INTERNET-DRAFT                                            Matthew Thomas
Intended Status: Informational                            Allison Mankin
Expires: January 20, 2017                                    Lixia Zhang
                                                           July 19, 2016

                 Report from the Workshop and Prize on
             Root Causes and Mitigation of Name Collisions


   This document provides context and a report of a workshop on Root
   Causes and Mitigation of Name Collisions, which took place in London,
   United Kindgdom, on March 8 to 10, 2014. The main goal of the
   workshop was to foster a discussion on the causes and potential
   mitigations of domain name collisions. This report provides a small
   amount of background and context, then provides a summary of the
   workshop's discussions.

Status of this Memo

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Copyright and License Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

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   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document. Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.

Table of Contents

   1  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2  Background and Context  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1  Brief Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3  Workshop Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.1  Research Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.2  System Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.3  Frameworks - Modeling, Analysis & Mitigation  . . . . . . .  9
     3.4  Conclusions and Next Steps  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   4  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   5  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   6  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Appendix A.  Program Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Appendix B.  Workshop Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Appendix C.  Peer-Reviewed Name Collision Papers . . . . . . . . . 14
   Appendix D.  Invited Name Collision Talks  . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Appendix E.  Panels and Discussions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Appendix F.  Workshop Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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1  Introduction

   It has been well known within the internet research and engineering
   community that many installed systems in the internet query the
   domain name system (DNS) root for names under a wide range of top-
   level domains (TLDs).  Many of these TLDs are not delegated which
   results in a response indicating that the name queried does not exist
   (commonly called an NXDOMAIN response [RFC7719]). In the Internet
   Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) community, it was
   observed as early as November 2010 by the Security and Stability
   Advisory Committee (SSAC) report [SAC045] that the addition of new
   TLDs in the DNS root could result in so-called name collisions for
   names used in environments other than the global internet. Some
   installed systems, following established (albeit not vetted)
   operational practices, generate queries to the global DNS with name
   suffixes that under seemingly reasonable assumptions at the time the
   systems were designed or configured, were not expected to be
   delegated as TLDs. Many of these installed systems depend explicitly
   or implicitly on the indication from the global DNS that the domain
   name suffix does not exist. After a new TLD is delegated, the global
   DNS may give a different response to the query involving the TLD than
   it did prior to the TLD's delegation.

   A name collision occurs when an attempt to resolve a name used in a
   private namespace results in a query to the public DNS, and the
   response indicates that the name is in the global DNS [NCRI]. In
   other words, the overlap of public and private namespaces may result
   in potential unintended (and therefore potentially harmful)
   resolution results. The impact of the global change on installed
   systems will be varied; risks to installed systems introduced by name
   collisions may arise due to varied causes.

   In a globally distributed system such as the internet, it is
   difficult, yet critical, to agree on policies for demarking
   boundaries of ownership and autonomy. Name space governance is
   critical to ensure predictable use of names in the global DNS.

   In order to help ensure this uniqueness and interoperability, ICANN,
   through its coordination of the IANA functions, is responsible for
   administration of certain responsibilities associated with Internet
   DNS root zone management such as generic (gTLD) and country code
   (ccTLD) Top-Level Domains.  Prior to ICANN's creation in 1998, seven
   generic TLDs were defined in the early development of the Internet
   [RFC1591].  Since the formation of ICANN, the delegations of generic,
   internationalized and country code TLDs (ccTLDs) have been
   administered and delegated by ICANN. During these delegations, it
   quickly became apparent within the IETF community there was a need to
   reserve name spaces that can be used for creating limited sets of

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   internal names without fear of conflicts with current or future TLD
   name spaces in the global DNS [RFC2606].

   While the reserved TLDs [RFC2606] aimed to enable operators to use
   them only as a small set of reserved names internally, with limited
   uses, educational awareness and operational best practices did not
   achieve the goal of reserving special-use domain names[RFC 6761], and
   other suffixes, not reserved though at the time not in conflict, were
   often employed instead. Faulty assumptions, or encouragement in some
   cases by vendor  documentation, of "we only use this name internally
   and there is no possibility of leakage to the global DNS" were made
   by numerous operators or administrators. Numerous reports and
   findings have clearly disproved these faulty assumptions by showing
   substantial "DNS leakage" into the global DNS through mechanisms such
   as search lists.

