Geopriv H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft Siemens
Expires: January 10, 2005 F. Adrangi
Intel
A. Lior
M. Jones
Bridgewater
July 12, 2004
Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS
draft-tschofenig-geopriv-radius-lo-00.txt
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document describes RADIUS attributes for conveying the Access
Network's operational ownership and location information based on a
civil and geospatial location location format.
The distribution of location information is privacy sensitive.
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Dealing with mechanisms to preserve the user's privacy is important
and addressed in this document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Delivery Methods for Location Information . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery . . . . . . . 5
3.2 Mid-session Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1 Use Case 1 - Use of Location Information in AAA . . . . . 8
4.2 Scenario 2 - Use of Location Information for other
Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1 Operator-Name Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2 Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.1 Civil Location Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2.2 Geospatial Location Information . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Policy-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Location-Type Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Billing-Description Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.1 Operator-Name Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.2 Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.3 Policy-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.4 Location-Type Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.5 Billing-Description Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. Table of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
12. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
13. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
15. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
16. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
17.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
17.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 38
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1. Introduction
Wireless LAN (WLAN) Access Networks (AN) are being deployed in public
places such as airports, hotels, shopping malls, and coffee shops by
a diverse set of incumbent operators such as cellular carriers (GSM
and CDMA), Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISP), and fixed
broadband operators.
When an end host authenticates itself to such a network, information
about the location and operational ownership of this network needs to
be conveyed to the users's home network to which the user has a
contractal relationship. The main intent of this document is to
enable location aware billing (e.g., determine the appropriate tariff
and taxation), location aware subscriber authentication and
authorization for roaming environments and to enable location aware
services.
This document describes AAA attributes that are used by a AAA client
or a local AAA server in an access network for conveying
location-related information to the user's home AAA server. This
document defines attributes for RADIUS [RFC2865].
Although the proposed attributes in this draft are intended for
wireless LAN deployments, they can also be used in other wireless and
wired networks where location-aware services are required.
Location information needs to be protected against unauthorized
access and distribution to preserve privacy of the owner of the
location information. With [I-D.ietf-geopriv-reqs] requirements for
a protocol-independent model for the access to geographic location
information was defined. The model includes a Location Generator
(LG) that creates Location Information, a Location Server (LS) that
authorizes access to Location Information, a Location Recipient (LR)
that requests and receives information, and a Rule Maker (RM) that
provides authorization policies to the LS which enforce access
control policies on access to a target.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
RADIUS specific terminology is reused from [RFC2865] and [RFC2866].
Terminology related to privacy issues, location information and
authorization policy rules are taken from [I-D.ietf-geopriv-reqs].
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3. Delivery Methods for Location Information
Location Infomation Objects defined in this document are transported
over RADIUS protocol from visited access network to the AAA server.
The information can be delivered to the RADIUS server during the
authentication/authorization phase described in Section 3.1, or in
the mid-session using the dynamic authorization protocol framework
described in Section 3.2. This section describes message flow for
both delivery methods.
3.1 Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery
Figure 1 shows an example message flow for delivering Location
Information during the network access authentication/authorization
procedure. Upon a network authentication request from an access
network client, the NAS submits a RADIUS Access-Request message which
contains location information attributes among other required
attributes. The authentication and/or authorization procedure is
completed based on a number of criteria, including the newly defined
Location-Information, Operator-Name, Location-Type,
Policy-Information attributes. A RADIUS Accounting Request message
is again allowed to carry location specific attributes.
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| Access | | Network | | AAA |
| Network | | Access | | Server |
| Client | | Server | | |
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| | |
| Authentication phase | |
| begin | |
|---------------------->| |
| | |
| | |
| | RADIUS |
| | Access-Request |
| | + Location-Information |
| | attributes |
| |----------------------------->|
| | |
: : :
: Multiple Protocol Exchanges to perform :
: Authentication, Key Exchange and Authorization :
: : :
: ...continued... :
: | |
| | RADIUS |
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| | Access-Accept |
| | + Rule set Information |
| |<-----------------------------|
| Authentication | |
| Accept | |
|<----------------------| |
| | |
| | RADIUS |
| | Accounting Request |
| | + Location-Information |
| | attributes |
| |----------------------------->|
| | |
Figure 1: Message Flow: Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery
3.2 Mid-session Delivery
Mid-session delivery method uses the Change of Authorization (COA)
message as defined in [RFC3576]. In accordance to [RFC3576], at
anytime during the session the AAA server may send the access network
a COA message containing session identification attributes (see
[RFC3576] for the possible options). The COA message may instruct
the access network to generate an Authorize-Only Access-Request
(Access-Request with Service-Type set to "Authorize-Only") in which
case it is instructing the access network to send the location
information attributes.
