Internet Engineering Task Force M. Badra
INTERNET DRAFT ENST Paris
I. Hajjeh
ESRGroups
Expires: December 2006 June 15, 2006
MTLS: TLS Multiplexing
<draft-badra-hajjeh-mtls-01.txt>
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) standard provides connection
security with mutual authentication, data confidentiality and
integrity, key generation and distribution, and security parameters
negotiation. However, missing from the protocol is a way to
multiplex application data over a single TLS session.
This document defines MTLS, a new TLS sub-protocol running over TLS
(or DTLS) Record protocol. The MTLS design provides application
multiplexing over a single TLS (or DTLS) session. Therefore, instead
of associating a TLS connection with each application, MTLS allows
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several applications to protect their exchanges over a single TLS
session.
1 Introduction
SMTP over TLS [SMTPTLS], HTTP over TLS [HTTPTLS], POP over TLS and
IMAP over TLS [POPTLS] are examples of securing, respectively, SMTP,
HTTP, POP and IMAP data exchanges using the TLS protocol [TLS].
TLS ([TLS], [TLSv1.1] and [DTLS]) is the most deployed security
protocol for securing exchanges, authenticating entities and for
generating and distributing cryptographic keys. However, what is
missing from the protocol is the way to multiplex application data
over the same TLS session.
Actually, TLS (or DTLS) clients and servers MUST establish a TLS (or
DTLS) session for each application they want to run over a transport
layer. However, some applications may agree or be configured to use
the same security policies or parameters (e.g. authentication method
and cipher_suite) and then to share a single TLS session to protect
their exchanges. In this way, this document extends TLS to allow
application multiplexing over TLS.
The document motivations included:
o TLS is application protocol-independent. Higher-level protocol
can operate on top of the TLS protocol transparently.
o TLS is a protocol of a modular nature. Since TLS is developed in
four independent protocols, the approach defined in this
document can be added by extending the TLS protocol and with a
total reuse of pre-existing TLS infrastructures and
implementations.
o It provides a secure VPN tunnel over a transport layer. Unlike
"ssh-connection" [SSHCON], MTLS can run over unreliable
transport protocols, such as UDP.
o Establishing a single session for a number of applications
-instead of establishing a session per application- reduces
resource consumption, latency and messages flow that are
associated with executing simultaneous TLS sessions.
o TLS can not forbid an intruder to analyze the traffic and cannot
protect data from inference. Thus, the intruder can know the
type of application data transmitted through the TLS session.
However, the extension defined in this document allows, by its
design, data protection against inference.
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1.2 Requirements language
The key words "MUST", "SHALL", "SHOULD", and "MAY", in this document
are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119.
2 TLS multiplexing overview and considerations
This document defines a new TLS sub-protocol called Multiplexing TLS
(MTLS) to handle data multiplexing, and it specifies the content
type mtls(TBD). It extends also TLS with a new extension type
allowing the negotiation of data multiplexing features.
2.1 Handshake
Based on the TLS Extensions [TLSExt], a client and a server can, in
an ordinary TLS handshake, negotiate the future use of MTLS. If the
client does attempt to initiate a TLS connection using MTLS with a
server that does not support it, it will be automatically alerted.
For servers aware of MTLS but not wishing to use it, it will
gracefully revert to an ordinary TLS handshake or stop the
negotiation.
The negotiation usually starts with the client determining whether
the server is capable of and willing to use MTLS or not. In order to
allow a TLS client to negotiate the application multiplexing
functionality, a new extension type SHOULD be added to the Extended
Client and Extended Server Hello messages.
