TLS Working Group                                              M. Badra
Internet-Draft                                         LIMOS Laboratory
Intended status: Informational
Expires: June 2008                                        November 2007

                      ECDHE_PSK Ciphersuites for TLS
                    <draft-badra-ecdhe-tls-psk-01.txt>


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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   This document updates RFC 4785 and RFC 4279 and specifies a set of
   ciphersuites that use an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman exchange
   authenticated with a pre-shared key. These ciphersuites provides
   Perfect Forward Secrecy. It specifies as well one authentication-
   only ciphersuites (with no encryption). This ciphersuite is useful
   when authentication and integrity protection is desired, but
   confidentiality is not needed or not permitted.

   The reader is expected to become familiar with RFC 4785 and RFC 4279
   prior to studying this document.



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1. Introduction

   RFC 4279 specifies ciphersuites for supporting TLS using pre-shared
   symmetric keys and they (a) use only symmetric key operations for
   authentication, (b) use a Diffie-Hellman exchange authenticated with
   a pre-shared key, or (c) combines public key authentication of the
   server with pre-shared key authentication of the client.

   RFC 4785 specifies authentication-only ciphersuites (with no
   encryption).

   This document specifies a set of ciphersuites that use an Elliptic
   Curve Diffie-Hellman exchange authenticated with a pre-shared key.
   These ciphersuites provides Perfect Forward Secrecy. It specifies as
   well one authentication-only ciphersuites (with no encryption). This
   ciphersuite is useful when authentication and integrity protection
   is desired, but confidentiality is not needed or not permitted.

2. Updating RFC4279

   The new ciphersuites proposed here match the ciphersuites defined in
   [RFC4279], except that they use an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
   exchange [RFC4492] authenticated with a pre-shared key. They are
   defined as follow:

   CipherSuite                           Key Exchange  Cipher      Hash

   TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA        ECDHE_PSK     RC4_128      SHA
   TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA   ECDHE_PSK     3DES_EDE_CBC SHA
   TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA    ECDHE_PSK     AES_128_CBC  SHA
   TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA    ECDHE_PSK     AES_256_CBC  SHA

   When these ciphersuites are used, the ServerKeyExchange and
   ClientKeyExchange messages also include the Diffie-Hellman
   parameters. The PSK identity and identity hint fields have the same
   meaning as in the previous section (note that the ServerKeyExchange
   message is always sent, even if no PSK identity hint is provided).

   The format of the ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange messages
   is shown below.

      struct {
          select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
              /* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */
              case ec_diffie_hellman_psk:  /* NEW */
                  opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
                  ServerECDHParams params;
          };
      } ServerKeyExchange;


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      struct {
          select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
              /* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */
              case ec_diffie_hellman_psk:   /* NEW */
                  opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
                  ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public;
          } exchange_keys;
      } ClientKeyExchange;

   The premaster secret is formed as follows. First, perform the
   Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman computation in the same way as for
   other Diffie-Hellman-based ciphersuites in [TLS1.0] or [TLS1.1]. Let
   Z be the value produced by this computation. Concatenate a uint16
   containing the length of Z (in octets), Z itself, a uint16
   containing the length of the PSK (in octets), and the PSK itself.

   This corresponds to the general structure for the premaster secrets
   (see Note 1 in Section 2 in RFC 4279) in [RFC4279], with
   "other_secret" containing Z:

       struct {
           opaque other_secret<0..2^16-1>;
           opaque psk<0..2^16-1>;
       };

   Here "other_secret" comes from the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
   exchange (ECDHE_PSK).

3. Updating RFC4785

   The new ciphersuite proposed here match the ciphersuites defined in
   [RFC4785], except that it uses an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
   exchange authenticated with a pre-shared key

      CipherSuite                     Key Exchange   Cipher      Hash

      TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA     ECDHE_PSK      NULL        SHA

4. Security Considerations

   The security considerations described throughout [TLS1.0],
   [TLSv1.1], RFC 4785 and RFC 4279 apply here as well.

5. IANA Considerations

   This document defines the following new ciphersuites, whose values
   are to be assigned from the TLS Cipher Suite registry defined in
   [TLS1.1].



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    CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA        = { 0xXX, 0xXX };
    CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA   = { 0xXX, 0xXX };
    CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA    = { 0xXX, 0xXX };
    CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA    = { 0xXX, 0xXX };
    CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA           = { 0xXX, 0xXX };

6. References


6.1. Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [TLS1.0]  T., Dierks, C., Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
             RFC 2246, January 1999.

   [TLS1.1]  Dierks, T., Rescorla, E., "The TLS Protocol Version 1.1",
             RFC 4346, April 200P.

   [RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
             for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December
             2005.

   [RFC4785] Blumenthal, U., Goel, P., "Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
             Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer
             Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, January 2007.

   [RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C.,
             Moeller, B., "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher
             Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May
             2006.

Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Bodo Moeller for comments on the
   document.

Author's Addresses

   Mohamad Badra
   LIMOS Laboratory - UMR (6158), CNRS
   France                    Email: badra@isima.fr

Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).




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