Figure 2 shows the approach graphically.
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Access network AAA server
| |
| COA + Service-Type "Authorize Only" |
|<----------------------------------------------|
| |
| COA NAK + Service-Type "Authorize Only" |
| + Error-Cause "Request Initiated" |
|---------------------------------------------->|
| |
| Access-Request + Service-Type "Authorize Only"|
| + Location Information attributes |
| + Location Information policy |
|---------------------------------------------->|
| |
| Access-Accept |
|<----------------------------------------------|
| |
Figure 2: Message Flow: Mid-session Delivery
Upon receiving the Authorize-Only message from the Access network,
the AAA server MUST respond with either an Access-Accept message or
an Access-Reject message.
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4. Scenarios
In the following subsections we describe two scenarios for use of
location information. The location infomration may refer to network
or user location information which in some cases may be identical.
How the network obtains the user's location information is out of
scope of this document. There are two consumers of the location
information: the AAA servers and other location-based services. The
privacy implications of these scenarios are described in Section 13.
4.1 Use Case 1 - Use of Location Information in AAA
An Operator requires Location Informaion for Authorization and
Billing purposes. The operator may deny service if Location
Information is not available. Or it may offer limited service. The
NAS delivers Location Information to the Home AAA server.
The user's location is transferred from the NAS to the RADIUS server
and the NAS and intermediaries (if any) are not allowed to use that
information other then to forward it to the home network.
The RADIUS server authenticates and authroizes the session. If the
user's location policies are available to the RADIUS server, the
RADIUS server may deliver those policies in an Access Accept. This
information may be needed if intermediaries or other elements want to
act as Location Servers (see Section 4.2). In the absence of
receiving the policies intermediaries MUST NOT divulge the location
information.
Location Information may also be reported in accouning messages.
Accounting messages are generated when the session starts, stops and
periodically. Accounting messages may also be generated when the
user roams during handoff. This information may be needed by the
billing system to calculate the users bill. For example, there may
be different tarrif rates applied based on the location and their
maybe different tax rates applied based on the location. Unless
otherwise specified, location information in the accounting stream
may not be transmitted to third parties.
The location information in the accounting stream MUST only be sent
in the proxy chain to the home network (unless specified otherwise).
4.2 Scenario 2 - Use of Location Information for other Services
Location Servers are entities that receive the user's location
information and transmit it to other entities. For the purpose of
this scenario Location servers are the NAS, and RADIUS servers. The
RADIUS servers are in the home network, in the visited network, or in
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broker networks.
Unless otherwise specified, excluding the proxy chain from the NAS to
the Home RADIUS, the Location Server may not transmit the location
information to other parties.
Upon authentication and authorization, the Home RADIUS may transmit
the Rule set in an Access-Accept to the other Location Server
allowing them to transmit location information. Then and only then
they are allowed to share the information.
Note since the NAS is the source of all Location information that is
disimenated by RADIUS, the NAS could tag the location information
with the location rules or a reference for the location rules
received in an Access-Accept. All location information in the
Accounting Stream will now be tagged.
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5. Overview
The location information and operational ownership of the access
network is conveyed in five AAA attributes which are: Operator-Name,
Location-Information, Location-Type , Policy-Information and
Billing-Description. Furthermore, basic authorization policy rules
are attached to the Location-Information attribute turning Location
Information into a Location Object as defined in
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-reqs].
5.1 Operator-Name Attribute
This attribute contains an operator name which uniquely identifies
the ownership of an access network. The Attribute value is a
non-NULL terminated string whose Length MUST NOT exceed 253 bytes.
The attribute value is comprised of the prefix and the identity,
separated by a colon. The prefix identifies the operator type;
example: GSM, CDMA, and REALM. The identity uniquely identifies the
operator name within the scope of the operator type.
As an example consider the string 'GSM:TADIG' where GSM is a prefix
indicating an operator type and TADIC is a unique globally known GSM
operator ID.
