[Search] [txt|pdf|bibtex] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03                                                   
Internet Engineering Task Force                          P. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft                                         Comodo Group Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                        October 27, 2014
Expires: April 30, 2015


                        HTTP Session Management
                    draft-hallambaker-httpsession-03

Abstract

   The HTTP Session Management Mechanism provides a mean of securely
   establishing a persistent authentication session between a HTTP
   client and server that does not rely on the presentation of a
   confidential bearer token.  The Session Management Mechanism is
   intended to provide a replacement for the existing HTTP State
   Management Mechanism (Cookies) for this purpose.

   This document defines the HTTP Accept-Session, Set-Session and
   Session headers and specifies their use to establish symmetric
   authentication keys and their use to authenticate and verify specific
   parts of an HTTP message.  Other means by which keys used to
   authenticate the messages are established are outside the scope of
   this document.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 30, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.





Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 1]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Relationship to Other Authentication Technologies . . . .   4
     1.2.  Example: Web Browser User Authentication  . . . . . . . .   5
     1.3.  Use in Web Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.  Session Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.1.  Fixed Session Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.1.1.  Id: Identifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.1.2.  MAC: Message Authentication Code Algorithm  . . . . .   9
       2.1.3.  Key: Authentication Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.1.4.  Scope Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.1.5.  Replay Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
         2.1.5.1.  Request Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
         2.1.5.2.  Response Replay Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.1.6.  Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.1.7.  TLS Binding (Fixed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.1.8.  Domain: String  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.2.  Session Context State Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.2.1.  Expiry time: Max-Age  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.2.2.  Now: Time Offset (Time) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
         2.2.2.1.  Now: Last Now (Time)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.2.3.  Count: Last Count (Count) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.2.4.  Nonce: Last Nonce (Nonce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   3.  Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.1.  Accept-Session Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.2.  Set-Session Header  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.3.  Session Header  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.3.1.  Value=[Binary] (required) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.3.2.  Nonce=[Binary]  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.3.3.  Stream=[Decimal]  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
         3.3.3.1.  Count=[Decimal] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
         3.3.3.2.  Time=[NTime]  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
         3.3.3.3.  Attribute tlsu=[value]  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
         3.3.3.4.  Attribute tlss=[value]  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.3.4.  Preparing the Input to the Authentication Algorithm .  16
   4.  Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.1.  Calculating the Authentication Value  . . . . . . . . . .  17



Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 2]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


       4.1.1.  Start line  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.1.2.  Canonical Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.1.3.  Message Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.2.  Generating a Session Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.3.  Verifying a HTTP Message under a Session Context  . . . .  18
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.1.  Data outside the specified scope is not authenticated . .  18
     5.2.  Truncated Hash Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.3.  Randomness of Secret Keys and nonces  . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.4.  Weak Ciphers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.2.  Non Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Appendix A.  Session Identifier Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

1.  Introduction

   The HTTP State Management Mechanism 'Cookies'[RFC6265] was intended
   to allow HTTP [RFC2616] servers to let servers maintain a stateful
   session over the mostly stateless HTTP protocol.  While the exchange
   of static tokens is an acceptable mechanism for maintaining state,
   use of static tokens as bearer tokens for authentication is not.
   Such tokens are not bound to any part of the message they purport to
   authenticate and may be disclosed to intermediaries including HTTP
   proxies and caches.

   While use of TLS transport provides a confidentiality enhancement for
   HTTP content, recent research [CRIME], [BEAST] demonstrates that
   relying on a transport or network layer to protect the
   confidentiality of a bearer authentication token is fundamentaly
   unsound.  The interaction of HTTP header compression mechanisms and a
   Turing complete active code mechanism under control of the attacker
   produces a threat model in which the capabilities afforded the
   attacker far exceed the capabilities that it is sensible to expect a
   protocol design to resist.

   The HTTP Accept-Session, Set-Session and Session headers provide a
   simple and effective means of maintaining a HTTP authentication
   session without passing static authentication data in either
   direction after the authentication session has been established.  The
   design of the Set-Session and Session headers permit them to be used
   as a replacement for the Set-Cookie and Cookie headers in situations
   where they are supported by both the client and the server and ensure
   correct behavior by intermediaries conformant to the HTTP
   specification.




Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 3]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


   A HTTP authentication session MAY be established inband by means of
   the Set-Session header.  The Set-Session header specifies a unique
   identifier for the session and determines the session parameters
   including the cryptographic algorithm and shared key.