   In 2012, ICANN created a new generic top-level domain (gTLD) program
   to add a potentially unlimited number of new gTLDs to the root zone
   as a mechanism to enhance competition, innovation and consumer
   choice. With the potential of many new gTLDs becoming delegated in
   the global DNS, operators or administrators who elected to use a non-
   delegated name space internally may face potential "name collision"

   This document is primarily a report on the March 2014 workshop that
   set out to examine the causes and mitigation of such name collisions
   and their associated risks. It is a companion to the Workshop and
   Prize on Root Causes and Mitigation of Name Collisions proceedings
   [WPNC], and it also provides some additional background and context.

2  Background and Context

   When the workshop was convened the context and status of the work
   around name collisions could be described as follows.

   Since early 2008, there had been numerous lengthy discussions within
   the ICANN community about the ability of the DNS root to scale to
   accommodate new gTLDs, and the impact of making those changes on the
   DNS ecosystem. In March 2008, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB)
   observed that the introduction of suffixes in use in a number of
   environments could lead to instability [IAB2008]. The Security and
   Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) in December 2010 issued their
   report on root scaling in which the committee formalized several
   recommendations based on "actual measurement, monitoring and data-
   sharing capabilities of root zone performance" to help determine the
   feasibility of root scaling [SAC046]. Separately, the Root Server

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   System Advisory Committee [RSSAC] agreed in late 2010 on the need to
   establish standard metrics to be collected and reported by all
   operators. This effort would provide the community with a baseline
   measure of the entire root server system's performance. With such an
   established baseline, any possible negative effect from additional
   TLDs within the root could potentially be identified. In late 2012,
   the ICANN Board affirmed the need to work with the root server
   operators via RSSAC to complete the documentation of the interactions
   between ICANN and the root server operators with respect to root zone
   scaling [IR2012].

   In March 2013, SSAC published an advisory titled "SSAC Advisory on
   Internal Name Certificates," which identified a Certificate Authority
   (CA) practice that, if widely exploited, "could pose a significant
   risk to the privacy and integrity of secure Internet communications
   [SAC057]. " The ICANN Board acknowledged the issues identified in the
   advisory report on internal name certificates [SAC057] as part of a
   more general category of issues. These issues included installed
   systems utilizing a namespace in a private network that includes a
   non-delegated TLD that is later delegated into the root. In May 2013,
   the ICANN Board commissioned a study on the use within private name
   spaces of TLDs that are not currently delegated at the root level of
   the global DNS [ISTUDY]. This study was focused on potential name
   collision events between applied-for new gTLDs and non-delegated TLDs
   potentially used in private namespaces. The study also examined the
   potential possibility of name collisions arising from the use of
   digital certificates referenced in the SSAC report on internal name
   certificates [SAC057].

   Between the RSSAC's and SSAC's advisory statements [RSSAC], [SAC046]
   and the ICANN commissioning of a study in May 2013, there was
   significant progress on establishing formalized, coordinated
   monitoring and measurement of the root. RSSAC approached its
   finalization of the specific metrics that each root operator will
   collect and initiated discussions about where the operators will send
   their data for analysis once collected. To properly gauge the risks
   of new gTLD delegations to the root, an established baseline of
   normal performance of the system would be required to start
   sufficiently ahead of the new delegations. The timing and execution
   of these RSSAC and SSAC recommendations timed poorly with the
   commissioned study, resulting in a limited pool of data repositories
   from which any baseline and risk measurements could be established.

   It is common practice for each root operator to monitor its own root
   server, and some operators report the status and performance of their
   services publicly. As of ICANN's study commissioned in May 2013
   [ISTUDY], there was no mechanism in place to allow a detailed view of
   the entire root system, short of the annual "Day in the Life"

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   ([DITL]) data repository, which contains root DNS data over a short
   coordinated time period from a varying subset of root operators and
   was intended to be used for research purposes, not to provide overall
   monitoring and an operational view of system health.  Due to the lack
   of a more comprehensive and desirable data repository for baseline
   and collision analysis DITL has become the de facto referential
   dataset for root traffic analysis.

   The commissioned study, conducted by the Interisle Consulting Group,
   was published in August of 2013. Their report "Name Collisions in the
   DNS" [INTERISLE], based on [DITL] measurements, addressed name
   collisions in the DNS and also recommended options to mitigate the
   various name collision risks. The study identified categories of
   strings according to the risk they represent: low risk (80 percent of
   applied-for strings), uncalculated risk (20 percent of applied-for
   strings) and high risk (2 applied-for strings).