This document defines three operator type prefixes which are: GSM,
CDMA, and REALM. The GSM prefix can be used to indicate operator
names based on GSMA TADIG codes. REALM can be used by any domain
name acquired from IANA. Possible forthcoming operator types MUST be
associated with an ogranization responsible for assigning/managing
operator names.
5.2 Location-Information Attribute
This document describes two formats for conveying location
information: civil and geospatial location information. Section
5.2.1 defines the civil location information format. Section 5.2.2
defines the geospatial location information format.
Additionally, the Precision field provides further information about
the location information provided via Radius. For large networks
information about the location of the user can be provided in
different degrees of accuracy. This field gives a hint. Ideally the
location of the user is returned to the home network but in some
cases it might not be available. It has to be noted that the user
does not provide the location information itself.
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5.2.1 Civil Location Information
Civil location is a popular way to describe the location of an
entity. Using an unstructured (as a text string) or a custom format
for civil location format is dangerous since the automatic processing
capabilities are limited.
For this document we reuse the civil location format defined in
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil].
The civil location format includes a number of fields, including the
country (expressed as a two-letter ISO 3166 code) and the
administrative units of [I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil] A1 through A6.
This designation offers street-level precision.
For completeness we include more detailed information from
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil] with regard to the defined civil
location elements (A1 through A6):
+----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
| Label | Description | Example |
+----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
| country | The country is | US |
| | identified by the | |
| | two-letter ISO 3166 | |
| | code. | |
| | | |
| A1 | national | New York |
| | subdivisions (state, | |
| | region, province, | |
| | prefecture) | |
| | | |
| A2 | county, parish, gun | King's County |
| | (JP), district (IN) | |
| | | |
| A3 | city, township, shi | New York |
| | (JP) | |
| | | |
| A4 | city division, | Manhattan |
| | borough, city | |
| | district, ward, chou | |
| | (JP) | |
| | | |
| A5 | neighborhood, block | Morningside Heights |
| | | |
| A6 | street | Broadway |
| | | |
| PRD | Leading street | N, W |
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| | direction | |
| | | |
| POD | Trailing street | SW |
| | suffix | |
| | | |
| STS | Street suffix | Avenue, Platz, |
| | | Street |
| | | |
| HNO | House number, | 123 |
| | numeric part only. | |
| | | |
| HNS | House number suffix | A, 1/2 |
| | | |
| LMK | Landmark or vanity | Low Library |
| | address | |
| | | |
| LOC | Additional location | Room 543 |
| | information | |
| | | |
| FLR | Floor | 5 |
| | | |
| NAM | Name (residence, | Joe's Barbershop |
| | business or office | |
| | occupant) | |
| | | |
| PC | Postal code | 10027-0401 |
+----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
Table 1
Additional CA types are defined in Section 3.4 of
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil]. These types are useful to express
further information about the location, language specific settings
via the 'language' item and encoding information via the 'script'
item. Section 12 shows usage examples of this attribute.
All attributes are optional and can appear in any order. The values
are encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629].
5.2.2 Geospatial Location Information
This document reusing geospatial location information from
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lci-option] which defines latitude, longitude,
and altitude, with resolution indicators for each. The value in the
Altitude field either indicates meters or floors (via the Altitude
Type field). As a coordinate reference system Section 2.1 of
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lci-option] defines (via extensible mechanism
using IANA registration) three values in the Datum field: WGS 84, NAD
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83 (with the associated vertical datum for the North American
Vertical Datum of 1988), NAD 83 (with the associated vertical datum
for the Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW). WGS 84 is used by the GPS
system.
During a protocol run it is possible to return Location-Information
attributes which provide both location information elements. If only
one location information element is provided then civil location MUST
be included in the request. Additionally, geospatial location MAY be
provided.
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6. Policy-Information Attribute
In some environments it is possible for the user to attach
information about its privacy preferences. These preferences allow
the visited network, intermediate RADIUS proxies and the home network
to authorize the distribution of the user's location information.
Without the user providing authorization information two approaches
are possible:
o The user hides its location information from the access network
and from intermediate networks using the appropriate network
access authentication mechanism. Section 13 discusses these
issues in more details.
o The access network attaches default authorization policies which
prevents intermediate networks and the home network to distribute
the location information to other entities. Additionally, the
home network might have authorization policies which control
distribution of location information. Users can dynamically
change their policies using the authroization framework defined in
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-rules] and [I-D.ietf-geopriv-rules].
