Network Working Group                                           D. Meyer
Internet-Draft                                   Universitaet Bremen TZI
Intended status: Standards Track                          P. Saint-Andre
Expires: September 1, 2009                                         Cisco
                                                       February 28, 2009


 Management and Use of Client Certificates for the Extensible Messaging
                      and Presence Protocol (XMPP)
                draft-meyer-xmpp-sasl-cert-management-00

Status of this Memo

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   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Abstract

   This document defines methods for managing and using client



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   certificates in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
   (XMPP).  These methods, which make use of the EXTERNAL mechanism of
   the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) protocol, enable
   an XMPP client to log in to an XMPP server without providing a
   password.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  First Login  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Certificate Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Uploading a Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.  Subsequent Login via SASL EXTERNAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   6.  Requesting the List of Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   7.  Removing a Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   8.  Revoking a Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     9.1.  Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     9.2.  Stream Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     9.3.  Check subjectAltName . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     9.4.  Changing the Password  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Appendix A.  XML Schema  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Appendix B.  Copying Conditions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15























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1.  Introduction

   An XMPP client typically needs a user name and a password to log in
   to an XMPP server.  Many clients provide a mechanism to store these
   credentials so that a human user can automatically log in without
   being prompted for the password.  While this practice is very user
   friendly, it can be a security risk, especially for some devices.
   Mobile devices like a mobile phone or a laptop might get stolen,
   providing the thief with the required password.  Mobile phones are
   particularly insecure: providing the password on the keypad for each
   login is too complicated and the risk of losing the phone is high.

   A solution to this problem is to allow a client to log in without
   knowing the password.  XMPP as specified in [rfc3920bis] allows the
   use of any Simple Authentication and Security Layer [SASL] mechanism
   in the authentication of XMPP entities, including the SASL EXTERNAL
   mechanism.  Therefore this document defines two methods that will
   enable password-free login for XMPP clients:

   o  How a client generates an X.509 certificate [X509], manages the
      list of client certificates, and informs the server of its
      authorized certificates.
   o  How a client presents a certificate during the Transport Layer
      Security [TLS] handshake and refers to it during SASL negotiation
      using the EXTERNAL mechanism.

   The overall process is as follows:

   1.  Client logs in to server using standard password-based
       authentication methods (or a previously authorized certificate).
   2.  Client generates or obtains a certificate.
   3.  Client informs server of the certificate.
   4.  On subsequent login attempts, client can use the authorized
       certificate.

   The client can also retrieve the list of authorized certificates,
   remove a certificate, or revoke a certificate.

   These use cases are explained in the following sections.


2.  First Login

   On first login, the client has not yet authorized a certificate and
   therefore cannot use SASL EXTERNAL to authenticate.  (There is a
   possible exception if the client already has a valid certificate
   issued by a certificate authority ("CA") that is recognized by the
   server, but we ignore that case here because it is relatively rare.)



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   Therefore the client would authenticate using standard XMPP methods
   as described in [rfc3920bis].  If the client will attempt to upload
   and authorize a certificate for subsequent login attempts, it MUST
   protect the client-to-server stream using channel encryption via
   Transport Layer Security [TLS] as described in [rfc3920bis].


3.  Certificate Generation

   In order to upload and authorize a certificate, the client needs to
   generate or obtain a certificate.  Here we assume that the client
   generates a self-signed certificate since this is also a requirement
   of [XMPP-E2E]; however, it is also possible for the client to obtain
   a CA-issued certificate.  The client certificate MUST include a JID
   as described in section 15.2.1.2 of [rfc3920bis], where the JID will
   be represented as an XmppAddr.  The JID can be either a bare JID of
   the form "user@domain.tld" or a full JID of the form
   "user@domain.tld/resource".

   subjectAltName=otherName:id-on-xmppAddr;UTF8:hamlet@example.com


4.  Uploading a Certificate

   After the client has logged in and generated a certificate, it shall
   upload the certificate to its XMPP server.  This is done by sending
   an XMPP IQ stanza of type "set" containing an <upload/> element
   qualified by the 'urn:xmpp:saslcert:0' namespace; this element in
   turn MUST contain at least one <item/> element, which in turn MUST
   contain a <certificate/> child element and SHOULD contain a <name/>
   child element.  The XML character of the <certificate/> element is
   the X.509 certificate in DER encoding, Base64-encoded as specified in
   Section 4 of [RFC4648] for sending over the XML stream.  The XML
   character data of the <name/> element is a human-readable name for
   the certificate (thus making it easier for a human user to manage the
   different certificates); the name does not have to be unique, since
   the certificate's fingerprint provides a truly unique identifier.  A
   client can upload multiple certificates with each certificate defined
   in one individual <item/> element.












