Updates to Lightweight OCSP Profile for High Volume Environments
draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5019bis-08
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (lamps WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Tadahiko Ito , Clint Wilson , Corey Bonnell , Sean Turner | ||
| Last updated | 2024-04-18 (Latest revision 2024-04-10) | ||
| Replaces | draft-bonnell-rfc5019bis | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews |
GENART Last Call review
(of
-05)
by Paul Kyzivat
Ready w/issues
SECDIR Last Call Review due 2024-03-29
Incomplete
OPSDIR Last Call Review due 2024-03-29
Incomplete
|
||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Russ Housley | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2024-03-02 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed | |
| Action Holders | |||
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
(None)
Has a DISCUSS. Has enough positions to pass once DISCUSS positions are resolved. |
||
| Responsible AD | Roman Danyliw | ||
| Send notices to | housley@vigilsec.com | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - No Actions Needed |
draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5019bis-08
Network Working Group 伊藤 忠彦 (T. Ito)
Internet-Draft SECOM CO., LTD.
Obsoletes: 5019 (if approved) C. Wilson
Intended status: Standards Track Apple, Inc.
Expires: 12 October 2024 C. Bonnell
DigiCert, Inc.
S. Turner
sn3rd
10 April 2024
Updates to Lightweight OCSP Profile for High Volume Environments
draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5019bis-08
Abstract
This specification defines a profile of the Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) that addresses the scalability issues inherent when
using OCSP in large scale (high volume) Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) environments and/or in PKI environments that require a
lightweight solution to minimize communication bandwidth and client-
side processing.
This specification obsoletes RFC 5019. The profile specified in RFC
5019 has been updated to allow and recommend the use of SHA-256 over
SHA-1.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/tadahik/RFC5019bis.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 12 October 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. OCSP Message Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. OCSP Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. OCSPRequest Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. Signed OCSPRequests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. OCSP Response Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1. OCSPResponse Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2. Signed OCSPResponses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.3. OCSPResponseStatus Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.4. thisUpdate, nextUpdate, and producedAt . . . . . . . 9
4. Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. OCSP Responder Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Sending an OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Ensuring an OCSPResponse Is Fresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Transport Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Caching Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Caching at the Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2. HTTP Proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3. Caching at Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.1. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.2. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.3. Impersonation Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.4. Denial-of-Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.5. Modification of HTTP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.6. Request Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . 16
8.7. Use of SHA-1 for the calculation of CertID field
values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Differences from RFC 5019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix B. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B.1. Root Certification Authority Certificate . . . . . . . . 19
B.2. End-entity Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.3. OCSP Responder Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B.4. OCSP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
B.5. OCSP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Introduction
The Online Certificate Status Protocol [RFC6960] specifies a
mechanism used to determine the status of digital certificates, in
lieu of using Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Since its
definition in 1999, it has been deployed in a variety of environments
and has proven to be a useful certificate status checking mechanism.
(For brevity we refer to OCSP as being used to verify certificate
status, but only the revocation status of a certificate is checked
via this protocol.)
To date, many OCSP deployments have been used to ensure timely and
secure certificate status information for high-value electronic
transactions or highly sensitive information, such as in the banking
and financial environments. As such, the requirement for an OCSP
responder to respond in "real time" (i.e., generating a new OCSP
response for each OCSP request) has been important. In addition,
these deployments have operated in environments where bandwidth usage
is not an issue, and have run on client and server systems where
processing power is not constrained.
As the use of PKI continues to grow and move into diverse
environments, so does the need for a scalable and cost-effective
certificate status mechanism. Although OCSP as currently defined and
deployed meets the need of small to medium-sized PKIs that operate on
powerful systems on wired networks, there is a limit as to how these
OCSP deployments scale from both an efficiency and cost perspective.
Mobile environments, where network bandwidth may be at a premium and
client-side devices are constrained from a processing point of view,
require the careful use of OCSP to minimize bandwidth usage and
client-side processing complexity. [OCSPMP]
PKI continues to be deployed into environments where millions if not
hundreds of millions of certificates have been issued. In many of
these environments, an even larger number of users (also known as
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relying parties) have the need to ensure that the certificate they
are relying upon has not been revoked. As such, it is important that
OCSP is used in such a way that ensures the load on OCSP responders
and the network infrastructure required to host those responders are
kept to a minimum.
This document addresses the scalability issues inherent when using
OCSP in PKI environments described above by defining a message
profile and clarifying OCSP client and responder behavior that will
permit:
1. OCSP response pre-production and distribution.
2. Reduced OCSP message size to lower bandwidth usage.
3. Response message caching both in the network and on the client.
It is intended that the normative requirements defined in this
profile will be adopted by OCSP clients and OCSP responders operating
in very large-scale (high-volume) PKI environments or PKI
environments that require a lightweight solution to minimize
bandwidth and client-side processing power (or both), as described
above.
OCSP does not have the means to signal responder capabilities within
the protocol. Thus, clients will need to use out-of-band mechanisms
to determine whether a responder conforms to the profile defined in
this document. Regardless of the availability of such out-of-band
mechanisms, this profile ensures that interoperability will still
occur between an OCSP client that fully conforms with [RFC6960] and a
responder that is operating in a mode as described in this
specification.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. OCSP Message Profile
This section defines a subset of OCSPRequest and OCSPResponse
functionality as defined in [RFC6960].
3.1. OCSP Request Profile
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3.1.1. OCSPRequest Structure
Provided for convenience here, but unchanged from [RFC6960], the
ASN.1 structure corresponding to the OCSPRequest with the relevant
CertID is:
OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsRequest TBSRequest,
optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
Request ::= SEQUENCE {
reqCert CertID,
singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
OCSPRequests that conform to this profile MUST include only one
Request in the OCSPRequest.RequestList structure.
The CertID.issuerNameHash and CertID.issuerKeyHash fields contain
hashes of the issuer's DN and public key, respectively. OCSP clients
that conform with this profile MUST use SHA-256 as defined in
[RFC6234] as the hashing algorithm for the CertID.issuerNameHash and
the CertID.issuerKeyHash values.