   Applications SHOULD make use of cryptographic enhancements to protect
   the confidentiality of a session context established using the Set-
   Session header.

   Clients and Servers MAY support other means of establishing a HTTP
   authentication session.  For example in a federated authentication
   scheme such as SAML, Kerberos or OpenID, the authentication session
   might be provided by a third party.

   Once the HTTP authentication session is established, a Session header
   is added to HTTP requests and/or responses as directed by the session
   context.  The session header specifies the session identifier and an
   authentication value calculated over portions of the HTTP message and
   other attributes to which it is bound as directed by the
   corresponding session context.  The bound attributes and portions of
   the HTTP message cannot then be changed without invalidating the
   authentication value.

   The use of bound attributes permits protection against TLS channel
   rebinding and/or HTTP message replay attacks.

   The portions of a HTTP message to which it is desirable to bind an
   authentication session depend on the situation.  Binding the
   authentication session to the message content prevents modification
   of the content but imposes more constraints on implementations than
   binding to the message start line.  Interactions with intermediaries
   and in particular intermediarries that are not fully compliant with
   the HTTP specification also raise concerns Web browsers are typically
   coded to be tollerant of such implementation defects and operate
   despite unauthorized modification of content by caches and other
   intermediaries.  The prefered behavior of a Web Service client in
   such situations is likely to be to abort the transaction rather than
   risk continuing with corrupted data.

1.1.  Relationship to Other Authentication Technologies

   The term 'user authentication' is commonly used in three separate
   contexts; credential management, credential presentation and session
   continuation:

      Credential Management describes the means by which credentials are
      created, issued and revoked.




Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 4]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


      Credential Presentation describes the means by which a party
      demonstrates holdership of a credential to establish an
      authentication session.

      Session Continuation describes the means by which a party
      demonstrates that a particular transaction is taking place within
      the context of a particular authentication session.

   The HTTP Session Management Mechanism is designed to support only
   Session Continuation and to compliment existing and future mechanisms
   for Credential management and Credential Presentation.  While a
   session continuation mechanism is not in itself a solution to the
   problem of user authentication, the provision of a robust session
   continuation mechanism that does not depend on a bearer token
   addresses the most challenging problem facing the designers of SAML,
   OpenID and OAUTH.

1.2.  Example: Web Browser User Authentication

   The principal mechanism for user authentication in use today is to
   present a HTML form in which the user enters their username and
   password.

   This approach has many known defects that are outside the scope of
   this document.  These include the risk of impersonation of the Web
   site causing the user to enter their username and password into a
   form controlled by the attack and the strong likelihood that the user
   will use the same password across multiple sites.

   The client indicates that it supports the session header by including
   one or more Accept-Session headers in the request transfering the
   username and password values.  The Accept-Session header specifies
   the scope and replay binding options that the client offers to
   support.

   [NB: These examples are not yet generated from running code and are
   for illustrative purposes only]

   POST /login.php HTTP/1.1
   Host: example.com
   Cache-Control: no-store
   Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
   Content-Length: 29
   Accept-Session: Start=required Request=required Content=optional
       Time=required

   username=skroob&password=1234




Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 5]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


   If the browser does not specify a Accept-Session header the server
   MAY reject the connection request entirely or fallback to the
   traditional Cookie mechanism as determined by site policy.

   If the service accepts the offer of session management support, it
   includes a Set-session Header in the response specifying the session
   context:

HTTP/1.1 201 OK
Content-Length: 35
Set-Session:
    Id=TUMnorO0SjHHS7D2uFcGlRYJ0Hd3eibwe0ogptoNMQuCYmCHfHAJcJlyvi
      j8WoXDglTSOkctnmoBzl8W0NLSlcgSyZcmsAyoWs8y1Rn2ZlO2WBgoWrFIOqPa4
      oB29dgs/ei6ieINZtmvXNCm2NUkWA==
    Key=7eb219188339135ba51e8715f3900bfb974995e145d6e490e4addbbdb26f4bb4
    Alg=HMAC-SHA256 Start=True Request=True Time=True Now=745531
    Domain=example.com Max-Age=31536000

<html><h1>Authenticated</h1></html>

   In this case the server avoids the need to track per client state by
   using a time based mechanism to avoid replay attacks and storing the
   state associated with the client session as encrypted data within the
   session identifier.  The scope of the content binding is limited to
   the start line and the timer to be used for replay attack prevention
   has an offset 745531 seconds in the past.

