Identity for E2E-Secure Communications
draft-barnes-mimi-identity-arch-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Richard Barnes , Rohan Mahy | ||
| Last updated | 2024-04-25 (Latest revision 2023-10-23) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
End-to-end (E2E) security is a critical property for modern user communications systems. E2E security protects users' communications from tampering or inspection by intermediaries that are involved in delivering those communcations from one logical endpoint to another. In addition to the much-discussed E2E encryption systems, true E2E security requires an identity mechanism that prevents the communications provider from impersonating participants in a session, as a way to gain access to the session. This document describes a high-level architecture for E2E identity, identifying the critical mechanisms that need to be specified.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)