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   <iq from='hamlet@example.com/denmark'
       id='hfg65sw'
       type='set'>
     <upload xmlns='urn:xmpp:saslcert:0'>
       <item>
         <name>Mobile Client</name>
         <certificate>
   MIICCTCCAXKgAwIBAgIJALhU0Id6xxwQMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMA4xDDAKBgNV
   BAMTA2ZvbzAeFw0wNzEyMjgyMDA1MTRaFw0wODEyMjcyMDA1MTRaMA4xDDAKBgNV
   BAMTA2ZvbzCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEA0DPcfeJzKWLGE22p
   RMINLKr+CxqozF14DqkXkLUwGzTqYRi49yK6aebZ9ssFspTTjqa2uNpw1U32748t
   qU6bpACWHbcC+eZ/hm5KymXBhL3Vjfb/dW0xrtxjI9JRFgrgWAyxndlNZUpN2s3D
   hKDfVgpPSx/Zp8d/ubbARxqZZZkCAwEAAaNvMG0wHQYDVR0OBBYEFJWwFqmSRGcx
   YXmQfdF+XBWkeML4MD4GA1UdIwQ3MDWAFJWwFqmSRGcxYXmQfdF+XBWkeML4oRKk
   EDAOMQwwCgYDVQQDEwNmb2+CCQC4VNCHesccEDAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MA0GCSqG
   SIb3DQEBBQUAA4GBAIhlUeGZ0d0msNVxYWAXg2lRsJt9INHJQTCJMmoUeTtaRjyp
   ffJtuopguNNBDn+MjrEp2/+zLNMahDYLXaTVmBf6zvY0hzB9Ih0kNTh23Fb5j+yK
   QChPXQUo0EGCaODWhfhKRNdseUozfNWOz9iTgMGw8eYNLllQRL//iAOfOr/8
         </certificate>
       </item>
     </upload>
   </iq>

   If the server can process the certificate, it returns an empty IQ
   result.

   <iq from='hamlet@example.com/denmark'
       id='hfg65sw'
       type='set'>

   (Error cases will be described in a future version of this
   specification, although the normal XMPP stanza errors apply.)

   Once the server has accepted the certificate, a client can use that
   certificate to authenticate the user using SASL EXTERNAL on
   subsequent logins.  Therefore the client MUST NOT store the password
   for subsequent login attempts.

   The client that uploads the certificate does not need to be the
   client that subsequently uses the certificate.  For example, a user
   might use a full-featured client to upload a certificate for
   subsequent use by a "bot" (e.g., an automated service or a device
   such as a set-top box).  The bot creates its certificate and private
   key, and the user uploads the certificate to the server with a
   different client.  After that procedure the bot can log in to the
   server and even participate in secure end-to-end communication
   without ever knowing the user's password.




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   An optional element <no-cert-management/> inside the <item/> element
   indicates that a client logged in with that certificate is not
   allowed to add or remove certificates from the list.  A server MAY
   allow such a client to query the list of certificates.

