| Internet-Draft | Org-Alter Policy Provision | October 2026 |
| Morrison | Expires 24 April 2027 | [Page] |
- Workgroup:
- Network Working Group
- Internet-Draft:
- draft-morrison-org-alter-policy-provision-06
- Published:
- Intended Status:
- Informational
- Expires:
Policy Provision and Governance Inheritance from an Organisational Identity Substrate
Abstract
This memo specifies how an artificial-intelligence agent runtime, bound at instantiation to a principal identity handle, resolves at session initialisation a target organisational identity substrate from a manifest source bound to the runtime's working context and retrieves from that substrate a typed policy stack comprising a handbook artefact, a standard-operating-procedure registry pointer, an enforcement-gate specification, and an audit-signal ingestion endpoint. The policy stack is then applied as runtime constraints on subsequent tool invocations, with audit signals emitted back to the same substrate. Policy provision occurs in the same act of session initialisation as principal identification, rather than as a separate ceremony against a side-channel governance plane. A principal concurrently bound to multiple organisational substrates operates the runtime under a deterministic composition of the several policy stacks. A cross-organisational residual conflict suspends the conflicting action, and is resolved through the peer-protocol Identity Accord ceremony only where the principal discloses each binding to the other, never through a meta-federation authority. The memo is Informational. The wire surface relies on the DNS-based discovery of draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery and the handle namespace of draft-morrison-identity-pronouns; no new transport is introduced.¶
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 April 2027.¶
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document.¶
1. Introduction
Artificial-intelligence agent runtimes operated by a human principal require, at the moment they begin acting on the principal's behalf, a corpus of policy artefacts that constrain their behaviour: permitted and refused actions, vocabulary and tone rules, escalation procedures, audit destinations, and the standard operating procedures the principal's organisation has adopted. In current practice these artefacts are supplied to the agent runtime by a governance plane architecturally separate from the principal's identity infrastructure. The agent runtime authenticates to one substrate (an identity provider) and receives policy from another (a governance platform, an orchestration framework's configuration plane, a per-tool policy console). The two substrates are joined by out-of-band integration work specific to each deployment.¶
This memo specifies a different arrangement and the wire surface that supports it. An organisational identity substrate, addressable by the same identity handle that authenticates the principal as a member of the organisation, exposes typed surfaces over the Model Context Protocol [MCP] that carry the policy artefacts the agent runtime requires. The agent runtime resolves the substrate at session initialisation, fetches the typed surfaces, applies them as runtime constraints, and emits audit signals to the same substrate.¶
The arrangement composes with the discovery mechanism of [MCPDNS], the handle namespace of [IDPRONOUNS], the attribution grammar of [IDCOMMITS], the cross-session coordination posture of [SUBSTRATE], and the cross-organisational ceremony of [IDACCORD]. No new transport, no new handle category, and no new attribution slot is introduced. This memo specifies the typed surface set, the session-initialisation flow that retrieves them, the runtime application of the retrieved enforcement-gate specification, the audit-signal flow back to the substrate, the live-update propagation, the multi-organisational composition rule, and the compliance-state inheritance posture.¶
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The following terms are defined for the purposes of this document.
Terms defined by the companion memos referenced here keep their
meaning and are repeated here only where this document uses them.
A handle named in this document corresponds to the alter: URI
formed from it as defined in [ALTER-URI]; for example, ~alice is
addressed as alter:~alice.¶
- Agent runtime
-
An artificial-intelligence agent runtime bound at instantiation to a principal identity handle.¶
- Principal
-
The human on whose behalf an agent runtime acts, named by the handle to which the runtime is bound at instantiation.¶
- Policy epoch
-
The monotonic identifier a substrate emits to mark a state of its policy artefacts. Update notifications carry it (Section 11.5), and the compliance snapshot is inherited at a single epoch (Section 9).¶
- ~handle
-
A principal identity handle as defined by [MCPDNS], classified into the trust tiers of [IDCOMMITS] and referenced under the conventions of [IDPRONOUNS]. A Sovereign-tier handle is human-controlled (e.g.
