Network Working Group L. Dunbar
Internet Draft Huawei
Intended status: Informational M. Zarny
Expires: October 2015 Goldman Sachs
C. Jacquenet
M. Boucadair
France Telecom
S. Chakrabarty
US Ignite
April 23, 2015
Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) Problem Statement
draft-dunbar-i2nsf-problem-statement-03.txt
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Abstract
This document describes the motivation and the problem statement for
Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF).
Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Motivation....................................3
2. Requirements Language..........................................4
3. Problem Space..................................................5
3.1. Challenges facing Customers...............................6
3.1.1. Lack of Standard Interfaces to Express Desired Policies
............................................................6
3.1.2. Lack of Interface to Monitor the Execution of Desired
Policies....................................................8
3.2. Challenges Facing Security Service Providers..............8
3.2.1. There is no standard Technical Characterization of
Security Functions..........................................8
3.2.2. Lack of A Standard Catalog of Security Function
Capabilities................................................9
3.2.3. Lack of A Common Interface to Enforce Security Policies
...........................................................10
3.2.4. High-Level Customer's Security Policies.............10
3.3. Lack of a Clear Interface to validate Policies across
Multiple Domains..............................................10
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3.4. Lack of A Standard Interface to inject feedback to NSF...11
4. Scope of the proposed work....................................11
4.1. Network Security Functions under Consideration...........12
4.2. A Two-Layer Approach.....................................12
5. Other Potential Uses of I2NSF.................................13
6. Related Industry Initiatives..................................14
6.1. Related IETF WGs.........................................14
6.2. Relationship with ETSI NFV ISG...........................15
6.3. OpenStack Firewall/Security as a Service.................16
6.4. Security as a Service by Cloud Security Alliance.........16
7. Security Policies Negotiation.................................16
8. Manageability Considerations..................................17
9. Security Considerations.......................................17
10. IANA Considerations..........................................17
11. References...................................................17
11.1. Normative References....................................17
11.2. Informative References..................................17
12. Acknowledgments..............................................19
12.1. Appendix: Relationship with Open Source Communities.....20
1. Introduction and Motivation
This document describes the motivation and the problem space for the
Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF)effort.
More and more service providers are providing hosted security
solutions to deliver cost-effective managed security services to
enterprise customers who face challenges in maintaining a secure
infrastructure, complying with regulatory requirements, and
controlling costs. The hosted security services are primarily
targeted at enterprises (especially small/medium ones), but could
also be provided to any kind of mass-market customer. The said
enterprises often suffer from a lack of security experts who could
continuously monitor, acquire new skills and propose immediate
mitigations to ever increasing sets of security attacks. Security is
a serious concern for the viability of the business to be considered
as a part-time job.
However, many medium and large enterprises have deployed various on-
premises security functions which they want to continue to use. They
are looking for combining local security functions with remote
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hosted security functions to achieve more efficient and immediate
counter-measures to both Internet-originated attacks and enterprise
network-originated (Denial of Service (DoS)) attacks. Some
enterprises may only need the hosted security services for their
remote branch offices where minimal security
infrastructures/capabilities exist.
Obviously, enabling a security function (e.g., firewall [I-D.ietf-
opsawg-firewalls]) does not mean that a network is protected. As
such, it is necessary to leverage existing on-premises security
functions and the expertise of service providers to properly select
which security features to solicit and to property configure those
functions for a better security protection.
According to [Gartner-2013], the demand for hosted (or cloud-based)
security services is growing. Small and medium-sized businesses
(SMBs) are increasingly adopting cloud-based security services to
replace on-premises security tools, while larger enterprises are
deploying a mix of traditional and cloud-based security services.
Still, even with the traditional way of deploying security features,
there is still a gap to coordinate among implementations from
distinct vendors. This is mainly the reason why mono-vendor security
functions are enabled in a given network segment.
This document does not elaborate on specific use case. The reader
should refer to [I2NSF-ACCESS], [I2NSF-DC] and [I2NSF-Mobile] for a
more in-depth discussion on use cases.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
This document makes use of the following terms and acronyms:
DC: Data Center
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Hosted Security Function: refers to a security function that is
hosted and managed by a third-party (e.g., service
providers).
Network Security Function (NSF): denotes a security functions that
is located in the network side.
