Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Phillip Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft Comodo Group Inc.
Intended Status: Standards Track March 21, 2014
Expires: September 22, 2014
Private-DNS
draft-hallambaker-dnse-00
Abstract
This document describes DNSE-JX, a transport security mechanism for
the DNS protocol. The mechanism may be employed to secure
communication between a client and its resolver or between a resolver
and an authoritative server.
Service binding including key exchange is effected using the JSON
Service Connect (JCX) Protocol. DNS protocol messages are wrapped in
a new framing protocol.
Deployment of the new security mechanism compliments DNSSEC.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Use Cases and Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Core Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. Client/Resolver Communications . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2. Resolver/Authoritative Communications . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.1. Legacy Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.2. Integrity Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.3. Limited message size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.1. Confidentiality Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.2. Integrity Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.3. Access Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1. Service Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. DNS Message Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. Satisfaction of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Service Connection and Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. DNS Message Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2. Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3. Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. Confidentialityty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3. Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.4. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Acnowledgementsts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction.
Recent events have required urgent consideration of privacy concerns
in Internet protocols. In particular the lack of confidentiality
controls in the DNS [RFC1035] protocol is of considerable concern.
This document illustrates the privacy and related concerns raised
with a set of use cases which in turn give rise to a set of
requirements. Private-DNS, a security enhancement for the DNS
protocol is then proposed to meet the stated set of requirements.
This enhancement provides for encryption and authentication of the
DNS protocol messages.
Private-DNS makes use of the JSON Service Connect (JCX) Protocol [I-
D.hallambaker-wsconnect] and introduces a new framing protocol.
1.1. Related Work
The proposal approach compliments the integrity controls provided by
DNSSEC [RFC4033]. While both provide integrity controls, the controls
provided by DNSSEC are based on digital signatures while this
proposal provides controls based on a Message Authentica Code
technique.
Like the Omnibroker protocol [I-D.hallambaker-omnibroker], this
proposal is built on JCX [I-D.hallambaker-wsconnect] but offers a low
level interface to the DNS protocol alone as opposed to a high level
interface to generalized discovery services. A client would use the
DNSE-JX interface in cases where retrieval of specific DNS resource
records is required. The OmniBroker protocol would be used in cases
where the client delegates the choice of discovery strategy to the
OmniBroker service.
1.2. Terminology
The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this
document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]
1.3. Defined Terms
[[These terms are deliberately left blank here or else we will spend
time wordsmithing the defined term definitions rather than looking at
the protocol.]
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Authoritative DNS Server
Caching Recursive Resolver
DNS
DNS Client
Recursive Resolver
Stub Resolver
2. Use Cases and Requirements
The immediate motivation for considering a DNS transport layer
security protocol is the desire to improve the privacy of Internet
communications by allowing encryption of DNS requests and responses.
Since any encryption protocol mustby its very nature require changes
to both the sender and receiver of a message, any such change is
necessarily backwards incompatible. Accordingly we consider two sets
of use cases:
* Use cases that illustrate aspects of the immediate concern of
protecting privacy of DNS protocol messages.
* Use cases that illustrate other concerns that might be usefully
addressed in any major revision of the DNS protocol.
2.1. Core Use Cases
The DNS is the Internet infrastructure that makes authoritative
statements about DNS names. In particular the DNS is used to support
discovery of Internet services by mapping DNS names onto IP
addresses.
In the conventional configuration, a client requiring information
from the DNS does not access DNS authoritative servers directly and
instead makes requests through a resolver. The resolver in turn
determines which requests to make to answer the query and forwards
the request to the authoritative server.
+-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+
| Client |--->| Resolver |--->|Authoritative|
+-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+
Due to the distributed and hierarchical nature of the DNS, answering
a DNS query typically requires queries to multiple Authoritative
servers. This process is known as Recursive Resolution of the DNS
Query. In the typical configuration the Resolver is a 'Caching
Recursive Resolver' capable of making Recursive Queries and caching
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the result to answer future queries. The client is typically a 'Stub
Client' that is not capable of making recursive queries itself and
must rely on a Recursive Resolver to do this for it.