With regard to authorization policies this document reuses work done
in [I-D.peterson-geopriv-pidf-lo] and encodes it in an non-XML
format.
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7. Location-Type Attribute
This document defines a separate attribute for the type of the
location. Instead of the values of the 'type-of-place' attribute
defined in Section 4.6 of [I-D.ietf-simple-rpid] which is reused by
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil] we define our own list of values for
the Location-Type attribute. The reason for this is given by the
size constraints of the attribute, dependence to other documents and
to the location names required for the RADIUS context. Consequently,
CA type '25' which equals the placetype is not used in the
Location-Information attribute as described in Section 5.2.
0 Reserved
1 Coffee Shop
2 Hotel
3 Airport
4 Mall
5 Restaurant
6 Bus
7 Library
8 Convention Center
9 School
10 Office
11 Airplane
12 Train
13 Ship
14 Educational Institute
15 Public Place
16 Other
Using these attribute types it is possible to describe the area in
more detail.
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8. Billing-Description Attribute
The Billing-Description Attribute contains unstructured text to be
printed on the users bill.
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9. Attributes
This section defines attributes for access network operational
ownership, Location Name, Location Information and Billing
Description.
9.1 Operator-Name Attribute
Operator-Name Attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
Interim, or Stop.
A summary of the Operator-Name Attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Operator-Name ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type:
To Be Assigned by IANA - Operator-Name
Length:
>= 3
Operator-Name:
The text field contains an Access Network Operator Name in
prefix-based format as describe above.
Example: REALM:anyisp.com
9.2 Location-Information Attribute
Location-Information attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
Interim or Stop if available.
The Location-Information Attribute has two variations depending on
civil or geospatial location information. The format is shown below.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Code | Precision |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Location-Info ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type (8 bits):
To Be Assigned by IANA - Location-Information
Length (8 bits):
>= 3
Code (8 bits):
Describes which location format is carried in this attribute:
(0) describes civil location information
(1) describes geospatial location information
All other bites of the Code field is reserved
and required for alignment.
Precision (8 bits):
Describes which location this attribute refers to:
(0) describes the location of the NAS
(1) describes the location of the AAA server
(2) describes the location of the end host (user)
(3) describes the location of the network
Location-Info (variable):
Contains either civil or
geospatial location information attributes.
For civil location information the Location-Info field in the above
structure is defined as followed:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Countrycode | Civic address elements ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Countrycode (16 bits):
Two-letter ISO 3166 country code in capital ASCII leters.
Civic address elements (variable):
The text field contains location information element.
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The format of the civic address elements is described in Section 3.3
of [I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil] with a TLV pair (whereby the Type
and Length fields are one-octed long). An example is given in
Section 12.
For geospatial location information the Location-Info field is
defined as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LaRes | Latitude +
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Latitude | LoRes | Longitude +
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Longitude | AT | AltRes | Altitude +
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Altitude | Datum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
LaRes (6 bits):
Latitude resolution
Latitude (34 bits)
LoRes (6 bits):
Longitude resolution.
Longitude (34 bits)
Altitude (30 bits)
AltRes (6 bits)"
Altitude resolution
AT (4 bits):
Altitude Type for altitude. The following codes are defined:
(1) Meters
(2) Floors
Datum (8 bits):
Coordinate reference system
The following codes for the this field are defined:
(1) WGS 84
(2) NAD 83
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(3) NAD 83
The length of the Location-Information Attribute MUST NOT exceed 253
octets. The length of the geospatial location information format is
fixed with 16 bytes plus a four byte header.
The Datum field contains an identifier for the coordinate system used
to interpret the values of Latitude, Longitude and Altitude. The
field with value (2) and the value (3) both represent the NAD 83
coordinate reference system but they differ from each other with
regard to their vertical datum representation as briefly noted in
Section 5.2.2 and described in more detail in
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lci-option].
9.3 Policy-Information Attribute
Policy-Information attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
Interim or Stop if available.
A summary of the Policy-Information attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Policy-Information ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type :
To Be Assigned by IANA - Policy-Information
Length:
>= 3
Policy-Information:
The text field contains information about the 'usage-rules'
element described below. Its length MUST NOT exceed 64 octets.
