Session Initiation Proposal V. Hilt
Investigation Working Group Bell Labs/Lucent Technologies
Internet-Draft G. Camarillo
Expires: January 8, 2005 Ericsson
July 10, 2004
Evaluating Scenarios for Session-specific Policies
draft-hilt-sipping-policy-scenarios-00
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Abstract
This draft describes detailed call flows for different use cases of
session-specific policies. It compares the two approaches that are
currently being discussed for session-specific policies, namely the
piggyback model and the separate channel model.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1 NAT Traversal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1.1 Piggyback Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1.2 Separate Channel Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 Codec Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1 Disclosure of Session Descriptions and Policies . . . . . 13
5.2 UA Support of Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3 Re-Use of Document Formats and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . 13
5.4 Asynchronous Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.5 Separation of Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Introduction
The concept of session-specific SIP session policies [3] has been
around for some time. However, it has proven that the mechanisms for
establishing session-specific policies are non-trivial and most
likely require to sacrifice some of the requirements defined in [5].
In this draft, we compare two approaches that have been proposed for
session-specific policies: the piggyback model and the separate
channel model. We analyze detailed call flows of use cases for both
models and discuss advantages and drawbacks of each model.
The main purpose of this draft is to spark the discussion about the
two models and to come to a conclusion on which if the models is the
most appropriate approach for session-specific policies.
2. Terminology
In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT
RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14, [1] and indicate requirement levels for
compliant implementations.
3. Scenario
All use cases in the subsequent sections are based on the following
scenario (see Figure 1). The user agent UA A is registered at proxy P
A, which is responsible for domain A. UA B is registered at P B in
domain B. Both domains A and B are separate and they are connected
through a transit network.
It is assumed that user agent and proxy of each domain have a
relationship (e.g. UA A is a customer of provider running domain A).
It is also assumed that the entities in different domains do not
necessarily have a relationship. This corresponds to a scenario where
a customer of one provider is establishing a session with a customer
of another provider. As a consequence, entities in one domain can't
make any assumptions about the capabilities of entities in the other
domain. In particular, it can't be assumed that session policies are
supported in the other domain. Additionally, it is assumed that
entities in one domain are not willing to disclose network internals
such as session policies to the other domain.
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: :
+---+ : : +---+
/-|P A|-:---------:--|P B|-\
+----+/ +---+ : : +---+ \+----+
|UA A| : : |UA B|
+----+ : : +----+
: :
Domain A Transit Domain B
Network
Figure 1
4. Use Cases
4.1 NAT Traversal
In this scenario, each domain is connected to the public Internet
through a NAT. UA A and UA B have local, non-routable addresses. The
proxies P A and P B implement MIDCOM [6] agents an control an
associated NAT that connects their domain to the Internet.
Session policies are needed to accomplish the following tasks for NAT
traversal:
o Enable proxies to examine the media addresses and ports in the
session description created by its associated UA (can either be an
offer or an answer). This information is needed to configure NAT
rules for incoming media traffic.
o Enable proxies to modify the media addresses and ports in the
session description created by its associated UA (offer or
answer). The modification is needed to replace the local addresses
with globally routable addresses at which the associated UA is
reachable from outside.
o Enable a proxy to examine the media addresses and ports in the
session description created by the remote UA (offer or answer).
This information is needed to configure NAT rules for outgoing
media traffic.
4.1.1 Piggyback Model
In the piggyback model, session policies are piggybacked on the SIP
messages used for the corresponding SDP offer/answer exchange.
4.1.1.1 Offer in Request - Alternative 1
The call flow in Figure 2 describes the piggyback model for INVITE
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requests carrying a session description offer. This alternative is
based on encryption to protect MIOs and MFOs from being inspected by
unauthorized network entities (e.g. in the transit network). It
corresponds to the piggyback model that has been discussed so far
(e.g. in [3])
It is important to note that this alternative still requires that the
UAs on both sides support session-specific policies, even if policies
are only used in one domain. In other words, to enable the use of
policies between UA A and P A in domain A, UA B in domain B also
needs to support policies, even if policies are not used in this
domain. Furthermore, encryption can only protect policies from being
inspected in the transit network. Entities in both domains must be
able to inspect the policies of the other domain.