   At the same time as the [INTERISLE] study, ICANN published a
   proposal, titled "New gTLD Collision Occurrence Management Plan"
   [NGCOMP], to manage the risk of name collisions within the applied-
   for gTLDs. Based on measurements, ICANN deemed two strings, .home and
   .corp, as high-risk because of their widespread use within internal
   networks and would indefinitely delay their delegation [INTERISLE].
   Those strings within the uncalculated-risk classification would be
   delayed 2 to 3 months in their application process while ICANN
   conducted more research into whether the string is of high- or low-
   risk classification. Those in the low-risk classification would face
   a delay in activating domains until 120 days after contracting with
   ICANN to allow for the change in certificate authority practices
   recommended in SSAC report on internal name certificates [SAC057].

   Within the ICANN proposal [NGCOMP], an approach termed the
   "alternative path to delegation" was outlined, in which a registry
   operator could elect to proceed with delegation, provided it
   initially blocked all second-level domains (SLDs) that appeared in
   the certain DITL datasets pending the completion of the assessment.
   The majority of new gTLD applicants that were eligible elected this
   alternative path once otherwise approved for delegation. The plan
   also outlined an outreach campaign to educate system administrators,
   software developers and other engineers about the name collision
   issue and possible mitigation measures.

   As a further provision, the "New gTLD Collision Occurrence Management
   Plan" called for a follow-up study that would develop a "Name
   Collision Occurrence Management Framework [NCOMF]." In February 2014,
   the document, "Mitigating the Risk of DNS Namespace Collisions: Phase
   One Report," was published by the ICANN-contracted group JAS Global
   Advisors [MRDNC]. The report provides a number of recommendations for

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   addressing the name collision issue focusing on a technique termed
   "controlled interruption," in which a registry would temporarily
   resolve all SLDs (or all SLDs present in the block list) to a
   specific IP, The report also makes provisions to
   implement an emergency plan and strategy in case name collisions had
   a "clear danger to human life."

2.1  Brief Update

   In the timeframe after the workshop, a final version of the Phase One
   Report was released in June 2014 [MRDNC].

   In July 2014, after a community review phase, a final recommendation
   was issued by ICANN [NCOMFINAL] and this has been followed by the
   publication of management documents for the implementation of a
   controlled interrupt for new gTLD delegations [NOCA], [NCSLDCIV],

   Much of the framework called for in the Name Collision Occurrence
   Management Framework [NCOMF] was not released by the time of this
   document and the Phase One Report [MRDNC] indicated that its
   publication was delayed due to a security vulnerability [JASBUG]
   identified during the course of the work.

   Broad community efforts to measure the impact of name collisions were
   not included in the final recommendation issued by ICANN [NCOMFINAL].
   At the time of this writing, RSSAC has just published its
   specification of common measurements to be collected by root
   operators, meeting one part of the needs for measurements of the root
   server system [RSSAC002].

3  Workshop Structure

   The Workshop and Prize on 'Root Causes and Mitigation of Name
   Collisions'[WPNC], sponsored by Verisign, took place March 8-10, 2014
   in London, United Kingdom. The WPNC was open to the public and it
   gathered subject area specialists, researchers and practitioners to
   discuss and present their views, concerns and ideas surrounding the
   name collision issue. Proceedings are published at the workshop's
   website [WPNC].

   The workshop focused on studies of name collision risks and
   mitigations with the expectation to advance the global community's
   insight into operational uses of name suffixes that can result in
   name collisions, and to gain a stronger understanding of the
   potential risks for the users of the installed systems. Additional
   emphasis and attention was given to discussions that may advance the

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   state of knowledge about the architecture and impacts of DNS
   namespaces with multiple scopes or resolution contexts and the
   utilization of new methods of monitoring and understanding the needs
   and methods for mitigating emerging Internet risks around name
   collisions. A technical program committee, whose members spanned a
   variety of organizations and universities, was assembled.  The
   committee issued a call for papers and evaluated all submissions to
   ensure the highest level of quality.

   A synthesis of the accepted papers and conference proceedings is
   captured in the subsections below. Another informal synopsis of the
   workshop combined with individual statements and observations is
   available online [COMMENTARY].