For this document we use the following fields of the 'usage-rules'
element, described in [I-D.peterson-geopriv-pidf-lo]:
o 'retransmission-allowed' (R): When the value of this element is
'0', then the recipient of this Location Object is not permitted
to share the enclosed Location Information, or the object as a
whole, with other parties. The value of '1' allows to share the
Location Information with other parties.
o 'retention-expires': This field specifies an absolute date at
which time the Recipient is no longer permitted to possess the
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location information. The data type of this field is a string and
the format is a 64 bit NTP timestamp [RFC1305].
o 'ruleset-reference': This field contains a URI that indicates
where a fuller ruleset of policies related to this object can be
found. As a deviation from [I-D.peterson-geopriv-pidf-lo] this
field only contains a reference and does not carry an attached
rule set. This modification is motivated by the size limitations
imposed by RADIUS. Per-default this field has a null-size. The
content of this field is of variable length.
We use the following encoding for the Policy-Information element.
The 'retransmission-allowed' flag consumes 1 bit, followed by 64 bits
for the NTP timestamp and a variable length 'ruleset-reference'.
We do not use the 'note-well' element since it contains a block of
text with generic privacy directives which are human-readable only.
9.4 Location-Type Attribute
Location-Type Attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
Interim, or Stop if available.
A summary of the Location-Type Attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Loc-Type ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type (8 bits):
To Be Assigned by IANA - Location-Name
Length (8 bits):
>= 3
Loc-Type (variable):
The content of this field corresponds to the integer codes for
access network location type.
9.5 Billing-Description Attribute
The Billing-Description Attribute contains unstructured text to be
printed on the users bill.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Billing-Text ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type (8 bits):
To Be Assigned by IANA - Billing-Description
Length (8 bits):
>= 3
Billing-Text (variable):
The content of this field contains text for billing purpose.
The length of the Billing-Description Attribute MUST NOT exceed 32
octets.
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10. Table of Attributes
The following table provides a guide to which attributes may be found
in which kinds of packets, and in what quantity.
Request Accept Reject Challenge Accounting # Attribute
Request
0-1 0 0 0 0-1 TBD Operator-Name
0+ 0 0 0 0+ TBD Location-Information
0-1 0 0 0 0-1 TBD Policy-Information
0-1 0 0 0 0-1 TBD Location-Type
0-1 0 0 0 0 TBD Billing-Description
The Location-Information attribute may appear more than once. This
is useful if the size of one Location-Information attribute exceeds
the maximum size of an AVP.
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11. IANA Considerations
This document requires the assignment of four new RADIUS attribute
numbers for the following attributes:
Operator-Name
Location-Information
Policy-Information
Location-Name
Billing-Description
Please refer to Section 10 for the registered list of numbers.
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12. Example
This section provides an example for a civil location information
format within the Location-Information attribute. The size of the
geo-spatial location information object is fixed and well-described
examples can be found in the Appendix of
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lci-option].
Due to the size limitations of the RADIUS attributes we give a more
detailed example borrowed from Section 4 of
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil].
+-------------+-----------+-------------------+
| Type | Length | Value |
+-------------+-----------+-------------------+
| Type | 8 bits | TBD |
| Length | 8 bits | 43 |
| Code | 16 bits | 1 |
| Precision | 8 bits | 2 |
| Countrycode | 16 bits | DE |
| CAtype | 8 bits | 1 |
| CAlength | 8 bits | 7 |
| CAvalue | 7 bytes | Bavaria |
| CAtype | 8 bits | 3 |
| CAlength | 8 bits | 6 |
| CAvalue | 6 byte | Munich |
| CAtype | 8 bits | 6 |
| CAlength | 8 bits | 11 |
| CAvalue | 11 bytes | Marienplatz |
| CAtype | 8 bits | 19 |
| CAlength | 8 bits | 1 |
| CAvalue | 1 byte | 8 |
| CAtype | 8 bits | 24 |
| CAlength | 8 bits | 5 |
| CAvalue | 5 bytes | 80331 |
+-------------+-----------+-------------------+
The Length element provides the length of the entire payload minus
the length of the initial 'Type', the 'Length' and the 'Code'
attribute. The Precision field has a value of '2' which refers to
the location of the end host (user). The CountryCode is set to 'DE'.
Note that the subsequent attributes are in Type-Length-Value format.
Type '1' indicates the region of 'Bavaria', '3' refers to the city
'Munich', '6' to the street 'Marienplatz', the house number '8' is
indicated by the type '19' and the zip code of '80331' is of type
'24'.
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The total sum of these attributes is 46 bytes.
