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Certification Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
RFC 6489

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         G. Huston
Request for Comments: 6489                                 G. Michaelson
BCP: 174                                                           APNIC
Category: Best Current Practice                                  S. Kent
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                      BBN
                                                           February 2012

              Certification Authority (CA) Key Rollover in
             the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)

Abstract

   This document describes how a Certification Authority (CA) in the
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) performs a planned rollover
   of its key pair.  This document also notes the implications of this
   key rollover procedure for relying parties (RPs).  In general, RPs
   are expected to maintain a local cache of the objects that have been
   published in the RPKI repository, and thus the way in which a CA
   performs key rollover impacts RPs.

Status of This Memo

   This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6489.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Huston, et al.            Best Current Practice                 [Page 1]
RFC 6489                      Key Rollover                 February 2012

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................2
      1.1. Terminology and Concepts ...................................2
   2. CA Key Rollover Procedure .......................................3
   3. Relying Party Requirements ......................................6
   4. Reissuing Certificates and RPKI Signed Objects ..................7
      4.1. CA Certificates ............................................7
      4.2. RPKI Signed Objects ........................................7
   5. Security Considerations .........................................8
   6. Acknowledgements ................................................8
   7. References ......................................................9
      7.1. Normative References .......................................9
      7.2. Informative References .....................................9

1.  Introduction

   This document describes an algorithm to be employed by a
   Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] to perform a rollover of its key
   pair.

   This document defines a conservative procedure for such entities to
   follow when performing a key rollover.  This procedure is
   "conservative" in that the CA's actions in key rollover are not
   intended to disrupt the normal operation of relying parties (RPs) in
   maintaining a local cached version of the RPKI distributed
   repository.  Using this procedure, RPs are in a position to be able
   to validate all authentic objects in the RPKI using the validation
   procedure described in [RFC6480] at all times.

1.1.  Terminology and Concepts

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "X.509
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], the
   profile for RPKI Certificates [RFC6487], and the RPKI repository
   structure [RFC6481] .

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

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