3.1  Research Findings

   Many of the research papers focused on the analysis of DITL data to
   better understand various aspects of the root NXDomain traffic
   Note: all workshop contributions are listed in Appendices C, D and E,
   and full papers and slides are available at the website [WPNC].

   While the DITL data has become the de facto referential dataset for
   root traffic analysis, some presenters echoed concerns that the
   dataset may have become biased or polluted with "artificial" queries
   after the ICANN "Reveal Day," in which the list of applied-for gTLD
   strings was publicly disclosed. No conclusive or empirical evidence
   of tampering was presented; however, concerns about the integrity and
   reliability of future DITL collections and analysis for purposes
   related to new gTLDs were echoed by some panelists [IESCPANEL].
   Furthermore, the statistical accuracy and completeness of DITL data -
   used to draw inferential conclusions or more specifically create SLD
   block lists - was examined. The efficacy of blocking domains based on
   sampled DNS data, e.g. DITL, was investigated by comparing
   measurements of SLDs within DITL and that of a multi-month root
   NXDomain collection at the A and J roots [BLOCKLISTS]. The findings
   provided insights into SLD-root affinities, SLD temporal query
   patterns and occurrence frequencies that demonstrated the
   ineffectiveness of block listing domains based on sampled DNS data
   such as [DITL].

   Measurements of queries specifying the recursion desired (RD) bit to
   the roots in DITL were quantified to identify the level and nature of
   naive DNS clients and to determine and assess potential impacts that
   could arise from the proposed SLD blocking technique to these naive
   clients [RARDBITS]. A substantial proportion of the root server
   request traffic contained queries with the RD bit specified. Both in

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   absolute and relative terms, requests specifying the RD bit for
   applied-for gTLDs were found to be significantly lower when compared
   to existing TLDs. The root cause determination of what system or
   mechanism is responsible for generating the queries was inconclusive
   and only speculative explanations of faulty implementations of a DNS
   resolving server were hypothesized. However, the analysis was also
   not able to identify instances of actual or potential harm resulting
   from these naive clients, suggesting if SLD blocking techniques were
   to be utilized it is unlikely there would be any negative impact to
   these naive clients.

3.2  System Analysis

   Comparison of elements can often help us to understand a system as a
   whole. A passive study of the DNS traffic in a provisioned domain
   such as "" may elucidate certain name collision parallels
   [CORPCOM].  Such measurements were presented as a proxy for the
   ".corp" potential new gTLD. According to the study, significant DNS
   traffic volume was directed at a variety of third-level domains under
   "" This prompted a series of questions surrounding how name
   collisions can be identified, as most end-users won't recognize that
   problems may be due to a name collision. How will users know that the
   problem they are experiencing is a result of a new, colliding gTLD?
   Will support groups be able to diagnose a name collision event from
   reported symptom(s)? Will a collision-based security hole be

   These questions, upon which underpinnings rely on communication and
   educational awareness, may find recommendations or parallels from
   other system references during the workshop [JASFRAMEWORK] - such as
   the postal and telephone system. Most telephone and postal systems
   have evolved over time, requiring individuals to alter the way they
   address their parcels or place their calls. Both systems implemented
   their changes in such a way that prior to the change, educational
   material is distributed and communicated, and for a period of time
   and after the change, compliance of the previous standard is
   temporarily accepted. While the telephone and postal system operate
   in a very different way than the DNS, these parallels of "advanced
   notification, education and communication, and a grace period" were
   insightful for how other similar systems transitioned.

3.3  Frameworks - Modeling, Analysis & Mitigation

   Statements from several TLD operators during the conference
   reverberated a theme for the need of improved tooling, education and
   communication surrounding name collisions. The delegation of new

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   gTLDs is an ongoing event and there is a clear and immediate need for
   these operators to have visibility to monitor and measure the effects
   of these new gTLD delegations. A lack of tools, shared data,
   communication and education surrounding name collisions has
   handicapped operators in their ability to quantitatively measure and
   proactively provide any steps for mitigation of risks. To this end,
   numerous techniques, frameworks and models that focused on the
   concepts of analyzing, detecting and measuring various name collision
   risk factors were presented and reviewed with the hopes of
   understanding these underlying concerns and issues [TECHNIQUES],