One of the major security weaknesses in the DNS infrastructure as
currently deployed is that by default most Internet enabled devices
accept DNS service from the servers offered to it by DHCP when a
connection is established. Since the DNS is a naming service and thus
a trusted service, DNS services SHOULD be trustworthy. The practice
of relying on a the 'local' DNS resolver advertised in the DHCP
connection is therefore highly unsatisfactory.
In real world circumstances this configuration is further complicated
by firewalls, NAT devices and other middleboxes. Many of which filter
or in some cases modify DNS protocol packets whether or not they are
addressed to that device.
For the purposes of considering the privacy of the DNS protocol,
there are two important protocol interactions to consider:
* Communications between a Client and a Resolver
* Communications between a Resolver and an Authoritative Server
The DNS protocol supports both modes of interaction without special
provision for either case. From a security point of view, the two
interactions have different characteristics and give rise to
different use cases.
2.1.1. Client/Resolver Communications
Communications between the client and the resolver reveal a lot of
privacy sensitive information about the user. A DNS query for the
address of a controversial Web Site indicates with high probability
that a user is viewing material from the site.
In the typical configuration a DNS client makes use of the DNS
resolution server(s) advertised by DHCP when a network configuration
is established or server(s) that are configured manually by an
administrator.
In either case the relationship between the client and the resolver
is at minimum persistent for the length of time the network
association is active. In the case that the DNS service is selected
and confinugred manually, the security relationship might last for
years or the entire life of the device.
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2.1.1.1. Local Resolver
For the sake of completeness, we state the case in which a client
obtains DNS service from a local DNS server advertised at the time
the network connection is established as a use case. Note however
that the privacy concerns that can be protected in such circumstances
are necessarily limited as the user has no idea where the service is
being provided from.
[U-LOCAL]: User connects to untrusted local network and wishes to use
the locally provided DNS service.
While a user may not intend to use the local DNS service, there are
many real world network configurations that attempt to impose this on
the user for a variety of reasons. In particular hotels and other
providers of local wireless Internet often make use of a 'captive DNS
resolver' to direct users to a portal for a variety of business
purposes that include limiting use of the wireless network to
particular parties.
While it is clearly impossible to provide robust privacy protections
to users who accept core network functions from random untrustworthy
sources, the ability to establish network connections in such
circumstances is essential.
2.1.1.2. Selected Public Resolver
A public resolver allows users to avoid the numerous security
vulnerabilities inherent in the local resolver model. Instead of
taking trusted services from random, anonymous providers, the user
selects a particular DNS resolution provider to be used regardless of
which network is in use.
Many Public DNS resolution services are for-profit commercial
ventures. The business models supporting such services include
advertising and data-mining the DNS log file data.
[[U-PUBLIC] The user takes DNS resolution service from a selected
provider offering a public DNS resolution service.
2.1.1.3. Selected Subscriber Resolver
In an alternative business model the DNS resolution service is
visible to the public Internet but only answers requests from paying
subscribers. While such a service might not be considered
sufficiently attractive for it to be offered as a stand-alone
service, an ISP or security provider might offer a privacy enhanced
DNS as part of a more general offering.
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[[U-SUBSCRIBER] The user takes DNS resolution service from a selected
provider offering the service on a subscription model of some form.
2.1.1.4. Selected Private Resolver
Most medium to large enterprises run their own DNS services as part
of their trusted network infrastructure.
Although the DNS is conceptually a single uniform namespace, many
Internet sites regard the DNS names of their internal network
machines to be secret. Protecting the secrecy of such names being one
of the principle attractions of a DNS privacy protocol to such
enterprises. this leads to the widespread use of 'split-horizon' DNS
in which different views of the DNS namespace are visible depending
on whether a machine is inside or outside the enterprise.
[U-PRIVATE] A device takes DNS resolution service from a private
service restricted to authorized use.
2.1.1.5. Hybrid Resolver
To reduce equipment costs and in response to employee demand, many
enterprises now support a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) model in which
a device that is the property of the owner. Such a device requires
access to a private DNS service to access enterprise resources within
a hidden split-horizon DNS. But the owner might not wish their
private use of the device to be visible to their employer.
[U-HYBRID] A user makes use of different DNS resolution services for
different portions of the DNS namespace.
2.1.2. Resolver/Authoritative Communications
Communications between a Resolver and an Authoritative Server can
also leak privacy sensitive data. Such leakage is mitigated at
resolvers with a large number of users and a high traffic load.