This document defines an extension of type
"application_layer_protocol". The "extension_data" field of this
extension contains a "data_multiplexing", where:
Struct {
ApplicationLayerProtocol alp_list<0..2^22-1>;
} data_multiplexing;
struct {
SenderChannelID sender_channel_id;
ReceiverChannelID receiver_channel_id;
uint32 max_packet_length;
ApplicationpProtocolName apn;
} ApplicationLayerProtocol;
opaque SenderChannelID [2];
opaque ReceiverChannelID [2];
Opaque ApplicationpProtocolName<1..2^4>;
Each channel has its identifier, which is composed of two parts
(sender_channel_id and receiver_channel_id) generated respectively
by the sender and the receiver. During the Handshake phase, the
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sender generates the sender_channel_id's value and initializes the
receiver_channel_id to empty field, in which the receiver replies
with a generated receiver_channel_id.
The sender (respectively the receiver) initializes its
max_packet_length with the data length (in octets), specifying how
many bytes the receiver (respectively the sender) can maximally send
on the channel. Each end of the channel establishes a 'receive
buffer' and a 'send buffer'.
How the negotiation of options within an extension is handled is up
to the definition of that extension. Implementations of this
document MAY allow the server to respond with the intersection
between what the client and the server support. However, the server
MAY reply with all the applications it supports, but in this case
the server MUST support at least one application requested by the
client. The sender_channel_id, receiver_channel_id and the
max_packet_size MUST be omitted from the server response for each
application not requested by the client.
Note: if the server (receiver) agrees, the client (sender) SHOULD
establish a single TLS (respectively DTLS) session for all
applications it wishes to run over a single TLS session. In this
case, the sender SHOULD send a data multiplexing extension
containing "ALL" as ApplicationpProtocolName value. The
sender_channel_id, the receiver_channel_id and the max_packet_length
fields SHOULD be omitted. If the receiver is able to negotiate such
a session, it will reply with a list of applications it can accept
to run through a single TLS session. The receiver_channel_id, the
sender_channel_id and the max_packet_length fields SHOULD be
omitted.
However, the client MAY indicate to the server its support of the
data multiplexing extension without determining the application
types it wishes to multiplex. In this case, the client sends an
empty data multiplexing extension. If the server is able of and
willing to use the data multiplexing extension, it MUST reply with
an empty extension of the same type. Once the Handshake is complete,
the client and the server SHOULD establish and manage many
application channels using the requests/responses defined below.
2.1.1. Opening and closing connections
Once the Handshake is complete, the two entities can start data
multiplexing using a set of requests/responses defined below. All
requests/requests will pass through MTLS layer and are formatted
into MTLS packets, depending on each request/response.
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The sender MAY request the opening of many channels. For each
request, the MTLS layer MUST generate and send the following
request:
struct {
uint8 type;
SenderChannelID sender_channel_id;
uint32 max_packet_length;// of the sender of this packet
ApplicationpProtocolName apn;
} RequestEstablishmentChannel;
The field "type" specifies the MTLS packet type (types are
summarized below), max_packet_length and the sender_channel_id are
used as previously described.
The receiver decides whether it can open the channel, and replies
with one of the following messages:
struct {
uint8 type;
SenderChannelID sender_channel_id;
ReceiverChannelID receiver_channel_id;
uint32 max_packet_length;
} RequestEstablishmentSuccess;
struct {
uint8 type;
SenderChannelID sender_channel_id;
opaque error<0..2^16>;
} RequestEchecChannel;
The field "error" conveys a description of the error.
The following packet MAY be sent to notify the receiver that the
sender will not send any more data on this channel and that any data
received after a closure request will be ignored. The sender of the
closure request MAY close its 'receive buffer' without waiting for
the receiver's response. However, the receiver MUST respond with a
confirmation of the closure and close down the channel immediately,
discarding any pending writes.
struct {
uint8 type;
SenderChannelID sender_channel_id;
ReceiverChannelID receiver_channel_id;
} CloseChannel;
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struct {
uint8 type;
SenderChannelID sender_channel_id;
ReceiverChannelID receiver_channel_id;
} ConfirmationCloseChannel;
2.2 MTLS sub-protocol
The structure of the MTLS packet is described below. The channel_id
value depends on the originator of the packet; for received
(respectively submitted) packets, it conveys the sender_channel_id
(respectively receiver_channel_id). The length conveys the data
length of the current packet.
