SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials (SD-JWT VC)
draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-03
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Oliver Terbu , Daniel Fett , Brian Campbell | ||
| Last updated | 2024-03-04 | ||
| Replaces | draft-terbu-oauth-sd-jwt-vc | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-03
Web Authorization Protocol O. Terbu
Internet-Draft MATTR
Intended status: Standards Track D. Fett
Expires: 5 September 2024 Authlete Inc.
B. Campbell
Ping Identity
4 March 2024
SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials (SD-JWT VC)
draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-03
Abstract
This specification describes data formats as well as validation and
processing rules to express Verifiable Credentials with JSON payloads
with and without selective disclosure based on the SD-JWT
[I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt] format.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization
Protocol Working Group mailing list (oauth@ietf.org), which is
archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-sd-jwt-vc.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 September 2024.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. SD-JWT as a Credential Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Verifiable Credentials based on SD-JWT . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Media Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Data Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2. JWT Claims Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. Verification and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5. Issuer-signed JWT Verification Key Validation . . . . . . 13
4. Presenting Verifiable Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1. Key Binding JWT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. JWT VC Issuer Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.3. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.1. Server-Side Request Forgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.2. Ecosystem-specific Public Key Verification Methods . . . 19
7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1. Unlinkability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.2. Verifiable Credential Type Identifier . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.3. Issuer Phone-Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. Relationships to Other Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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Appendix A. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.2. Media Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.2.1. application/vc+sd-jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.3. Well-Known URI Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix B. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B.1. Example 1: Person Identification Data (PID) Credential . 24
Appendix C. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix D. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Introduction
1.1. Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model
In the so-called Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model, Issuers issue so-
called Verifiable Credentials to a Holder, who can then present the
Verifiable Credentials to Verifiers. Verifiable Credentials are
cryptographically signed statements about a Subject, typically the
Holder.
+------------+
| |
| Issuer |
| |
+------------+
|
Issues Verifiable Credential
|
v
+------------+
| |
| Holder |
| |
+------------+
|
Presents Verifiable Credential
|
v
+-------------+
| |+ +------------+
| Verifiers ||+ | Status |
| |||----- optionally ------->| Provider |
+-------------+|| retrieve status of | |
+-------------+| Verifiable Credential +------------+
+-------------+
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Figure 1: Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model with optional Status Provider
Verifiers can check the authenticity of the data in the Verifiable
Credentials and optionally enforce Key Binding, i.e., ask the Holder
to prove that they are the intended holder of the Verifiable
Credential, for example, by proving possession of a cryptographic key
referenced in the credential. This process is further described in
[I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt].
To support revocation of Verifiable Credentials, revocation
information can optionally be retrieved from a Status Provider. The
role of a Status Provider can be fulfilled by either a fourth party
or by the Issuer.
1.2. SD-JWT as a Credential Format
JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [RFC7519] can in principle be used to express
Verifiable Credentials in a way that is easy to understand and
process as it builds upon established web primitives.
Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT)
[I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt] is a specification that
introduces conventions to support selective disclosure for JWTs: For
an SD-JWT document, a Holder can decide which claims to release
(within bounds defined by the Issuer).
SD-JWT is a superset of JWT as it can also be used when there are no
selectively disclosable claims and also supports JWS JSON
serialization, which is useful for long term archiving and multi
signatures. However, SD-JWT itself does not define the claims that
must be used within the payload or their semantics.
This specification uses SD-JWT and the well-established JWT content
rules and extensibility model as basis for representing Verifiable
Credentials with JSON payloads. These Verifiable Credentials are
called SD-JWT VCs. The use of selective disclosure in SD-JWT VCs is
OPTIONAL.
SD-JWTs VC can contain claims that are registered in "JSON Web Token
Claims" registry as defined in [RFC7519], as well as public and
private claims.
Note: This specification does not utilize the W3C's Verifiable
Credentials Data Model v1.0, v1.1, or v2.0.
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1.3. Requirements Notation and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119].
1.4. Terms and Definitions
This specification uses the terms "Holder", "Issuer", "Verifier",
"Key Binding", and "Key Binding JWT" defined by
[I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt].
Verifiable Credential (VC): An Issuer-signed assertion with claims
about a Subject.
SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credential (SD-JWT VC): A Verifiable
Credential encoded using the format defined in
[I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt]. It may or may not
contain selectively disclosable claims.
Unsecured Payload of an SD-JWT VC: A JSON object containing all
selectively disclosable and non-selectively disclosable claims of
the SD-JWT VC. The Unsecured Payload acts as the input JSON
object to issue an SD-JWT VC complying to this specification.
Status Provider: An entity that provides status information (e.g.
revocation) about a Verifiable Credential.
2. Scope
* This specification defines
- Data model and media types for Verifiable Credentials based on
SD-JWTs.
- Validation and processing rules for Verifiers and Holders.
3. Verifiable Credentials based on SD-JWT
This section defines encoding, validation and processing rules for
SD-JWT VCs.
3.1. Media Type
SD-JWT VCs compliant with this specification MUST use the media type
application/vc+sd-jwt as defined in Appendix A.2.1.
3.2. Data Format
SD-JWT VCs MUST be encoded using the SD-JWT format defined in
Section 5 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt]. A
presentation of an SD-JWT VC MAY contain a Key Binding JWT.
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Note that in some cases, an SD-JWT VC MAY have no selectively
disclosable claims, and therefore the encoded SD-JWT will not contain
any Disclosures.
3.2.1. JOSE Header
This section defines JWT header parameters for the SD-JWT component
of the SD-JWT VC.
The typ header parameter of the SD-JWT MUST be present. The typ
value MUST use vc+sd-jwt. This indicates that the payload of the SD-
JWT contains plain JSON and follows the rules as defined in this
specification. It further indicates that the SD-JWT is a SD-JWT
component of a SD-JWT VC.
The following is a non-normative example of a decoded SD-JWT header:
{
"alg": "ES256",
"typ": "vc+sd-jwt"
}
3.2.2. JWT Claims Set
This section defines the claims that can be included in the payload
of SD-JWT VCs.
3.2.2.1. New JWT Claims
3.2.2.1.1. Verifiable Credential Type - vct Claim
This specification defines the JWT claim vct (for verifiable
credential type). The vct value MUST be a case-sensitive StringOrURI
(see [RFC7519]) value serving as an identifier for the type of the
SD-JWT VC. The vct value MUST be a Collision-Resistant Name as
defined in Section 2 of [RFC7515].