Older OCSP clients which provide backward compatibility with
[RFC5019] use SHA-1 as defined in [RFC3174] as the hashing algorithm
for the CertID.issuerNameHash and the CertID.issuerKeyHash values.
However, these OCSP clients should transition from SHA-1 to SHA-256
as soon as practical.
Clients MUST NOT include the singleRequestExtensions structure.
Clients SHOULD NOT include the requestExtensions structure. If a
requestExtensions structure is included, this profile RECOMMENDS that
it contain only the nonce extension (id-pkix-ocsp-nonce). See
Section 5 for issues concerning the use of a nonce in high-volume
OCSP environments.
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3.1.2. Signed OCSPRequests
Clients SHOULD NOT send signed OCSPRequests. Responders MAY ignore
the signature on OCSPRequests.
If the OCSPRequest is signed, the client SHALL specify its name in
the OCSPRequest.requestorName field; otherwise, clients SHOULD NOT
include the requestorName field in the OCSPRequest. OCSP servers
MUST be prepared to receive unsigned OCSP requests that contain the
requestorName field, but MUST handle such requests as if the
requestorName field were absent.
3.2. OCSP Response Profile
3.2.1. OCSPResponse Structure
The ASN.1 structure corresponding to the OCSPResponse with the
relevant CertID is:
OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
responseType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
response OCTET STRING }
The value for response SHALL be the DER encoding of BasicOCSPResponse.
BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsResponseData ResponseData,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
responderID ResponderID,
producedAt GeneralizedTime,
responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certID CertID,
certStatus CertStatus,
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
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Responders MUST generate a BasicOCSPResponse as identified by the id-
pkix-ocsp-basic OID. Clients MUST be able to parse and accept a
BasicOCSPResponse. OCSPResponses that conform to this profile SHOULD
include only one SingleResponse in the ResponseData.responses
structure, but MAY include additional SingleResponse elements if
necessary to improve response pre-generation performance or cache
efficiency, and to ensure backward compatibility. For instance, to
provide support to OCSP clients which do not yet support the use of
SHA-256 for CertID hash calculation, the OCSP responder MAY include
two SingleResponses in a BasicOCSPResponse. In that
BasicOCSPResponse, the CertID of one of the SingleResponses uses
SHA-1 for the hash calculation, and the CertID in the other
SingleResponse uses SHA-256. OCSP responders SHOULD NOT distribute
OCSP responses that contain CertIDs that use SHA-1 if the OCSP
responder has no clients that require the use of SHA-1. Operators of
OCSP responders may consider logging the hash algorithm used by OCSP
clients to inform their determination of when it is appropriate to
obsolete the distribution of OCSP responses that employ SHA-1 for
CertID field hashes. See Section 8.7 for more information on the
security considerations for the continued use of SHA-1.
The responder SHOULD NOT include responseExtensions. As specified in
[RFC6960], clients MUST ignore unrecognized non-critical
responseExtensions in the response.
In the case where a responder does not have the ability to respond to
an OCSP request containing an option not supported by the server, it
SHOULD return the most complete response it can. For example, in the
case where a responder only supports pre-produced responses and does
not have the ability to respond to an OCSP request containing a
nonce, it SHOULD return a response that does not include a nonce.
Clients SHOULD attempt to process a response even if the response
does not include a nonce. See Section 5 for details on validating
responses that do not contain a nonce. See also Section 8 for
relevant security considerations.
Responders that do not have the ability to respond to OCSP requests
that contain an unsupported option such as a nonce MAY forward the
request to an OCSP responder capable of doing so.
The responder MAY include the singleResponse.singleResponse
extensions structure.
3.2.2. Signed OCSPResponses
Clients MUST validate the signature on the returned OCSPResponse.
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If the response is signed by a delegate of the issuing certification
authority (CA), a valid responder certificate MUST be referenced in
the BasicOCSPResponse.certs structure.
It is RECOMMENDED that the OCSP responder's certificate contain the
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck extension, as defined in [RFC6960], to indicate
to the client that it need not check the certificate's status. In
addition, it is RECOMMENDED that neither an OCSP authorityInfoAccess
(AIA) extension nor cRLDistributionPoints (CRLDP) extension be
included in the OCSP responder's certificate. Accordingly, the
responder's signing certificate SHOULD be relatively short-lived and
renewed regularly.
Clients MUST be able to identify OCSP responder certificates using
the byKey field and SHOULD be able to identify OCSP responder
certificates using the byName field of the ResponseData.ResponderID
choices.
Older responders which provide backward compatibility with [RFC5019]
MAY use the byName field to represent the ResponderID, but should
transition to using the byKey field as soon as practical.
Newer responders that conform to this profile MUST use the byKey
field to represent the ResponderID to reduce the size of the
response.
3.2.3. OCSPResponseStatus Values
As long as the OCSP infrastructure has authoritative records for a
particular certificate, an OCSPResponseStatus of "successful" will be
returned. When access to authoritative records for a particular
certificate is not available, the responder MUST return an
OCSPResponseStatus of "unauthorized". As such, this profile extends
the [RFC6960] definition of "unauthorized" as follows:
The response "unauthorized" is returned in cases where the client is
not authorized to make this query to this server or the server is not
capable of responding authoritatively.
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For example, OCSP responders that do not have access to authoritative
records for a requested certificate, such as those that generate and
distribute OCSP responses in advance and thus do not have the ability
to properly respond with a signed "successful" yet "unknown"
response, will respond with an OCSPResponseStatus of "unauthorized".
Also, in order to ensure the database of revocation information does
not grow unbounded over time, the responder MAY remove the status
records of expired certificates. Requests from clients for
certificates whose record has been removed will result in an
OCSPResponseStatus of "unauthorized".
Security considerations regarding the use of unsigned responses are
discussed in [RFC6960].
3.2.4. thisUpdate, nextUpdate, and producedAt
When pre-producing OCSPResponse messages, the responder MUST set the
thisUpdate, nextUpdate, and producedAt times as follows:
thisUpdate: The time at which the status being indicated is known to
be correct.
nextUpdate: The time at or before which newer information will be
available about the status of the certificate. Responders MUST
always include this value to aid in response caching. See
Section 7 for additional information on caching.
producedAt: The time at which the OCSP response was signed.
| Note: In many cases the value of thisUpdate and producedAt will
| be the same.