   Data-driven analysis and mitigation require operators to be versed
   and skilled with data analysis techniques to better understand the
   contextual intent and ownership of DNS queries. An overview of
   various DNS analysis techniques in which ways of decomposing names,
   measuring temporal distributions between queries and detecting
   organizational/geographical affinities, was presented [TECHNIQUES].
   More specific techniques were also showcased, such as a systematic
   way of observing and characterizing the impact of search lists within
   root DNS traffic allowing operators to quantify the number of unique
   entities that may be reliant on a particular name space
   [SEARCHLISTS]. While not exhaustive, the techniques presented have
   been proven to elucidate patterns within root DNS traffic data and
   could serve as the potential building blocks of a DNS analysis

   Most of the previously published work focused on name collisions has
   produced various quantitative analyses based on observations of
   internet traffic and data, including DNS queries and web content, in
   which behavior and associated risks have been inferred. An
   understanding of the inverse of the process by starting with a
   fundamental model of name resolution at the client was proposed as an
   alternative means to define risk [MODELING]. This model deconstructed
   the process of name resolution at the resolver library of a client
   system and formalized a model from which derived metrics could be
   used to define and quantify associated risks. While the model
   presented is only a piece of the greater name collision puzzle, it
   provides potentially new insights into otherwise what may be
   considered a missing piece.

   Just as important as understanding the root causes of name
   collisions, providing effective mitigation strategies is a critical
   piece of the name collision puzzle. Mitigation can be achieved from
   both higher levels, such as ICANN, as well as the enterprise level.
   Proposed strategies for mitigating name collisions at both of these
   levels were presented. While the technical details for each proposed
   strategy varies, underlying dependencies in both strategies require

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   operators to monitor and educate/train their users.

3.4  Conclusions and Next Steps

   In their concluding statement, the workshop committee stated: "It
   occurs to the program committee that the analysis of the interactions
    between the different uses of domain names within local or global
   context is almost a non-existent topic of research. This may have to
   do with the lack of accessible data, lack of theory of root causes, a
   lack of interest, or a bias in the participation of the workshop. We
   think that this is evidence that this study of the global centrally
   important technical system needs to be ramped up".

   Follow-on commentary [NEXTSTEPS] from the attendees reaffirmed this
   opinion with recurring messages of a need to understand the root
   causes of name collision and the need to overcome shortcomings within
   our shared data collection, monitoring and analysis of the DNS.

   Many name collision unknowns still exist. What are the root-causes of
   these queries? What is going on within a recursive name server? What
   vulnerabilities or subtle attack vectors do these new gTLD
   delegations enable? The limited datasets available to researchers and
   operators are not sufficient to draw baseline measurements for these
   questions, forcing the community to make inferences and rank guesses
   as to what is going on within the DNS. Using these sub-optimal data
   repositories to create solutions such as block lists are only dealing
   with the symptoms of the problem and not addressing the root cause.
   To properly answer these questions, the community needs to address
   the issue of a shortage of funding and data collection / analysis.
   Communication and educational outreach programs need to be improved
   in order raise the awareness of impacted parties and broaden
   participation and sharing.

4  Security Considerations

   Workshop participants discussed security aspects related to root
   cause analysis and mitigation techniques of potential name collision
   events. As noted in several papers and presentations, security
   concerns both may arise, and may be addressed, with name collision
   mitigation techniques. Follow-on measurement-based research is
   important to security considerations for name collisions.

5  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

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6  Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank both the program committee (Appendix A) and
   the workshop participants (Appendix F), with equal appreciation to
   those who spoke formally and those who joined in the lively

   Additionally, we would like to thank the following people for their
   review comments: Burt Kaliski, Olaf Kolkman, Ed Lewis, Nevil
   Brownlee, Tim Wicinski, and Danny McPherson.

7  Informative References

   [SAC045] "Invalid Top Level Domain Queries at the Root Level of the
              Domain Name System",
              en.pdf , November 2010.

   [NCRI] "Name Collision Resources & Information",
    , Accessed
              December 2014.

   [RFC1591] J. Postel, "Domain Name System Structure and Delegation",
              RFC 1591, March 1994.

   [RFC2606] D. Eastlake, A. Panitz, "Reserved Top Level DNS Names", RFC
              2606 (also BCP 32), June 1999.

   [RFC6761] S. Cheshire, M. Krochmal, "Special-Use Domain Names", RFC
              6761, February 2013.

   [WPNC] "Workshop and Prize on Root Causes and Mitigation of Name
              Collisions (WPNC)",, June 2014.

