Network Working Group S. Kent
Request for Comments: 2406 BBN Corp
Obsoletes: 1827 R. Atkinson
Category: Standards Track @Home Network
November 1998
IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction..................................................2
2. Encapsulating Security Payload Packet Format..................3
2.1 Security Parameters Index................................4
2.2 Sequence Number .........................................4
2.3 Payload Data.............................................5
2.4 Padding (for Encryption).................................5
2.5 Pad Length...............................................7
2.6 Next Header..............................................7
2.7 Authentication Data......................................7
3. Encapsulating Security Protocol Processing....................7
3.1 ESP Header Location......................................7
3.2 Algorithms..............................................10
3.2.1 Encryption Algorithms..............................10
3.2.2 Authentication Algorithms..........................10
3.3 Outbound Packet Processing..............................10
3.3.1 Security Association Lookup........................11
3.3.2 Packet Encryption..................................11
3.3.3 Sequence Number Generation.........................12
3.3.4 Integrity Check Value Calculation..................12
3.3.5 Fragmentation......................................13
3.4 Inbound Packet Processing...............................13
3.4.1 Reassembly.........................................13
3.4.2 Security Association Lookup........................13
3.4.3 Sequence Number Verification.......................14
3.4.4 Integrity Check Value Verification.................15
Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 2406 IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998
3.4.5 Packet Decryption..................................16
4. Auditing.....................................................17
5. Conformance Requirements.....................................18
6. Security Considerations......................................18
7. Differences from RFC 1827....................................18
Acknowledgements................................................19
References......................................................19
Disclaimer......................................................20
Author Information..............................................21
Full Copyright Statement........................................22
1. Introduction
The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header is designed to
provide a mix of security services in IPv4 and IPv6. ESP may be
applied alone, in combination with the IP Authentication Header (AH)
[KA97b], or in a nested fashion, e.g., through the use of tunnel mode
(see "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol" [KA97a],
hereafter referred to as the Security Architecture document).
Security services can be provided between a pair of communicating
hosts, between a pair of communicating security gateways, or between
a security gateway and a host. For more details on how to use ESP
and AH in various network environments, see the Security Architecture
document [KA97a].
The ESP header is inserted after the IP header and before the upper
layer protocol header (transport mode) or before an encapsulated IP
header (tunnel mode). These modes are described in more detail
below.
ESP is used to provide confidentiality, data origin authentication,
connectionless integrity, an anti-replay service (a form of partial
sequence integrity), and limited traffic flow confidentiality. The
set of services provided depends on options selected at the time of
Security Association establishment and on the placement of the
implementation. Confidentiality may be selected independent of all