For the purposes of this profile, ASN.1-encoded GeneralizedTime
values such as thisUpdate, nextUpdate, and producedAt MUST be
expressed Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and MUST include seconds (i.e.,
times are YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero.
GeneralizedTime values MUST NOT include fractional seconds.
4. Client Behavior
4.1. OCSP Responder Discovery
Clients MUST support the authorityInfoAccess extension as defined in
[RFC5280] and MUST recognize the id-ad-ocsp access method. This
enables CAs to inform clients how they can contact the OCSP service.
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In the case where a client is checking the status of a certificate
that contains both an authorityInformationAccess (AIA) extension
pointing to an OCSP responder and a cRLDistributionPoints extension
pointing to a CRL, the client SHOULD attempt to contact the OCSP
responder first. Clients MAY attempt to retrieve the CRL if no
OCSPResponse is received from the responder after a locally
configured timeout and number of retries.
4.2. Sending an OCSP Request
To avoid needless network traffic, applications MUST verify the
signature of signed data before asking an OCSP client to check the
status of certificates used to verify the data. If the signature is
invalid or the application is not able to verify it, an OCSP check
MUST NOT be requested.
Similarly, an application MUST validate the signature on certificates
in a chain, before asking an OCSP client to check the status of the
certificate. If the certificate signature is invalid or the
application is not able to verify it, an OCSP check MUST NOT be
requested. Clients SHOULD NOT make a request to check the status of
expired certificates.
5. Ensuring an OCSPResponse Is Fresh
In order to ensure that a client does not accept an out-of-date
response that indicates a 'good' status when in fact there is a more
up-to-date response that specifies the status of 'revoked', a client
must ensure the responses they receive are fresh.
In general, two mechanisms are available to clients to ensure a
response is fresh. The first uses nonces, and the second is based on
time. In order for time-based mechanisms to work, both clients and
responders MUST have access to an accurate source of time.
Because this profile specifies that clients SHOULD NOT include a
requestExtensions structure in OCSPRequests (see Section 3.1),
clients MUST be able to determine OCSPResponse freshness based on an
accurate source of time. Clients that opt to include a nonce in the
request SHOULD NOT reject a corresponding OCSPResponse solely on the
basis of the nonexistent expected nonce, but MUST fall back to
validating the OCSPResponse based on time.
Clients that do not include a nonce in the request MUST ignore any
nonce that may be present in the response.
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Clients MUST check for the existence of the nextUpdate field and MUST
ensure the current time, expressed in GMT time as described in
Section 3.2.4, falls between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate times. If
the nextUpdate field is absent, the client MUST reject the response.
If the nextUpdate field is present, the client MUST ensure that it is
not earlier than the current time. If the current time on the client
is later than the time specified in the nextUpdate field, the client
MUST reject the response as stale. Clients MAY allow configuration
of a small tolerance period for acceptance of responses after
nextUpdate to handle minor clock differences relative to responders
and caches. This tolerance period should be chosen based on the
accuracy and precision of time synchronization technology available
to the calling application environment. For example, Internet peers
with low latency connections typically expect NTP time
synchronization to keep them accurate within parts of a second;
higher latency environments or where an NTP analogue is not available
may have to be more liberal in their tolerance (e.g. allow one day
difference).
See the security considerations in Section 8 for additional details
on replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
6. Transport Profile
OCSP clients can send HTTP-based OCSP requests using either the GET
or POST method. The OCSP responder MUST support requests and
responses over HTTP. When sending requests that are less than or
equal to 255 bytes in total (after encoding) including the scheme and
delimiters (http://), server name and base64-encoded OCSPRequest
structure, clients MUST use the GET method (to enable OCSP response
caching). OCSP requests larger than 255 bytes SHOULD be submitted
using the POST method. In all cases, clients MUST follow the
descriptions in A.1 of [RFC6960] when constructing these messages.
When constructing a GET message, OCSP clients MUST base64-encode the
OCSPRequest structure according to [RFC4648], section 4. Clients
MUST NOT include whitespace or any other characters that are not part
of the base64 character repertoire in the base64-encoded string.
Clients MUST properly URL-encode the base64-encoded OCSPRequest
according to [RFC3986]. OCSP clients MUST append the base64-encoded
OCSPRequest to the URI specified in the AIA extension [RFC5280]. For
example:
http://ocsp.example.com/MEowSDBGMEQwQjAKBggqhkiG9w0CBQQQ7sp6GTKpL2dA
deGaW267owQQqInESWQD0mGeBArSgv%2FBWQIQLJx%2Fg9xF8oySYzol80Mbpg%3D%3D
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In response to properly formatted OCSPRequests that are cachable
(i.e., responses that contain a nextUpdate value), the responder will
include the binary value of the DER encoding of the OCSPResponse
preceded by the following HTTP [RFC9110] and [RFC9111] headers.
Content-type: application/ocsp-response
Content-length: < OCSP response length >
Last-modified: < producedAt HTTP-date >
ETag: "< strong validator >"
Expires: < nextUpdate HTTP-date >
Cache-control: max-age=< n >, public, no-transform, must-revalidate
Date: < current HTTP-date >
See Section 7.2 for details on the use of these headers.
7. Caching Recommendations
The ability to cache OCSP responses throughout the network is an
important factor in high volume OCSP deployments. This section
discusses the recommended caching behavior of OCSP clients and HTTP
proxies and the steps that should be taken to minimize the number of
times that OCSP clients "hit the wire". In addition, the concept of
including OCSP responses in protocol exchanges (aka stapling or
piggybacking), such as has been defined in TLS, is also discussed.
7.1. Caching at the Client
To minimize bandwidth usage, clients MUST locally cache authoritative
OCSP responses (i.e., a response with a signature that has been
successfully validated and that indicate an OCSPResponseStatus of
'successful').
