP-CHAP packet with the
Code field set to 1 as specified in [x]
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3: The Client computes the authentication response and sends it in a
EAP-CHAP packet - Code field set to 2 (Response) as specified in
[x]
4: The AAA Client forwards the authentication response to the
Authenticator to have it verified. The authenticator compares
the Response Value with its own calculation of the expected value.
Based on this comparison, the authenticator sends a Success or
Failure packet.
As described in section x.x, if the Client is correctly
authenticated and based on the security policies the Home domain
decides to share the TSK, it may:
- either sends a notification to the Client to use the current
TSK value (RANDTSK=0) and distribute the current TSK value to
the Local domain
- or generate a new RANDTSK and derive the corresponding TSK
value.
5: The TSK is sent to the Local domain in the NAS-Session-Key AVP
(AVP Code 408) with the NAS-Key-Binding AVP (AVP Code 404) set to
5.
The RANDTSK is carried in the Message Field of the EAP-Success
Payload.
The AAA client stores the TSK and assigns a TSK Identifier for
subsequent uses of this TSK between the Client and the Local
Domain: whenever the TSK is used, the TSK Identifier MUST be
carried in the Name Field of the EAP Request/Response Payloads [x]
6: The AAAc then forwards the EAP-Success carrying also the RANDTSK
and TSK Identifier in the Message Field to the Client.
The following steps are optional but since CHAP does not allow mutual
authentication, the Client can not make sure any third party modified
the RANDTSK value or not. For these reasons, in order to make sure of
the integrity of the RANDTSK, the Client SHOULD perform the following
steps:
7: the Client Challenges the network sending a ESP-CHAP Payload with
a Name Field set to the TSK Identifier so the Local domain knows
to use the TSK to process this request locally.
8: the AAAc uses the TSK to compute the Response, sent back to the
Client in a EAP-CHAP (Code set to 2) Payload with the Name field
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set to the TSK Identifier
9: The Client compares the Response Value with its own calculation of
the expected value. Based on this comparison, the Client sends a
Success or Failure packet. If the authentication fails, the Client
SHOULD sent a Report (EAP Code set to 1, Type 7, Subtype 3).
After a success, the Local domain SHOULD in the same way challenge
the Client to make sure they both have the same value for subsequent
uses.
7.2. TSK update
User AAA Client/AAAL AAAH
| | |
| | 1. RANDTSK, TSK |
| |<------------------|
| | 2. Ack |
| +-----------------e>|
| | |
| 3. RANDTSK, TSK Id. |
|<---------------| |
| | |
| 4. Acknowledgement |
|--------------->| |
| | |
| 5. Challenge, TSK Id. |
|--------------->| |
| | |
| 6. Response, TSK Id. |
|<---------------| |
| | |
| 7. Success | |
|--------------->| |
| | |
| 8. Challenge, TSK Id. |
|<---------------| |
| | |
| 9. Response, TSK Id. |
|--------------->| |
| | |
| 10. Sucess | |
|<---------------| |
The home domain can decide to update the TSK based on network
policies or different other reasons; the procedure will be as
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follows:
1. The Home Domain generates a random number, RANDTSK and derives the
corresponding TSK. It sends the RANDTSK and the TSK values in NAS-
Session-Key AVP: NAS-Key-Binding AVP 5 and NAS-Key-Binding AVP 6
to the Local Domain in a RAR Command (Command code 258).
2. The Local domain acknowledges the receipt of the message by
responding with a RAA Command (Commande Code 258).
3. The AAAc then stores the TSK and informs the Client to update the
TSK by sending an EAP TSK Packet (Code=1, Type=7, Subtype 1
carrying the RANDTSK and Subtype 2 carrying the TSK Identifier)
4. The Client acknowledges the request by sending a EAP TSK Response
(Code=2, Type=7).
5. The Client then challenges the network to make sure the TSK Update
order is coming from the valid network. The Client thus challenge
the Local domain sending a EAP CHAP Packet (Code=1, Type=4)
with the Name field set to the TSK Identifier.
6. The AAA Client computes the authentication data and responds
sending a EAP CHAP Response (Code=2, Type=4) with the Name field
set to the TSK Identifier.