~alice); an Instrument-tier handle is agent-runtime-vendor-controlled and conventionally prefixed~cc-(e.g.~cc-example-model). A handle's trust tier is a property of the handle, not a property of any session it appears in.¶ - Organisational identity substrate
-
A network-addressable system that authoritatively recognises a set of
~handlesas members of an organisation, maintains the organisation's policy artefacts, and exposes typed surfaces by which authenticated agent runtimes of recognised members may retrieve those artefacts and submit audit signals back. The substrate is itself addressable by a handle, conventionally domain-qualified (e.g.~example.com, addressed asalter:~example.com).¶ - Policy artefact
-
A datum retrieved from the organisational identity substrate that constrains an agent runtime's subsequent behaviour. The required policy artefacts specified by this memo are the handbook, the standard-operating-procedure registry, the enforcement-gate specification, and the audit-signal ingestion endpoint.¶
- Enforcement gate
-
A single rule within the enforcement-gate specification comprising a trigger predicate evaluated against tool name and arguments, an action selected from a defined action set, an applicability scope, and an explanation string. Enforcement gates are policy retrieved from the substrate; they are not hardcoded behaviour of the agent runtime.¶
- Audit signal
-
An append-only record submitted by the agent runtime to the organisational identity substrate's ingestion endpoint following a runtime event that meets a substrate-specified significance predicate.¶
- Session-bind
-
The discrete act, at agent runtime instantiation, of authenticating the bound principal handle to the resolved organisational identity substrate and retrieving the policy artefacts that will govern the session.¶
- Manifest source
-
A configuration surface bound to the agent runtime's working context (DNS TXT record under the
_alter.scheme of [MCPDNS], project-resident anchor file, environment variable, or handle- scoped fallback) that names the target organisational identity substrate for the session. Section 4 gives the normative evaluation order, which is this one, and states why it runs from least to most writable by a party who controls only the working directory tree.¶ - Accord
-
The peer-protocol cross-organisational ceremony defined by [IDACCORD]. Referenced here as the terminator of unresolvable multi-organisational policy-composition residuals.¶
3. Architecture
The arrangement specified by this memo comprises four operative surfaces and three flow stages.¶
3.1. Operative Surfaces
The organisational identity substrate SHALL expose at minimum the following four typed surfaces over the Model Context Protocol [MCP] to authenticated agent runtimes of recognised members. Each surface is addressable as a tool invocation against the substrate.¶
org_alter_handbook-
Returns the organisational handbook artefact. The handbook comprises the body of prose policy that an organisation customarily supplies to a contractor at the commencement of an engagement: voice and tone rules, vocabulary constraints, positioning rules, decision-routing rules, and any further prose policy the organisation considers operative. The surface SHALL support both whole-handbook retrieval and section-scoped retrieval by section identifier.¶
org_alter_sop_registry-
Returns the registry of standard operating procedures maintained by the organisational identity substrate. Each registry entry carries a stable identifier, a title, a status (live, draft, deprecated), a body, and an invocation verb under which the agent runtime may execute the procedure. The surface SHALL support both registry listing and individual-procedure retrieval.¶
org_alter_enforcement_gates-
Returns the specification of enforcement gates the agent runtime is to apply to subsequent tool invocations. The grammar of an enforcement gate is defined in Section 5.¶
org_alter_ingest-
Accepts audit signals submitted by the agent runtime per Section 6. The surface is append-only; admitted signals are written to the organisational identity substrate's append-only event log and are not retractable or amendable.¶
Additional surfaces (a roster surface, a decisions surface, a compliance surface) MAY be exposed by the organisational identity substrate; agent runtimes consulting such surfaces operate beyond the required minimum specified here.¶
3.2. Flow Stages
The session-bind flow comprises three stages, executed in order:¶
-
Resolve. The agent runtime determines the target organisational identity substrate by consulting the manifest source, as specified in Section 4.¶
-
Retrieve. The agent runtime authenticates to the resolved substrate using the bound principal handle's session credential and retrieves the four required policy artefacts via the surfaces of Section 3.1.¶
-
Apply. The agent runtime translates the retrieved enforcement-gate specification into runtime hooks, registers the audit-signal endpoint as the destination for subsequent significant-event emissions, and surfaces the handbook and SOP registry to the bound principal as in-context advisory material.¶
The three stages constitute session-bind. All three SHALL complete before the agent runtime acts on the principal's first prompt of the session. If any stage fails, session-bind SHALL fail; partial inheritance of policy is not permitted (Section 9).¶
4. Discovery and Resolution
The agent runtime SHALL resolve the target organisational identity substrate from a manifest source bound to the runtime's working context. Manifest sources are evaluated in the priority order below, from the source least writable by a party who controls only the working directory tree to the source most writable by such a party. The first source that yields a handle is operative; later sources are not consulted.¶
-
DNS TXT record under the
_alter.scheme of [MCPDNS]. The agent runtime resolves the working directory's source- control remote (where present) to a domain name and queries_alter.<domain>per [MCPDNS]. The TXT record'sorg_alterfield, when present, names the target substrate. Writing this source requires control of the domain's DNS zone in the sense of [RFC9499]. A party who controls only the working directory tree does not by that fact possess it.¶ -
Project-resident anchor. A file at an implementation- defined path within the working directory tree (a recommended path is