   Once the session has been established, the client MUST include a
   Session header in subsequent HTTP requests made to the specified DNS
   domains.

  GET /status.php HTTP/1.1
  Host: example.com
  Cache-Control: no-store
  Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
  Content-Length: 29
  Session: Id=TUMnorO0SjHHS7D2uFcGlRYJ0Hd3eibwe0ogptoNMQuCYmCHfHAJcJlyvi
        j8WoXDglTSOkctnmoBzl8W0NLSlcgSyZcmsAyoWs8y1Rn2ZlO2WBgoWrFIOqPa4
        oB29dgs/ei6ieINZtmvXNCm2NUkWA==
        Value=cjkMkfnnYP8JYWZAbRLvtpqImmOK3rsrOT1XcvAgHDk=;
        Now=745533


   In this case the session scope does not specify responses and so the
   response does not require an Session header but a server MAY provide
   one so as to specify updated values for the replay attack prevention
   attributes Now and/or Count.  Whenever a Session header is present
   the Id and Value attributes MUST be specified and correct:



Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 6]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


   HTTP/1.1 201 OK
   Content-Length: 35
   Session:
       Id=TUMnorO0SjHHS7D2uFcGlRYJ0Hd3eibwe0ogptoNMQuCYmCHfHAJcJlyvi
         j8WoXDglTSOkctnmoBzl8W0NLSlcgSyZcmsAyoWs8y1Rn2ZlO2WBgoWrFIOqPa4
         oB29dgs/ei6ieINZtmvXNCm2NUkWA==
       Value=cjkMkfnnYP8JYWZAbRLvtpqImmOK3rsrOT1XcvAgHDk=;
       Now=745532

   <html><h1>Shield is Closed</h1></html>

   In this particular instance the clock at the server is running behind
   that of the client requiring the timer offset value to be decreased
   by one second.  To ensure that the replay attack protection values
   only increase or stay the same, the client uses the last value of the
   old time offset until the new time offset value has superceded it.

   The Web Browser MAY terminate the session by simply deleting the
   session context information from its store preventing reuse.  A
   client MAY inform the server that the session context is about to be
   deleted by including a Session header with the Deleted attribute:

  HEAD /status.php HTTP/1.1
  Host: example.com
  Session: Id=TUMnorO0SjHHS7D2uFcGlRYJ0Hd3eibwe0ogptoNMQuCYmCHfHAJcJlyvi
        j8WoXDglTSOkctnmoBzl8W0NLSlcgSyZcmsAyoWs8y1Rn2ZlO2WBgoWrFIOqPa4
        oB29dgs/ei6ieINZtmvXNCm2NUkWA==
        Value=cjkMkfnnYP8JYWZAbRLvtpqImmOK3rsrOT1XcvAgHDk=;
        Deleted


   A server may inform the client that the session has been terminated
   by including a Session header with the Deleted attribute in the
   response.

1.3.  Use in Web Services

   Use of HTTP Session Managment simplifies implemenatation of Web
   Services.  Using the SOAP [TBS] approach a Web Service message is
   encoded in XML [TBS], wrapped in a SOAP envelope and a WS-Security
   [TBS] header with an XML Signature [TBS] attached.  The whole package
   is then attached to a HTTP message as a content payload.

   This approach involves a considerable degree of complexity and in
   most cases does nothing more than attach authentication data to a
   message.  Carrying the authentication value as a HTTP header
   typically eliminates the need for the SOAP and WS-Security layers
   entirely.



Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 7]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


   Use of session management in Web Services presents different
   requirements and constraints.  In the case of an entirely new Web
   Service with no deployment history, there is no need to consider
   support for legacy code at all, eliminating one of the principal
   constraints governing use of new HTTP protocol features in Web
   Browsers.

   A single HTTP message MAY have multiple Session headers.  This
   facilitates support for multi-party transactions in which A submits a
   transaction to B who countersigns it and passes it to C who is
   required to chek that she has proof of agreement by both A and B.

   Use of the Session header permits the developer to isolate integrity
   and authentication checks to a single point of control, as is advised
   by best security practice.  The security monitor examines a HTTP
   message, verifies that the required integrity data is present and
   correct and only passes the payload on for processing by the Web
   Service itself if and only if the verification checks have been
   passed.