   [SAC046] "Report of the Security and Stability Advisory Committee on
              Root Scaling",
              en.pdf, December 2010.

   [RSSAC] "RSSAC response to the root scaling report",
              board-25nov10-en.pdf, November 2010.

   [IR2012] "Preliminary Report | Regular Meeting of the ICANN Board",
              report-13sep12-en.htm, September 2012.

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   [SAC057] "Advisory on Internal Name Certificates",
              en.pdf, March, 2013.

   [ISTUDY] "Security Studies on the Use of Non-Delegated TLDs, and
              Dotless Names",
              28may13-en.htm, May 2013.

   [DITL] "A Day in the Life of the Internet (DITL)" ,
    , July 2011.

   [INTERISLE] "Name Collision in the DNS",
              collision-02aug13-en.pdf, August 2013.

   [IAB2008] "The IAB's response to ICANN's solicitation on DNS
              March 2008.

   [NGCOMP] "New gTLD Collision Risk Mitigation",
              gtld-collision-mitigation-05aug13-en.pdf, August 2013.

   [NCOMF] "ICANN Selects Lead for Development of Name Collision
              Occurrence Management Framework",
              11nov13-en.htm, November 2013.


   [MRDNC] "Mitigating the Risk of DNS Namespace Collisions",
              collision-mitigation-26feb14-en.pdf, February 2014.

   [RSSAC002] "Advisory on Measurements of the Root Server System",

   [COMMENTARY] "Proceedings of Name Collisions Workshop Available" ,
              of_name_collisions_workshop_available/, March 2014.

   [NOCA] "Name Collision Occurrence Assessment" ,

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              04aug14-en.htm , August 2014.

   [NCSLDCIV] "Name Collision SLD Controlled Interruption Variations" ,
              controlled-interruption-12sep14-en.htm , September 2014.

   [ADDNOCA] "Addendum To Name Collision Occurrence Assessment" ,
              addendum-14nov14-en.htm , November 2014.

   [JASBUG] "Group Policy Remote Code Execution Vulnerability - CVE-
              2015-0008" ,
              bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-0008 , February 2015.

Appendix A.  Program Committee

   This workshop program committee consisted of Geoff Huston, Burt
   Kaliski, Olaf Kolkman, John Levine, Allison Mankin, Lixia Zhang,
   Anne-Marie Eklund Loewinder, and Andrew Sullivan.

Appendix B.  Workshop Material

   Main Workshop Page:

   Name Collision Invited and Submitted Papers, Panels and Videos:

Appendix C.  Peer-Reviewed Name Collision Papers

   [TECHNIQUES] "Analysis Techniques for Determining Cause and Ownership
              of DNS Queries" by Matthew Thomas and Andrew Simpson

   [RARDBITS] "Analysing the Use of the RA and RD bits in Queries to
              Root Servers" by Jim Reid

   [BLOCKLISTS] "The Effectiveness of Block Lists in Preventing
              Collisions" by Matthew Thomas, Yannis Labrou and Andrew

   [MODELING] "What's in a Name (Collision): Modeling and Quantifying
              Collision Potential" by Casey Deccio and Duane Wessels

   [SEARCHLISTS] "Detecting Search Lists in Authoritative DNS" by Andrew

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Appendix D.  Invited Name Collision Talks

   [KEEPEYE] "Keeping an Eye on Name Collisions" by Bruce Schneier

   [CORPCOM] "Looking at as a proxy for .corp" by Colin Strutt

   [DNSENDUSER] "Measuring DNS Behaviors from the End User Perspective"
              by Geoff Huston

   [DNS-OARC] "DNS-OARC" by Keith Mitchell

   [ENTNETWORK] "Name Collision Mitigation for Enterprise Networks" by
              Paul Hoffman

Appendix E.  Panels and Discussions

   [IESCPANEL] "Internet Engineering and Standards Considerations" by
              Suzanne Woolf, Peter Koch, Olaf Kolkman, Warren Kumari,
              and John Levine

   [JASFRAMEWORK] "Name Collisions Management Framework" by Jeff Schmidt

   [NEXTSTEPS] "Workshop Wrap-Up and Next Steps" by Burt Kaliski

Appendix F.  Workshop Participants

   A list of workshop participants is provided at [WPNC].

Authors' Addresses

   Matthew Thomas

   Allison Mankin

   Lixia Zhang

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