A type is associated with rules defining which claims may or must
appear in the Unsecured Payload of the SD-JWT VC and whether they
may, must, or must not be selectively disclosable. This
specification does not define any vct values; instead it is expected
that ecosystems using SD-JWT VCs define such values including the
semantics of the respective claims and associated rules (e.g.,
policies for issuing and validating credentials beyond what is
defined in this specification).
The following is a non-normative example of how vct is used to
express a type:
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{
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential"
}
For example, a value of https://credentials.example.com/
identity_credential can be associated with rules that define that at
least the registered JWT claims given_name, family_name, birthdate,
and address must appear in the Unsecured Payload. Additionally, the
registered JWT claims email and phone_number, and the private claims
is_over_18, is_over_21, and is_over_65 may be used. The type might
also indicate that any of the aforementioned claims can be
selectively disclosable.
3.2.2.2. Registered JWT Claims
SD-JWT VCs MAY use any claim registered in the "JSON Web Token
Claims" registry as defined in [RFC7519].
If present, the following registered JWT claims MUST be included in
the SD-JWT and MUST NOT be included in the Disclosures, i.e. cannot
be selectively disclosed:
* iss
- REQUIRED. The Issuer of the Verifiable Credential. The value
of iss MUST be a URI. See [RFC7519] for more information.
* nbf
- OPTIONAL. The time before which the Verifiable Credential MUST
NOT be accepted before validating. See [RFC7519] for more
information.
* exp
- OPTIONAL. The expiry time of the Verifiable Credential after
which the Verifiable Credential is no longer valid. See
[RFC7519] for more information.
* cnf
- OPTIONAL unless cryptographic Key Binding is to be supported,
in which case it is REQUIRED. Contains the confirmation method
identifying the proof of possession key as defined in
[RFC7800]. It is RECOMMENDED that this contains a JWK as
defined in Section 3.2 of [RFC7800]. For proof of
cryptographic Key Binding, the Key Binding JWT in the
presentation of the SD-JWT MUST be signed by the key identified
in this claim.
* vct
- REQUIRED. The type of the Verifiable Credential, e.g.,
https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential, as defined
in Section 3.2.2.1.1.
* status
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- OPTIONAL. The information on how to read the status of the
Verifiable Credential. See
[I-D.looker-oauth-jwt-cwt-status-list] for more information.
The following registered JWT claims MAY be contained in the SD-JWT or
in the Disclosures and MAY be selectively disclosed:
* sub
- OPTIONAL. The identifier of the Subject of the Verifiable
Credential. The Issuer MAY use it to provide the Subject
identifier known by the Issuer. There is no requirement for a
binding to exist between sub and cnf claims.
* iat
- OPTIONAL. The time of issuance of the Verifiable Credential.
See [RFC7519] for more information.
3.2.2.3. Public JWT claims
Additional public claims MAY be used in SD-JWT VCs depending on the
application.
3.2.2.4. SD-JWT VC without Selectively Disclosable Claims
An SD-JWT VC MAY have no selectively disclosable claims. In that
case, the SD-JWT VC MUST NOT contain the _sd claim in the JWT body.
It also MUST NOT have any Disclosures.
3.3. Example
The following is a non-normative example of an unsecured payload of
an SD-JWT VC.
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{
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
"given_name": "John",
"family_name": "Doe",
"email": "johndoe@example.com",
"phone_number": "+1-202-555-0101",
"address": {
"street_address": "123 Main St",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"
},
"birthdate": "1940-01-01",
"is_over_18": true,
"is_over_21": true,
"is_over_65": true
}
The following is a non-normative example of how the unsecured payload
of the SD-JWT VC above can be used in a SD-JWT where the resulting
SD-JWT VC contains only claims about the Subject that are selectively
disclosable:
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{
"_sd": [
"09vKrJMOlyTWM0sjpu_pdOBVBQ2M1y3KhpH515nXkpY",
"2rsjGbaC0ky8mT0pJrPioWTq0_daw1sX76poUlgCwbI",
"EkO8dhW0dHEJbvUHlE_VCeuC9uRELOieLZhh7XbUTtA",
"IlDzIKeiZdDwpqpK6ZfbyphFvz5FgnWa-sN6wqQXCiw",
"JzYjH4svliH0R3PyEMfeZu6Jt69u5qehZo7F7EPYlSE",
"PorFbpKuVu6xymJagvkFsFXAbRoc2JGlAUA2BA4o7cI",
"TGf4oLbgwd5JQaHyKVQZU9UdGE0w5rtDsrZzfUaomLo",
"jdrTE8YcbY4EifugihiAe_BPekxJQZICeiUQwY9QqxI",
"jsu9yVulwQQlhFlM_3JlzMaSFzglhQG0DpfayQwLUK4"
],
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"iat": 1683000000,
"exp": 1883000000,
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
"_sd_alg": "sha-256",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
}
}
Note that a cnf claim has been added to the SD-JWT payload to express
the confirmation method of the Key Binding.