.alter/org-alter.tomlor an[org-alter]block withinpyproject.toml,package.json, orCargo.toml) names the target substrate by handle. This source carries no cryptographic binding to the substrate it names; it is consulted only when source (1) does not resolve.¶ -
Environment variable. An implementation-defined environment variable (a recommended name is
ALTER_ORG_HANDLE) carries the target substrate handle.¶ -
Handle-scoped fallback. If sources (1) through (3) do not resolve, the runtime falls back to the principal's own handle-scoped substrate. That substrate exposes the same typed surfaces as an organisational identity substrate but is scoped to the principal alone and does not participate in multi-organisational composition (Section 8).¶
The resolved handle is translated to a substrate endpoint via the DNS-based resolution mechanism of [MCPDNS]. The agent runtime opens a Model Context Protocol session against the endpoint, authenticating with the bound principal handle's session credential obtained from the implementation-defined session manifest.¶
A substrate that does not recognise the authenticating handle as a member SHALL refuse the session; an unrecognised handle MUST NOT receive policy artefacts. The substrate MAY further refuse on trust-tier grounds: an Instrument-tier handle SHALL be admitted only when the substrate's policy explicitly admits Instrument-tier sessions from the corresponding Sovereign-tier handle's delegation.¶
5. Enforcement Gate Grammar
The org_alter_enforcement_gates surface (Section 3.1) returns
an enforcement-gate specification. An enforcement-gate
specification is a list of enforcement gates. Each enforcement
gate is an object with the following fields.¶
-
id(string, REQUIRED) -
A stable identifier for the gate, unique within the specification. Identifiers are used as the addressing target for audit signals (Section 6) and for policy-update propagation (Section 7).¶
-
trigger(object, REQUIRED) -
The trigger predicate evaluated against each prospective tool invocation. The object's keys are predicate operators; the values are operator-specific patterns. Minimum operator set:¶
-
tool_name_match(string): regular expression matched against the tool name.¶ -
path_glob(string): glob pattern matched against any argument resolvable as a filesystem path.¶ -
command_substring(string): substring matched against any argument carrying a command string.¶ -
arg_arity(object): minimum and maximum bounds on argument list length.¶
A trigger object matches when every operator present in the object matches. Additional operators MAY be defined by the substrate and SHOULD be ignored by agent runtimes that do not understand them.¶
-
-
action(enum, REQUIRED) -
One of:¶
-
block: the tool invocation is refused. The runtime returns the gate's explanation string to the agent reasoning loop as a synthetic error and emits apolicy.violationaudit signal.¶ -
prompt-for-confirmation: the tool invocation is paused and a confirmation prompt is rendered to the Sovereign-tier principal. The invocation proceeds only on principal confirmation. Agate.confirmation-requestedaudit signal is emitted on prompt; agate.confirmation-grantedorgate.confirmation-deniedsignal is emitted on outcome.¶ -
allow-with-audit: the tool invocation proceeds, and agate.allowed-with-auditaudit signal is emitted.¶
-
-
scope(object, OPTIONAL) -
An applicability scope restricting the gate's effect. Recognised keys:¶
-
explanation(string, REQUIRED) -
A human-readable explanation of the gate, returned to the agent runtime on action execution. The explanation SHOULD be sufficient for the reasoning loop to surface to the principal without further substrate round-trip.¶
-
audit_emit_on(array of strings, OPTIONAL) -
A list of event types for which audit signals are emitted on this gate's evaluation, beyond the action-implicit signals enumerated above. Substrate-significance predicates (Section 6) may select event types not directly tied to a gate; this field carries the per-gate overrides.¶
When two or more gates trigger on a single prospective tool
invocation (after applicability-scope filtering), the gate whose
action is most restrictive prevails. Order of restrictiveness,
from most to least, is block, prompt-for-confirmation,
allow-with-audit.¶
The agent runtime SHALL NOT maintain enforcement gates outside the specification retrieved from the substrate. Gates are policy, sourced from the substrate; an agent runtime that hardcodes a gate operates outside the surface of this memo.¶
6. Audit Signal Flow
The agent runtime emits audit signals to the substrate's
org_alter_ingest surface for runtime events that meet a
substrate-specified significance predicate. The significance
predicate is itself policy retrieved from the substrate; the
substrate determines which events are significant, not the runtime.¶
An audit signal is an object with the following minimum fields:¶
-
type(string, REQUIRED) -
The event type. The minimum-set of event types a conformant runtime SHALL emit when triggered comprises:¶
-
session.startat session bind, carrying the bound principal handle, trust tier, resolved substrate handle, and manifest source used for resolution.¶ -
session.endat session termination, carrying the bound handle and a structured summary of session activity.¶ -
tool.invokeper tool invocation that meets the substrate- specified significance predicate, carrying the tool name, a redacted argument summary, the gate evaluation outcome, and the result classification.¶ -
policy.violationwhen ablockgate action fires, carrying the gate identifier and the offending invocation.¶ -
policy.updateon receipt of a live-substrate policy update (Section 7), acknowledging the new policy epoch.¶ -
gate.confirmation-requested,gate.confirmation-granted,gate.confirmation-deniedonprompt-for-confirmationflow.¶ -
gate.allowed-with-auditon the corresponding action.¶
-
-
payload(object, REQUIRED) -
Event-type-specific structured data. The substrate's significance predicate MAY constrain payload shape per event type.¶
-
attribution(object, REQUIRED) -
Carries the Sovereign-tier handle and any in-scope Instrument-tier handle. The grammar follows the trailer slots defined by [IDCOMMITS]; the audit-signal
attributionfield is the protocol-layer companion to the commit-trailer block.¶ -
timestamp(string, REQUIRED) -
Timestamp in the format of [RFC3339] at which the runtime emitted the signal.¶
-
gate_id(string, OPTIONAL) -
When the signal arises from a gate evaluation, the identifier of the gate.¶
