DNS query name minimisation to improve privacy
draft-bortzmeyer-dns-qname-minimisation-01

Network Working Group                                      S. Bortzmeyer
Internet-Draft                                                     AFNIC
Intended status: Informational                            March 21, 2014
Expires: September 22, 2014

             DNS query name minimisation to improve privacy
               draft-bortzmeyer-dns-qname-minimisation-01

Abstract

   This document describes one of the techniques that could be used to
   improve DNS privacy (see [I-D.bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy]), a
   technique called "qname minimisation".

   Discussions of the document should currently take place on the dns-
   privacy mailing list [dns-privacy].

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   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Qname minimisation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Operational considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4

1.  Introduction and background

   The problem statement is exposed in
   [I-D.bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy].  The terminology ("qname",
   "resolver", etc) is also defined in this companion document.  This
   specific solution is not intended to completely solve the problem,
   far from it.  It is better to see it as one tool among a toolbox.

   It follows the principle explained in section 6.1 of [RFC6973]: the
   less data you send out, the less privacy problems you'll get.

2.  Qname minimisation

   The idea is to minimise the amount of data sent from the DNS
   resolver.  When a resolver receives the query "What is the AAAA
   record for www.example.com?", it sends to the root (assuming a cold
   resolver, whose cache is empty) the very same question.  Sending
   "What are the NS records for .com?"  would be sufficient (since it
   will be the answer from the root anyway).  To do so would be
   compatible with the current DNS system and therefore could be easily
   deployable, since it is an unilateral change to the resolvers.

   To do such minimisation, the resolver needs to know the zone cut
   [RFC2181].  There is not a zone cut at every label boundary.  If we
   take the name www.foo.bar.example, it is possible that there is a
   zone cut between "foo" and "bar" but not between "bar" and "example".

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   So, assuming the resolver already knows the name servers of .example,
   when it receives the query "What is the AAAA record of
   www.foo.bar.example", it does not always know if the request should
   be sent to the name servers of bar.example or to those of example.
   [RFC2181] suggests a method to find the zone cut (section 6), so
   resolvers may try it.

   Note that DNSSEC-validating resolvers already have access to this
   information, since they have to find the zone cut (the DNSKEY record
   set is just below, the DS record set just above).

   It can be noted that minimising the amount of data sent also
   partially addresses the case of a wire sniffer, not just the case of
   privacy invasion by the servers.

   One should note that the behaviour suggested here (minimising the
   amount of data sent in qnames) is NOT forbidden by the [RFC1034]
   (section 5.3.3) or [RFC1035] (section 7.2).  Sending the full qname
   to the authoritative name server is a tradition, not a protocol
   requirment.

3.  Operational considerations

   The administrators of the forwarders, and of the authoritative name
   servers, will get less data, which will reduce the utility of the
   statistics they can produce (such as the percentage of the various
   qtypes).  On the other hand, it will decrease their legal
   responsability, in many cases.

   Some broken name servers do not react properly to qtype=NS requests.
   As an example, look at www.ratp.fr (not ratp.fr), which is delegated
   to two name servers that reply properly to "A www.ratp.fr" queries
   but send REFUSED to queries "NS www.ratp.fr".  This behaviour is a
   gross protocol violation and there is no need to stop improving the
   DNS because of such brokenness.  However, qname minimisation may
   still work with such domains since they are only leaf domains (no
   need to send them NS requests).

   Another way to deal with such broken name servers would be to try
   with A requests (A being choosen because it is the most common and
   hence the least revealing qtype).  Instead of querying name servers
   with a query "NS example.com", we could use "A _.example.com" and see
   if we get a referral.

4.  Security considerations

   Under study.

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5.  Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Olaf Kolkman, Mark Andrews and Francis Dupont for the
   interesting discussions on this qname minimisation.  Thanks to Mohsen
   Souissi for proofreading.  Thanks to Phillip Hallam-Baker for the
   fallback on A queries, to deal with broken servers.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, July
              2013.

   [I-D.bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy]
              Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS privacy problem statement", draft-
              bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy-01 (work in progress),
              December 2013.

6.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2181]  Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
              Specification", RFC 2181, July 1997.

   [dns-privacy]
              IETF, , "The dns-privacy mailing list", March 2014.

Author's Address

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   Stephane Bortzmeyer
   AFNIC
   Immeuble International
   Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines  78181
   France

   Phone: +33 1 39 30 83 46
   Email: bortzmeyer+ietf@nic.fr
   URI:   http://www.afnic.fr/

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