Internet Engineering Task Force J. Arbeiter, Ed.
Internet-Draft Harris Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track J. Downs, Ed.
Expires: October 21, 2010 PAR Government Systems Corp.
April 19, 2010
RTP Payload Format for SMPTE 336M Encoded Data
draft-arbeiter-rtp-klv-02.txt
Abstract
This document specifies the payload format for packetization of KLV
(Key-Length-Value) Encoded Data, as defined by the Society of Motion
Picture and Television Engineers (SMPTE) in SMPTE 336M, into the
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP).
Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 21, 2010.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions, Definitions and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Description of SMPTE 336M Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Payload Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. RTP Header Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Payload Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.1. The KLVunit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.2. KLVunit Mapping to RTP Packet Payload . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3.1. Loss of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3.1.1. Damaged KLVunits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3.1.2. Treatment of Damaged KLVunits . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Congestion Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Payload Format Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Media Type Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Mapping to SDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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1. Introduction
This document specifies the payload format for packetization of KLV
(Key-Length-Value) Encoded Data, as defined by the Society of Motion
Picture and Television Engineers (SMPTE) in [SMPTE336M], into the
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550].
The payload format is defined in such a way that arbitrary KLV data
can be carried. No restrictions are placed on which KLV data keys
can be used.
A brief description of SMPTE 336M, KLV Encoded Data, is given. The
payload format itself, including use of the RTP header fields, is
specified in Section 4. The media type and IANA considerations are
also described. This document concludes with security considerations
relevant to this payload format.
2. Conventions, Definitions and Acronyms
The term "KLV item" is used in this document to refer to one single
universal key, length, and value triplet, or one single SMPTE
Universal Label, encoded as described in [SMPTE336M].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Description of SMPTE 336M Data
[SMPTE336M], Data Encoding Protocol Using Key-Length-Value, defines a
byte-level data encoding protocol for representing data items and
data groups. This encoding protocol definition is independent of the
application or transportation method used.
SMPTE 336M data encoding can be applied to a wide variety of binary
data. This encoding has been used to provide diverse and rich
metadata sets that describe or enhance associated video
presentations. Use of SMPTE 336M encoded metadata in conjunction
with video has enabled improvements in multimedia presentations,
content management and distribution, archival and retrieval, and
production workflow.
The SMPTE 336M standard defines a Key-Length-Value (KLV) triplet as a
data interchange protocol for data items or data groups where the Key
identifies the data, the Length specifies the length of the data and
the Value is the data itself. The KLV protocol provides a common
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interchange point for all compliant applications irrespective of the
method of implementation or transport.
The standard also provides methods for combining associated KLV
triplets in data sets where the set of KLV triplets is itself coded
with KLV data coding protocol. Such sets can be coded in either full
form (Universal Sets) or in one of four increasingly bit-efficient
forms (Global Sets, Local Sets, Variable Length Packs and Defined
Length Packs). The standard provides a definition of each of these
data constructs.
The standard also describes implications of KLV coding including the
use of a SMPTE Universal Label as a value within a KLV coding triplet
or whose meaning is entirely conveyed by the SMPTE UL itself. The
two kinds of usage for such standalone SMPTE Universal Labels are a)
as a value in a K L V construct and b) as a Key that has no Length
and no Value.
The standard also defines the use of KLV coding to provide a means to
carry information that is registered with a non-SMPTE external
agency.
The encoding byte range (length of the payload) may accommodate
unusually large volumes of data. Consequently, a specific
application of KLV encoding may require only a limited operating data
range and those details shall be defined in a relevant application
document.
4. Payload Format
The main goal of the payload format design for SMPTE 336M data is to
provide carriage of SMPTE 336M data over RTP in a simple, yet robust
manner. All forms of SMPTE 336M data can be carried by the payload
format. The payload format maintains simplicity by using only the
standard RTP headers and not defining any payload headers.
SMPTE 336M KLV data is broken into KLVunits (see Section 4.2.1) based
on source data timing. Each KLVunit is then placed into one or more
RTP packet payloads. The RTP header marker bit is used to assist
receivers in locating the boundaries of KLVunits.
4.1. RTP Header Usage
This payload format uses the RTP packet header fields as described in
the table below:
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+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Field | Usage |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Timestamp | The RTP Timestamp encodes the instant along a |
| | presentation timeline that the entire KLVunit encoded |
| | in the packet payload is to be presented. When one |
| | KLVunit is placed in multiple RTP packets, the RTP |
| | timestamp of all packets comprising that KLVunit MUST |
| | be the same. The timestamp clock frequency SHALL be |
| | defined as a parameter to the payload format |
| | (Section 6). |
| M-bit | The RTP header marker bit (M) SHALL be set to '1' for |
| | any RTP packet which contains the final byte of a |
| | KLVunit. For all other packets, the RTP header marker |
| | bit SHALL be set to '0'. This allows receivers to |
| | pass a KLVunit for parsing/decoding immediately upon |
| | receipt of the last RTP packet comprising the |
| | KLVunit. Without this, a receiver would need to wait |
| | for the next RTP packet with a different timestamp to |
| | arrive, thus signaling the end of one KLVunit and the |
| | start of another. |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
The remaining RTP header fields are used as specified in [RFC3550].
