SIDR Working Group S. Turner
Internet-Draft IECA, Inc.
Intended status: BCP K. Patel
Expires: August 27, 2013 Cisco Systems
R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
February 23, 2013
Router Keying for BGPsec
draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-01
Abstract
BGPsec-speaking routers must be provisioned with private keys and the
corresponding public key must be published in the global RPKI
(Resource Public Key Infrastructure). This document describes two
ways of provisioning public/private keys, router-driven and operator-
driven.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 27, 2013.
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Internet-Draft Router Keying for BGPsec February 23, 2013
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1. Introduction
BGPsec-speaking routers must be provisioned with private keys and the
corresponding public key must be published in the global RPKI
(Resource Public Key Infrastructure). The public key is published in
the RPKI in the form of a certificate [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles]. This document describes two methods for generating the
necessary public/private key-pair: router-driven and operator-driven.
The difference between the two models is where the keys are
generated. Keys are generated on the router in the router-drive
method but elsewhere by the operator in the operator-drive model.
The router-driven model is most familiar to PKI subscribers because
its design supports CPs (Certification Policies), often times for
human subscribers, that require the private key only ever be
controlled by the subscriber to ensure that no one can impersonate
the subscriber. For non-humans, this model does not always work in
particular when an operator wants to support hot-swappable routers
the same private key needs to be installed in the soon-to-be online
router that was installed in the soon-to-be offline router.
The remainder of this document describes how operators can use the
two methods to provision new and existing routers.
Note that in both models, the key pair is for algorithms defined in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. The first version specifies ECDSA on
the P-256 curve.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119].
It is assumed that the reader understands BGPsec [I-D.ietf-sidr-
bgpsec-overview] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol], the RPKI [RFC6480],
and [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles].
3. Provisioning a New Router
When commissioning a new router, operators may use either the router-
driven or operator-drive methods. Regardless of the method chosen,
the operator first needs to establish a secure communication channel
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