Hosted security function: Refers to a security function that is not
located on premises but it is enabled in another
administrative domain, typically a service provider's
domain, a data center, etc.
Packet based Security Functions: the security functions that
perform actions or invoke function calls based content
in the packet and/or contextual information such as
state, time, events, etc.
3. Problem Space
The following sub-sections describe the problems and challenges
facing customers and network security service providers (called
service provider, for short) when security functions are no longer
physically hosted at customer premises. Security functions can be
distributed across networks (or administrative domains): on
customer premises or on service provider premises. Security
services are then provided by combining several security
functions, whether they are located in the customer premises or in
the network.
The "Customer-Provider" relationship may be between any two
parties: different firms or different domains of the same firm.
Contractual agreements may be required in such contexts to
formally document the customer's security requirements and the
provider's guarantees to fulfill those requirements. Such
agreements may detail protection levels, escalation procedure,
alarms reporting, etc. There is currently no standard mechanism to
capture those requirements.
Dynamic means to discover security service functions may not be a
valid requirement but means to retrieve the capabilities of on-
premises service functions may be required so that a service
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provider could propose an efficient security service. These
capabilities can be documented in a static manner (e.g., during
the contractual agreements) or offer an interface so that a
service provider can update the capabilities of security device
hosted on the customer's premises. This dynamic capability
retrieval is recommended because security functions may be subject
to software and hardware updates. These updates may have
implications on the policies enforced by the service providers.
Note a service provider may be a customer of another service
provider.
3.1. Challenges facing Customers
When customers invoke hosted security services, their security
policies may be enforced by a collection of security functions
hosted in different domains. The following sub-section elaborates
on some customer-specific issues.
Customers may not have security skills. As such, they are not able
to express sufficiently precise requirements or security policies.
Usually these customers express expectations (that can be viewed
as loose security requirements). Customers may also express
guidelines such as which critical communications are to be
preserved during critical events, which hosts are to service even
during severe security attacks, etc.
3.1.1. Lack of Standard Interfaces to Express Desired Policies
Customers need to express their security requirements, guidelines,
and expectations to the service providers, which in turn will be
translated into security policies and associated configuration
sets to the set of security functions. But no standard technical
characterization and/or APIs exist, even for most common security
services. Most security services are accessible only through
disparate, proprietary interfaces (e.g., portals, APIs), in
whatever format vendors choose to offer.
Without standard interfaces, especially in multi-vendor
environments, it is complex for customers to update security
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policies and integrate with services provided by the security
service providers. This complexity is induced by the diversity of
the configuration models, policy models, supported management
interfaces, etc. as implemented by existing implementations. The
current practices that rely on the use of scripts that generates
automatically scripts should be adjusted each time an
implementation from a different vendor is enabled in a network
side.
Introducing automated mechanisms to dynamically enforce security
polices to accommodate customer's requirement relies upon a formal
modeling of security requirements. Note, some customers may
express only their general expectations while others may provide
more specific security requirements. These requirements are
technology-agnostic. Translating these requirements into
technology-specific actions is handled by the service provider.
Customers may also require means to easily update/modify their
security requirements with immediate effect in the underlying
involved network elements.
While security agreements are in place, security functions may be
solicited without requiring an explicit invocation means.
Nevertheless, some explicit invocation means may be required to
interact with a service function.
Here is an example of how standard interfaces could help achieve
faster implementation time cycles. Let us consider a customer who
would like to dynamically allow an encrypted flow with specific
port, src/dst addresses or protocol type through the firewall/IPS
to enable an encrypted video conferencing call only during the
time of the call. With no commonly accepted interface in place,
the customer would have to learn about the particular provider's
firewall/IPS interface, and send the request in the provider's
required format. If a firewall/IPS interface standard exists, the
customer would be able to send the request, without having to do
much preliminary legwork. Such a standard helps providers too
since they could now offer the same firewall/IPS interface to
represent firewall/IPS services, which may be offered by different
vendors' products. They have now abstracted the firewall/IPS
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services. Lastly, it helps the firewall/IPS vendors since they
could now work on common specifications.
3.1.2. Lack of Interface to Monitor the Execution of Desired Policies
How a policy is translated into technology-specific actions is
hidden from the customers. However, customers still need ways to
monitor the delivered security service that is the result of the
execution of their desired security requirements, guidelines and
expectations.