Most OCSP clients will send OCSPRequests at or near the nextUpdate
time (when a cached response expires). To avoid large spikes in
responder load that might occur when many clients refresh cached
responses for a popular certificate, responders MAY indicate when the
client should fetch an updated OCSP response by using the cache-
control:max-age directive. Clients SHOULD fetch the updated OCSP
Response on or after the max-age time. To ensure that clients
receive an updated OCSP response, OCSP responders MUST refresh the
OCSP response before the max-age time.
7.2. HTTP Proxies
The responder SHOULD set the HTTP headers of the OCSP response in
such a way as to allow for the intelligent use of intermediate HTTP
proxy servers. See [RFC9110] and [RFC9111] for the full definition
of these headers and the proper format of any date and time values.
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+===============+==================================================+
| HTTP Header | Description |
+===============+==================================================+
| Date | The date and time at which the OCSP server |
| | generated the HTTP response. |
+---------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Last-Modified | This value specifies the date and time at which |
| | the OCSP responder last modified the response. |
| | This date and time will be the same as the |
| | thisUpdate timestamp in the request itself. |
+---------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Expires | Specifies how long the response is considered |
| | fresh. This date and time will be the same as |
| | the nextUpdate timestamp in the OCSP response |
| | itself. |
+---------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| ETag | A string that identifies a particular version of |
| | the associated data. This profile RECOMMENDS |
| | that the ETag value be the ASCII HEX |
| | representation of the SHA-256 hash of the |
| | OCSPResponse structure. |
+---------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Cache-Control | Contains a number of caching directives. |
| | * max-age = < n > -where n is a time value later |
| | than thisUpdate but earlier than nextUpdate. |
| | * public -makes normally uncachable response |
| | cachable by both shared and nonshared caches. |
| | * no-transform -specifies that a proxy cache |
| | cannot change the type, length, or encoding of |
| | the object content. |
| | * must-revalidate -prevents caches from |
| | intentionally returning stale responses. |
+---------------+--------------------------------------------------+
Table 1: HTTP Headers
OCSP responders MUST NOT include a "Pragma: no-cache", "Cache-
Control: no-cache", or "Cache-Control: no-store" header in
authoritative OCSP responses.
OCSP responders SHOULD include one or more of these headers in non-
authoritative OCSP responses.
For example, assume that an OCSP response has the following timestamp
values:
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thisUpdate = March 19, 2023 01:00:00 GMT
nextUpdate = March 21, 2023 01:00:00 GMT
productedAt = March 19, 2023 01:00:00 GMT
and that an OCSP client requests the response on March 20, 2023
01:00:00 GMT. In this scenario, the HTTP response may look like
this:
Content-Type: application/ocsp-response
Content-Length: 1000
Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2023 01:00:00 GMT
Last-Modified: Sun, 19 Mar 2023 01:00:00 GMT
ETag: "97df3588b5a3f24babc3851b372f0ba7
1a9dcdded43b14b9d06961bfc1707d9d"
Expires: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 01:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: max-age=86000,public,no-transform,must-revalidate
<...>
OCSP clients MUST NOT include a no-cache header in OCSP request
messages, unless the client encounters an expired response which may
be a result of an intermediate proxy caching stale data. In this
situation, clients SHOULD resend the request specifying that proxies
should be bypassed by including an appropriate HTTP header in the
request (i.e., Pragma: no-cache or Cache-Control: no-cache).
7.3. Caching at Servers
In some scenarios, it is advantageous to include OCSP response
information within the protocol being utilized between the client and
server. Including OCSP responses in this manner has a few attractive
effects.
First, it allows for the caching of OCSP responses on the server,
thus lowering the number of hits to the OCSP responder.
Second, it enables certificate validation in the event the client is
not connected to a network and thus eliminates the need for clients
to establish a new HTTP session with the responder.
Third, it reduces the number of round trips the client needs to make
in order to complete a handshake.
Fourth, it simplifies the client-side OCSP implementation by enabling
a situation where the client need only the ability to parse and
recognize OCSP responses.
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This functionality has been specified as an extension to the TLS
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] protocol in Section 4.4.2 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis], but can be applied to any client-server
protocol.
This profile RECOMMENDS that both TLS clients and servers implement
the certificate status request extension mechanism for TLS.
Further information regarding caching issues can be obtained from
[RFC3143].
8. Security Considerations
The following considerations apply in addition to the security
considerations addressed in Section 5 of [RFC6960].
8.1. Replay Attacks
Because the use of nonces in this profile is optional, there is a
possibility that an out of date OCSP response could be replayed, thus
causing a client to accept a good response when in fact there is a
more up-to-date response that specifies the status of revoked. In
order to mitigate this attack, clients MUST have access to an
accurate source of time and ensure that the OCSP responses they
receive are sufficiently fresh.
Clients that do not have an accurate source of date and time are
vulnerable to service disruption. For example, a client with a
sufficiently fast clock may reject a fresh OCSP response. Similarly
a client with a sufficiently slow clock may incorrectly accept
expired valid responses for certificates that may in fact be revoked.
Future versions of the OCSP protocol may provide a way for the client
to know whether the server supports nonces or does not support
nonces. If a client can determine that the server supports nonces,
it MUST reject a reply that does not contain an expected nonce.
Otherwise, clients that opt to include a nonce in the request SHOULD
NOT reject a corresponding OCSPResponse solely on the basis of the
nonexistent expected nonce, but MUST fall back to validating the
OCSPResponse based on time.
8.2. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
To mitigate risk associated with this class of attack, the client
must properly validate the signature on the response.
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The use of signed responses in OCSP serves to authenticate the
identity of the OCSP responder and to verify that it is authorized to
sign responses on the CA's behalf.
Clients MUST ensure that they are communicating with an authorized
responder by the rules described in Section 4.2.2.2 of [RFC6960].
8.3. Impersonation Attacks
The use of signed responses in OCSP serves to authenticate the
identity of OCSP responder.
As detailed in [RFC6960], clients must properly validate the
signature of the OCSP response and the signature on the OCSP response
signer certificate to ensure an authorized responder created it.