The following are the Disclosures belonging to the SD-JWT payload
above:
*Claim given_name*:
* SHA-256 Hash: jsu9yVulwQQlhFlM_3JlzMaSFzglhQG0DpfayQwLUK4
* Disclosure:
WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiSm9o
biJd
* Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "given_name", "John"]
*Claim family_name*:
* SHA-256 Hash: TGf4oLbgwd5JQaHyKVQZU9UdGE0w5rtDsrZzfUaomLo
* Disclosure:
WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkRv
ZSJd
* Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "family_name", "Doe"]
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*Claim email*:
* SHA-256 Hash: JzYjH4svliH0R3PyEMfeZu6Jt69u5qehZo7F7EPYlSE
* Disclosure:
WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImVtYWlsIiwgImpvaG5kb2VA
ZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXQ
* Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "email",
"johndoe@example.com"]
*Claim phone_number*:
* SHA-256 Hash: PorFbpKuVu6xymJagvkFsFXAbRoc2JGlAUA2BA4o7cI
* Disclosure:
WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInBob25lX251bWJlciIsICIr
MS0yMDItNTU1LTAxMDEiXQ
* Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "phone_number",
"+1-202-555-0101"]
*Claim address*:
* SHA-256 Hash: IlDzIKeiZdDwpqpK6ZfbyphFvz5FgnWa-sN6wqQXCiw
* Disclosure:
WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVl
dF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRv
d24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiVVMifV0
* Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "address", {"street_address":
"123 Main St", "locality": "Anytown", "region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"}]
*Claim birthdate*:
* SHA-256 Hash: jdrTE8YcbY4EifugihiAe_BPekxJQZICeiUQwY9QqxI
* Disclosure:
WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTQw
LTAxLTAxIl0
* Contents: ["AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA", "birthdate", "1940-01-01"]
*Claim is_over_18*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 09vKrJMOlyTWM0sjpu_pdOBVBQ2M1y3KhpH515nXkpY
* Disclosure:
WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMTgiLCB0cnVl
XQ
* Contents: ["Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ", "is_over_18", true]
*Claim is_over_21*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 2rsjGbaC0ky8mT0pJrPioWTq0_daw1sX76poUlgCwbI
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* Disclosure:
WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMjEiLCB0cnVl
XQ
* Contents: ["G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA", "is_over_21", true]
*Claim is_over_65*:
* SHA-256 Hash: EkO8dhW0dHEJbvUHlE_VCeuC9uRELOieLZhh7XbUTtA
* Disclosure:
WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLCB0cnVl
XQ
* Contents: ["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "is_over_65", true]
The SD-JWT and the Disclosures would then be serialized by the Issuer
into the following format for issuance to the Holder:
eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogInZjK3NkLWp3dCIsICJraWQiOiAiZG9jLXNp
Z25lci0wNS0yNS0yMDIyIn0.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjA5dktySk1PbHlUV00wc2pwdV9wZE9C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.D43eE
W1ae2yAzhzriJuBz-_cgX1wwNJIgNMjsdO28QE0fU8KC8ugjTPaylIp48HMVS0xV2wDQ
9bl1zFzlbDULg~WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLC
AiSm9obiJd~WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgI
kRvZSJd~WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImVtYWlsIiwgImpvaG5kb2VA
ZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXQ~WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInBob25lX251b
WJlciIsICIrMS0yMDItNTU1LTAxMDEiXQ~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIi
wgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2
FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOi
AiVVMifV0~WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOT
QwLTAxLTAxIl0~WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMTgiLC
B0cnVlXQ~WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMjEiLCB0cnV
lXQ~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLCB0cnVlXQ~
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3.4. Verification and Processing
The recipient (Holder or Verifier) of an SD-JWT VC MUST process and
verify an SD-JWT VC as described in Section 8 of
[I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt].
If Key Binding is required (refer to the security considerations in
Section 11.6 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt]), the
Verifier MUST verify the Key Binding JWT according to Section 8 of
[I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt]. To verify the Key Binding
JWT, the cnf claim of the SD-JWT MUST be used.
Furthermore, the recipient of the SD-JWT VC MUST validate that the
public verification key for the Issuer-signed JWT as defined in
Section 3.5.
If there are no selectively disclosable claims, there is no need to
process the _sd claim nor any Disclosures.
If status is present in the verified payload of the SD-JWT, the
status SHOULD be checked. It depends on the Verifier policy to
reject or accept a presentation of a SD-JWT VC based on the status of
the Verifiable Credential.
Any claims used that are not understood MUST be ignored.
Additional validation rules MAY apply, but their use is out of the
scope of this specification.
3.5. Issuer-signed JWT Verification Key Validation
A recipient of an SD-JWT VC MUST apply the following rules to
validate that the public verification key for the Issuer-signed JWT
corresponds to the iss value:
* JWT VC Issuer Metadata: If a recipient supports JWT VC Issuer
Metadata and if the iss value contains an HTTPS URI, the recipient
MUST obtain the public key using JWT VC Issuer Metadata as defined
in Section 5.
* X.509 Certificates: If the recipient supports X.509 Certificates,
the recipient MUST obtain the public key from the leaf X.509
certificate defined by the x5c JWT header parameters of the
Issuer-signed JWT and validate the X.509 certificate chain in the
following cases:
- If the iss value contains a DNS name encoded as a URI using the
DNS URI scheme [RFC4501], the DNS name MUST match a dNSName
Subject Alternative Name (SAN) [RFC5280] entry of the leaf
certificate.
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- In all other cases, the iss value MUST match a
uniformResourceIdentifier SAN entry of the leaf certificate.
* DID Document Resolution: If a recipient supports DID Document
Resolution and if the iss value contains a DID [W3C.DID], the
recipient MUST retrieve the public key from the DID Document
resolved from the DID in the iss value. In this case, if the kid
JWT header parameter is present, the kid MUST be a relative or
absolute DID URL of the DID in the iss value, identifying the
public key.
Separate specifications or ecosystem regulations MAY define rules
complementing the rules defined above, but such rules are out of
scope of this specification. See Section 6.2 for security
considerations.
If a recipient cannot validate that the public verification key
corresponds to the iss value of the Issuer-signed JWT, the SD-JWT VC
MUST be rejected.
4. Presenting Verifiable Credentials
This section defines encoding, validation and processing rules for
presentations of SD-JWT VCs.
4.1. Key Binding JWT
If the presentation of the SD-JWT VC includes a Key Binding JWT, the
Key Binding JWT MUST adhere to the rules defined in Section 5.3 of
[I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt].
The Key Binding JWT MAY include additional claims which, when not
understood, MUST be ignored by the Verifier.