2.  Session Context

   The processing of the Session header is determined by the session
   context which consists of a set of fixed attributes that remain
   constant for the lifetime of the session and state attributes that
   are updated as Session headers are generated and verified.

2.1.  Fixed Session Context

   The fixed session context elements are set when the session is
   established and remain constant for the lifetime of the session.  The
   values specified can only be changed by establishing a new session
   which MUST have a different session identifier.

2.1.1.  Id: Identifier

   The session identifier is a statistically unique sequence of binary
   data which SHOULD be unique, MUST be statistically unique, SHOULD be
   less than 512 octets in length and MUST NOT be longer than 4096
   octets in length.

   Servers MAY avoid the need to maintain per-session server side state
   by encoding the some or all of the fixed session context parameters
   in to the identifier.  Servers MUST ensure that appropriate
   cryptographic enhancements are employed to authenticate the sessikon
   context and protect the confidentiality of the authentication key.
   The scheme used to construct the session identifiers used in the
   examples is described in Appendix A



Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 8]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


2.1.2.  MAC: Message Authentication Code Algorithm

   The message authentication algorithm to be used to calculate the
   authentication value.

   HMAC construction [RFC2104]

   HMAC-SHA256-128  HMAC using the SHA-1 algorithm with the output
      truncated to the first 64 bits.

   HMAC-SHA512-256  HMAC using the SHA-1 algorithm with the output
      truncated to the first 256 bits.

   HMAC-SHA2-256-128  HMAC using the SHA-2 algorithm with the output
      truncated to the first 128 bits.

   HMAC-SHA2-512-256  HMAC using the SHA-2 algorithm with the output
      truncated to the first 256 bits.

   CMAC Construction [RFC4493]

   CMAC-AES128-64  The AES algorithm employed in CMAC mode with a 128
      bit key and the output truncated to the first 64 bits.

   CMAC-AES128  The AES algorithm employed in CMAC mode with a 128 bit
      key and the entire output.

2.1.3.  Key: Authentication Key

   The cryptographic key to be used to calculate the authentication
   value.

2.1.4.  Scope Attributes

   The scope attributes specify which parts of the message are
   authenticated.

   The scope is specified by the start, header and content attributes.
   The order in which the scope attributes are specified in the HTTP
   Set-Session header is immaterial.  The scope is always constructed in
   the same order as the elements occur in a HTTP message, i.e. start,
   dummy headers and content.

   Content: Boolean  If set true, the specified scope includes the
      message body.  The content transfer encoding (e.g. chunked) is
      ignored for the purpose of determining the content.





Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                 [Page 9]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


   ContentDigest: Label  If a message digest algorithm is specified the
      authentication scope MAY be calculated indirectly by first
      calculating a Message Digest value over the content and using the
      resulting value in place of the actual content value to calculate
      the Message Authentication Code value.

   Start: Boolean  If set true, the specified scope includes the message
      start line.  This being the request Line in the case of a request
      and the status line in the case of a response.

2.1.5.  Replay Attacks

   Preventing replay attacks in HTTP requests and responses poses
   considerably different challenges.  Since a HTTP response is always
   immediately preceded by a request, return of a request nonce is
   sufficient to prevent a response replay attack.  This approach is
   stateless and does not require client or server to store state
   information.

   Since the HTTP protocol requires that certain methods be idempotent,
   the HTTP protocol does not lend itself to preventing request replay
   attacks in the same fashion.  Request replay MAY be prevented by use
   of counter techniques or mitigated by limiting request replay to a
   particular time window.

2.1.5.1.  Request Replay Attack

   Two mechanisms for preventing or mitigating request replay attacks
   are specified:

   Counter: Boolean  Counter based mechanisms are supported by the count
      attribute.  The value of a counter MUST increase for successive
      transactions within the same transaction stream.  Concurrency MAY
      be supported by specifying multiple streams but this requires a
      separate counter state to be maintained for each transaction
      stream.

   Time: Boolean  Time based approaches are supported by the time
      attribute.  If the value of the time attribute falls within the
      permitted acceptance window, the message MAY be accepted.
      Otherwise the message MUST be rejected.

      Using a time based approach avoids the need to maintain state at
      either the client or server.  The principal disadvantage of this
      approach being that the mechanism only protects against a replay
      attack within a specific time.





Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 10]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


      Another disadvantage to the time based approach is that it relies
      on the sender and receiver maintaining a tollerably close time
      synchronization over the duration of the transaction and for the
      latency introduced by the communication path being tollerably
      small.

   Neither method is entirely satisfactory.  The counter mechanism
   requires that the client and server both maintain state and the time
   based mechanism only prevents request replay attack outside a
   specified time interval.

   For Web Services that require a stronger assurance that request
   replay attack cannot succeed (e.g. payment transactions) without
   maintaining server side state, such controls should be provided by
   the Web Service protocol rather than relying on the HTTP session
   continuation mechanism.  For example, the Web Services protocol might
   define a two phase interaction in which the client requested a server
   nonce in the first phase to be returned in the second phase.

2.1.5.2.  Response Replay Attack

   If a HTTP Session header in a request specifies a nonce value, the
   corresponding Session header in the response (if present) MUST
   specify the same nonce value.

2.1.6.  Direction

   A session MAY be defined to apply to requests only, responses only or
   to both requests and responses.

   Request: Boolean  This session context applies to requests.

   Response: Boolean  This session context applies to responses.

2.1.7.  TLS Binding (Fixed)

   The TLS binding attribute specifies whether TLS channel binding is to
   be used.

2.1.8.  Domain: String

   The DNS Domain(s) to which the session context applies.  The syntax
   and semantics of the Domain attribute are identical to those of the
   Domain attribute of the Cookie header defined in [].







Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 11]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


2.2.  Session Context State Attributes

2.2.1.  Expiry time: Max-Age

   The time at which the session expires.  To avoid the need for the
   client or server to have access to a realtime clock, Set-Session and
   Session headers specify the expiry time as the remaining lifetime of
   the session from the instant the header is generated in seconds.

   A server MAY update the value Max-Age value to extend the lifetime of
   the session before expiry by specifying a new value for Max-Age in
   the Session header.

2.2.2.  Now: Time Offset (Time)

   The Time Offset value is used to calculate the value of the Now
   attribute in the session header and is only required when the Time
   replay protection mechanism is in use.

   To avoid the need for clients or servers to have access to a
   reference time source, time values used to protect against replay
   attack are specified relative to an arbitrary epoch start time
   specified by the server.  The Time Offset value is the difference
   between the time epoch specified by the server and the local time
   according to the machine.  A server MAY use the same epoch start time
   for all clients or use a different epoch for each one.

2.2.2.1.  Now: Last Now (Time)

   If the local clock at the client runs faster or slower than that of
   the server, a timing discrepancy emerges over time.  A client SHOULD
   and a server MAY correct for such inaccuracies by noting the value of
   the now attribute specified by the other party and adjusting the
   local time offset value accordingly provided that the mechanism
   employed to do so ensures that the values of the now attribute in a
   HTTP message is never less than the value specified in a previous
   header.

   Recording the value of the last value of Now specified in a header
   permits this condition to be met.

2.2.3.  Count: Last Count (Count)

   If counter based replay attack prevention is in use the client and
   server MUST maintain a record of the last value of the counter for
   each concurrent stream active within the session.





Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 12]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


2.2.4.  Nonce: Last Nonce (Nonce)

   If nonce based replay attack prevention is in use, the parties MUST
   maintain a record of the last nonce value so as to be able to return
   it when necessary.

   In most circumstances the nonce value is used immediately and need
   not be stored.

3.  Syntax

   The Accept-Session, Set-Session and Session headers use the following
   common syntax elements

   Label  [ alpha (alpha | '-')* ]

   Binary  [Base 64 encoding of a binary value]

   Offer  [ "Optional" | "Required" | "Refused" ]

   DTime  [Decimal time value from current time]

   Decimal  [Decimal numeric value]

3.1.  Accept-Session Header

   The Accept-Session header is used to negotiate the establishment of
   an authentication context.  When used in a request the Accept-Session
   header specifies a set of acceptable parameters for the session
   context.

   MAC=[Label(,Label)*]  The message authentication algorithms the
      client is willing to support.

   Content=[Offer]  Offers or requires the inclusion of the message
      content in the authentication scope.

   ContentDigest=[Offer]  Offers or requires the inclusion of the
      message content by means of a content digest in the authentication
      scope.

   Start=[Offer]  Offers or requires the inclusion of the message start
      line in the authentication scope.

   Request=[Offer]  Offers or requires the use of a Session header in a
      request message.





Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 13]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


   Response=[Offer]  Offers or requires the use of a Session header in a
      response message.

   TLSU=[Offer]  Offers or requires the use of tls-unique TLS chanel
      binding as specified in [RFC5929].

   TLSE=[Offer]  Offers or requires the use of tls-server-end-point TLS
      chanel binding as specified in [RFC5929].

   Nonce=[Offer]  Offers or requires the use of the nonce response
      replay attack prevention mechanism.

   Counter=[Offer]  Offers or requires the use of the counter request
      replay attack prevention mechanism.

   Time=[Optional | Required]  Offers or requires the use of the time
      request replay attack prevention mechanism.

   When used by the client to offer the use of an authentication
   session, all header attributes are optional.  Note however that even
   though it is permissable for a client to offer an empty Accept-
   Session header, doing so does not allow a valid session context to be
   established as the server is required to specify at least an
   authentication scope and MAC algorithm from amongst those offered by
   the client.

3.2.  Set-Session Header

   The Set-Session Header is specified in a response to accept an offer
   of using the session continuation mechanism made by specifing accept-
   session in the corresponding request.

   The features specified in the Set-Session header MUST be consistent
   with the features offered in the corresponding request.

   Id=[Binary]  The session context identifier in base64 encoding.

   Key=[Binary]  The cryptographic key to be used to calculate the
      authentication value in base64 encoding.

   MAC=[Label]  The message authentication algorithm to be used to
      calculate the authentication value as defined in [RFC5698] .

   Content  Specifies the inclusion of the message content in the
      authentication scope.

   ContentDigest  Specifies the inclusion of the message content by
      means of a content digest in the authentication scope.



Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 14]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


   Start  Specifies the inclusion of the message start line in the
      authentication scope.

   Request  Specifies the use of a Session header in a request message.

   Response  Specifies the use of a Session header in a response
      message.

   TLSBinging  Specifies the use of TLS Binding [Need to think this
      through further]

   Counter=[Decimal]  Specifies the use of the counter replay attack
      prevention mechanism.  The value of the attribute specifies the
      maximum number of permitted streams.

   Time=[NTime]  Specifies the use of the time replay attack prevention
      mechanism and the current value of the time value in seconds.

      Servers SHOULD NOT use a time offset from a fixed epoch (e.g. 32
      bit UNIX epoch).

   Max-Age=[NTime]  Specifies the number of seconds in which the session
      parameters expire measured from the time at which the request was
      issued.

   A Set-Session header MUST contain the following elements:

      Id

      Key

      MAC

      At least one Scope attribute offered by the client

      At least one direction attribute

      A Max-Age value

3.3.  Session Header

   The Session header has the tag 'Session' and takes a sequence of
   attribute values as follows:

   [Insert ABNF here]

   The session context identifier as in base64 encoding.




Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 15]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


3.3.1.  Value=[Binary] (required)

   The value attribute specifies the value resulting from applying the
   authentication context and nonce (if present) to the specified scope.

3.3.2.  Nonce=[Binary]

   The nonce attribute MAY be specified in a request.  If a request
   specifies a nonce attribute, the corresponding response MUST specify
   a nonce attribute with the same value.

3.3.3.  Stream=[Decimal]

   The Stream attribute MUST NOT be specified in a request unless the
   counter attribute is specified in the session context and the value
   of the stream count is less than the number of permitted streams.

3.3.3.1.  Count=[Decimal]

   The Count attribute MUST NOT be specified in a request unless the
   counter attribute is specified in the session context.  The value of
   the count attribute MUST be greater than the value of the count
   attribute in all previous requests under the specified session with
   the same stream attribute.

3.3.3.2.  Time=[NTime]

   Specifies a time value to be used in combination with the specified
   authentication context.  The format of the time value is determined
   by the authentication context.

3.3.3.3.  Attribute tlsu=[value]

   Specifies the TLS unique channel binding as specified in [RFC5929].

3.3.3.4.  Attribute tlss=[value]

   Specifies the TLS server end point channel binding as specified in
   [RFC5929].

3.3.4.  Preparing the Input to the Authentication Algorithm

   [Should specify how the content scope is assembles and how the replay
   attack attributes are included within it.]







Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 16]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


4.  Processing

4.1.  Calculating the Authentication Value

   The input to the MAC algorithm is the concatenation of the following
   values.

