Internet-Draft RPKI Signed Checklists September 2022
Snijders Expires 15 March 2023 [Page]
Network Working Group
6482 (if approved)
Intended Status:
Standards Track
J. Snijders, Ed.

A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)


This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC 6482.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 15 March 2023.

1. Introduction

The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more information.) As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow entities to verify that an AS has been given permission by an IP address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes within that block. A ROA provides this function.

The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects [RFC6488], which defines a Crytopgraphic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] wrapper for the ROA content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document defines:

  • The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA. (This OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object).
  • The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the payload that specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.) The ROA eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690].
  • Additional steps required to validate ROAs (in addition to the validation steps specified in [RFC6488]).

1.1. Changes from RFC6482

This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6482] and the profile described in this document.

  • Clarifications on the requirements for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers X.509 certificate extension.
  • Strengthening of ASN.1 formal notation.
  • Incorporate errata.
  • Add an example ROA payload and ROA as appendix.

3. The ROA ContentType

The content-type for a ROA is defined as routeOriginAuthz and has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.

This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).

4. The ROA eContent

The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS number. A ROA is formally defined as:

RPKI-ROA-2022 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
  pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiROA-2022(TBD) }


  FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
      pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }

ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
  { TYPE RouteOriginAttestation
    IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }

id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
    pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }

RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
  version [0]           INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
  asID                  ASID,
  ipAddrBlocks          SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }

ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)

ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
  addressFamily         OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)),
  addresses             SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress
  -- addressFamily can only be '0001'H (IPv4) or '0002'H (IPv6) -- })

  address               IPAddress,
  maxLength             INTEGER (0..128) OPTIONAL
  -- maxLength must be equal or larger than size of IPAddress, --
  -- and equal or smaller to what the AFI context permits -- })

  -- If addressFamily is IPv4, size can't exceed 32 --
  -- If addressFamily is IPv6, size can't exceed 128 -- })


4.1. version

The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation MUST be 0.

4.2. asID

The asID field contains the AS number that is authorized to originate routes to the given IP address prefixes.

4.3. ipAddrBlocks

The ipAddrBlocks field encodes the set of IP address prefixes to which the AS is authorized to originate routes. Note that the syntax here is more restrictive than that used in the IP Address Delegation extension defined in RFC 3779. That extension can represent arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only prefixes.

Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, addressFamily contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family. This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6. Therefore, addressFamily MUST be either 0001 or 0002. There MUST be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI. The ROAIPAddressFamily structure MUST NOT appear more than twice.

Within a ROAIPAddress structure, the addresses field represents prefixes as a sequence of type IPAddress. (See [RFC3779] for more details). If present, the maxLength MUST be an integer greater than or equal to the length of the accompanying prefix, and less than or equal to the length (in bits) of an IP address in the address family (32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6). When present, the maxLength specifies the maximum length of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise. (For example, if the IP address prefix is 203.0.113/24 and the maxLength is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more specific prefix with a maximum length of 26. In this example, the AS would be authorized to advertise 203.0.113/24,, or, but not When the maxLength is not present, the AS is only authorized to advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROA.

Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA may contain the prefix 203.0.113/24 with maxLength 26, as well as the prefix with maxLength 28. (Such a ROA would authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with 203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as well as the specific prefix Additionally, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the IP address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this is NOT RECOMMENDED as, in such a case, the ROAIPAddress with the shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA.

5. ROA Validation

Before a relying party can use a ROA to validate a routing announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ROA. To validate a ROA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional ROA-specific validation steps.

  • The IP Address Delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and every IP address prefix(es) in the ROA payload is contained within the set of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP Address Delegation extension.
  • The EE certificate MUST NOT use "inherit" elements as described in [RFC3779].
  • The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension described in [RFC3779] is not used in Route Origin Authorizations and MUST NOT be present.

6. Security Considerations

There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication. Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.

The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to originate a route to the prefix(es) in the ROA. Thus, the integrity of a ROA MUST be established. The ROA specification makes use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security considerations in [RFC6488] also apply to ROAs. Additionally, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity; thus, ROAs inherit all security considerations associated with that data structure.

The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate routes to the prefix(es) is established through use of the address space and AS number PKI described in [RFC6480]. Specifically, one MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the ROA are contained within those in the certificate's IP Address Delegation Extension.