The substrate's audit-signal endpoint is append-only. Admitted signals SHALL NOT be retracted or amended by the emitting runtime or by the substrate operator. This section requires policy and audit to be co-located at the same substrate; an audit channel addressable separately from the policy that governed the audited events does not satisfy this specification.¶
7. Live Policy Updates
The agent runtime maintains, for the duration of the session, a subscription channel against the resolved organisational identity substrate over which the substrate emits policy-update notifications. The subscription channel SHOULD be implemented as a server-sent events stream [SSE] or equivalent unidirectional-from-substrate transport that the existing Model Context Protocol session can carry without additional authentication round-trip.¶
On receipt of a policy-update notification, the runtime SHALL:¶
-
Re-fetch the affected policy artefact via the corresponding typed surface of Section 3.1.¶
-
Recompute the runtime hooks of Section 5 from the updated enforcement-gate specification.¶
-
Atomically replace its in-memory policy state. No tool invocation issued after the atomic replacement observes a partial composition of the pre-update and post-update gate sets.¶
-
Emit a
policy.updateaudit signal acknowledging the new policy epoch.¶
A runtime SHALL NOT require process restart to apply a policy
update. An update notification that the runtime cannot apply
(because the substrate returned a malformed artefact, or because
the runtime's hook surface cannot represent the updated gate set)
SHALL cause the runtime to emit a policy.update-failed audit
signal and either retain the prior policy state and surface the
condition to the principal, or terminate the session at the
substrate's configured failure-mode.¶
8. Multi-Organisational Composition
A principal MAY be concurrently recognised by multiple organisational identity substrates. When more than one substrate recognises the principal for a session (for example, when the manifest-source resolution of Section 4 names a primary substrate and the session credential carries auxiliary memberships), the agent runtime composes the retrieved policy stacks under the following rules.¶
-
org_alter_handbookcomposition -
Handbooks compose by union. Where two handbooks declare conflicting sections, the substrate declared earlier in the manifest's precedence order prevails. In the absence of explicit precedence, the substrate resolved from the working- context anchor (Section 4(1) or 4(2)) prevails.¶
-
org_alter_sop_registrycomposition -
Standard-operating-procedure registries compose by union. Procedures are identified by the tuple
(substrate-handle, procedure-identifier)to permit identically-named procedures across substrates without collision.¶ -
org_alter_enforcement_gatescomposition -
Enforcement gates compose by union under a strictest-applicable rule: where two gates from distinct substrates trigger on a single prospective tool invocation, the gate whose action is most restrictive prevails (order as in Section 5).¶
-
org_alter_ingestsegregation -
An audit signal arising from a gate whose evaluation drew on policy from multiple substrates SHALL be emitted only to the audit-signal endpoint of the substrate whose own policy contributed the gate, and SHALL carry only that substrate's share of the evaluation. A runtime MUST NOT emit an audit signal to a substrate whose policy did not participate in the evaluation. A runtime MUST NOT include in an emitted signal a field, count, identifier, gate reference or timing correlation from which the receiving substrate could infer that the principal is bound to another substrate. Where a gate cannot be evaluated without disclosing that a peer contribution exists, the runtime SHALL suppress the invocation and record a local diagnostic visible to the principal only. The prohibition this rule enforces is stated in the Privacy Considerations under Identity-Binding Leakage.¶
Cross-organisational residual conflicts that the composition rules above cannot resolve (for example, two substrates' handbooks declaring mutually-inconsistent positioning rules where neither is clearly subordinate under the manifest precedence) SHALL cause the agent runtime to suspend the conflicting action and to record a local diagnostic visible to the principal only. The runtime MUST NOT emit a residual-conflict signal to any substrate and MUST NOT name one substrate to another, because either act discloses the principal's other binding. Where the principal elects to have the conflict resolved between the substrates, the principal discloses each binding to the other as a deliberate act, and the peer-protocol Identity Accord ceremony [IDACCORD] then proceeds between the participating substrates on that disclosure. Resolution does not proceed via a meta-federation authority, and the composition rules of this section define none.¶
9. Compliance-State Inheritance
At session-bind, the agent runtime inherits the organisational identity substrate's then-current compliance state as a single coherent snapshot. The snapshot comprises at minimum:¶
-
The audit-signal endpoint URI and its current write credential.¶
-
The enforcement-gate specification at its current epoch.¶
-
The standard-operating-procedure registry pointer at its current revision.¶
-
A hash of the handbook artefact at its current revision.¶
-
The set of compliance commitments the substrate has accepted and currently asserts (for example, a refusal of a specified category of automated invocation, or a specified regulatory posture).¶
Inheritance SHALL be atomic. Either all snapshot elements are inherited at a single substrate epoch, or session-bind fails. A session that proceeds with a partial snapshot is non-conformant. The runtime SHALL surface session-bind failure to the principal with the substrate-returned diagnostic; it SHALL NOT silently degrade to a fallback policy stack.¶
Subsequent live updates (Section 7) modify the snapshot at the runtime in place but do not retroactively alter the snapshot epoch recorded at session-bind. The audit trail of a session is the sequence of policy epochs the runtime observed across its lifetime, anchored by the session-bind snapshot.¶
10. IANA Considerations
This memo requests no IANA action.¶
The four required typed surfaces named in Section 3.1
(org_alter_handbook, org_alter_sop_registry,
org_alter_enforcement_gates, org_alter_ingest) are illustrative
of the reference substrate operated by Alter Meridian Pty Ltd.