   The Start Line  Is included if and only if the value of the start
      attribute of the session context is true.

   The Canonical HTTP Headers  Are always included.

   The Message Content  Is included if and only if the value of the
      content attribute of the session context is true.

4.1.1.  Start line

   The Start line is the HTTP start line including the final CRLF.

   Example:

4.1.2.  Canonical Headers

   The canonical form of the header(s) specified for inclusion in the
   authentication scope by the session context sorted into alphabetical
   order.  At present only the Session header is specified and MUST
   always be included.

   The canonical Session header contains all the attributes of the
   Session header to be added to the HTTP message with the exception of
   the Value attribute.  Attributes MUST be specified in alphabetical
   order.

   Example:

4.1.3.  Message Content

   If the Content-Digest parameter of the session context is empty the
   Message content value is the actual value of the message content
   ignoring any transfer encoding but after any content-encoding has
   taken place.

   If the Content-Digest parameter of the session context specifies at
   least one Message Digest algorithm, the sender MAY chose to calculate
   the authentication value over the actual value of the content as
   specified above or first apply one of the specified message digest
   algorithms to the actual value of the message content as specified




Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 17]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


   above and then calculate the authentication value over the resulting
   digest value.

   Example:

4.2.  Generating a Session Header

   Generating a Session Header requires the following steps to be
   performed:

      The Session header parameters are calculated according to the
      session context.

      If necessary, the session context is updated to reflect new values
      of relevant replay attack prevention attributes.

      The authentication value is calculated over the specified scope.

      The Session header is added to the HTTP headers.

4.3.  Verifying a HTTP Message under a Session Context

   Verifying messages follows the same approach as generation.  The
   verifier calculates the authentication value over the input values as
   specified in the session context.  If the resulting authentication
   value matches that specified by the sender, the authentication
   succeeds and fails otherwise.

5.  Security Considerations

5.1.  Data outside the specified scope is not authenticated

   The integrity check only extends to the portions of the message that
   are within the specified scope.

5.2.  Truncated Hash Algorithms

   If the authentication context permits the use of a truncated MAC, it
   MUST specify the minimum length of the MAC after truncation and
   verifiers MUST reject MAC values shorter than that length as invalid.

5.3.  Randomness of Secret Keys and nonces

   The security of any cryptographic protocol relies on the difficulty
   of guessing secret keys.  Secret keys and nonces SHOULD be generated
   using a mechanism that ensures that the range of possible values is
   sufficiently large to prevent 'brute force' guessing attacks.  For
   more information see [RFC4086].



Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 18]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


5.4.  Weak Ciphers

   Specification of the cryptographic algorithms used to construct the
   Integrity header value is implicit in the authentication context
   identifier and thus outside the scope of this specification.

6.  IANA Considerations

   Add the 'Accept-Session', 'Set-Session' and 'Session' headers to the
   list of provisional HTTP headers.

   Add the HMAC algorithm entries to the RFC 5698 regitry
   http://www.iana.org/assignments/dssc/dssc.xml

   [Upgrade if/when this becomes an RFC]

   Create a registry for Session Header attributes.  The initial
   contents of the registry to be:

   [Stuff from rest of document.]

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
              1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC2965]  Kristol, D. and L. Montulli, "HTTP State Management
              Mechanism", RFC 2965, October 2000.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [RFC4493]  Song, JH., Poovendran, R., Lee, J., and T. Iwata, "The
              AES-CMAC Algorithm", RFC 4493, June 2006.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.




Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 19]


Internet-Draft           HTTP Session Management            October 2014


   [RFC5698]  Kunz, T., Okunick, S., and U. Pordesch, "Data Structure
              for the Security Suitability of Cryptographic Algorithms
              (DSSC)", RFC 5698, November 2009.

   [RFC5929]  Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
              for TLS", RFC 5929, July 2010.

7.2.  Non Normative References

   [BEAST]    "TBS", , <BEAST>.

   [CRIME]    "TBS", , <CRIME>.

   [RFC3275]  Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible Markup
              Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", RFC 3275,
              March 2002.

   [RFC4120]  Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
              Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
              July 2005.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, September 2009.

   [RFC6265]  Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
              April 2011.

Appendix A.  Session Identifier Encoding

Author's Address

   Phillip Hallam-Baker
   Comodo Group Inc.

   Email: philliph@comodo.com
















Hallam-Baker             Expires April 30, 2015                [Page 20]