   <iq from='hamlet@example.com/denmark'
       id='hf65d4aq'
       type='set'>
     <upload xmlns='urn:xmpp:saslcert:0'>
       <item>
         <name>Simple Bot</name>
         <no-cert-management/>
         <certificate>
           Base64-encoded-cert-data
         </certificate>
       </item>
     </upload>
   </iq>


5.  Subsequent Login via SASL EXTERNAL

   The RECOMMENDED protocol flow for client-to-server use of SASL
   EXTERNAL with end-user certificates is as follows:

   1.   Client initiates stream to the server.

       <stream:stream
               xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
               xmlns='jabber:client'
               to='example.com'
               version='1.0'>

   2.   Server replies with stream header.

       <stream:stream
               xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
               xmlns='jabber:client'
               id='c2s_234'
               from='example.com'
               version='1.0'>

   3.   Server advertises TLS stream feature.

       <stream:features>
         <starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'>
           <required/>
         </starttls>



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       </stream:features>

   4.   Client sends STARTTLS command to the server.

       <starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>

   5.   Server tells the client to proceed.

       <proceed xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>

   6.   During TLS handshake, the server requests a certificate and the
        client presents its certificate.
   7.   TLS negotiation completes successfully.
   8.   Client initiates a new stream header to the server.

       <stream:stream
               xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
               xmlns='jabber:client'
               to='example.com'
               version='1.0'>

   9.   Server replies with stream header.

       <stream:stream
               xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
               xmlns='jabber:client'
               id='c2s_345'
               from='example.com'
               version='1.0'>

   10.  Server advertises SASL mechanisms.  If the server expects that
        the client will be able to authenticate and authorize as the
        identity provided in the presented certificate, then the server
        SHOULD advertise the SASL EXTERNAL mechanism; otherwise, if
        presented certificate is unacceptable (e.g., because the
        certificate is expired, not yet valid, or revoked), the server
        MUST NOT offer the EXTERNAL mechanism.

       <stream:features>
         <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
           <mechanism>EXTERNAL<mechanism>
           <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5<mechanism>
           <mechanism>ANONYMOUS<mechanism>
           <required/>
         </mechanisms>
       </stream:features>





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   11.  Because the client presented a certificate, it SHOULD consider
        EXTERNAL to be its preferred SASL mechanism.  If the client
        certificate includes only one XMPP address and the user wishes
        to authorize as the identity that has been authenticated by the
        TLS layer (i.e., the XMPP address that is contained in the
        client certificate), then the client SHOULD NOT include an
        authorization identity (i.e., the XML character data for the
        <auth/> element SHOULD be "=", indicating an empty response); if
        the client certificate contains more than one XMPP address or if
        the user wishes to authorize as another identity, then the
        client MUST include an authorization identity; if the client
        certificate contain no XMPP address, then the client SHOULD
        include an authorization identity (but MAY include no
        authorzation identity since the client may not even know its
        identity, instead having it assigned by the server).

       <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
             mechanism='EXTERNAL'>=</auth>

   12.  Server determines whether to allow authentication and
        authorization of user.
        1.  If (1) the certificate presented by the client contains only
            one valid XMPP address that corresponds to a registered
            account on the server and (2) the client did not pass an
            authorization identity in the SASL exchange, then the server
            SHOULD allow authentication and authorization of that JID.
            For the purpose of client authentication and authorization
            with a server, a valid XMPP address is a JID encapsulated as
            a subjectAltName entity of type otherName with an ASN.1
            Object Identifier of "id-on-xmppAddr" as specified in
            Section 15.2.1.3 of [rfc3920bis].

       <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>

        2.  If the certificate contains more than one valid XMPP address
            that corresponds to a registered account on the server
            (e.g., because the server offers virtual hosting), then the
            server SHOULD allow authentication and authorization of the
            JID specified as the authorization identity.

       <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>

        3.  If no authorization identity is included, then the server
            MUST return a SASL failure case of <invalid-authzid/> and
            close the stream.






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       <failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
         <invalid-authzid/>
       </failure>
       </stream:stream>

        4.  If the certificate does not contain an XMPP address, then
            the server MAY attempt to determine if there is a registered
            account associated with the user, for example by performing
            an LDAP lookup based on the Common Name in the certificate;
            if such a JID mapping is successful and the mapped JID
            matches the authorization identity provided, then the server
            SHOULD allow authentication and authorization of that mapped
            JID.

       <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>

        5.  If JID mapping is unsuccessful, then the server MUST return
            a SASL failure case of <not-authorized/> and close the
            stream.

       <failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
         <not-authorized/>
       </failure>
       </stream:stream>

        6.  If JID mapping is successful but the mapped JID does not
            match the authorization identity provided (if any), then the
            server MUST return a SASL failure case of <invalid-authzid/>
            and close the stream.