Conforming substrates MAY name their surfaces by any convention
consistent with their addressing primitive. This memo specifies
the typed-surface enumeration over an organisational identity
substrate, not the surface names themselves.¶
Where a substrate elects to advertise its handle in the [MCPDNS]
discovery record, the org_alter field is added under the
field-extension mechanism of [MCPDNS]; this memo requests no
separate registry allocation. No new DNS RR types, transport
identifiers, port numbers, URI schemes, or media types are
introduced. The reuse of the _alter.<domain> DNS label
(Section 4(1)) is per [MCPDNS] and requires no further allocation
here.¶
The project-resident anchor path of Section 4(2), the environment-variable name of Section 4(3), and the session-manifest layout referenced in Section 4 are implementation-defined and are not registered.¶
11. Security Considerations
The arrangement specified by this memo concentrates policy, attribution, and audit on a single substrate addressable by the principal's identity credential. The arrangement depends on that concentration, and the concentration is the main source of the following security considerations.¶
11.1. Manifest-Source Spoofing
The subsections below reason about a substrate that has already
been correctly resolved. This subsection addresses the step that
precedes all of them. A party able to influence the working
directory tree that an agent runtime resolves against (a
compromised or malicious repository, a poisoned pull request
checked out for review, a dependency that ships an [org-alter]
block) may attempt to cause the manifest-source resolution of
Section 4 to name a substrate that party controls. Such a party
need not compromise a substrate; it is enough that content it
controls is consulted as the resolution input. Mitigations:¶
-
Section 4 orders the DNS TXT source ahead of the project- resident anchor because writing the former requires control of a DNS zone, and writing the latter requires only write access to the working directory tree. A conformant implementation SHALL NOT consult the project-resident anchor when the DNS source resolves. Resolution then does not depend on working-directory content. The
org_alterfield lies outside the Ed25519 signing input of the [MCPDNS] envelope; its integrity rests on the DNSSEC validation that [MCPDNS] requires for that record.¶ -
The project-resident anchor carries no cryptographic binding to the substrate it names. A runtime that resolves the session's governing substrate via the project-resident anchor SHOULD surface that fact to the principal. Governance derived from working-directory content is otherwise indistinguishable from governance derived from a cryptographically-bound source.¶
-
Section 8's handbook-composition tie-break defers, in the absence of explicit precedence, to the substrate resolved from the working-context anchor. Because Section 4 places the DNS source ahead of the project-resident anchor, this tie-break resolves to the DNS-bound substrate whenever DNS resolves, and to the project-resident anchor only when DNS does not.¶
11.2. Substrate Compromise
A compromised organisational identity substrate may serve falsified policy artefacts to authenticated members, induce the runtime to emit audit signals to an attacker-controlled endpoint, or suppress update notifications to keep runtimes operating under stale gates. Mitigations:¶
-
The substrate's policy artefacts SHOULD be served over a channel authenticated by the cryptographic identity envelope of [MCPDNS] (the
_alter.<domain>Ed25519 binding) so that a consuming runtime can verify the artefact bears the substrate's declared signing key.¶ -
Audit-signal endpoints SHOULD be pinned at session-bind time to the endpoint URI recorded in the compliance snapshot (Section 9); mid-session redirection of the endpoint SHALL require a
policy.updatenotification carrying the new endpoint under the same signing key.¶ -
Runtimes SHOULD treat suppressed update notifications as an observable substrate signal under the substrate-observation posture of [SUBSTRATE]; prolonged absence of update events on a substrate that asserts an active policy lifecycle is itself diagnostic.¶
11.3. Trust-Tier Escalation
An Instrument-tier handle that successfully presents a Sovereign- tier session credential (through credential theft, compromised session manifest, or substrate misissuance) would receive the more permissive Sovereign-tier gate set. Mitigations:¶
-
The substrate SHALL bind trust tier to the handle itself, not to the session, and SHALL refuse Instrument-tier handles presenting Sovereign-tier credentials at the recognition step.¶
-
Audit signals SHALL carry attribution per Section 6; an Instrument-tier session writing to the audit log under a Sovereign-tier attribution is detectable by post-hoc audit and by the cross-tier checks defined in [IDCOMMITS].¶
-
Sovereign-tier confirmation prompts (Section 5's
prompt-for- confirmationaction) SHOULD be rendered through an out-of- band channel addressable only by the human principal. An Instrument-tier session in possession of the Sovereign-tier session credential then cannot satisfy a confirmation on the principal's behalf.¶
11.4. Multi-Organisational Conflict Exploitation
A principal recognised by multiple substrates may be the vector for an exploit in which one substrate's gate is suppressed by a falsified or absent gate from a second substrate. Mitigations:¶