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13. Privacy Considerations
This section discusses privacy implications for the distribution of
location lnformation within RADIUS.
In many cases the location information of the network also reveals
the current location of the user with a certain degree of precision
depending on the mechanism used, to determine the location, update
frequence, where the location was generated, size of the network and
other mechanism (such as movement traces or interpolation).
Two entities act as location servers in the configuration shown in
Section 4:
Entity in the visited network (e.g., visited AAA server): In this
scenario it is be difficult to obtain authorization policies from
the end host (or user). In this case we have to assume that the
visited network does not allow unrestricted distribution of
location information. Hence, as a simplification we can assume
that per default only the home network is allowed to receive
location information.
Entity in the home network (e.g., home AAA server): The AAA server in
the home network might be an ideal place for storing authorization
policies. Once the infrastructure is deployed and useful
applications are available there might be a strong desire to use
location information for other purposes as well (such as location
aware applications). Authorization policy rules described in
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-rules] and in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-rules] are
tailored for this environment. The user typically has a
contractual relationship to his home network and hence the trust
relationship between them are higher. These policies might be
useful for preventing further distribution of the user's location
to other location based services. The home AAA server (or a
similar entity) thereby acts as a location server for access to
location services. As a default policy we specify that the home
network MUST NOT distribute the user's location information to
other entities.
For the envisioned usage scenarios the network access authentication
procedure is tighly coupled to the transfer of location information.
If the authentication mechanism allows the visited networks or
brokers to learn the user's identity then it is possible to
correleate location information with a particular user. This allows
the visited network and brokers to learn movement patterns of users.
A scenario where the user is attached to the home network is, from a
privacy point of view, simpler than a scenario where a user roams
into a visited network (where possibly no direct relationship between
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the visited and the home network operator is available and some AAA
brokers need to be consulted) since the NAS and the home AAA are in
the same administrative domain. With subscription-based network
access as used today the user has a contractual relationship with the
home network provider which could allow higher privacy considerations
to be applied (including rules stored at the home network itself for
the purpose of restricting further distribution).
In many cases it is necessary to secure the transport of location
information along the RADIUS infrastructure. Mechanism to achieve
this functionality are discussed in Section 14.
One way to ensure that the visited network and intermediate networks
are incapable to learn the user identity is to use EAP methods which
hide the user identity either actively or passively. Some EAP
methods (such as [I-D.arkko-pppext-eap-aka]) protect the user's
identity against passive adversaries by utilizing temporal
identities. In some cases the visited network is still able to
retrieve the plaintext identity of the user and user identity
confidentiality is only provided against eavesdroppers at the
wireless link. Depending on the movement patters of the user, the
network topology and available roaming agreements it is possible that
a AAA broker is able to see both the plaintext user identity and
subsequent temporal identities. Associating location information and
the user identity is possible in these cases.
It is assumed that the true username is not carried within the
initial EAP-Identity Request/Response message exchange. Support for
username privacy is supported with [I-D.arkko-roamops-rfc2486bis].
For stronger security and privacy protection active user identity
confidentiality is highly suggested. EAP methods such as
[I-D.josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap] or [I-D.tschofenig-eap-ikev2]
provide such a protection.
Unfortunately, most users are not educated about the importance of
user identity confidentiality and many EAP methods do not provide
active user identity confidentiality. User identity confidentiality
is often treated as an exotic features which mainly aims to prevent
eavesdroppers on the wireless link to learn the user identity of the
attached users. Awareness for this type of threat model does often
not exist. In many cases it is even not possible for users to freely
select their favorite authentication and key exchange protocol (based
on their security requirements). Instead the choice is often
predetermined by a given architecture.
It was noted that different granualrity of location information can
be provided to the home network. From a privacy point of view lower
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granularity is preferrable. The user, however, has no control over
the granularity and cannot lie about its location.
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14. Security Considerations
Requirements for the security protection of a Location Object is
defined in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-reqs]: Mutual end-point authentication,
data object integrity, data object confidentiality and replay
protection. The distribution of location information can be
restricted with the help of authorization policies. Basic
authorization policies are attached to the location information
itself, in the same fashion as described in
[I-D.peterson-geopriv-pidf-lo]. It is possible that the user was
already able to transfer some authorization policies to the access
network to restrict the distribution of location information. This
is, however, rather unlikely in case of roaming users. Hence, it
will be primarily the NAS creating the Location Object which also
sets the authorization policies. If no authorization information is
provided by the user then the visited network MUST set the
authorization policies to only allow the home AAA server to use the
provided location information. Other entities, such as the visited
network and possibly AAA brokers MUST NOT use the location
information for a purpose other than described in this document.