7. IANA Considerations

7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.

The IANA has allocated for this document in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549." registry:

Decimal   Description             References
  24      id-ct-routeOriginAuthz  [RFC6482][RFC-to-be]

Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to reference the RFC publication instead of this draft.

7.2. RPKI Signed Objects sub-registry

The IANA has registered the OID for the RPKI Signed Checklist in the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by [RFC6488] as follows:

Name              OID                         Specification
ROA               1.2.840.113549.  [RFC6482][RFC-TBD]

7.3. File Extension

The IANA has added an item for the ROA file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry created by [RFC6481] as follows:

Filename Extension  RPKI Object                     Reference
       .roa         Route Origination Authorization [RFC6481][RFC-to-be]

Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to make this addition permanent and to reference the RFC publication instead of this draft.

7.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.

The IANA is requested to allocate for this document in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549." registry:

Decimal  Description                      References
    TBD  id-mod-rpkiROA-2022              [RFC-to-be]

7.5. Media Type

The IANA is requested to update the media type application/rpki-roa in the "Media Type" registry as follows:

   Type name: application
   Subtype name: rpki-roa
   Required parameters: N/A
   Optional parameters: N/A
   Encoding considerations: binary
   Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ROA [RFC-to-be].
       This media type contains no active content. See
       Section 6 of [RFC-to-be] for further information.
   Interoperability considerations: None
   Published specification: [RFC-to-be]
   Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
   Additional information:
     Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
         in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
         prefixes and an AS identifer as defined in [RFC-to-be].
     Magic number(s): None
     File extension(s): .roa
     Macintosh file type code(s):
   Person & email address to contact for further information:
     Job Snijders <>
   Intended usage: COMMON
   Restrictions on usage: None
   Change controller: IETF

8. References

8.1. Normative References

Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <>.
Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, , <>.
Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, , <>.
Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, , <>.
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, , <>.
Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, , <>.
Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, , <>.
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <>.
ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, .

8.2. Informative References

Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, , <>.
Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, , <>.
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, , <>.

Appendix A. Acknowledgements

Matt Lepinski, Stephen Kent, and Derrick Kong authored the original RPKI ROA profile specification. The global Internet routing community owes a debt of gratitude to Matt Lepinski, Stephen Kent, and Derrick Kong for crafting this cornerstone of modern day routing safety.

The original authors wished to thank Charles Gardiner and Russ Housley for their help and contributions. Additionally, the original authors thank Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano, Danny McPherson, and Sam Weiler for their careful reviews and helpful comments.

Appendix B. Example ROA eContent Payload

Below an example of a DER encoded ROA eContent is provided with annotation following the '#' character.

$ echo 302402023CCA301E301C04020002301630090307002001067C208C30090307002A0EB2400000 \
  | xxd -r -ps \
  | openssl asn1parse -i -dump -inform DER
    0:d=0  hl=2 l=  36 cons: SEQUENCE                   # RouteOriginAttestation
    2:d=1  hl=2 l=   2 prim:  INTEGER           :3CCA   # ASID 15562
    6:d=1  hl=2 l=  30 cons:  SEQUENCE                  # ipAddrBlocks
    8:d=2  hl=2 l=  28 cons:   SEQUENCE                 #  ROAIPAddressFamily
   10:d=3  hl=2 l=   2 prim:    OCTET STRING            #   addressFamily
      0000 - 00 02                              ..      #    IPv6
   14:d=3  hl=2 l=  22 cons:    SEQUENCE                #   addresses
   16:d=4  hl=2 l=   9 cons:     SEQUENCE               #    ROAIPAddress
   18:d=5  hl=2 l=   7 prim:      BIT STRING            #     address
      0000 - 00 20 01 06 7c 20 8c               . ..| . #      2001:67c:208c::/48
   27:d=4  hl=2 l=   9 cons:     SEQUENCE               #    ROAIPAddress
   29:d=5  hl=2 l=   7 prim:      BIT STRING            #     address
      0000 - 00 2a 0e b2 40                     .*..@   #      2a0e:b240::/48
      0007 - <SPACES/NULS>

Below is a complete Base64 [RFC4648] encoded RPKI ROA Signed Object.


Author's Address

Job Snijders (editor)