Today, there is no standard way for customers to get security
service assurance (including running "what-if" scenarios to assess
the efficiency of the delivered security service) of their
specified security policies properly enforced by the security
functions in the provider domain.
3.2. Challenges Facing Security Service Providers
Security Service Providers need to utilize multiple instances of
security functions from various vendors to enforce the security
policies desired by their customers.
The security functions that are invoked when enforcing a security
policy can be located in different equipment and network
locations.
3.2.1. There is no standard Technical Characterization of Security
Functions
Many types of network security functions exist, and they can be
deployed in multiple locations in a given network in perhaps
different roles. They could be hosted on a common device or on
multiple devices. Below are a few examples of security functions
and locations/contexts in which they are often deployed.
Security functions can be categorized into meta-domains, such as:
External Intrusion & Attack Protection:
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e.g., Firewall/ACL; Authentication; IPS; IDS; Endpoint
Protection; etc.;
Security Functions in a DMZ:
e.g., Firewall/ACL; IDS/IPS, authentication and
authorization services, NAT, forward proxies, application
FWs, AAA; etc.
Internal Security Analysis & report:
e.g., Security Log; Event Correlation; Forensic Analysis;
etc;
Internal Data and Content Protection:
e.g., Encryption; Authorization; Public/Private key
management for internal database, etc.
Given the diversity of security functions, contexts in which they
can be deployed, and constant evolution of these functions,
standardizing all aspects of security functions is challenging,
most probably not feasible, and not necessary. For example, from
an I2NSF perspective, there is no need to standardize on how a
firewall filters are created or applied. What is needed is the
ability for a customer to describe its requirements (intent) of a
security policy-possibly by means of APIs.
3.2.2. Lack of A Standard Catalog of Security Function Capabilities
To offer security services, service providers need to activate
various security functions on devices manufactured by multiple
vendors. Even within one product category (e.g., firewall),
security functions provided by different vendors can have
different features and capabilities: filters that can be designed
and activated by a firewall may or may not support IPv6, depending
on the firewall technology, for example.
Today, there is no method for vendors to describe the capabilities
of their security functions. Without a common technical
framework to describe the capabilities of their security
functions, various providers could describe security functions in
different ways.
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3.2.3. Lack of A Common Interface to Enforce Security Policies
Based on customer-specified requirements for global security
policy enforcement purposes, service providers need to select a
set of security functions (located in the network or elsewhere) to
accommodate customer's requirements. However, there are no
standardized interfaces to security functions provided by
different vendors, making it very difficult to automate the
process.
3.2.4. High-Level Customer's Security Policies
Customers may not have security skills. As such, they are not able
to express requirements or security policies that are precise
enough. Usually these customers express expectations (that can be
viewed as loose security requirements). Customers may also express
guidelines such as which critical communications are to be
preserved during critical events, which hosts are to service even
during severe security attacks, etc.
Therefore, service providers have to build system to translate
customers' loose and abstract security policies to the exact
provisioning data models to the selected security functions.
3.3. Lack of a Clear Interface to validate Policies across Multiple
Domains
One key aspect of a hosted security service with security
functions located at different premises is to have a standard
interface to express, monitor and verify security policies that
combine several distributed security functions.
The work conducted by ETSI's Network Functions Virtualization
(NFV) Industry Specification group (ISG) raises additional
management challenges for security policies to be enforced by
(distributed) virtual Network Security Functions (vNSF).
Virtualization techniques require a standard interface to express,
monitor, and manage the security policies that combine several
security functions that may be running on different premises, and
which may be virtualized or not.
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Without standard interfaces and security policy data models, the
enforcement of a customer-driven security policy remains
challenging because of the inherent complexity brought by the
combined invocation of several, yet vendor-specific security
functions, but also because of the accompanying complexity of
configuration procedures and operational tasks in a multi-vendor,
heterogeneous environment.
Ensuring the consistent enforcement of the policies at various
domains is challenging. Standard data models are likely to
contribute to softening that issue.