More extensible authorization policies can be stored at the user's
home network. These policies are useful when location information is
distributed to other entities in a location-based service. This
scenario is, however, outside the scope of this document.
It is necessary to use authorization policies to prevent the
unauthorized distribution of location information. The security
requirements which are created based on [I-D.ietf-geopriv-reqs] are
inline with threats which appear in the relationship with disclosure
of location information as described in
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-threat-analysis]. [I-D.peterson-geopriv-pidf-lo]
proposes S/MIME to protect the Location Object against modifications
and against eavesdropping. To provide mutual authentication
confidentiality protection and a digital signature is necessary.
Furthermore, to offer replay protection a gurantee of freshness is
necessary (for example, based on timestamps).
The security of S/SIME is based on public key cryptography which
raises performance, deployment and size considerations. Encryption
requires that the local AAA server knows the recipient's public key
(e.g., the public key of the home AAA server). Some sort of public
key infrastructure is therfore required to obtain the public key and
to verify the digital signature (at the home network). Providing
per-object cryptographic protection is, both at the home and at the
visited network, computationally expensive.
To overcome this limitation an alternative approach is suggested.
Two security mechanisms are proposed for RADIUS:
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o [RFC2865] proposes the usage of a static key which is not
appropriate for protection of location information due to the
missing dynamic key management and absent confidentiality
protection. If no authentication, integrity and replay protection
between the participating entities are provided then an
adversaries can spoof and modify transmitted AVPs.
o RADIUS over IPsec [RFC3579] allows to run standard key management
mechanisms, such as KINK [I-D.ietf-kink-kink], IKE and IKEv2
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2], to establish IPsec security associations.
Confidentiality protection MUST be used to prevent eavesdropper
gaining access to location information. Confidentiality
protection is not only a property required by this document, it is
also required for the transport of keying material in the context
of EAP authentication and authorization. Hence, this requirement
is, in many environments, already fulfilled. Mutual
authentication must be provided between the local AAA server and
the home AAA server to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. This is
another requirement raised in the area of key transport with
RADIUS and does not represent a deployment obstacle. The
performance advantages a superior compared to the usage of S/MIME
and object security since the expensive authentication and key
exchange protocol run needs to be provided only once (at for a
long time). Symmetric channel security with IPsec is highly
efficient. Since IPsec protection is suggested as a mechanism to
protect RAIDUS already no additional considerations need to be
addressed beyond those described in [RFC3579]. Where an untrusted
AAA intermediary is present, the Location Object MUST NOT be
provided to the intermediary.
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15. Open Issues
A future version of this document will describe the described Radius
attributes work with Diameter.
Furthermore, the scenarios described in Section 4 need to be
described in more detail.
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16. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following people for their help
with a previous version of this draft and for their input:
Chuck Black
Paul Congdon
Jouni Korhonen
Sami Ala-luukko
Farooq Bari
Ed Van Horne
Mark Grayson
Jukkat Tuomi
Jorge Cuellar
Christian Guenther
Henning Schulzrinne provided the civil location information content
found in this draft. The geospatial location information format is
based on work done by J. Polk, J. Schnizlein and M. Linsner. The
authorization policy format is based on the work done by Jon
Peterson.
The authors would like to thank Victor Lortz, Jose Puthenkulam,
Bernrad Aboba, Jari Arkko, Parviz Yegani, Serge Manning, Kuntal
Chowdury, Pasi Eronen Blair Bullock and Eugene Chang for their
feedback.
This document is partially based on the discussions within the IETF
GEOPRIV working group. Therefore, the authors thank Henning
Schulzrinne, James Polk and John Morris for their work they have done
in the Geopriv working group.
Furthermore, we also have to thank Allison Mankin, Randall Gellens,
Andrew Newton, Ted Hardie, Jon Peterson for their time discussing a
number of details with us.
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17. References
17.1 Normative References
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil]
Schulzrinne, H., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
(DHCPv4 and DHCPv6) Option for Civic Addresses",
draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil-02 (work in progress), March
2004, <reference.I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil.xml>.