4.2. Examples
The following is a non-normative example of a presentation of the SD-
JWT shown above including a Key Binding JWT:
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eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogInZjK3NkLWp3dCIsICJraWQiOiAiZG9jLXNp
Z25lci0wNS0yNS0yMDIyIn0.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjA5dktySk1PbHlUV00wc2pwdV9wZE9C
VkJRMk0xeTNLaHBINTE1blhrcFkiLCAiMnJzakdiYUMwa3k4bVQwcEpyUGlvV1RxMF9k
YXcxc1g3NnBvVWxnQ3diSSIsICJFa084ZGhXMGRIRUpidlVIbEVfVkNldUM5dVJFTE9p
ZUxaaGg3WGJVVHRBIiwgIklsRHpJS2VpWmREd3BxcEs2WmZieXBoRnZ6NUZnbldhLXNO
NndxUVhDaXciLCAiSnpZakg0c3ZsaUgwUjNQeUVNZmVadTZKdDY5dTVxZWhabzdGN0VQ
WWxTRSIsICJQb3JGYnBLdVZ1Nnh5bUphZ3ZrRnNGWEFiUm9jMkpHbEFVQTJCQTRvN2NJ
IiwgIlRHZjRvTGJnd2Q1SlFhSHlLVlFaVTlVZEdFMHc1cnREc3JaemZVYW9tTG8iLCAi
amRyVEU4WWNiWTRFaWZ1Z2loaUFlX0JQZWt4SlFaSUNlaVVRd1k5UXF4SSIsICJqc3U5
eVZ1bHdRUWxoRmxNXzNKbHpNYVNGemdsaFFHMERwZmF5UXdMVUs0Il0sICJpc3MiOiAi
aHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc3N1ZXIiLCAiaWF0IjogMTY4MzAwMDAwMCwgImV4
cCI6IDE4ODMwMDAwMDAsICJ2Y3QiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9jcmVkZW50aWFscy5leGFtcGxl
LmNvbS9pZGVudGl0eV9jcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIl9zZF9hbGciOiAic2hhLTI1NiIsICJj
bmYiOiB7Imp3ayI6IHsia3R5IjogIkVDIiwgImNydiI6ICJQLTI1NiIsICJ4IjogIlRD
QUVSMTladnUzT0hGNGo0VzR2ZlNWb0hJUDFJTGlsRGxzN3ZDZUdlbWMiLCAieSI6ICJa
eGppV1diWk1RR0hWV0tWUTRoYlNJaXJzVmZ1ZWNDRTZ0NGpUOUYySFpRIn19fQ.D43eE
W1ae2yAzhzriJuBz-_cgX1wwNJIgNMjsdO28QE0fU8KC8ugjTPaylIp48HMVS0xV2wDQ
9bl1zFzlbDULg~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7In
N0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd2
4iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiVVMifV0~eyJhbGciOi
AiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImtiK2p3dCJ9.eyJub25jZSI6ICIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwgI
mF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL3ZlcmlmaWVyIiwgImlhdCI6IDE3MDk1N
zYwMzcsICJzZF9oYXNoIjogIkQtaGVBamp0Q2Z4bkhjTDJyckZtNXNreTBjYXlZakhYd
zd3U2dwU3N2bzQifQ.ytKc24j5CGv8So1Iyo5LhPROWCpg-p4YwtyNCt0L1QsSh7MPhS
mUtBzlOgb3xvMde0uk3MUpLLUVO96zlrp6zg
In this presentation, the Holder provides only the Disclosure for the
claim address. Other claims are not disclosed to the Verifier.
The following example shows a presentation of a (different) SD-JWT
without a Key Binding JWT:
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eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogInZjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjA5dkt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.V6kss6mIDxbnPKHlL3_KSO0HbpMLCEP4URCorrCcNRtF92
nDglL2MXr2JQ2wBTBXSxdKniE2F08KD_h7DAI-zA~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDh
pcm9BIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0Iiw
gImxvY2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW5
0cnkiOiAiVVMifV0~
5. JWT VC Issuer Metadata
This specification defines the JWT VC Issuer Metadata to retrieve the
JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration of the Issuer of the SD-JWT VC.
The Issuer is identified by the iss claim in the JWT. Use of the JWT
VC Issuer Metadata is OPTIONAL.
Issuers publishing JWT VC Issuer Metadata MUST make a JWT VC Issuer
Metadata configuration available at the location formed by inserting
the well-known string /.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer between the host
component and the path component (if any) of the iss claim value in
the JWT. The iss MUST be a case-sensitive URL using the HTTPS scheme
that contains scheme, host and, optionally, port number and path
components, but no query or fragment components.
5.1. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Request
A JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration MUST be queried using an HTTP
GET request at the path defined in Section 5.
The following is a non-normative example of an HTTP request for the
JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration when iss is set to
https://example.com:
GET /.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
If the iss value contains a path component, any terminating / MUST be
removed before inserting /.well-known/ and the well-known URI suffix
between the host component and the path component.
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The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request for the
JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration when iss is set to
https://example.com/tenant/1234:
GET /.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer/tenant/1234 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
5.2. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Response
A successful response MUST use the 200 OK HTTP and return the JWT VC
Issuer Metadata configuration using the application/json content
type.
An error response uses the applicable HTTP status code value.
This specification defines the following JWT VC Issuer Metadata
configuration parameters:
* issuer REQUIRED. The Issuer identifier, which MUST be identical
to the iss value in the JWT.
* jwks_uri
- OPTIONAL. URL string referencing the Issuer's JSON Web Key
(JWK) Set [RFC7517] document which contains the Issuer's public
keys. The value of this field MUST point to a valid JWK Set
document.
* jwks
- OPTIONAL. Issuer's JSON Web Key Set [RFC7517] document value,
which contains the Issuer's public keys. The value of this
field MUST be a JSON object containing a valid JWK Set.
JWT VC Issuer Metadata MUST include either jwks_uri or jwks in their
JWT VC Issuer Metadata, but not both.
It is RECOMMENDED that the JWT contains a kid JWT header parameter
that can be used to look up the public key in the JWK Set included by
value or referenced in the JWT VC Issuer Metadata.
The following is a non-normative example of a JWT VC Issuer Metadata
configuration including jwks:
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{
"issuer":"https://example.com",
"jwks":{
"keys":[
{
"kid":"doc-signer-05-25-2022",
"e":"AQAB",
"n":"nj3YJwsLUFl9BmpAbkOswCNVx17Eh9wMO-_AReZwBqfaWFcfG
HrZXsIV2VMCNVNU8Tpb4obUaSXcRcQ-VMsfQPJm9IzgtRdAY8NN8Xb7PEcYyk
lBjvTtuPbpzIaqyiUepzUXNDFuAOOkrIol3WmflPUUgMKULBN0EUd1fpOD70p
RM0rlp_gg_WNUKoW1V-3keYUJoXH9NztEDm_D2MQXj9eGOJJ8yPgGL8PAZMLe
2R7jb9TxOCPDED7tY_TU4nFPlxptw59A42mldEmViXsKQt60s1SLboazxFKve
qXC_jpLUt22OC6GUG63p-REw-ZOr3r845z50wMuzifQrMI9bQ",
"kty":"RSA"
}
]
}
}
The following is a non-normative example of a JWT VC Issuer Metadata
configuration including jwks_uri:
{
"issuer":"https://example.com",
"jwks_uri":"https://jwt-vc-issuer.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks"
}
Additional JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration parameters MAY also
be used.
5.3. JWT VC Issuer Metadata Validation
The issuer value returned MUST be identical to the iss value of the
JWT. If these values are not identical, the data contained in the
response MUST NOT be used.
6. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations in the SD-JWT specification
[I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt] apply to this
specification. Additionally, the following security considerations
need to be taken into account when using SD-JWT VCs:
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6.1. Server-Side Request Forgery
The JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration is retrieved from the JWT VC
Issuer by the Holder or Verifier. Similar to other metadata
endpoints, the URL for the retrieval MUST be considered an untrusted
value and could be a vector for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
attacks.
Before making a request to the JWT VC Issuer Metadata endpoint, the
Holder or Verifier MUST validate the URL to ensure that it is a valid
HTTPS URL and that it does not point to internal resources. This
requires, in particular, ensuring that the host part of the URL does
not address an internal service (by IP address or an internal host
name) and that, if an external DNS name is used, the resolved DNS
name does not point to an internal IPv4 or IPv6 address.
When retrieving the metadata, the Holder or Verifier MUST ensure that
the request is made in a time-bound and size-bound manner to prevent
denial of service attacks. The Holder or Verifier MUST also ensure
that the response is a valid JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration
document before processing it.
Additional considerations can be found in [OWASP_SSRF].
6.2. Ecosystem-specific Public Key Verification Methods
When defining ecosystem-specific rules for the verification of the
public key, as outlined in Section 3.5, it is critical that those
rules maintain the integrity of the relationship between the iss
value within the Issuer-signed JWT and the public keys of the Issuer.
It MUST be ensured that for any given iss value, an attacker cannot
influence the type of verification process used. Otherwise, an
attacker could attempt to make the Verifier use a verification
process not intended by the Issuer, allowing the attacker to
potentially manipulate the verification result to their advantage.
7. Privacy Considerations
The Privacy Considerations in the SD-JWT specification
[I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt] apply to this
specification. Additionally, the following privacy considerations
need to be taken into account when using SD-JWT VCs.
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7.1. Unlinkability
The Privacy Considerations in Section 12.5 of
[I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt] apply especially to the cnf
claim.
7.2. Verifiable Credential Type Identifier
Issuers and Holders have to be aware that while this specification
supports selective disclosure of claims of a given SD-JWT VC, the vct
claim is not selectively disclosable. In certain situations this
could lead to unwanted leakage of additional context information.
In general, Issuers are advised to choose vct values following data
minimization principles. For example, government Issuers issuing an
SD-JWT VC to their citizens to enable them to prove their age, might
consider using a vct value that does not allow third-parties to infer
additional personal information about the Holder, e.g., country of
residency or citizenship.
Additionally, Holders have to be informed that, besides the actual
requested claims, the vct information is shared with the Verifier.
7.3. Issuer Phone-Home
A malicious Issuer can choose the Issuer identifier of the SD-JWT VC
to enable tracking the usage behavior of the Holder if the Issuer
identifier is Holder-specific and if the resolution of the key
material to verify the Issuer-signed JWT requires the Verifier to
phone home to the Issuer.
For example, a malicious Issuer could generate a unique value for the
Issuer identifier per Holder, e.g., https://example.com/issuer/
holder-1234 and host the JWT VC Issuer Metadata. The Verifier would
create a HTTPS GET request to the Holder-specific well-known URI when
the SD-JWT VC is verified. This would allow the malicious Issuer to
keep track where and how often the SD-JWT VC was used.
Verifiers are advised to establish trust in an SD-JWT VC by pinning
specific Issuer identifiers and should monitor suspicious behaviour
such as frequently rotating Issuer identifiers. If such behaviour
was detected, Verifiers are advised to reject SD-JWT VCs issued by
such Issuers.
Holders are advised to reject SD-JWT VCs if they contain easily
correlatable information in the Issuer identifier.
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8. Relationships to Other Documents
This specification defines validation and processing rules for
verifiable credentials using JSON payloads and secured by SD-JWT
[I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt]. Other specifications
exist that define their own verifiable credential formats; for
example, W3C Verifiable Credential Data Model (VCDM) 2.0 [W3C.VCDM]
defines a data model for verifiable credentials encoded as JSON-LD,
and ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 [ISO.18013-5] defines a representation of
verifiable credentials in the mobile document (mdoc) format encoded
as CBOR and secured using COSE.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt]
Fett, D., Yasuda, K., and B. Campbell, "Selective
Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-08, 4
March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/api/v1/doc/document/draft-
ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt/>.
[I-D.looker-oauth-jwt-cwt-status-list]
Looker, T. and P. Bastian, "JWT and CWT Status List", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-looker-oauth-jwt-cwt-
status-list-01, 10 July 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-looker-oauth-
jwt-cwt-status-list-01>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
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[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.
9.2. Informative References
[EUDIW.ARF]
Commission, E., "The European Digital Identity Wallet
Architecture and Reference Framework",
<https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-
architecture-and-reference-framework/releases>.
[IANA.well-known]
IANA, "Well-Known URIs",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris>.
[ISO.18013-5]
ISO/IEC, "ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021", 1 September 2024,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/69084.html>.
[OWASP_SSRF]
OWASP, "Server Side Request Forgery Prevention Cheat
Sheet", <https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/
Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html/>.
[RFC4501] Josefsson, S., "Domain Name System Uniform Resource
Identifiers", RFC 4501, DOI 10.17487/RFC4501, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4501>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[W3C.DID] Sporny, M., Longley, D., Sabadello, M., Reed, D., Steele,
O., and C. Allen, "Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0",
19 July 2022, <https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/>.
[W3C.VCDM] Sporny, M., Longley, D., Chadwick, D., and O. Steele,
"Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0", 10 February
2024, <https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/>.
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Appendix A. IANA Considerations
A.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
* Claim Name: "vct"
* Claim Description: Verifiable credential type identifier
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): [[ Section 3.2.2.1.1 of this of this
specification ]]
A.2. Media Types Registry
A.2.1. application/vc+sd-jwt
The Internet media type for a SD-JWT VC is application/vc+sd-jwt.
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: vc+sd-jwt
* Required parameters: n/a
* Optional parameters: n/a
* Encoding considerations: 8-bit code points; SD-JWT VC values are
encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may
be the empty string) separated by period ('.') and tilde ('~')
characters.
* Security considerations: See Security Considerations in Section 6.
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
* Published specification: [[ this specification ]]
* Applications that use this media type: Applications that issue,
present, and verify SD-JWT-based verifiable credentials.
* Additional information:
- Magic number(s): n/a
- File extension(s): n/a
- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
* Person & email address to contact for further information: Oliver
Terbu oliver.terbu@mattr.global (mailto:oliver.terbu@mattr.global)
* Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: none
* Author: Oliver Terbu oliver.terbu@mattr.global
(mailto:oliver.terbu@mattr.global)
* Change controller: IETF
A.3. Well-Known URI Registry
This specification requests the well-known URI defined in Section 5
in the IANA "Well-Known URIs" registry [IANA.well-known] established
by [RFC5785].