3.4. Lack of A Standard Interface to inject feedback to NSF
Today, many security functions, such as IPS and Antivirus, depend
heavily on the associated profiles. They can perform more
effective protection if they have the up-to-date profiles. As more
sophisticated threats arise, enterprises, vendors, and service
providers have to rely on each other to achieve optimal
protection. [CA] is one of those initiatives that aim at
combining efforts conducted by multiple organizations.
Today there is no standard interface to exchange security profiles
between organizations.
4. Scope of the proposed work
A primary goal of I2NSF is to define a set of clear interfaces and
data models for packet based network security functions (NSFs).
I2NSF will identify how to dynamically design, enforce and manage
the security policies that combine several security functions that
may be running on different premises.
I2NSF aims to define a template for exposing security
requirements. I2NSF also aims at documenting the dynamic security
parameter service negotiation procedure to be established between
a customer and a service provider (i.e., between a Security Policy
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Enforcement Point (SPEP) and a Security Policy Decision Point
(SPDP)). The outcomes of such negotiation are meant to feed the
computation logic used by the security service provider for
dynamic security resource allocation and policy enforcement
purposes.
I2NSF may be invoked by any (authorized) client-e.g., upstream
applications (controllers), orchestration systems, security
portals, etc.
4.1. Network Security Functions under Consideration
There are many security functions being deployed and new ones are
popping up with business and application demands. In order to have
a concrete context for the discussion, I2NSF focuses on the Flow-
aware Security Functions that provide treatment to packets/flows,
such as IPS/IDS, HTTP filter, and stateless flow filter. (They are
different from Application layer security functions, such as email
filters, virus treatment, etc). Sample services associated with
flow-aware security functions include deep packet inspection,
packet/flow/stream filtering, and redirection (remote and local).
Sample IPS/IDS functions include flow/stream pattern matching and
remediation, respectively.
The reason for starting with flow-based, security-related
functions is due to security policies that primarily rely upon
security functions that are essentially located in networks.
4.2. A Two-Layer Approach
There are two layers that govern the interaction between network
security functions:
- Security Service and Policy Layer
- Functional Layer
The Security Service and Policy Layer is used by customers to
express their requirements for a global security policy
enforcement and possibly monitor how efficiently the said security
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policy is enforced for their specific flows. This layer will
leverage existing protocols, such as RESTconf or NETCONF to carry
security policy provisioning information that can be expressed by
Discretionary Access Control, Mandatory Access Control, Role Based
Access Control, Attribute-Based Access Control, Policy-Based
Access Control, or combinations of these.
The Functional Layer specifies how customer-driven security
policies invoke the security functions that compose a security
policy, by means of dynamic configuration procedures. This
requires the definition of a vendor-agnostic information model,
along with one or more data models, to represent (virtual and
physical) security functions that pertain to a security policy.
This layer will leverage the existing protocols and data models
defined by I2RS, Netconf, and NETMOD WGs.
The security functions offered by hosted security services assume
bi-directional information exchange among multiple entities for
dynamic policy negotiation and validation purposes. Such exchanges
may also yield policy-driven actions, e.g., traffic redirection to
higher level security functions, etc. Therefore, the enforcement
of security policies requires programmatic interfaces and
protocols.
One of the objectives of the proposed work is to standardize the
dynamic security service parameter negotiation that typically
takes place between the customer and the security service provider
to facilitate and contribute to the automation of the overall
security service delivery procedure, from service parameter
exposure and negotiation to resource allocation and security
service fulfillment and assurance.
5. Other Potential Uses of I2NSF
The I2NSF framework allows the clients to view, request, and/or
verify the security functions/policies offered by providers at
different premises. This framework can make it possible for a
cluster of devices requiring the similar security policies to have
consistent policies across multiple sites.
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Network service providers can provide "Hosted Security Functions"
services. Network providers can also act as security function
brokers to facilitate if not optimize the enforcement of customer-
driven security policies. They can expose a service catalog and
standard mechanisms by which enterprises (or applications) can
query, request, or/and verify the needed security functions or
policies.
With the standard interfaces for clients to request the required
security functions and policies, network operators can leverage
their current service to enterprises (e.g. VPN, private IP
services) and access to a vast population of end users to offer a
set of consolidated Security solutions and policies. Network
operators can be instrumental in defining a common interface and
framework as part of an IETF-conducted specification effort.