-
The strictest-applicable rule of Section 8 SHALL be evaluated over the gates actually retrieved from each substrate. A substrate that fails to return its enforcement-gate specification at session-bind SHALL cause session-bind to fail for that substrate (no implicit empty-gate-set composition).¶
-
The principal's manifest precedence declarations SHOULD be authenticated against the key bound to the principal's handle under [MCPDNS] so that a forged precedence claim cannot install a less-restrictive substrate as the primary.¶
11.5. Live-Update Replay
An attacker positioned to observe the subscription channel may
attempt to replay an aged policy.update notification to roll a
runtime back to an earlier policy epoch. Mitigations:¶
-
Update notifications SHALL carry a monotonic substrate-emitted epoch identifier.¶
-
Runtimes SHALL reject notifications carrying an epoch less than or equal to the runtime's currently-applied epoch.¶
-
The substrate's append-only audit log retains the ordered history of issued epoch identifiers and is consultable for post-hoc replay detection.¶
11.6. Pseudonymous Discovery Substrates
The handle-scoped fallback of Section 4(4) operates the typed surfaces against a principal-scoped substrate that does not assert organisational membership. An agent runtime in this configuration inherits the principal's own policy stack but does not benefit from multi-organisational composition. Implementations SHOULD surface to the principal that the session is operating in the fallback configuration so that the absence of an organisational substrate is not silently consumed.¶
12. Privacy Considerations
The audit-signal flow of Section 6 records the agent runtime's tool-invocation activity on the substrate. The substrate operator has visibility into the principal's session activity at the granularity of the substrate-specified significance predicate.¶
12.1. Significance-Predicate Scope
The substrate determines which events are significant and therefore audited. A significance predicate covering every tool invocation yields a complete activity log; a narrower predicate audits only events the substrate considers operative. Substrate operators SHOULD publish their significance predicates as part of the handbook artefact so that authenticated members understand the scope of audit they consent to as a function of membership.¶
12.2. Argument Redaction
Tool-invocation arguments SHOULD be redacted before inclusion in
the tool.invoke audit signal payload. Minimum redaction practice
is removal of secret material (credentials, signing keys),
personally-identifying information about third parties referenced
in the invocation, and any field the principal has marked
sensitive in a per-session redaction profile. Substrate operators
SHOULD specify their argument-redaction expectations in the
handbook artefact.¶
12.3. Identity-Binding Leakage
A principal may be concurrently bound to more than one organisational substrate. The fact of that concurrency is itself identifying: a substrate that learns a peer substrate participated in an evaluation learns that the principal is bound to that peer, and no party other than the principal can consent to the disclosure. [SUBSTRATE] names this failure Identity-Binding Leakage and treats it as an anti-pattern.¶
Accordingly, a substrate MUST NOT be told, and MUST NOT be able to infer, that the principal holds a binding to any other substrate. The prohibition covers the existence of the other binding, its count, its name, its handle, its domain, and any gate, signal field, error, latency or ordering artefact from which any of those could be derived. It is not satisfied by pseudonymising the peer substrate, because a stable pseudonym still discloses that a peer exists, and it is not satisfied by notice, because notice does not make the disclosure consented to by the principals it identifies.¶
Revisions -00, -01 and -02 of this memo specified in this position a Cross-Substrate Audit Fan-Out, under which audit signals arising from a multi-substrate evaluation were broadcast to every contributing substrate. That mechanism is withdrawn. It performed the disclosure this section prohibits, and it cannot be made conformant by notice or by declaration in a handbook artefact. Implementations of an earlier revision SHOULD disable the fan-out and emit under the segregation rule of Section 8.¶
13. Relation to Companion Memos
This memo composes with five companion Internet-Drafts.¶
[MCPDNS] supplies the DNS-based discovery surface from which the manifest-source resolution of Section 4(1) draws and the cryptographic identity envelope referenced in Section 11. This memo introduces no new DNS records or labels beyond those specified by [MCPDNS].¶
[IDPRONOUNS] supplies the conventions for referencing a handle, over the handle of [MCPDNS] and the trust tiers of [IDCOMMITS] used throughout this memo. This memo introduces no new handle category.¶
[IDCOMMITS] supplies the attribution grammar that the audit-
signal attribution field of Section 6 mirrors at the protocol
layer. An audit signal and an Acted-By: / Drafted-With: commit
trailer block carry the same attribution shape, one at runtime,
one at version-control commit time.¶
[SUBSTRATE] supplies the substrate-observation posture under which the runtime treats absence of expected update notifications as a substrate signal (Section 11). Substrate observation also supplies the cross-session coordination floor against which multiple concurrent runtimes of the same principal deconflict without exchanging coordination messages.¶