Unlike clients which typically direct DNS requests to a single
resolver or a small number of resolvers, resolvers typically interact
with a large number of authoritative servers. Some of which service a
large number of DNS domains and others service are restricted to a
publishing data for a specific enterprise.
Although these use cases are not distinguished in the DNS protocol,
the privacy implications and protocol constraints of interactions
with the two types of server are very different. Any interaction
between a resolver and an authoritative server that responds to
requests for a single domain with a single host effectively discloses
the nature of the request regardless of whether encryption is used.
At the other extreme, traffic analysis of interactions with
authoritative services serving a large number of domains revealls
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much less.
[U-A-BULK] Interaction between a resolver and an authoritative server
supporting a large number of domains.
[U-A-TAIL] Interaction between a resolver and an authoritative server
supporting a small number of domains such that the interaction is
effectively disclosure of the nature of the communication.
2.2. Constraints
Any proposal to address the use cases must operate within the
constraints set by existing DNS infrastructure and administration
practices.
2.2.1. Legacy Deployment
The DNS protocol specification was first published in 1987 and has
evolved significantly over time. While the vast majority of deployed
DNS servers support modern features such as EDN(0) and DNSSEC, many
do not. Likewise, most DNS clients and servers accept messages longer
than the 500 byte minimum implementation requirement.
Regretably, while most DNS clients and servers are capable of
supporting features introduced since [RFC1035], many middle-box
devices including firewalls and residential network gateway devices
do not.
2.2.2. Integrity Attacks
One of the core security vulnerabilities of the original DNS protocol
is that responses are only weakly bound to requests, thus enabling an
attack known as 'DNS-Spoofing'.
While DNSSEC is intended to provide a long term solution to the
problem of DNS spoofing, deployment of DNSSEC is currently the rare
exception rather than the rule.
2.2.3. Limited message size
One of the chief performance limitations of the DNS as currently
deployed is that most DNS servers will only accept a single request
per DNS message. Th despite support for multiple queries in a single
request in the DNS protocol,
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2.3. Requirements
The use cases set out above give rise to the following requirements.
the term 'requirement' is used to refer to protocol features that
might be considered desirable without taking a position as to whether
they are necessary or desirable in practice. A proposal that is
simpler or more performant may be considered to be superior to one
that satisfies every requirement.
2.3.1. Confidentiality Requirements
[R-C-PASSIVE]
Protect the confidentiality of request and response data
against a passive attacker.
[R-C-AFIRST]
Protect the confidentiality of request and response data
against an active attacker after first contact.
[R-C-ACTIVE]
Protect the confidentiality of request and response data
against an active attacker on every contact.
[R-C-TRAFFIC]
Protect the contents of messages from being disclosed by an
external attacker through traffic analysis.
[R-C-LINKING]
Protect the client against profiling by the resolver.
[R-C-ATHOR]
Protect the confidentiality of messages against profiling by
authoritative servers.
2.3.2. Integrity Requirements
[R-PSPOOF]
Prevent spoofing of DNS responses by passive attack
[R-ASPOOF]
Prevent spoofing of DNS responses by active attack
2.3.3. Access Requirements
[R-CANON]
Support anonymous access to a DNS resolution service
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[R-CAUTH]
Support authentication of the client requesting access to a DNS
resolution service
[R-AMP]
Prevent Message amplification attack
[R-DDOS]
Prevent Denial of Service attack on the service
Note that [[R-CANON] and [[RCAUTH] are mutually exclusive. While it
is desirable for a solution to be capable of supporting both it is
not possible for a request to be anonymous and authenticated at the
same time by definition. The access requirement [[RCAUTH] is also
distinct from the spoofing countermeasure requirements [R-PSPOOF] and
[R-ASPOOF]. The access requirement [[RCAUTH] requires that the
service identify the source of a request. The anti-spoofing
requirements require that responses be authenticated against the
requests made.
3. Architecture
PRIVATE-DNS has two parts
* Service Connection
* DNS message encapsulation
In PRIVATE-DNS, the service connection is provided by the existing
[I-D.hallambaker-wsconnect] proposal. The DNS message encapsulation
is new and supports encryption and authentication of the DNS protocol
messages.