6. Related Industry Initiatives
6.1. Related IETF WGs
IETF NETCONF: I2NSF should consider using the NETCONF protocol
exchange security policy provisioning information between
participating devices/security functions and the computation logic
(a.k.a., a security Policy Decision Point (PDP)) that resides in
the control plane and which makes the decisions to dynamically
allocate resources and enforce customer-driven security policies.
NETMOD ACL Model: [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] describes the very
basic attributes for access control. I2NSF will extend the ACL
data model to be more comprehensive, for example, extend to
multiple actions and policies, and describes various services
associated with the security functions under consideration.
In addition, I2NSF has to specify ways to monitor/report of Packet
Based Security Functions.
I2RS: the WG currently discusses the specification of an interface
between the forwarding and the control planes, to facilitate the
dynamic enforcement of traffic forwarding policies based upon
IGP/BGP route computation results. I2NSF is looking specifically
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into expressing security policies in two layers. I2NSF should
leverage the protocols and data models developed by I2RS.
I2NSF aims to develop the additional information models and data
models for distributed security functions, like the firewall and
IPS/IDS. The policy structure specified by [I-D.hares-i2rs-bnp-
info-model] can be used by I2NSF to be extended to include
recursive actions to other security functions.
The IETF SFC WG specifies service function chaining techniques
while treating service functions as a black box; VNFpool is about
the reliability and availability of the virtualized network
functions. But neither addresses how service functions are
invoked, or configured.
Both SFC and VNFpool do not cover in-depth specification (e.g.
rules for the requested FW) to invoke security functions. In SFC
and VNFpool, a firewall function is a black box that is treated in
the same way as a video optimization function. SFC and VNFpool do
not cover the negotiation part, e.g. Client needs Rules x/y/z for
FW, but the Provider can only offer x/z.
The IETF SACM (Security Assessment and Continuous Monitoring) WG
specifies mechanisms to assess endpoint security. The endpoints
can be routers, switches, clustered DB, or an installed piece of
software. SACM is about "How to encode that policy in a manner
where assessment can be automated". For example:
- a Solaris 10 SPARC or Windows 7 system used in an environment
that requires adherence to a policy of Mission Critical
Classified.
- rules like "The maximum password age must be 30 days" and
"The minimum password age must be 1 day"
[I2NSF-GAP] has a more extensive study comparing I2NSF with
various existing efforts in similar/adjacent areas.
6.2. Relationship with ETSI NFV ISG
ETSI's NFV ISG defines the architecture to pool together many
virtual network functions to be managed and consumed collectively.
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I2NSF is one of the enabling tools for NFV, specifically the VNF
as a Service (VNFaaS) specified by ETSI NFV Group Specification
Use Cases [gs_NFV].
ETSI's NFV ISG effort is actively contributed by service
providers. It defines a detailed service model for VNFaaS as well
as requirements that should be taken into account by the I2NSF
initiative.
6.3. OpenStack Firewall/Security as a Service
Open source projects like OpenStack and CloudStack have begun to
tackle the issues of interfaces to security functions but much
work remains.
OpenStack completed the Firewall as a Service project and
specified the set of APIs for Firewall services [API]
OpenStack has defined the APIs for managing Security Groups [SG]
The attributes defined by OpenStack Firewall/Security as a Service
are at this point are basic. However, they can serve as the basis
of the information model that the I2NSF IETF initiative aims to
specify.
6.4. Security as a Service by Cloud Security Alliance
https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/secaas/#_get-involved
SaaS by CSA is at the initial stage of defining the scope of work.
7. Security Policies Negotiation
The protocol needed for this security function/policies negotiation
may be somewhat correlated to the dynamic service parameter
negotiation procedure [RFC7297]. The CPP template documented in
RFC7297, even though currently covering only Connectivity (but
includes security clauses such as isolation requirements, non-via
nodes, etc.), could be extended as a basis for the negotiation
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procedure. Likewise, the companion CPNP could be a candidate to
proceed with the negotiation procedure.
The "security as a service" would be a typical example of the kind
of (CPP-based) negotiation procedures that could take place between
a corporate customer and a service provider. However, more security
specific parameters have to be considered by this proposed work.
8. Manageability Considerations
TBD.
9. Security Considerations
This document sketches a problem statement for the dynamic
interaction with service functions.
