IETF                                                          S. Farrell
Internet-Draft                                    Trinity College Dublin
Intended status: Informational                         February 23, 2008
Expires: August 26, 2008


                      Other Certificates Extension
                   draft-farrell-pkix-other-certs-01

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 26, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

Abstract

   Some applications that associate state information with public key
   certificates can benefit from a way to link together a set of
   certificates belonging to the same end entity that can safely be
   considered to be equivalent for the purposes of referencing that
   application state information.  This memo defines a certificate
   extension that supports such linkage that can allow applications to
   establish the required linkage without introducing a new protocol
   data unit.



Farrell                  Expires August 26, 2008                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft              Abbreviated Title              February 2008


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  A Use Case  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Other Certificates Extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   4.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements  . . . . . . . . . . 7





































Farrell                  Expires August 26, 2008                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft              Abbreviated Title              February 2008


1.  Introduction

   RFC 3280 [RFC3280] defines a profile for the use of public key
   certificates for Internet applications.  If an application associates
   application state information with a public key certificate, then
   that association may be disrupted if the end entity changes its
   public key certficate.  Such disruption can occur due to renewals or
   if the end entity changes its certificate issuer.  Similarly, if the
   end entity is actually a distributed system, where each instance has
   a different private key, then the relying party has no way to
   assoicate the different public key certificates with the relevant
   application state information.

   For example, assume a web browser retains state information (perhaps
   passwords) about a web site, indexed (possibly indirectly) via values
   contained in the web server's public key certificate (perhaps a DNS
   name).  When the web server certificate expires, and a new certifiate
   is acquired (perhaps with a different DNS name), then the browser
   cannot safely map the new certificate to the relevant state
   information.

   This memo defines a new public key certificate extension that
   supports such linkage.

   Other than the issuer asserting that the set of certificates belong
   to the same end entity, the detailed semantics of the linkage of
   certifcates is not defined here, since that is a matter for
   application developers and the operators of certification authorities
   (CAs).  In particular we do not define how a CA can validate that the
   same end entity is the holder of the various private keys, nor how
   the application should make use of this information.  Nor do we
   define what kinds of state information may be shared.

   CAs MUST however only issue certificates containing this extension
   where the links created are such that the relevant consumers of the
   certificates can safely make use of those links.  This will typically
   be the case where the certificates are only used by a single
   application.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].


2.  A Use Case

   Public key certificates expire, typically about a year after they are
   created.  Some applications might need to know that the same entity



Farrell                  Expires August 26, 2008                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft              Abbreviated Title              February 2008


   is the subject of this certificate and a previously used certificate.

   For example, if a web server certificate expires, it could be useful
   for a web browser to know that the server currently presenting a
   certificate in a TLS [RFC4346] handshake represents the same web
   server that previously presented a certificate.  This could be used
   for example to allow the browser to automatically fill in form fields
   for the server in question, even if the server certificate has been
   replaced.  While the same effect can be achieved based on the use of
   the same issuer and subject fields in a certificate there could be
   security issues involved in such comparisons, e.g. if the subject
   name includes a DNS name and the ownership of that DNS domain has
   changed.

   The use of the new extension provides a way for the CA to signal to
   the application that the same end entity is involved, regardless of
   name changes.  The new extension could also allow the web site
   operator to more easily change CA when renewing its certificate.


3.  Other Certificates Extension

   This section defines the syntax for the other certificates extension.

   The new extension is simply a list of references to the linked
   certificates.  The references make use of the SCVPCertID structure
   from the SCVP [RFC5055] protocol which contains a hash over the
   relevant certificate and the certificate's issuer and serial number.

   When this extension is present the CA is asserting that the same end
   entity is the subject of the relevant certificates.

   This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.

   id-ce-otherCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { id-ce XXX }

   OtherCertificates ::= SEQUENCE OF SCVPCertID


4.  Acknowledgements

   The use case motivating this was contributed to the W3C web security
   context (WSC) working group by Tyler Close.  See
   http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/wiki/SafeWebFormEditor for details.







Farrell                  Expires August 26, 2008                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft              Abbreviated Title              February 2008


5.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.


6.  Security Considerations

   While it should go without saying, relying parties MUST validdate any
   certificates per the algorithm given in RFC 3280 [RFC3280] before
   making any use of those certificates.

   Relying parties similarly MUST NOT assume that any other fields in
   the relevant certificates have common values.  For example, linked
   certificates might have non-overlapping key usage extensions.

   More TBD.  Some warnings for CAs and applications needed.


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3280]  Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
              Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
              April 2002.

   [RFC5055]  Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.
              Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
              (SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4346]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.


Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

   TBD








Farrell                  Expires August 26, 2008                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft              Abbreviated Title              February 2008


Author's Address

   Stephen Farrell
   Trinity College Dublin
   Department of Computer Science
   Trinity College
   Dublin,   2
   Ireand

   Phone: +353-1-896-1761
   Email: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie








































Farrell                  Expires August 26, 2008                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft              Abbreviated Title              February 2008


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.


Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.


Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).





Farrell                  Expires August 26, 2008                [Page 7]