[IDACCORD] supplies the peer-protocol ceremony by which Section 8's cross-organisational residuals are resolved, where the principal has disclosed each binding to the other.¶
14. Implementation Status
A partial reference implementation of the agent-runtime side of this specification is operated by the present author against a production substrate. Of the four typed surfaces of Section 3.1, the SOP registry and the audit ingest are reachable as tool invocations; the handbook and the enforcement-gate specification are not yet exposed as typed surfaces.¶
The provisioning path (the session-bind flow of Section 3.2) is implemented as a service that no agent-runtime session yet invokes. The supply of policy artefacts described in earlier revisions of this section is therefore intent rather than experience. The instrument-tier and recognised-member admission of Section 4 is specified but not enforced by the reference deployment. The audit-signal flow of Section 6 is not exercised by the reference deployment.¶
As [RFC7942] describes, this section documents implementation experience and is to be removed before publication as an RFC. No claim of interoperability is made; the reference deployment is a single substrate operated by the specification's author.¶
15. Document History
draft-morrison-org-alter-policy-provision-06 (October 2026):¶
-
Rewrites the prose against the drafting rules and pins each citation of another Internet-Draft to its latest posted revision. No change to any surface, flow, rule or requirement.¶
-
Editorial pass before upload: adds Agent runtime, Principal and Policy epoch to the definitions, corrects the first name of the [IDACCORD] co-author in that reference, and removes a sentence announcing the privacy subsections. No requirement changes.¶
draft-morrison-org-alter-policy-provision-05 (October 2026):¶
-
Replaces the hand-typed BCP 14 key-words paragraph with the standard boilerplate.¶
-
Corrects the reference for server-sent events in Section 7. [RFC8441] specifies WebSocket bootstrapping over HTTP/2, not server-sent events; the reference is now the WHATWG HTML Standard [SSE].¶
-
Adds [RFC3339] as a normative reference for the audit-signal
timestampfield of Section 6.¶ -
Corrects the [IDACCORD] reference to that draft's full title and both of its authors.¶
-
Attributes the ~handle to [MCPDNS] and the trust tiers to [IDCOMMITS] in Section 2 and Section 13, as [IDPRONOUNS] itself does. Section 11.4 authenticates manifest precedence against the key bound to the principal's handle under [MCPDNS], as [IDPRONOUNS] defines no such key.¶
-
Corrects Section 11.1. Because the
org_alterfield is not within the Ed25519 signing input of the [MCPDNS] envelope, the subsection no longer describes DNS resolution as Ed25519-bound; it states that the field's integrity rests on DNSSEC.¶ -
Corrects Section 8, where the manifest-source resolution of Section 4 was described as returning more than one substrate handle. Section 4 yields one; further substrates arise from memberships the session credential carries.¶
-
Corrects the Abstract to the residual-conflict route of Section 8 as revised in -03: the action is suspended, and the [IDACCORD] ceremony proceeds only on the principal's disclosure.¶
-
Corrects Section 10, which attributed the session-manifest layout to Section 4(2) and Section 4(3); those name the project-resident anchor and the environment variable. Removes the statement about what a future revision might request.¶
-
Corrects the section references in Section 14: the provisioning path is the session-bind flow of Section 3.2, member and instrument-tier admission is in Section 4, and Section 6 has no substrate-to-substrate audit leg. Aligns the RFC 7942 sentence with RFC 7942.¶
-
Removes statements of the memo's own contribution from Section 1 and Section 10 and from the -01 entry below, a statement that a meta-federation authority is structurally precluded from Section 8, and the essential-property wording from Section 6.¶
-
Replaces "Morrison-family" with "companion" in Section 2 and Section 13.¶
-
Removes the name of a draft that was never posted from the -01 entry below, and removes the Acknowledgements section.¶
-
Rewrites sentences in Sections 1, 2, 11 and 14 in plainer terms and removes bold labels from the lists in Sections 3.2 and 4.¶
-
States in Section 2 that a handle corresponds to an
alter:URI, and adds an informative reference to [ALTER-URI].¶ -
No change to the typed surface set, the session-bind flow, the enforcement-gate grammar, the audit-signal fields, the live-update mechanism, the composition rules, the compliance-state inheritance posture, or the IANA position.¶
draft-morrison-org-alter-policy-provision-04 (September 2026):¶
-
Corrects the Implementation Status. Earlier revisions described the supply of policy artefacts, its instrument-tier and recognised-member scoping, and the Section 6 audit leg as operating; each is specified but not exercised by the reference deployment. Two of the four Section 3.1 surfaces are recorded as reachable and two as not.¶
draft-morrison-org-alter-policy-provision-03 (August 2026):¶
-
Withdraws the Cross-Substrate Audit Fan-Out. The
org_alter_ingestfan-out rule that applied under multi- organisational composition is replaced by a segregation rule under which an audit signal reaches only the substrate whose own policy contributed the gate, with a normative prohibition on any field from which a receiving substrate could infer a peer binding.¶ -