8.4. Denial-of-Service Attacks
OCSP responders should take measures to prevent or mitigate denial-
of-service attacks. As this profile specifies the use of unsigned
OCSPRequests, access to the responder may be implicitly given to
everyone who can send a request to a responder, and thus the ability
to mount a denial-of-service attack via a flood of requests may be
greater. For example, a responder could limit the rate of incoming
requests from a particular IP address if questionable behavior is
detected.
8.5. Modification of HTTP Headers
Values included in HTTP headers, as described in Section 6 and
Section 7, are not cryptographically protected; they may be
manipulated by an attacker. Clients SHOULD use these values for
caching guidance only and ultimately SHOULD rely only on the values
present in the signed OCSPResponse. Clients SHOULD NOT rely on
cached responses beyond the nextUpdate time.
8.6. Request Authentication and Authorization
The suggested use of unsigned requests in this environment removes an
option that allows the responder to determine the authenticity of
incoming request. Thus, access to the responder may be implicitly
given to everyone who can send a request to a responder.
Environments where explicit authorization to access the OCSP
responder is necessary can utilize other mechanisms to authenticate
requestors or restrict or meter service.
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8.7. Use of SHA-1 for the calculation of CertID field values
Although the use of SHA-1 for the calculation of CertID field values
is not of concern from a cryptographic security standpoint, the
continued use of SHA-1 in an ecosystem requires that software that
interoperates with the ecosystem maintain support for SHA-1. This
increases implementation complexity and potential attack surface for
the software in question. Thus, the continued use of SHA-1 in an
ecosystem to maintain interoperability with legacy software must be
weighed against the increased implementation complexity and potential
attack surface.
9. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-10, 3 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8446bis-10>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3174] Eastlake 3rd, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
(SHA1)", RFC 3174, DOI 10.17487/RFC3174, September 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3174>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.
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[RFC5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5019>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6234>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[RFC9111] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9111>.
[RFC9500] Gutmann, P. and C. Bonnell, "Standard Public Key
Cryptography (PKC) Test Keys", RFC 9500,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9500, December 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9500>.
10.2. Informative References
[OCSPMP] Open Mobile Alliance, "OCSP Mobile Profile V1.0",
www.openmobilealliance.org .
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[RFC3143] Cooper, I. and J. Dilley, "Known HTTP Proxy/Caching
Problems", RFC 3143, DOI 10.17487/RFC3143, June 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3143>.
Appendix A. Differences from RFC 5019
This document obsoletes [RFC5019]. [RFC5019] defines a lightweight
profile for OCSP that makes the protocol more suitable for use in
high-volume environments. The lightweight profile specifies the
mandatory use of SHA-1 when calculating the values of several fields
in OCSP requests and responses. In recent years, weaknesses have
been demonstrated with the SHA-1 algorithm. As a result, SHA-1 is
increasingly falling out of use even for non-security relevant use
cases. This document obsoletes the lightweight profile as specified
in RFC 5019 to instead recommend the use of SHA-256 where SHA-1 was
previously required. An [RFC5019]-compliant OCSP client is still
able to use SHA-1, but the use of SHA-1 may become obsolete in the
future.
Substantive changes to RFC 5019:
* Section 3.1.1 requires new OCSP clients to use SHA-256 to support
migration for OCSP clients.
* Section 3.2.2 requires new OCSP responders to use the byKey field,
and support migration from byName fields.
* Section 6 clarifies that OCSP clients MUST NOT include whitespace
or any other characters that are not part of the base64 character
repertoire in the base64-encoded string.
Appendix B. Examples
B.1. Root Certification Authority Certificate
This is a self-signed certificate for the certification authority
that issued the end-entity certificate and OCSP delegated responder
example certificates below.
The the key pair for the certification authority is the "testECCP521"
key from [RFC9500], section 2.3.
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
0 552: SEQUENCE {
4 394: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 1: INTEGER 1
16 10: SEQUENCE {
18 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA512 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 4)
: }
28 56: SEQUENCE {
30 11: SET {
32 9: SEQUENCE {
34 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
39 2: PrintableString 'XX'
: }
: }
43 20: SET {
45 18: SEQUENCE {
47 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
52 11: UTF8String 'Certs 'r Us'
: }
: }
65 19: SET {
67 17: SEQUENCE {
69 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
74 10: UTF8String 'Issuing CA'
: }
: }
: }
86 30: SEQUENCE {
88 13: UTCTime 02/04/2024 12:37:47 GMT
103 13: UTCTime 02/04/2025 12:37:47 GMT
: }
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118 56: SEQUENCE {
120 11: SET {
122 9: SEQUENCE {
124 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
129 2: PrintableString 'XX'
: }
: }
133 20: SET {
135 18: SEQUENCE {
137 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
142 11: UTF8String 'Certs 'r Us'
: }
: }
155 19: SET {
157 17: SEQUENCE {
159 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
164 10: UTF8String 'Issuing CA'
: }
: }
: }
176 155: SEQUENCE {
179 16: SEQUENCE {
181 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1)
190 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp521r1 (1 3 132 0 35)
: }
197 134: BIT STRING
: 04 01 D0 FD 72 57 A8 4C 74 7F 56 25 75 C0 73 85
: DB EB F2 F5 2B EA 58 08 3D B8 2F DD 15 31 D8 AA
: E3 CC 87 5F F0 2F F7 FA 2D A2 60 D8 EB 62 D6 D2
: F5 D6 49 27 8E 32 17 36 A0 62 8C BB B3 03 08 B6
: E6 18 DB 00 F6 2A D2 04 C6 46 03 59 BC 81 8A B8
: 96 1B F0 F0 FC 0E C5 AA E8 A4 28 17 3C E5 6F 00
: DE 9B 15 7C 1E 5C 82 C6 4F 56 2F CA DE FC 4A 4C
: 28 F6 D3 42 CF 3E F6 16 FC 82 D3 3B 72 85 C9 21
: F2 BF 36 FD D8
: }
334 66: [3] {
336 64: SEQUENCE {
338 29: SEQUENCE {
340 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
345 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
347 20: OCTET STRING
: 8E C2 14 09 60 76 EA 90 38 E9 39 AE 1B 6D 52 C4
: 17 7D 9F BE
: }
: }
369 15: SEQUENCE {
371 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
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376 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
379 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
381 3: SEQUENCE {
383 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
: }
: }
: }
386 14: SEQUENCE {
388 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
393 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
396 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
398 2: BIT STRING 2 unused bits
: '100000'B (bit 5)
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
402 10: SEQUENCE {
404 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA512 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 4)
: }
414 139: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
418 135: SEQUENCE {
421 65: INTEGER
: 6E BF F5 48 98 87 0A 05 C6 10 9E D1 FB 77 AB D4
: B7 56 AA B7 59 1E 0B 42 C3 24 FB FB 01 41 20 99
: 95 B3 01 22 A2 6D 8B 1A 1F E8 32 EB B9 98 3F AE
: FF EA 35 9B 4E EF 9A 66 63 FF E8 A9 1A 9F 13 23
: 09
488 66: INTEGER
: 00 A8 67 86 C7 B5 EE 97 90 59 BB 85 45 DA B1 C2
: CD EE F9 2F EE A2 B0 5F 24 EC 0A F2 03 A4 40 D3
: 44 25 FC 75 41 5E EF 78 C6 79 B8 AD 92 E9 91 1E
: 35 61 94 12 4B A3 B9 F7 14 C2 6B 14 73 68 79 B9
: 4C 6F
: }
: }
: }
B.2. End-entity Certificate
This is an end-entity certificate whose status is requested and
returned in the OCSP request and response examples below.