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A.3.1. Registry Contents
* URI suffix: jwt-vc-issuer
* Change controller: IETF
* Specification document: [[ Section 5 of this of this specification
]]
* Related information: (none)
Appendix B. Examples
Important: The following examples are not normative and provided for
illustrative purposes only. In particular, neither the structure of
the claims nor the selection of selectively disclosable claims are
normative.
Line breaks have been added for readability.
B.1. Example 1: Person Identification Data (PID) Credential
This example shows how the artifacts defined in this specification
could be used to represent the concept of a Person Identification
Data (PID) [EUDIW.ARF] using the data of a German citizen.
Key Binding is applied using the Holder's public key passed in a cnf
claim in the SD-JWT.
The Issuer is using the following input claims set:
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{
"vct": "https://bmi.bund.example/credential/pid/1.0",
"given_name": "Erika",
"family_name": "Mustermann",
"birthdate": "1963-08-12",
"source_document_type": "id_card",
"address": {
"street_address": "Heidestraße 17",
"locality": "Köln",
"postal_code": "51147",
"country": "DE"
},
"nationalities": [
"DE"
],
"gender": "female",
"birth_family_name": "Gabler",
"place_of_birth": {
"locality": "Berlin",
"country": "DE"
},
"also_known_as": "Schwester Agnes",
"age_equal_or_over": {
"12": true,
"14": true,
"16": true,
"18": true,
"21": true,
"65": false
}
}
The following is the issued SD-JWT:
eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogInZjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjBIWm1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0UjQtV2ciLCAiWEx0TGphZFVXYzl6Tl85aE1KUm9xeTQ2VXNDS2IxSXNoWnV1cVVGS1N
DQSIsICJhb0NDenNDN3A0cWhaSUFoX2lkUkNTQ2E2NDF1eWNuYzh6UGZOV3o4bngwIiw
gImYxLVAwQTJkS1dhdnYxdUZuTVgyQTctRVh4dmhveHY1YUhodUVJTi1XNjQiLCAiazV
oeTJyMDE4dnJzSmpvLVZqZDZnNnl0N0Fhb25Lb25uaXVKOXplbDNqbyIsICJxcDdaX0t
5MVlpcDBzWWdETzN6VnVnMk1GdVBOakh4a3NCRG5KWjRhSS1jIl19LCAiX3NkX2FsZyI
6ICJzaGEtMjU2IiwgImNuZiI6IHsiandrIjogeyJrdHkiOiAiRUMiLCAiY3J2IjogIlA
tMjU2IiwgIngiOiAiVENBRVIxOVp2dTNPSEY0ajRXNHZmU1ZvSElQMUlMaWxEbHM3dkN
lR2VtYyIsICJ5IjogIlp4amlXV2JaTVFHSFZXS1ZRNGhiU0lpcnNWZnVlY0NFNnQ0alQ
5RjJIWlEifX19.DwtmJtGWChYF8dRhOA0xWGLp415Y8xC6twBfGVzKovZWY8gaKvHEsv
iEeWZKuRkmIRtFZrb7KhACCQ-44ZNONQ~WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3Iiw
gImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiRXJpa2EiXQ~WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwg
ImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIk11c3Rlcm1hbm4iXQ~WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtd
lZBIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTYzLTA4LTEyIl0~WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZ
W5IZGhRIiwgInNvdXJjZV9kb2N1bWVudF90eXBlIiwgImlkX2NhcmQiXQ~WyJRZ19PNj
R6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgInN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIiwgIkhlaWRlc3RyYVx1MD
BkZmUgMTciXQ~WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIkt
cdTAwZjZsbiJd~WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgInBvc3RhbF9jb2RlIi
wgIjUxMTQ3Il0~WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiRE
UiXQ~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7Il9zZCI6IFs
iWEZjN3pYUG03enpWZE15d20yRXVCZmxrYTVISHF2ZjhVcF9zek5HcXZpZyIsICJiZDF
FVnpnTm9wVWs0RVczX2VRMm4zX05VNGl1WE9IdjlYYkdITjNnMVRFIiwgImZfRlFZZ3Z
RV3Z5VnFObklYc0FSbE55ZTdZR3A4RTc3Z1JBamFxLXd2bnciLCAidjRra2JfcFAxamx
2VWJTanR5YzVicWNXeUEtaThYTHZoVllZN1pUMHRiMCJdfV0~WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0J
JZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBbIkRFIl1d~WyI1YlBzMUlxdVpOYT
Boa2FGenp6Wk53IiwgImdlbmRlciIsICJmZW1hbGUiXQ~WyI1YTJXMF9OcmxFWnpmcW1
rXzdQcS13IiwgImJpcnRoX2ZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkdhYmxlciJd~WyJ5MXNWVTV3ZG
ZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIkJlcmxpbiJd~WyJIYlE0WDhzclZXM
1FEeG5JSmRxeU9BIiwgInBsYWNlX29mX2JpcnRoIiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIldwaEhvSUR5b
1diQXBEQzR6YnV3UjQweGwweExoRENfY3Y0dHNTNzFyRUEiXSwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiR
EUifV0~WyJDOUdTb3VqdmlKcXVFZ1lmb2pDYjFBIiwgImFsc29fa25vd25fYXMiLCAiU
2Nod2VzdGVyIEFnbmVzIl0~WyJreDVrRjE3Vi14MEptd1V4OXZndnR3IiwgIjEyIiwgd
HJ1ZV0~WyJIM28xdXN3UDc2MEZpMnllR2RWQ0VRIiwgIjE0IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJPQktsV
FZsdkxnLUFkd3FZR2JQOFpBIiwgIjE2IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJNMEpiNTd0NDF1YnJrU3V5c
kRUM3hBIiwgIjE4IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJEc210S05ncFY0ZEFIcGpyY2Fvc0F3IiwgIjIxI
iwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJlSzVvNXBIZmd1cFBwbHRqMXFoQUp3IiwgIjY1IiwgZmFsc2Vd~
The following payload is used for the SD-JWT:
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{
"_sd": [
"0HZmnSIPz337kSWe7C34l--88gzJi-eBJ2Vz_HJwATg",
"9ZbplC7TdEW7qal6BBZlMtqJdmeEOiXevdJloXVJdRQ",