10. IANA Considerations
This document requires no IANA actions. RFC Editor: Please remove
this section before publication.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
11.2. Informative References
[SG] http://docs.openstack.org/admin-guide-
cloud/content/securitygroup_api_abstractions.html
[API] http://docs.openstack.org/admin-guide-
cloud/content/fwaas_api_abstractions.html
[CA] http://cyberthreatalliance.org/
[I-D.hares-i2rs-bnp-info-model]
Hares, S., Wu, Q., Tantsura, J., and R. White, "An
Information Model for Basic Network Policy and Filter
Rules", draft-hares-i2rs-bnp-info-model-02 (work in
progress), March 2015.
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[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]
Bogdanovic, D., Sreenivasa, K., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
"Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model",
draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-02 (work in progress), March
2015.
[I-D.ietf-opsawg-firewalls]
Baker, F. and P. Hoffman, "On Firewalls in Internet
Security", draft-ietf-opsawg-firewalls-01 (work in
progress), October 2012.
[RFC7297] Boucadair, M., "IP Connectivity Provisioning Profile",
RFC7297, April 2014.
[I2NSF-PACKET] E. Lopez, "Packet-based Paradigm for Interfaces to
NSFs", <draft-lopez-i2nsf-packet-00>, March 2015.
[I2NSF-ACCESS] A. Pastor, et al, "Access Use Cases for an Open OAM
Interface to Virtualized Security Services", <draft-
pastor-i2nsf-access-usecases-00>, Oct 2014.
[I2NSF-DC] M. Zarny, et al, "I2NSF Data Center Use Cases", <draft-
zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases-00>, Oct 2014.
[I2NSF-MOBILE] M. Qi, et al, "Integrated Security with Access
Network Use Case", <draft-qi-i2nsf-access-network-usecase-
00>, Oct 2014.
[I2NSF-GAP] D. Zhang, et al, "Analysis of Existing Work for I2NSF",
<draft-zhang-gap-analysis-00>, Feb 2015.
[gs_NFV] ETSI NFV Group Specification, Network Functions
Virtualizsation (NFV) Use Cases. ETSI GS NFV 001v1.1.1,
2013.
[Gartner-2013] E. Messmer, "Gartner: Cloud-based security as a
service set to take off", Network World, 31 October 2013
[NW-2011] J. Burke, "The Pros and Cons of a Cloud-Based Firewall",
Network World, 11 November 2011
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[Application-SDN] J. Giacomonni, "Application Layer SDN", Layer
123 ONF Presentation, Singapore, June 2013
12. Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments to Andy Malis for his review and contributions.
This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.
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Authors' Addresses
Linda Dunbar
Huawei Technologies
5340 Legacy Drive, Suite 175
Plano, TX 75024, USA
Phone: (469) 277 5840
Email: ldunbar@huawei.com
Myo Zarny
Goldman Sachs
30 Hudson Street
Jersey City, NJ 07302
Email: myo.zarny@gs.com
Christian Jacquenet
France Telecom
Rennes 35000
France
Email: Christian.jacquenet@orange.com
Mohamed Boucadair
France Telecom
Rennes 35000
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Shaibal Chakrabarty
US Ignite
1776 Massachusetts Ave NW, Suite 601
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (214) 708 6163
Email: shaibalc@us-ignite.org
12.1. Appendix: Relationship with Open Source Communities
One of the goals of the I2NSF initiative is to form a
collaborative loop from IETF to Industry Open Source Communities.
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Open-source initiatives are not to be considered as an alternative
to formal standardization processes. On the contrary, they are
complementary, with the former acting as an enabler and
accelerator of the latter. Open-source provides an ideal mechanism
to quick prototyping and validating contending proposals, and
demonstrating the feasibility of disruptive ideas that could
otherwise not be considered. In this respect, open-source
facilitates the engagement in the standardization process of small
(and typically more dynamic) players such as start-ups and
research groups, which would see better opportunities of being
heard and a clearer rewards to their efforts. An open-source
approach is extremely useful as well for the production of open
reference implementations of the standards at the same (or even
faster) pace they are defined. The availability of such reference
implementations translate into much simpler interoperability and
conformance assessments for both providers and users, and can
become the basis for incremental differentiation of a common
solution, thus allowing a cooperative competition ("coopetition")
model.
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