       <failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
         <invalid-authzid/>
       </failure>
       </stream:stream>

   13.  If SASL authentication succeeded, the client opens new stream,
        then the client and server proceed with resource binding as
        described in [rfc3920bis].  If the XmppAddr in the certificate
        is a full JID then the server MUST force the client to use the
        defined resource during resource binding.  The client is only
        allowed to use the provided resource name.  If a client with the
        same resource name is currently logged in and that client is not
        forced to use the specified resource name, it SHOULD be logged
        out by the server.







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6.  Requesting the List of Certificates

   A client can request the list of all certificates that are authorized
   to authenticate using SASL EXTERNAL.  This is done by sending an XMPP
   IQ stanza of type "get" containing a <list/> element qualified by the
   'urn:xmpp:saslcert:0' namespace.

   <iq from='hamlet@example.com/denmark'
       id='hf7435gj'
       type='get'>
     <list xmlns='urn:xmpp:saslcert:0'/>
   </iq>

   The server then returns the list of all known certificates, including
   the provided name.  Each certificate is contained in a separate
   <item/> element and identified by the value of the 'id' attribute.
   The 'id' SHOULD be the SHA1 value in hex of the certificate.

   <iq id='hf7435gj'
       to='hamlet@example.com/denmark'
       type='result'>
     <list xmlns='urn:xmpp:saslcert:0'>
       <item id='428b1358a286430f628da23fb33ddaf6e474f5c5'>
         <name>Mobile Client</name>
         <certificate>
           Base64-encoded-cert-data
         </certificate>
       </item>
       <item id='571b23d99892f4566017426e92c377288ed6c983'>
         <name>Simple Bot</name>
         <no-cert-management/>
         <certificate>
           Base64-encoded-cert-data
         </certificate>
       </item>
     </list>
   </iq>


7.  Removing a Certificate

   A client needs to create a new certificate before its current one
   expires.  After the new certificate is uploaded to the server, it
   might want to remove the old certificate to keep the list of
   certificates short (otherwise the list will grow indefinitely, making
   certificate handling more difficult for the user).  The client
   removes a certificate by sending an XMPP IQ stanza of type "set"
   containing a <remove/> element that in turn contains an empty <item/>



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   whose 'id' attribute uniquely identified the certificate.  Similar to
   the upload procedure a client can remove multiple certificates by
   adding more than one <item/> element.

   <iq from='hamlet@example.com/denmark'
       id='di5rshyy'
       type='set'>
     <remove xmlns='urn:xmpp:saslcert:0'/>
       <item id='428b1358a286430f628da23fb33ddaf6e474f5c5'/>
     </remove>
   </iq>

   Once a certificate has been removed it can no longer be used for SASL
   EXTERNAL.  A server MAY automatically remove expired certificates
   from the list.


8.  Revoking a Certificate

   The user can revoke a certificate for a stolen or compromised device.
   The mechanism is similar to removing a certificate.  The difference
   is that if a client is logged in with the compromised certificate
   using SASL EXTERNAL, the server SHOULD close the stream to that
   client thus forcing that client to log out.  The client revokes a
   certificate by sending an XMPP IQ stanza of type "set" containing a
   <revoke/> element that in turn contains an empty <item/> whose 'id'
   attribute uniquely identified the certificate.

   <iq from='hamlet@example.com/denmark'
       id='rev9gewf'
       type='set'>
     <revoke xmlns='urn:xmpp:saslcert:0'/>
       <item id='428b1358a286430f628da23fb33ddaf6e474f5c5'/>
     </revoke>
   </iq>


9.  Security Considerations

9.1.  Certificate Policies

   This specification defines a method whereby a user can authorize
   self-signed certificates for login.  In accordance with local
   security policies, a given XMPP deployment can refuse to support this
   feature, can allow only clients that have authenticated with CA-
   issued certificates to upload self-signed certificates, can accept
   self-signed certificates only for full JIDs, etc.