Each entity maintains its max_packet_length that is originally
initialized (during the channel establishment or during the
handshake phase) to a value not bigger than the maximum size of this
entity's 'receive buffer'. For each received packet, the entity MUST
subtract the packet's length from the max_packet_length. The result
is always positive since the packet's length is always less than or
equal to the current max_packet_length.
The free space of the 'receive buffer' MAY increase in length.
Consequently, the entity MUST inform the other end about this
increase, allowing the other entity to send packet with length
bigger than the old max_packet_length but smaller or equal than the
new value.
The entity MAY indicate this increase using either data or
Acknowledgment packets. In the first case, the entity MUST set the
max_packet_length_changed to 1 and extra_length set to the extra
free space. In the second case, the entity only needs to send the
length of the extra free space.
If the length of the 'receive buffer' does not change,
Acknowledgment packet will never be sent. However, the entity MAY
send data packet but in this case, it MUST set the
max_packet_length_changed to 0 and MUST consequently remove the
extra_length field from the packet header.
In the case where the 'receive buffer' of an entity fills up, the
other entity MUST wait for an Acknowledgment or a data packet with
packet_length_changed set to 1, before sending any more
MTLSPlaintext packets.
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struct {
uint8 type;
uint16 channel_id;
uint8 max_packet_length_changed;
uint32 extra_length; // omitted if the value of the
// max_packet_length_changed is 0
uint32 length;
opaque data[MTLSPlaintext.length];
} MTLSPlaintext;
struct {
uint8 type;
uint16 channel_id; // of the receiver of that packet
uint32 extra_length;
} Acknowledgment;
The TLS Record Layer receives data from MTLS, supposes it as
uninterpreted data and applies the fragmentation and the
cryptographic operations on it, as defined in [TLS].
Note: multiple MTLS fragments MAY be coalesced into a single
TLSPlaintext record.
Received data is decrypted, verified, decompressed, and reassembled,
then delivered to MTLS sub-protocol. Next, the MTLS sends data to
the appropriate application using the channel identifier and the
length value.
2.3 MTLS Message Types
RequestEstablishmentChannel 0x01
RequestEstablishmentSuccess 0x02
RequestEchecChannel 0x03
CloseChannel 0x04
ConfirmationCloseChannel 0x05
MTLSPlaintext 0x06
Acknowledgment 0x07
Security Considerations
Security issues are discussed throughout this document, and in
[TLS], [TLSv1.1], [DTLS] and [TLSEXT] documents.
If a fatal error related to a channel or a connection of an
arbitrary application occurs, the secure session MUST NOT be
resumed.
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IANA Considerations
This section provides guidance to the IANA regarding registration of
values related to the TLS protocol.
There are name spaces that require registration: the mtls content
type, the data_multiplexing extension, and the MTLS message types.
References
[TLS] Dierks, T., et. al., "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC
2246, January 1999.
[TLSExt] Blake-Wilson, S., et. al., "Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Extensions", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[DTLS] Rescorla, E., Modadugu, N., "Datagram Transport Layer
Security", RFC 4347, April 2006.
[TLSv1.1] Dierks, T., Rescorla, E., "The TLS Protocol Version 1.1",
RFC 4346, April 200P.
[SMTPTLS] Hoffman, P., "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over
TLS", RFC 2487, January 1999.
[HTTPTLS] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[POPTLS] Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP", RFC
2595, June 1999.
[SSHCON] Lonvick, C., "SSH Connection Protocol", RFC 4254, January
2005.
Author's Addresses
Mohamad Badra
ENST Paris
France Email: Mohamad.Badra@enst.fr
Ibrahim Hajjeh
ESRGroups, Security WG
France Email: Ibrahim.Hajjeh@esrgroups.org
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