7. The client compares the Response Value with its own calculation of
the expected value. Based on this comparison, the Client sends a
Success or Failure packet.
8. After a success, the Local domain SHOULD in the same way challenge
the Client to make sure they both have the same value for
subsequent uses.
8. Security considerations
This document introduces the concept of securely delegating part of
the security functions to the Visited domain to avoid delays in
authentication and key distribution procedures and reduce signaling
load between the visited and home Domains. The Temporary Shared Key
mechanism is an optimization that AAAL and AAAH may decide to use or
not based on policies and roaming agreements.
In the case the Home network decides neither to generate nor to
update but to reuse the existing TSK while the user is roaming to a
new domain as described in section x.x, the previously visited domain
still having knowledge of the current TSK value may perform
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undesirable operations on behalf of the user. For this reason, the
AAAH SHOULD update the Temporary Shared Key update process at least
every time the MN is entering a new visited domain.
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9. References
[1] Jari T. Malinen and Charles E. Perkins. Mobile IPv6
Regional Registrations. Internet Draft, Internet
Engineering Task Force, December 2000.
[2] Hesham Soliman, Claude Castelluccia, Karim El-Malki, and
Ludovic Bellier. Hierarchical MIPv6 mobility management.
Internet Draft, Internet Engineering Task Force, September
2000.
[3] N. Asokan, Patrik Flykt, Charles E. Perkins and Thomas
Eklund AAA for IPv6 Network Access. Internet Draft,
Internet Engineering Task Force, January 2000.
[4] Charles E. Perkins and Pat R. Calhoun. AAA Registration
Keys for Mobile IP. Internet Draft, Internet Engineering
Task Force, July 2001.
[5] Alfred J. Menzes, Paul C. van Oorschot, Scott A. Vanstone,
"Handbook of Applied Cryptography" Kerberos Authentication
protocol, p 501-502
[6] Franck Le, Raj Patil and Stefano M. Faccin. Challenge-
Response Authentication Request. Internet Draft, Internet
Engineering Task Force, February 2001.
[7] Franck Le and Stefano M. Faccin, Key distribution for
Mobile IPv6. Internet Draft, Internet Engineering Task
Force, February 2001.
[8] Pat R. Calhoun, William Bulley, Allan C. Rubens, Tut
Systems, Jeff Haag, Glen Zorn, "Diameter NASREQ
Extensions", Internet Draft, Internet Engineering Task
Force, May 2001.
[9] Pat R. Calhoun, Charles E. Perkins, "Diameter Mobile IPv4
Extensions" , Internet Draft, Internet Engineering Task
Force, May 2001.
[10] Pat R. Calhoun, Haseeb Akhtar, Jari Arkko, Erik Guttman,
Allan C. Rubens, Glen Zorn, "Diameter Base Protocol",
Internet Draft, Internet Engineering Task Force, June 2001.
[11] Stefano M. Faccin, Franck Le, Basavaraj Patil, Charles E.
Perkins, "Diameter Mobile IPv6 Application, Internet Draft,
Internet Engineering Task Force, July 2001.
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[12] Subir Das, Anthony McAuley, Basavaraj Patil, Henry
Haverinen, Yoshihiro Ohba, Shinichi Baba, "Basic User
Registration Protocol (BURP) Requirements", Internet Draft,
Internet Engineering Task Force, January 2001.
[13] Yoshihiro Ohba, James Kempf, Phil Roberts, Barani Subbiah,
Basavaraj Patil, Henry Haverinen, Hesham Soliman, "Usage
Scenarios of a User Registration Protocol (URP)", Internet
Draft, Internet Engineering Task Force, July 2001.
[14] J. Arkko, H. Haverinen, "EAP AKA Authentication", Internet
Draft, Internet Engineering Task Force, May 2001.
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10. Authors' Addresses
Stefano M. Faccin
Nokia Research Center
6000 Connection Drive
Irving, TX 75039
USA
Phone: +1 972 894-4994
E-mail: stefano.faccin@nokia.com
Franck Le
Nokia Research Center
6000 Connection Drive
Irving, TX 75039
USA
Phone: +1 972 374-1256
E-mail: franck.le@nokia.com
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