"I00fcFUoDXCucp5yy2ujqPssDVGaWNiUliNz_awD0gc",
"IEBYSJGNhXIlrQo58ykXm2Zx3yll9ZlTtToPo17QQiY",
"Lai6IU6d7GQagXR7AvGTrnXgSld3z8EIg_fv3fOZ1Wg",
"hvDXhwmGcJQsBCA2OtjuLAcwAMpDsaU0nkovcKOqWNE",
"ikuur8Q4k8q3VcyA7dC-mNjZBkReDTU-CG4niTE7OTU",
"qvzNLj2vh9o4SEXOfMiYDuvTykdsWCNg0wTdlr0AEIM",
"wzW15bhCkvksxVvuJ8RF3xi8i64ln1jo_76BC2oa1ug",
"zOeBXhxvIS4ZzmQcLlxKuEAOGGByjOqa1z2IoVx_YDQ"
],
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"iat": 1683000000,
"exp": 1883000000,
"vct": "https://bmi.bund.example/credential/pid/1.0",
"age_equal_or_over": {
"_sd": [
"Fc8I_07LOcgPwrDJKQyIGO97wVsOplMLjHvRC4R4-Wg",
"XLtLjadUWc9zN_9hMJRoqy46UsCKb1IshZuuqUFKSCA",
"aoCCzsC7p4qhZIAh_idRCSCa641uycnc8zPfNWz8nx0",
"f1-P0A2dKWavv1uFnMX2A7-EXxvhoxv5aHhuEIN-W64",
"k5hy2r018vrsJjo-Vjd6g6yt7AaonKonniuJ9zel3jo",
"qp7Z_Ky1Yip0sYgDO3zVug2MFuPNjHxksBDnJZ4aI-c"
]
},
"_sd_alg": "sha-256",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
}
}
The following Disclosures are created by the Issuer:
*Claim given_name*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 0HZmnSIPz337kSWe7C34l--88gzJi-eBJ2Vz_HJwATg
* Disclosure:
WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiRXJp
a2EiXQ
* Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "given_name", "Erika"]
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*Claim family_name*:
* SHA-256 Hash: I00fcFUoDXCucp5yy2ujqPssDVGaWNiUliNz_awD0gc
* Disclosure:
WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIk11
c3Rlcm1hbm4iXQ
* Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "family_name", "Mustermann"]
*Claim birthdate*:
* SHA-256 Hash: Lai6IU6d7GQagXR7AvGTrnXgSld3z8EIg_fv3fOZ1Wg
* Disclosure:
WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTYz
LTA4LTEyIl0
* Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "birthdate", "1963-08-12"]
*Claim source_document_type*:
* SHA-256 Hash: qvzNLj2vh9o4SEXOfMiYDuvTykdsWCNg0wTdlr0AEIM
* Disclosure:
WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInNvdXJjZV9kb2N1bWVudF90
eXBlIiwgImlkX2NhcmQiXQ
* Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "source_document_type",
"id_card"]
*Claim street_address*:
* SHA-256 Hash: bd1EVzgNopUk4EW3_eQ2n3_NU4iuXOHv9XbGHN3g1TE
* Disclosure:
WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgInN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIiwg
IkhlaWRlc3RyYVx1MDBkZmUgMTciXQ
* Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "street_address",
"Heidestra\u00dfe 17"]
*Claim locality*:
* SHA-256 Hash: f_FQYgvQWvyVqNnIXsARlNye7YGp8E77gRAjaq-wvnw
* Disclosure:
WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIktcdTAw
ZjZsbiJd
* Contents: ["AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA", "locality", "K\u00f6ln"]
*Claim postal_code*:
* SHA-256 Hash: XFc7zXPm7zzVdMywm2EuBflka5HHqvf8Up_szNGqvig
* Disclosure:
WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgInBvc3RhbF9jb2RlIiwgIjUx
MTQ3Il0
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* Contents: ["Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ", "postal_code", "51147"]
*Claim country*:
* SHA-256 Hash: v4kkb_pP1jlvUbSjtyc5bqcWyA-i8XLvhVYY7ZT0tb0
* Disclosure:
WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiREUiXQ
* Contents: ["G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA", "country", "DE"]
*Claim address*:
* SHA-256 Hash: zOeBXhxvIS4ZzmQcLlxKuEAOGGByjOqa1z2IoVx_YDQ
* Disclosure:
WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7Il9zZCI6
IFsiWEZjN3pYUG03enpWZE15d20yRXVCZmxrYTVISHF2ZjhVcF9zek5HcXZp
ZyIsICJiZDFFVnpnTm9wVWs0RVczX2VRMm4zX05VNGl1WE9IdjlYYkdITjNn
MVRFIiwgImZfRlFZZ3ZRV3Z5VnFObklYc0FSbE55ZTdZR3A4RTc3Z1JBamFx
LXd2bnciLCAidjRra2JfcFAxamx2VWJTanR5YzVicWNXeUEtaThYTHZoVllZ
N1pUMHRiMCJdfV0
* Contents: ["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "address", {"_sd":
["XFc7zXPm7zzVdMywm2EuBflka5HHqvf8Up_szNGqvig",
"bd1EVzgNopUk4EW3_eQ2n3_NU4iuXOHv9XbGHN3g1TE",
"f_FQYgvQWvyVqNnIXsARlNye7YGp8E77gRAjaq-wvnw",
"v4kkb_pP1jlvUbSjtyc5bqcWyA-i8XLvhVYY7ZT0tb0"]}]
*Claim nationalities*:
* SHA-256 Hash: hvDXhwmGcJQsBCA2OtjuLAcwAMpDsaU0nkovcKOqWNE
* Disclosure:
WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBb
IkRFIl1d
* Contents: ["nPuoQnkRFq3BIeAm7AnXFA", "nationalities", ["DE"]]
*Claim gender*:
* SHA-256 Hash: IEBYSJGNhXIlrQo58ykXm2Zx3yll9ZlTtToPo17QQiY
* Disclosure:
WyI1YlBzMUlxdVpOYTBoa2FGenp6Wk53IiwgImdlbmRlciIsICJmZW1hbGUi
XQ
* Contents: ["5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw", "gender", "female"]
*Claim birth_family_name*:
* SHA-256 Hash: ikuur8Q4k8q3VcyA7dC-mNjZBkReDTU-CG4niTE7OTU
* Disclosure:
WyI1YTJXMF9OcmxFWnpmcW1rXzdQcS13IiwgImJpcnRoX2ZhbWlseV9uYW1l
IiwgIkdhYmxlciJd
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* Contents: ["5a2W0_NrlEZzfqmk_7Pq-w", "birth_family_name",
"Gabler"]
*Claim locality*:
* SHA-256 Hash: WphHoIDyoWbApDC4zbuwR40xl0xLhDC_cv4tsS71rEA
* Disclosure:
WyJ5MXNWVTV3ZGZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIkJlcmxp
biJd
* Contents: ["y1sVU5wdfJahVdgwPgS7RQ", "locality", "Berlin"]
*Claim place_of_birth*:
* SHA-256 Hash: wzW15bhCkvksxVvuJ8RF3xi8i64ln1jo_76BC2oa1ug
* Disclosure:
WyJIYlE0WDhzclZXM1FEeG5JSmRxeU9BIiwgInBsYWNlX29mX2JpcnRoIiwg
eyJfc2QiOiBbIldwaEhvSUR5b1diQXBEQzR6YnV3UjQweGwweExoRENfY3Y0
dHNTNzFyRUEiXSwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiREUifV0
* Contents: ["HbQ4X8srVW3QDxnIJdqyOA", "place_of_birth", {"_sd":
["WphHoIDyoWbApDC4zbuwR40xl0xLhDC_cv4tsS71rEA"], "country":
"DE"}]
*Claim also_known_as*:
* SHA-256 Hash: 9ZbplC7TdEW7qal6BBZlMtqJdmeEOiXevdJloXVJdRQ
* Disclosure:
WyJDOUdTb3VqdmlKcXVFZ1lmb2pDYjFBIiwgImFsc29fa25vd25fYXMiLCAi
U2Nod2VzdGVyIEFnbmVzIl0
* Contents: ["C9GSoujviJquEgYfojCb1A", "also_known_as", "Schwester
Agnes"]
*Claim 12*:
* SHA-256 Hash: Fc8I_07LOcgPwrDJKQyIGO97wVsOplMLjHvRC4R4-Wg
* Disclosure:
WyJreDVrRjE3Vi14MEptd1V4OXZndnR3IiwgIjEyIiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["kx5kF17V-x0JmwUx9vgvtw", "12", true]
*Claim 14*:
* SHA-256 Hash: f1-P0A2dKWavv1uFnMX2A7-EXxvhoxv5aHhuEIN-W64
* Disclosure:
WyJIM28xdXN3UDc2MEZpMnllR2RWQ0VRIiwgIjE0IiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["H3o1uswP760Fi2yeGdVCEQ", "14", true]
*Claim 16*:
* SHA-256 Hash: k5hy2r018vrsJjo-Vjd6g6yt7AaonKonniuJ9zel3jo
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* Disclosure:
WyJPQktsVFZsdkxnLUFkd3FZR2JQOFpBIiwgIjE2IiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["OBKlTVlvLg-AdwqYGbP8ZA", "16", true]
*Claim 18*:
* SHA-256 Hash: qp7Z_Ky1Yip0sYgDO3zVug2MFuPNjHxksBDnJZ4aI-c
* Disclosure:
WyJNMEpiNTd0NDF1YnJrU3V5ckRUM3hBIiwgIjE4IiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["M0Jb57t41ubrkSuyrDT3xA", "18", true]
*Claim 21*:
* SHA-256 Hash: aoCCzsC7p4qhZIAh_idRCSCa641uycnc8zPfNWz8nx0
* Disclosure:
WyJEc210S05ncFY0ZEFIcGpyY2Fvc0F3IiwgIjIxIiwgdHJ1ZV0
* Contents: ["DsmtKNgpV4dAHpjrcaosAw", "21", true]
*Claim 65*:
* SHA-256 Hash: XLtLjadUWc9zN_9hMJRoqy46UsCKb1IshZuuqUFKSCA
* Disclosure:
WyJlSzVvNXBIZmd1cFBwbHRqMXFoQUp3IiwgIjY1IiwgZmFsc2Vd
* Contents: ["eK5o5pHfgupPpltj1qhAJw", "65", false]
The following shows a presentation of the SD-JWT with a Key Binding
JWT that discloses only nationality and the fact that the person is
over 18 years old:
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eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogInZjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjBIWm1
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The following is the payload of a corresponding Key Binding JWT:
{
"nonce": "1234567890",
"aud": "https://example.com/verifier",
"iat": 1709576037,
"sd_hash": "1iLSX-71FP_ui-8bmvdMrAhIYFMdgEufpEQIDwlLQUQ"
}
After the validation, the Verifier will have the following data for
further processing:
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{
"iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
"iat": 1683000000,
"exp": 1883000000,
"vct": "https://bmi.bund.example/credential/pid/1.0",
"age_equal_or_over": {
"18": true
},
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
},
"nationalities": [
"DE"
]
}
Appendix C. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Alen Horvat, Andres Uribe, Christian Bormann,
Giuseppe De Marco, Michael Jones, Mike Prorock, Orie Steele, Paul
Bastian, Torsten Lodderstedt, Tobias Looker, and Kristina Yasuda for
their contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to
the initial set of implementations.
Appendix D. Document History
-03
* Include disclosure of age_equal_or_over/18 in the PID example
-02
* Made specific rules for public verification key validation
conditional
* Finetuned rules for obtaining public verification key
* Editorial changes
* added Brian Campbell as co-author
* Renamed JWT Issuer Metadata to JWT VC Issuer Metadata
* 'iat' is now optional and allowed to be selectively disclosable
* Fix inconstancy in the .well-known path construction
* Added registration request to IANA for the well-known URI
* Fix some formatting and text in the media type and JWT claim
registration requests
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* Clarify the optionality of the cnf claim
* Added relationships to other documents
* Added PID example
-01
* Introduce rules for type identifiers (Collision-Resistant Name)
* Rename type to vct
* Removed duplicated and inconsistent requirements on KB-JWT
* Editorial changes
* Added issuer public verification key discovery section.
-00
* Upload as draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-00
* Aligned terminology and descriptions with latest version of SD-JWT
[[ pre Working Group Adoption: ]]
-00
* Initial Version
* Removed W3C VCDM transformation algorithm
* Various editorial changes based on feedback
* Adjusted terminology based on feedback
* Added non-selectively disclosable JWT VC
* Added a note that this is not W3C VCDM
Authors' Addresses
Oliver Terbu
MATTR
Email: oliver.terbu@mattr.global
Daniel Fett
Authlete Inc.
Email: mail@danielfett.de
Brian Campbell
Ping Identity
Email: bcampbell@pingidentity.com
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