Replaces the Cross-Substrate Audit Fan-Out subsection of the Privacy Considerations with Identity-Binding Leakage. The new subsection states the prohibition directly and records the withdrawal. [SUBSTRATE] already names that failure as an anti-pattern, and the two positions in this memo were inconsistent with it.¶
-
Revises the cross-organisational residual-conflict route. The runtime no longer emits an
accord.residualsignal to the participating substrates; it suspends the action and records a local diagnostic, and the [IDACCORD] ceremony proceeds only on the principal's own disclosure of each binding to the other.¶ -
No change to the typed surface set, the session-bind flow, the enforcement-gate grammar, the audit-signal shape, the live- update mechanism, the compliance-state inheritance posture, or the IANA position.¶
draft-morrison-org-alter-policy-provision-01 (May 2026):¶
-
Retitles the memo from "Org-Alter-Mediated Policy Provision and Governance Inheritance for Agent Runtimes Bound to a Principal Identity" to "Policy Provision and Governance Inheritance from an Organisational Identity Substrate". The retitled framing generalises the substrate above the operator-specific
org_alter_*surface naming and clarifies that what the memo specifies is the typed-surface enumeration over the substrate, not the surface-name convention. The abbreviated title and the body terminology are retained.¶ -
Softens the IANA Considerations section. The previous revision requested establishment of a Model Context Protocol Tool Surface Names registry with the four
org_alter_*names as initial entries. The revised section requests no IANA action; the surface names are explicitly illustrative of the reference substrate, and conforming substrates MAY name surfaces by any convention consistent with their addressing primitive. A future revision or companion specification proposing such a registry remains possible.¶ -
Adopts the organisational-identity-substrate framing, in which the substrate is the core primitive.¶
-
No substantive change to the typed surface set, the session-bind flow, the enforcement-gate grammar, the audit- signal flow, the live-update mechanism, the multi-organisational composition rules, or the compliance-state inheritance posture.¶
draft-morrison-org-alter-policy-provision-00 (May 2026):¶
-
Initial submission.¶
-
Specifies the four required typed surfaces of the organisational identity substrate (
org_alter_handbook,org_alter_sop_registry,org_alter_enforcement_gates,org_alter_ingest).¶ -
Defines the session-bind flow (Resolve, Retrieve, Apply).¶
-
Specifies the enforcement-gate grammar and the strictest- applicable composition rule.¶
-
Specifies the audit-signal flow and the append-only ingestion endpoint.¶
-
Specifies the live-policy-update subscription and atomic- replacement requirement.¶
-
Specifies multi-organisational composition and the cross- organisational residual route to [IDACCORD].¶
-
Specifies compliance-state inheritance and the atomic-snapshot requirement.¶
16. Normative References
- [RFC2119]
- Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
- [RFC8174]
- Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
- [RFC3339]
- Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
- [MCPDNS]
- Morrison, B., "Discovery of Model Context Protocol Servers via DNS TXT Records", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery-09, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-mcp-dns-discovery/>.
- [IDPRONOUNS]
- Morrison, B., "Identity Pronouns: A Reference-Axis Extension to ~handle Identity Systems", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-identity-pronouns-05, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-identity-pronouns/>.
- [IDCOMMITS]
- Morrison, B., "Identity-Attributed Git Commits via Tier-Structured Trailers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits-04, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-identity-attributed-commits/>.
- [SUBSTRATE]
- Morrison, B., "Substrate-Observation as an Alternative to Envelope Coordination for Concurrent Sessions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-substrate-observation-04, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-substrate-observation/>.
- [IDACCORD]
- Morrison, B. and C. Whiteside, "Identity Accord Protocol: A Peer Ceremony for Bilateral Agreements Between Identity-Substrate-Bound Principals", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-identity-accord-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-identity-accord/>.
- [MCP]
- Agentic AI Foundation, "Model Context Protocol Specification", , <https://modelcontextprotocol.io>.
17. Informative References
- [ALTER-URI]
- Morrison, B., "The 'alter' URI Scheme for Dispatchable ~handle References", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme-05, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-morrison-alter-uri-scheme/>.
- [RFC9499]
- Hoffman, P. and K. Fujiwara, "DNS Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 9499, DOI 10.17487/RFC9499, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9499>.
- [RFC7942]
- Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
- [SSE]
- WHATWG, "HTML Living Standard: Server-sent events", , <https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/server-sent-events.html>.