datatracker.ietf.org
Sign in
Version 5.6.2.p3, 2014-07-31
Report a bug

Authentication for DHCP Messages
RFC 3118

Document type: RFC - Proposed Standard (June 2001; Errata)
Document stream: IETF
Last updated: 2013-03-02
Other versions: plain text, pdf, html

IETF State: (None)
Document shepherd: No shepherd assigned

IESG State: RFC 3118 (Proposed Standard)
Responsible AD: (None)
Send notices to: No addresses provided

Network Working Group                                   R. Droms, Editor
Request for Comments: 3118                                 Cisco Systems
Category: Standards Track                             W. Arbaugh, Editor
                                                  University of Maryland
                                                               June 2001

                    Authentication for DHCP Messages

Status of this Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document defines a new Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
   (DHCP) option through which authorization tickets can be easily
   generated and newly attached hosts with proper authorization can be
   automatically configured from an authenticated DHCP server.  DHCP
   provides a framework for passing configuration information to hosts
   on a TCP/IP network.  In some situations, network administrators may
   wish to constrain the allocation of addresses to authorized hosts.
   Additionally, some network administrators may wish to provide for
   authentication of the source and contents of DHCP messages.

1. Introduction

   DHCP [1] transports protocol stack configuration parameters from
   centrally administered servers to TCP/IP hosts.  Among those
   parameters are an IP address.  DHCP servers can be configured to
   dynamically allocate addresses from a pool of addresses, eliminating
   a manual step in configuration of TCP/IP hosts.

   Some network administrators may wish to provide authentication of the
   source and contents of DHCP messages.  For example, clients may be
   subject to denial of service attacks through the use of bogus DHCP
   servers, or may simply be misconfigured due to unintentionally
   instantiated DHCP servers.  Network administrators may wish to
   constrain the allocation of addresses to authorized hosts to avoid
   denial of service attacks in "hostile" environments where the network

Droms & Arbaugh             Standards Track                     [Page 1]
RFC 3118            Authentication for DHCP Messages           June 2001

   medium is not physically secured, such as wireless networks or
   college residence halls.

   This document defines a technique that can provide both entity
   authentication and message authentication.  The current protocol
   combines the original Schiller-Huitema-Droms authentication mechanism
   defined in a previous work in progress with the "delayed
   authentication" proposal developed by Bill Arbaugh.

1.1 DHCP threat model

   The threat to DHCP is inherently an insider threat (assuming a
   properly configured network where BOOTP ports are blocked on the
   enterprise's perimeter gateways.)  Regardless of the gateway
   configuration, however, the potential attacks by insiders and
   outsiders are the same.

   The attack specific to a DHCP client is the possibility of the
   establishment of a "rogue" server with the intent of providing
   incorrect configuration information to the client.  The motivation
   for doing so may be to establish a "man in the middle" attack or it
   may be for a "denial of service" attack.

   There is another threat to DHCP clients from mistakenly or
   accidentally configured DHCP servers that answer DHCP client requests
   with unintentionally incorrect configuration parameters.

   The threat specific to a DHCP server is an invalid client
   masquerading as a valid client.  The motivation for this may be for
   "theft of service", or to circumvent auditing for any number of
   nefarious purposes.

   The threat common to both the client and the server is the resource
   "denial of service" (DoS) attack.  These attacks typically involve
   the exhaustion of valid addresses, or the exhaustion of CPU or
   network bandwidth, and are present anytime there is a shared
   resource.  In current practice, redundancy mitigates DoS attacks the
   best.

1.2 Design goals

   These are the goals that were used in the development of the
   authentication protocol, listed in order of importance:

   1. Address the threats presented in Section 1.1.
   2. Avoid changing the current protocol.

Droms & Arbaugh             Standards Track                     [Page 2]
RFC 3118            Authentication for DHCP Messages           June 2001

[include full document text]