The the key pair for the end-entity certificate is the "testECCP256"
key from [RFC9500], section 2.3.
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
0 475: SEQUENCE {
4 316: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 4: INTEGER 27979789
19 10: SEQUENCE {
21 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA512 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 4)
: }
31 56: SEQUENCE {
33 11: SET {
35 9: SEQUENCE {
37 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
42 2: PrintableString 'XX'
: }
: }
46 20: SET {
48 18: SEQUENCE {
50 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
55 11: UTF8String 'Certs 'r Us'
: }
: }
68 19: SET {
70 17: SEQUENCE {
72 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
77 10: UTF8String 'Issuing CA'
: }
: }
: }
89 30: SEQUENCE {
91 13: UTCTime 02/04/2024 12:37:47 GMT
106 13: UTCTime 02/04/2025 12:37:47 GMT
: }
121 28: SEQUENCE {
123 26: SET {
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125 24: SEQUENCE {
127 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
132 17: UTF8String 'xn--18j4d.example'
: }
: }
: }
151 89: SEQUENCE {
153 19: SEQUENCE {
155 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1)
164 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER prime256v1 (1 2 840 10045 3 1 7)
: }
174 66: BIT STRING
: 04 42 25 48 F8 8F B7 82 FF B5 EC A3 74 44 52 C7
: 2A 1E 55 8F BD 6F 73 BE 5E 48 E9 32 32 CC 45 C5
: B1 6C 4C D1 0C 4C B8 D5 B8 A1 71 39 E9 48 82 C8
: 99 25 72 99 34 25 F4 14 19 AB 7E 90 A4 2A 49 42
: 72
: }
242 80: [3] {
244 78: SEQUENCE {
246 29: SEQUENCE {
248 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
253 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
255 20: OCTET STRING
: 5B 70 A7 98 17 F7 9F F6 37 D2 F7 E3 DC 44 6C 21
: 09 D7 BB D4
: }
: }
277 31: SEQUENCE {
279 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
284 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
286 22: SEQUENCE {
288 20: [0]
: 8E C2 14 09 60 76 EA 90 38 E9 39 AE 1B 6D 52 C4
: 17 7D 9F BE
: }
: }
: }
310 12: SEQUENCE {
312 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
317 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
320 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
322 0: SEQUENCE {}
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
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324 10: SEQUENCE {
326 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA512 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 4)
: }
336 140: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
340 136: SEQUENCE {
343 66: INTEGER
: 00 8A 2D F1 26 0D 16 44 9C AD CB 18 E5 3F 35 1D
: 29 8D CE 13 FF D0 60 BC EC DD D6 23 CE 3D 08 DD
: 2A 98 D6 B4 9C C5 D6 F0 79 C3 28 64 79 9E FF C3
: F7 1F 93 F2 E2 CC 06 5A 45 51 69 87 42 65 C0 24
: F3 7C
411 66: INTEGER
: 01 5B C0 34 5E C8 B2 3C 9C 99 7D A6 62 78 E0 E6
: B6 7A 08 A1 B6 4F F9 E4 CB 35 69 06 50 52 FA B8
: 2B 4B B5 09 98 B6 B5 E9 2C 02 5F BE 41 3A 59 85
: 6A 09 49 78 F7 92 B1 F6 5E 8C F5 30 4B 2B 95 FA
: 57 7C
: }
: }
: }
B.3. OCSP Responder Certificate
This is a certificate for the OCSP delegated response that signed the
OCSP response example below.
The the key pair for the OCSP Responder certificate is the
"testECCP384" key from [RFC9500], section 2.3.