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lci-option]
Polk, J., Schnizlein, J. and M. Linsner, "Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol Option for Coordinate-based
Location Configuration Information",
draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lci-option-03 (work in progress),
December 2003,
<reference.I-D.ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lci-option.xml>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A. and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC
2865, June 2000.
[RFC2866] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000,
<reference.RFC.2866.xml>.
[RFC3576] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D. and B.
Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576,
July 2003, <reference.RFC.3576.xml>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003,
<reference.RFC.3629.xml>.
17.2 Informative References
[I-D.adrangi-radius-bandwidth-capability]
Adrangi, F., "Access Network Bandwidth Capability",
draft-adrangi-radius-bandwidth-capability-00 (work in
progress), February 2004,
<reference.I-D.adrangi-radius-bandwidth-capability.xml>.
[I-D.arkko-pppext-eap-aka]
Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "EAP AKA Authentication",
draft-arkko-pppext-eap-aka-11 (work in progress), October
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2003, <reference.I-D.arkko-pppext-eap-aka.xml>.
[I-D.arkko-roamops-rfc2486bis]
Aboba, B., "The Network Access Identifier",
draft-arkko-roamops-rfc2486bis-00 (work in progress),
February 2004,
<reference.I-D.arkko-roamops-rfc2486bis.xml>.
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-common-rules]
Schulzrinne, H., Morris, J., Tschofenig, H. and J. Polk,
"Geopriv Rules", draft-ietf-common-rules-00 (work in
progress), January 2004,
<reference.I-D.ietf-geopriv-common-rules.xml>.
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-reqs]
Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, D. and D.
Polk, "Geopriv requirements", draft-ietf-geopriv-reqs-04
(work in progress), October 2003,
<reference.I-D.ietf-geopriv-reqs.xml>.
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-rules]
Schulzrinne, H., Morris, J., Tschofenig, H., Polk, J. and
J. Rosenberg, "Common Rules", draft-ietf-common-rules-00
(work in progress), January 2004,
<reference.I-D.ietf-geopriv-common-policy.xml>.
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-threat-analysis]
Danley, M., "Threat Analysis of the Geopriv Protocol",
draft-ietf-geopriv-threat-analysis-01 (work in progress),
September 2003,
<reference.I-D.ietf-geopriv-threat-analysis.xml>.
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2]
Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-13 (work in progress), March 2004,
<reference.I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2.xml>.
[I-D.ietf-kink-kink]
Thomas, M. and J. Vilhuber, "Kerberized Internet
Negotiation of Keys (KINK)", draft-ietf-kink-kink-05 (work
in progress), January 2003,
<reference.I-D.ietf-kink-kink.xml>.
[I-D.ietf-simple-rpid]
Schulzrinne, H., Gurbani, V., Kyzivat, P. and J.
Rosenberg, "RPID: Rich Presence: Extensions to the
Presence Information Data Format (PIDF)",
draft-ietf-simple-rpid-02 (work in progress), March 2004,
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<reference.I-D.ietf-simple-rpid.xml>.
[I-D.josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap]
Josefsson, S., Palekar, A., Simon, D. and G. Zorn,
"Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP)",
draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-07 (work in progress),
October 2003,
<reference.I-D.josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap.xml>.
[I-D.peterson-geopriv-pidf-lo]
Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object
Format", draft-peterson-geopriv-pidf-lo-02 (work in
progress), October 2003,
<reference.I-D.peterson-geopriv-pidf-lo.xml>.
[I-D.tschofenig-eap-ikev2]
Tschofenig, H., Kroeselberg, D. and Y. Ohba, "EAP IKEv2
Method (EAP-IKEv2)", draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-03 (work
in progress), February 2004,
<reference.I-D.tschofenig-eap-ikev2.xml>.
[RFC1305] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3)
Specification, Implementation", RFC 1305, March 1992,
<reference.RFC.1305.xml>.
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.
Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig
Siemens
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich, Bayern 81739
Germany
EMail: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
F. Adrangi
Intel Corporatation
2111 N.E. 25th Avenue
Hillsboro OR
USA
EMail: farid.adrangi@intel.com
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Avi Lior
Bridgewater Systems Corporation
303 Terry Fox Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K2K 3J1
CANADA
EMail: avi@bridgewatersystems.com
Mark Jones
Bridgewater Systems Corporation
303 Terry Fox Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K2K 3J1
CANADA
EMail: mark.jones@bridgewatersystems.com
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