To make use of PRIVATE-DNS a client first establishes a connection to
a DNS server (resolver or authoritative) using the connection
protocol. Once a client has established a connection it MAY use it to
make as many queries as desired until either the connection context
expires or is cancelled by the service.
The Service Connection and Query Service MAY be operated on the same
host or on separate hosts.
3.1. Service Connection
The service connection mechanism is responsible for establishing a
connection context between a client and a service. The connection
context comprises:
* A security context (opaque identifier, key, algorithm choice)
between the client and the connection service
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* One or more query host connection contexts, each
comprisingNetwork connection description (IP address, Port,
Protocol, transport)Security Context (opaque identifier, key,
algorithm choice) between the client and the query host
The PRIVATE-DNS proposal is designed on the assumption that Service
Connection transactions are relatively infrequent and thus the
efficiency of the Service Connection protocol is not a major concern.
Accordingly the Service Connection protocol is implemented as a
JSON/REST Web Service over HTTP. While of an efficient encoding (e.g.
[I-D.hallambaker-jsonbcd] would permit a more efficient
implementation of the protocol using UDP, such an approach would be
vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks against the service unless
appropriate countermeasures were taken. For example use of a 'cookie'
approach to prove the validity of the purported request source
address.
A service connection MAY return a host connection set that includes
multiple protocol and/or transport options. This has the important
consequence that it allows new message formats or a transition to an
entirely new protocol to be effected by simply defining a new
identifier.
A distinction is drawn between a connection to a service and a
connection to a host. A connection to a host is a relationship to a
specific instance of a service with a distinct IP address. A
connection to a service is a relationship to a set of hosts. This
distinction is an important one for Denial of Service mitigation. A
DNS service need not publish the same network connection description
to every client. This permits a service to mitigate DoS attacks by
filtering query requests by IP address, a strategy that is greatly
enhanced by the large address space of IPv6.
Different configurations of the Service Connection service allow a
DNS service to meet different combinations of security requirements.
For example the Public Resolver described in [U-PUBLIC] would not
require authentication of the client to the service but this would be
required for the Subscriber, Private and Hybrid Resolvers described
in [U-SUBSCRIBER], [[U-PRIVATE] and [[U-HYBRID].].
3.2. DNS Message Encapsulation
The DNS Query Encapsulation is designed for efficiency and to support
the following features
* Encryption
* Authentication
* Multiple DNS queries and responses per PRIVATE-DNS Query [[*]
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* Multiple packet responses [[*]
The features marked [[*] are not essential for the purpose of meeting
the privacy requirements but considerably improve the efficiency and
flexibility of the DNS protocol. In particular the ability to make
multiple DNS queries in a single transaction enables the use of novel
discovery techniques without impact on performance.
Choice of encoding scheme is notoriously open to differences without
distinctions (aka bikeshedding). Fortunately this is a decision that
the Service Connection service makes easy to revisit.
Accordingly this specification only describes the information to be
put in the massages rather than the messages themselves.
The principle design choice to be made is between a tagged data
format (e.g. JSON) and a position based format (e.g. the format used
in TLS). A tagged format offers greater flexibility while a position
based format is more efficient. At present the TLS position based
approach is prefered since this is compatible with the traditional
approach in DNS.
3.3. Satisfaction of Requirements
[[TBS go through each requirement and show that it is satisfied or
satisfiable by a particular configuration.]
4. Service Connection and Key Exchange
The Service Connection is established using [I-D.hallambaker-
wsconnect]. The protocol identifiers for PRIVATE-DNS are as follows:
Service Identifier
PRIVATE-DNS
Protocol
DNS
Presentation
PRIVATE-DNS-P
Transport
UDP
Under certain network conditions attempts to reach the PRIVATE-DNS
service may fail due to constraints imposed by firewalls or through
attempted censorship. Under these conditions, HTTP [RFC2616] MAY be
used as an alternative transport as follows:
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Protocol
DNS
Presentation
POST
Transport
HTTP
A PRIVATE-DNS service offered in this fashion MUST support HTTP/1.1
or higher.