4.2. Payload Data
4.2.1. The KLVunit
A KLVunit is a logical collection of all KLV items that are to be
presented at a specific time. A KLVunit is comprised of one or more
KLV items. Compound items (sets, packs) are allowed as per
[SMPTE336M], but the contents of a compound item MUST NOT be split
across two KLVunits. Multiple KLV items in a KLVunit occur one after
another with no padding or stuffing between items.
4.2.2. KLVunit Mapping to RTP Packet Payload
An RTP packet payload SHALL contain one, and only one, KLVunit or a
fragment thereof. KLVunits small enough to fit into a single RTP
packet (RTP packet size is up to implementation but should consider
underlying transport/network factors such as MTU limitations) are
placed directly into the payload of the RTP packet, with the first
byte of the KLVunit (which is the first byte of a KLV universal key)
being the first byte of the RTP packet payload.
KLVunits too large to fit into a single RTP packet payload MAY span
multiple RTP packet payloads. When this is done, the KLVunit data
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MUST be sent in sequential byte order, such that when all RTP packets
comprising the KLVunit are arranged in sequence number order,
concatenating the payload data together exactly reproduces the
original KLVunit.
Additionally, when a KLVunit is fragmented across multiple RTP
packets, all RTP packets transporting the fragments a KLVunit MUST
have the same timestamp.
KLVunits are bounded with changes in RTP packet timestamps. The
marker (M) bit in the RTP packet headers marks the last RTP packet
comprising a KLVunit (see Section 4.1).
4.3. Implementation Considerations
4.3.1. Loss of Data
RTP is generally deployed in network environments where packet loss
may occur. RTP header fields enable detection of lost packets, as
described in [RFC3550]. When transmitting payload data described by
this payload format, packet loss can cause the loss of whole KLVunits
or portions thereof.
4.3.1.1. Damaged KLVunits
A damaged KLVunit is any KLVunit that was carried in one or more RTP
packets that have been lost. When a lost packet is detected (through
use of the sequence number header field), the receiver:
o SHOULD consider the KLVunit carried in the prior packet (in
sequence number order) as damaged unless that prior packet's M bit
in the RTP header was set to '1'.
o SHOULD consider all subsequent packets (in sequence number order)
up to and including the next one with the M-bit in the RTP header
set to '1' as part of a damaged KLVunit.
The example below illustrates how a receiver would handle a lost
packet in one possible packet sequence:
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+---------+-------------+ +--------------+
| RTP Hdr | Data | | |
+---------+-------------+ +--------------+
.... | ts = 30 | KLV KLV ... | | | >---+
| M = 1 | | | | |
| seq = 5 | ... KLV KLV | | | |
+---------+-------------+ +--------------+ |
Last RTP pkt for time 30 Lost RTP Pkt |
For time 30 (seq = 6) |
|
+--------------------------------------------------------+
|
| +---------+-------------+ +---------+-------------+
| | RTP Hdr | Data | | RTP Hdr | Data |
| +---------+-------------+ +---------+-------------+
+--> | ts = 45 | KLV KLV ... | | ts = 45 | ... KLV ... | >---+
| M = 0 | | | M = 1 | | |
| seq = 7 | ... KLV ... | | seq = 8 | ... KLV KLV | |
+---------+-------------+ +---------+-------------+ |
RTP pkt for time 45 Last RTP pkt for time 45 |
KLVunit carried in these two packets is "damaged" |
|
+----------------------------------------------------------------+
|
| +---------+-------------+
| | RTP Hdr | Data |
| +---------+-------------+
+--> | ts = 55 | KLV KLV ... | ....
| M = 1 | |
| seq = 9 | ... KLV ... |
+---------+-------------+
Last and only RTP pkt
for time 55
In this example, the packets with sequence numbers 7 and 8 contain
portions of a KLVunit with timestamp of 45. This KLVunit is
considered "damaged" due to the missing RTP packet with sequence
number 6, which may have been part of this KLVunit. The KLVunit for
timestamp 30 (ended in packet with sequence number 5) is unaffected
by the missing packet. The KLVunit for timestamp 55, carried in the
packet with sequence number 9, is also unaffected by the missing
packet and is considered complete and intact.
4.3.1.2. Treatment of Damaged KLVunits
SMPTE 336M KLV data streams are built in such a way that it is
possible to partially recover from errors or missing data in a
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stream. Exact specifics of how damaged KLVunits are handled are left
to each implementation, as different implementations may have
differing capabilities and robustness in their downstream KLV payload
processing. Because some implementations may be particularly limited
in their capacity to handle damaged KLVunits, receivers MAY drop
damaged KLVunits entirely.