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9.2.  Stream Characteristics

   This specification allows the user to manipulate an alternative way
   to log into the server.  The certificates are not required to be
   signed and any certificate can be used.  Therefore the server MUST
   reject any communication described in this document if the link
   between client and server is not secured with both STARTTLS and SASL
   to prevent a man-in-the-middle to modify the certificate.

9.3.  Check subjectAltName

   The server MUST check if the JID in the subjectAltName of the
   certificate matches the bare JID of the user.  A user MUST NOT be
   allowed to upload certificates for a different user.

9.4.  Changing the Password

   [XEP-0077] defines a mechanism to change the password without knowing
   the current one.  If the server supports password change it MUST
   return not-authorized for clients logged in using SASL EXTERNAL and
   MAY include a password change form requiring the old password.  If
   the client has logged in with the current password, the server MAY
   change the password without a form as specified in XEP-0077.

   If a client is allowed to change the password without knowing the
   current password, the additional security provided by this document
   is compromised.


10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [rfc3920bis]
              Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
              Protocol (XMPP): Core", draft-saintandre-rfc3920bis-08
              (work in progress), October 2008.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.

   [SASL]     Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
              Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.

   [TLS]      Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [X509]     "ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997 E): Information



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              Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
              Authentication Framework", June 1997.

10.2.  Informative References

   [XEP-0077]
              Saint-Andre, P., "In-Band Registration", XSF XEP 0077,
              January 2006.

   [XMPP-E2E]
              Meyer, D. and P. Saint-Andre, "Extensible Messaging and
              Presence Protocol (XMPP) End-to-End Encryption Using
              Transport Layer Security ("XTLS")",
              draft-meyer-xmpp-e2e-encryption-00 (work in progress),
              February 2009.


Appendix A.  XML Schema

   The following schema is not normative.

   <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>

   <xs:schema
       xmlns:xs='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema'
       targetNamespace='urn:xmpp:saslcert:0'
       xmlns='urn:xmpp:jingle:saslcert:0'
       elementFormDefault='qualified'>

     <xs:element name='list'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:sequence>
           <xs:element name='item'
                       type='itemElementType'
                       minOccurs='0'
                       maxOccurs='unbounded'/>
         </xs:sequence>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

     <xs:element name='remove'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:sequence>
           <xs:element name='item'
                       type='itemElementType'
                       minOccurs='0'
                       maxOccurs='unbounded'/>
         </xs:sequence>



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       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

     <xs:element name='revoke'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:sequence>
           <xs:element name='item'
                       type='itemElementType'
                       minOccurs='0'
                       maxOccurs='unbounded'/>
         </xs:sequence>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

     <xs:element name='upload'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:sequence>
           <xs:element name='item'
                       type='itemElementType'
                       minOccurs='0'
                       maxOccurs='unbounded'/>
         </xs:sequence>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

     <xs:complexType name='itemElementType'>
       <xs:sequence>
         <xs:element name='name'
                     type='xs:string'
                     minOccurs='0'
                     maxOccurs='1'/>
         <xs:element name='no-cert-management'
                     type='empty'
                     minOccurs='0'
                     maxOccurs='1'/>
         <xs:element name='certificate'
                     type='xs:string'
                     minOccurs='0'
                     maxOccurs='1'/>
       </xs:sequence>
       <xs:attribute name='id' type='xs:string' use='optional'/>
     </xs:complexType>

     <xs:simpleType name='empty'>
       <xs:restriction base='xs:string'>
         <xs:enumeration value=''/>
       </xs:restriction>
     </xs:simpleType>



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   </xs:schema>


Appendix B.  Copying Conditions

   Regarding this entire document or any portion of it, the authors make
   no guarantees and are not responsible for any damage resulting from
   its use.  The authors grant irrevocable permission to anyone to use,
   modify, and distribute it in any way that does not diminish the
   rights of anyone else to use, modify, and distribute it, provided
   that redistributed derivative works do not contain misleading author
   or version information.  Derivative works need not be licensed under
   similar terms.


Authors' Addresses

   Dirk Meyer
   Universitaet Bremen TZI

   Email: dmeyer@tzi.de


   Peter Saint-Andre
   Cisco

   Email: psaintan@cisco.com
























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