Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Authentication Using M2M Certificate
draft-ypoeluev-tls-m2mcertificate-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Yuri Poeluev , Warwick Ford | ||
| Last updated | 2015-09-24 (Latest revision 2015-03-23) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This memo defines Transport Layer Security (TLS) extensions and associated semantics that allow clients and servers to negotiate the use of M2M certificates for a TLS/DTLS session, and specifies how to transport M2M certificates via TLS/DTLS. It also defines the registry for non-X.509 certificate types. The X.509 public key certificate format is overly verbose for Internet- of-Things (IoT) constrained environments, where nodes with limited memory and networks with limited bandwidth are not uncommon. The Machine-to-Machine (M2M) certificate format is a pruned down and encoding-optimized replacement for X.509, which reuses much of the X.509 semantics but reduces certificate sizes by typically 40%.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)