5. Congestion Control
The general congestion control considerations for transporting RTP
data apply; see RTP [RFC3550] and any applicable RTP profile like AVP
[RFC3551].
Further, SMPTE 336M data can be encoded in different schemes which
reduce the overhead associated with individual data items within the
overall stream. SMPTE 336M grouping constructs, such as local sets
and data packs, provide a mechanism to reduce bandwidth requirements.
6. Payload Format Parameters
This RTP payload format is identified using the media type
application/smpte336m, which is registered in accordance with
[RFC4855] and using the template of [RFC4288].
6.1. Media Type Definition
Type name: application
Subtype name: smpte336m
Required parameters:
rate: RTP timestamp clock rate. Typically chosen based on
sampling rate of metadata being transmitted, but other rates
may be specified.
Optional parameters:
Encoding considerations: This media type is framed and binary; see
Section 4.8 of [RFC4288].
Security considerations: See Section 8 of XXXX.
Interoperability considerations: Data items in smpte336m can be
very diverse. Receivers may only be capable of interpreting a
subset of the possible data items; unrecognized items are skipped.
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Agreement on data items to be used out of band, via application
profile or similar, is typical.
Published specification: XXXX
Applications that use this media type: Audio and video streaming
and conferencing tools
Additional Information: none
Person & email address to contact for further information: J.
Arbeiter <jarbeite@harris.com>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: This media type depends on RTP framing, and
hence is only defined for transfer via RTP ([RFC3550]). Transport
within other framing protocols is not defined at this time.
Author:
J. Arbeiter <jarbeite@harris.com>
J. Downs <jeff_downs@partech.com>
Change controller: IETF Audio/Video Transport working group
delegated from the IESG
6.2. Mapping to SDP
The mapping of the above defined payload format media type and its
parameters to SDP [RFC4566] SHALL be done according to Section 3 of
[RFC4855].
7. IANA Considerations
This memo requests that IANA registers application/smpte336m as
specified in Section 6.1. The media type is also requested to be
added to the IANA registry for "RTP Payload Format MIME types"
(http://www.iana.org/assignments/rtp-parameters).
8. Security Considerations
RTP packets using the payload format defined in this specification
are subject to the security considerations discussed in the RTP
specification [RFC3550], and in any applicable RTP profile. The main
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security considerations for the RTP packet carrying the RTP payload
format defined within this memo are confidentiality, integrity and
source authenticity. Confidentiality is achieved by encryption of
the RTP payload. Integrity of the RTP packets through suitable
cryptographic integrity protection mechanism. Cryptographic system
may also allow the authentication of the source of the payload. A
suitable security mechanism for this RTP payload format should
provide confidentiality, integrity protection and at least source
authentication capable of determining if an RTP packet is from a
member of the RTP session or not.
Note that the appropriate mechanism to provide security to RTP and
payloads following this memo may vary. It is dependent on the
application, the transport, and the signalling protocol employed.
Therefore a single mechanism is not sufficient, although if suitable
the usage of SRTP [RFC3711] is recommended. Other mechanism that may
be used are IPsec [RFC4301] and TLS [RFC5246] (RTP over TCP), but
also other alternatives may exist.
This RTP payload format presents the possibility for significant non-
uniformity in the receiver-side computational complexity during
processing of SMPTE 336M payload data. Because the length of SMPTE
336M encoded data items is essentially unbounded, receivers must take
care when allocating resources used in processing. It is trivial to
construct pathological data that would cause a naive decoder to
allocate large amounts of resources, resulting in denial-of-service
threats. Receivers are encouraged to place limits on resource
allocation that are within the bounds set forth by any application
profile in use.
This RTP payload format does not contain any inheritly active
content. However, individual SMPTE 336M KLV items could be defined
to convey active content in a particular application. Therefore,
receivers capable of decoding and interpreting such data items should
use appropriate caution and security practices. Receivers not
capable of decoding such data items are not at risk; unknown data
items are skipped over and discarded according to SMPTE 336M
processing rules.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
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Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, July 2003.
[RFC3551] Schulzrinne, H. and S. Casner, "RTP Profile for Audio and
Video Conferences with Minimal Control", STD 65, RFC 3551,
July 2003.
[RFC4288] Freed, N. and J. Klensin, "Media Type Specifications and
Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 4288, December 2005.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006.
[RFC4855] Casner, S., "Media Type Registration of RTP Payload
Formats", RFC 4855, February 2007.
[SMPTE336M]
SMPTE, "SMPTE336M-2007: Data Encoding Protocol Using Key-
Length-Value", 2007, <http://www.smpte.org>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
RFC 3711, March 2004.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
Authors' Addresses
J. Arbeiter (editor)
Harris Corporation
US
Phone:
Email: jarbeite@harris.com
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J. Downs (editor)
PAR Government Systems Corp.
US
Phone:
Email: jeff_downs@partech.com
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