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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0 587: SEQUENCE {
4 430: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 1: INTEGER 1
16 10: SEQUENCE {
18 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA512 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 4)
: }
28 56: SEQUENCE {
30 11: SET {
32 9: SEQUENCE {
34 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
39 2: PrintableString 'XX'
: }
: }
43 20: SET {
45 18: SEQUENCE {
47 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
52 11: UTF8String 'Certs 'r Us'
: }
: }
65 19: SET {
67 17: SEQUENCE {
69 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
74 10: UTF8String 'Issuing CA'
: }
: }
: }
86 30: SEQUENCE {
88 13: UTCTime 02/04/2024 12:37:47 GMT
103 13: UTCTime 02/04/2025 12:37:47 GMT
: }
118 60: SEQUENCE {
120 11: SET {
122 9: SEQUENCE {
124 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
129 2: PrintableString 'XX'
: }
: }
133 20: SET {
135 18: SEQUENCE {
137 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
142 11: UTF8String 'Certs 'r Us'
: }
: }
155 23: SET {
157 21: SEQUENCE {
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159 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
164 14: UTF8String 'OCSP Responder'
: }
: }
: }
180 118: SEQUENCE {
182 16: SEQUENCE {
184 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1)
193 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp384r1 (1 3 132 0 34)
: }
200 98: BIT STRING
: 04 5B 09 01 B8 85 23 29 6E B9 19 D5 0F FA 1A 9C
: B3 74 BC 4D 40 95 86 28 2B FE CA 11 B1 D9 5A DB
: B5 47 34 AF 57 0B F8 2B 72 28 CF 22 6B CF 4C 25
: DD BC FE 3B 1A 3A D3 94 30 EF F7 63 E1 D6 8D 2E
: 15 1D 91 72 0B 77 95 B5 8D A6 B3 46 39 61 3A 8F
: B9 B5 A8 DA 48 C6 74 71 17 F9 91 9E 84 24 F3 7E
: C8
: }
300 135: [3] {
303 132: SEQUENCE {
306 29: SEQUENCE {
308 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
313 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
315 20: OCTET STRING
: 0A E3 A0 FE 9D D4 25 76 98 B5 EB 72 EB CA 0C E7
: BF 3D F5 F1
: }
: }
337 31: SEQUENCE {
339 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
344 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
346 22: SEQUENCE {
348 20: [0]
: 8E C2 14 09 60 76 EA 90 38 E9 39 AE 1B 6D 52 C4
: 17 7D 9F BE
: }
: }
: }
370 12: SEQUENCE {
372 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
377 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
380 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
382 0: SEQUENCE {}
: }
: }
384 14: SEQUENCE {
386 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
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391 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
394 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
396 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits
: '1'B (bit 0)
: }
: }
400 19: SEQUENCE {
402 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER extKeyUsage (2 5 29 37)
407 12: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
409 10: SEQUENCE {
411 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ocspSigning (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 9)
: }
: }
: }
421 15: SEQUENCE {
423 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ocspNoCheck (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 5)
434 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
436 0: NULL
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
438 10: SEQUENCE {
440 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA512 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 4)
: }
450 138: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
454 134: SEQUENCE {
457 65: INTEGER
: 14 2A 8C D6 0A 6C 65 C7 74 65 DF 11 5B C1 FF F8
: BE 0E 21 B4 DA 1A DA 53 D9 06 34 A5 DE 89 07 0F
: 75 94 5A 8D 0B 18 FE 17 59 3D 5C 9A CA 49 00 15
: 54 06 BF 6F 72 5A 64 EB 11 AC 7E AF 8A 19 4E DC
: C6
524 65: INTEGER
: 49 0B 0B 49 A6 2E E6 D3 44 31 F6 BF EE 80 D5 AC
: 9C 21 52 88 A5 1D C6 EB E3 EE 68 3D 94 9B 73 D2
: 17 B1 44 96 4A 14 E0 D6 24 6E 5D 52 1F FF 05 CD
: B0 F2 FC B0 81 86 28 76 E5 EE E1 02 DC A0 FD 7B
: 08
: }
: }
: }
B.4. OCSP Request
This is a base64-encoded OCSP request for the end-entity certificate
above.
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MGEwXzBdMFswWTANBglghkgBZQMEAgEFAAQgOplGd1aAc6cHv95QGGNF5M1hNNsI
Xrqh0QQl8DtvCOoEIEdKbKMB8j3J9/cHhwThx/X8lucWdfbtiC56tlw/WEVDAgQB
qvAN
0 97: SEQUENCE {
2 95: SEQUENCE {
4 93: SEQUENCE {
6 91: SEQUENCE {
8 89: SEQUENCE {
10 13: SEQUENCE {
12 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)
23 0: NULL
: }
25 32: OCTET STRING
: 3A 99 46 77 56 80 73 A7 07 BF DE 50 18 63 45 E4
: CD 61 34 DB 08 5E BA A1 D1 04 25 F0 3B 6F 08 EA
59 32: OCTET STRING
: 47 4A 6C A3 01 F2 3D C9 F7 F7 07 87 04 E1 C7 F5
: FC 96 E7 16 75 F6 ED 88 2E 7A B6 5C 3F 58 45 43
93 4: INTEGER 27979789
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
B.5. OCSP Response
This is a base64-encoded OCSP response for the end-entity certificate
above.