5. DNS Message Encapsulation
The DNS Message Encapsulation format is described using the format
desribed in [RFC5246]. Note that in this notation the size of a
length specifier is defined by the maximum number of octets permitted
in the corresponding data field. For convenience these sizes are
given as 255 or 65335 to specify 1 and 2 byte length specifiers
respectively. The actual length of the data fields that can be used
in practice will depend on the maximum size of UDP packet that can be
reliably transmitted.
Note that the omission of version numbers in the on-the-wire data
structures is intentional. Use of the message encapsulation requires
that the parties have previously established a host connection
comprising the network and security parameters required to
communicate. The choice of message encapsulation including the
protocol version is defined in the host connection.
In the DNS protocol requests and responses use the same message
structure. The encapsulation uses different structures for requests
and responses but the payload of each structure is a sequence of
[RFC1035] messages.
opaque TransactionID<16..255>
opaque SecurityContextID<1..255>
5.1. Request
If the UDP transport is in use, a request consists of exactly one
packet.
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A request has the following structure:
struct {
TransactionID transactionID;
SecurityContextID securityContextID;
opaque encryptedPayload<1..65535>
} Request;
Where:
transactionID
Is a unquie identifier for the transaction and an input to the
function used to derrive the initialization vector (IV) for the
encryption algorithm
securityContextID
Is the opaque security context identifier returned by the
Service Connect Service.
encryptedPayload
Is the encrypted message payload.
5.2. Response
A response MAY consist of 1 or up to 16 packets, each formatted as
follows:
struct {
TransactionID transactionID;
uint8 index;
uint8 maxIndex;
uint16 clearResponse;
opaque encryptedPayloadSegment<0..65535>
} Response;
Where:
transactionID
Is a unquie identifier for the transaction and an input to the
function used to derrive the initialization vector (IV) for the
encryption algorithm
index
Is the index number of this response packet.
maxIndex
Is the index number of the last packet. The value of maxIndex
MUST be the same for every packet. Receivers MUST reject
packets
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clearResponse
Is a response code sent enclair. The value 0 indicates a
successful response. Error codes TBS. It might be expedient to
merge these with index and maxIndex to shave some bytes.
encryptedPayloadSegment
Is the encrypted message payload segment.
To obtain the encryptedPayload of the response, the receiver:
* Waits for all the response packets to arrive
* Sorts the response packets by the value of index.
* Extracts the value of encryptedPayloadSegment from each
response
* Concatenate the values of encryptedPayloadSegment to obtain the
encryptedPayload value
UDP packets MAY be sent out of order and the order in which they were
received MAY not match the order in which they were sent. A receiver
MUST accept response packets recieved in any order.
5.3. Payload
The payload is a sequence of the following types of data::::
DNS Message(s)
The Payload MUST contain at least one DNS message
Options
The Payload may contain additional options (To be defined)
Pading
The Payload MAY contain padding
Message Authentication Code
The Payload MUST contain a MAC. this is calculated over the
contents of the payload excluding the MAC. For this reason the
MAC is always the last data in the payload.
Placing the MAC inside the payload ensures that it is encrypted. this
prevents a passive attacker determining the length of the MAC which
might leak information..
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6. Security Considerations
[[TBS]
6.1. Service
6.2. Confidentialityty
6.3. Integrity
6.4. Privacy
7. IANA Considerations
8. Acnowledgementsts
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.hallambaker-jsonbcd] Hallam-Baker, P, "Binary Encodings for
JavaScript Object Notation: JSON-B, JSON-C, JSON-D",
Internet-Draft draft-hallambaker-jsonbcd-01, 21 January
2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T.,Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R.,Gettys, J.,Mogul, J.,Frystyk, H.,Masinter,
L.,Leach, P.,Berners-Lee, T., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
-- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[I-D.hallambaker-wsconnect] Hallam-Baker, P, "JSON Service Connect
(JCX) Protocol", Internet-Draft draft-hallambaker-
wsconnect-05, 21 January 2014.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, 1 November 1987.
[I-D.hallambaker-omnibroker] Hallam-Baker, P, "OmniBroker Protocol",
Internet-Draft draft-hallambaker-omnibroker-07, 21 January
2014.
[RFC4033] Arends, R.,Austein, R.,Larson, M.,Massey, D.,Rose, S.,
"DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033,
March 2005.
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Author's Address
Phillip Hallam-Baker
Comodo Group Inc.
philliph@comodo.com
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