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MIIDnwoBAKCCA5gwggOUBgkrBgEFBQcwAQEEggOFMIIDgTCBsKIWBBQK46D+ndQl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0 927: SEQUENCE {
4 1: ENUMERATED 0
7 920: [0] {
11 916: SEQUENCE {
15 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ocspBasic (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 1)
26 901: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
30 897: SEQUENCE {
34 176: SEQUENCE {
37 22: [2] {
39 20: OCTET STRING
: 0A E3 A0 FE 9D D4 25 76 98 B5 EB 72 EB CA 0C E7
: BF 3D F5 F1
: }
61 15: GeneralizedTime 02/04/2024 12:37:47 GMT
78 132: SEQUENCE {
81 129: SEQUENCE {
84 89: SEQUENCE {
86 13: SEQUENCE {
88 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha-256 (2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1)
99 0: NULL
: }
101 32: OCTET STRING
: 3A 99 46 77 56 80 73 A7 07 BF DE 50 18 63 45 E4
: CD 61 34 DB 08 5E BA A1 D1 04 25 F0 3B 6F 08 EA
135 32: OCTET STRING
: 47 4A 6C A3 01 F2 3D C9 F7 F7 07 87 04 E1 C7 F5
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: FC 96 E7 16 75 F6 ED 88 2E 7A B6 5C 3F 58 45 43
169 4: INTEGER 27979789
: }
175 0: [0]
177 15: GeneralizedTime 03/04/2024 12:37:47 GMT
194 17: [0] {
196 15: GeneralizedTime 10/04/2024 12:37:47 GMT
: }
: }
: }
: }
213 10: SEQUENCE {
215 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: ecdsaWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3)
: }
225 105: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
228 102: SEQUENCE {
230 49: INTEGER
: 00 D1 99 59 A2 21 BE 03 9B DC 84 5E 2B F6 5E DA
: 1E 42 2E 9F B6 98 CB 9A 50 6A A9 12 22 FB 78 6D
: 7C 5F CE CA 37 47 9C 5B A1 DF C7 10 29 8A AA AD
: 66
281 49: INTEGER
: 00 CA 88 F7 2D 56 EE D2 42 CE 7C ED DD 99 04 41
: D0 1F 6D 23 E4 01 62 18 6B 1B 23 56 F7 F8 2F 59
: 2B A3 48 CE 00 FA 0E 75 A5 0F 0A 52 7E 29 44 6A
: B3
: }
: }
332 595: [0] {
336 591: SEQUENCE {
340 587: SEQUENCE {
344 430: SEQUENCE {
348 3: [0] {
350 1: INTEGER 2
: }
353 1: INTEGER 1
356 10: SEQUENCE {
358 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: ecdsaWithSHA512 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 4)
: }
368 56: SEQUENCE {
370 11: SET {
372 9: SEQUENCE {
374 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
379 2: PrintableString 'XX'
: }
: }
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383 20: SET {
385 18: SEQUENCE {
387 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: organizationName (2 5 4 10)
392 11: UTF8String 'Certs 'r Us'
: }
: }
405 19: SET {
407 17: SEQUENCE {
409 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
414 10: UTF8String 'Issuing CA'
: }
: }
: }
426 30: SEQUENCE {
428 13: UTCTime 02/04/2024 12:37:47 GMT
443 13: UTCTime 02/04/2025 12:37:47 GMT
: }
458 60: SEQUENCE {
460 11: SET {
462 9: SEQUENCE {
464 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
469 2: PrintableString 'XX'
: }
: }
473 20: SET {
475 18: SEQUENCE {
477 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: organizationName (2 5 4 10)
482 11: UTF8String 'Certs 'r Us'
: }
: }
495 23: SET {
497 21: SEQUENCE {
499 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
504 14: UTF8String 'OCSP Responder'
: }
: }
: }
520 118: SEQUENCE {
522 16: SEQUENCE {
524 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1)
533 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: secp384r1 (1 3 132 0 34)
: }
540 98: BIT STRING
: 04 5B 09 01 B8 85 23 29 6E B9 19 D5 0F FA 1A 9C
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: B3 74 BC 4D 40 95 86 28 2B FE CA 11 B1 D9 5A DB
: B5 47 34 AF 57 0B F8 2B 72 28 CF 22 6B CF 4C 25
: DD BC FE 3B 1A 3A D3 94 30 EF F7 63 E1 D6 8D 2E
: 15 1D 91 72 0B 77 95 B5 8D A6 B3 46 39 61 3A 8F
: B9 B5 A8 DA 48 C6 74 71 17 F9 91 9E 84 24 F3 7E
: C8
: }
640 135: [3] {
643 132: SEQUENCE {
646 29: SEQUENCE {
648 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
653 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
655 20: OCTET STRING
: 0A E3 A0 FE 9D D4 25 76 98 B5 EB 72 EB CA 0C E7
: BF 3D F5 F1
: }
: }
677 31: SEQUENCE {
679 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
684 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
686 22: SEQUENCE {
688 20: [0]
: 8E C2 14 09 60 76 EA 90 38 E9 39 AE 1B 6D 52 C4
: 17 7D 9F BE
: }
: }
: }
710 12: SEQUENCE {
712 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
717 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
720 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
722 0: SEQUENCE {}
: }
: }
724 14: SEQUENCE {
726 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
731 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
734 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
736 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits
: '1'B (bit 0)
: }
: }
740 19: SEQUENCE {
742 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: extKeyUsage (2 5 29 37)
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747 12: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
749 10: SEQUENCE {
751 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: ocspSigning (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 9)
: }
: }
: }
761 15: SEQUENCE {
763 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: ocspNoCheck (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 5)
774 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
776 0: NULL
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
778 10: SEQUENCE {
780 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: ecdsaWithSHA512 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 4)
: }
790 138: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
794 134: SEQUENCE {
797 65: INTEGER
: 14 2A 8C D6 0A 6C 65 C7 74 65 DF 11 5B C1 FF F8
: BE 0E 21 B4 DA 1A DA 53 D9 06 34 A5 DE 89 07 0F
: 75 94 5A 8D 0B 18 FE 17 59 3D 5C 9A CA 49 00 15
: 54 06 BF 6F 72 5A 64 EB 11 AC 7E AF 8A 19 4E DC
: C6
864 65: INTEGER
: 49 0B 0B 49 A6 2E E6 D3 44 31 F6 BF EE 80 D5 AC
: 9C 21 52 88 A5 1D C6 EB E3 EE 68 3D 94 9B 73 D2
: 17 B1 44 96 4A 14 E0 D6 24 6E 5D 52 1F FF 05 CD
: B0 F2 FC B0 81 86 28 76 E5 EE E1 02 DC A0 FD 7B
: 08
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
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Acknowledgments
The authors of this version of the document wish to thank Alex Deacon
and Ryan Hurst for their work to produce the original version of the
lightweight profile for the OCSP protocol.
The authors of this version of the document wish to thank Paul
Kyzivat, Russ Housley, Rob Stradling, Roman Danyliw, and Wendy Brown
for their reviews, feedback, and suggestions.
The authors wish to thank Magnus Nystrom of RSA Security, Inc.,
Jagjeet Sondh of Vodafone Group R&D, and David Engberg of CoreStreet,
Ltd. for their contributions to the original [RFC5019] specification.
Listed organizational affiliations reflect the author’s affiliation
at the time of RFC5019 was published.
Authors' Addresses
Tadahiko Ito
SECOM CO., LTD.
Email: tadahiko.ito.public@gmail.com
Additional contact information:
伊藤 忠彦
SECOM CO., LTD.
Clint Wilson
Apple, Inc.
Email: clintw@apple.com
Corey Bonnell
DigiCert, Inc.
Email: corey.bonnell@digicert.com
Sean Turner
sn3rd
Email: sean@sn3rd.com
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