UA A P A P B UA B
| | | |
| INVITE offer | | |
|--------------->| | | (1)
| 488 | | |
| +DiscloseInfoA | | |
|<---------------| | | (2)
| ACK | | |
|--------------->| | |
| | | |
| INVITE offer | INVITE offer | |
| +[MIOAoffer]A | +[MIOAoffer]A | |
| | +[MFOAoffer]B | |
|--------------->|--------------->| | (3)
| 488 | 488 | |
| +DiscloseInfoB | +DiscloseInfoB | |
|<---------------|<---------------| | (4)
| ACK | ACK | |
|--------------->|--------------->| |
| | | |
| INVITE offer | INVITE offer | INVITE offer |
| +[MIOAoffer]AB | +[MIOAoffer]AB | +[MIOAoffer]AB |
| | +[MFOAoffer]B | +[MFOAoffer]B |
| | | +DiscloseInfoB |
|--------------->|--------------->|--------------->| (5)
| | | |
| 183 answer | 183 answer | 183 answer |
| +[MIOBanswer]B | +[MIOBanswer]B | +[MIOBanswer]B |
| +[MFOBanswer]A | +[MFOBanswer]A | |
|<---------------|<---------------|<---------------| (6)
| | | |
| PRACK | PRACK | PRACK |
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| +[MIOAanswer]A | +[MIOAanswer]A | +[MIOAanswer]A |
|--------------->|--------------->|--------------->| (7)
| OK | OK | OK |
|<---------------|<---------------|<---------------|
| | | |
| OK | OK | OK |
|<---------------|<---------------|<---------------|
| | | |
| ACK |
|------------------------------------------------->|
| |
Figure 2
Steps (1) and (2) are needed if P A detects that UA A does not
disclose the required aspects of its session description offer in a
Media Interface Object A (MIOAoffer). In this case, P A returns a 488
response that requests the disclosure of these aspects. This steps
could be avoided, for example, by providing information about what to
disclose as part of the device configuration [4].
In step (3) UA A creates Media Interface Object A (MIOAoffer) that
discloses the IP addresses and ports it has used in the offer. UA A
encrypts MIOAoffer with a key known to P A ([MIOAoffer]A). P A can
now perform its MIDCOM functionalities based on the data in MIOAoffer
and creates a Media Filter Object for MIOAoffer (MFOAoffer), which
contains the external addresses and ports UA B must use to reach UA
A. P A encrypts MFOAoffer with a key known to UA B.
In step (4) P B returns a 488 response and asks UA A to disclose the
addresses and ports used in the offer. It also asks P A to disclose
all policies that affect the addresses and ports in the offer, since
these are the addresses and ports that will later be used in the
session.
Step (5) is analogous to step (3) except that MIOAoffer and MFOAoffer
are now encrypted with a keys known to P B and UA B. Finally, P B
asks UA B to disclose the addresses and ports it is going to use in
the answer.
In step (6) UA B has accepted the policies contained in MFOAoffer. It
creates a 183 response with its session description answer and a
MIOBanswer containing the local IP addresses and ports. UA B encrypts
MIOBanswer with a key known to P B. The use of a 183 response instead
of a 200 OK later enables UA A to cancel the INVITE transaction if it
decides not to accept the requested policies before the INVITE
transaction is completed.
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P B examines the addresses and ports in MIOBanswer and inserts
MFOBanswer containing the external addresses and ports to be used
with the session description answer. It encrypts MFOBanswer with a
key known to UA A.
In step (7) UA A accepts the policies in MFOBanswer and creates a
PRACK. It inserts a MIOAanswer, which contains the addresses and
ports it is using to send media to UA B. UA A encrypts MIOAanswer
with a key known to P A. Since P A has no policies for the answer, no
additional MFOs are needed.
4.1.1.2 Offer in Request - Alternative 2
The call flow in Figure 3 also piggybacks policy information on
messages exchanged within a SIP INVITE transaction. In this call
flow, these messages are used to exchange policies between UA and
proxy. The flow ensures that policy information does not leave the
local domain by rejecting messages and removing policy headers.
UA A P A P B UA B
| | | |
| INVITE offer | | |
|--------------->| | | (1)
| 488 | | |
| +DiscloseInfoA | | |
|<---------------| | | (2)
| ACK | | |
|--------------->| | |
| | | |
| INVITE offer | | |
| +MIOAoffer | | |
|--------------->| | | (3)
| 488 | | |
| +MFOAoffer | | |
|<---------------| | | (4)
| ACK | | |
|--------------->| | |
| | | |
| INVITE offer | INVITE offer | INVITE offer |
| | | +DiscloseInfoB |
|--------------->|--------------->|--------------->| (5)
| | | |
| 183 answer | 183 answer | 183 answer |
| | | +MIOBoffer |
| | | +MIOBanswer |
|<---------------|<---------------|<---------------| (6)
| | | |
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| PRACK | PRACK | PRACK |
| +MIOAanswer | | |
| | | +MFOBanswer |
|--------------->|--------------->|--------------->| (7)
| OK | OK | OK |
|<---------------|<---------------|<---------------|
| | | |
| UPDATE offer | UPDATE offer | UPDATE offer |
|<---------------|<---------------|<---------------| (8)
| | | |
| OK answer | OK answer | OK answer |
| +MIOAanswer | | |
|--------------->|--------------->|--------------->| (9)
| | | |
| OK | OK | OK |
|<---------------|<---------------|<---------------|
| | | |
| ACK |
|------------------------------------------------->|
| |
Figure 3
The basic idea of exchanging MIOs and MFOs is the same as in the
above flow. Steps (1) - (3) are identical. In step (4) P A returns a
MFOAoffer containing the modified addresses and ports for the offer
to UA A. UA A can now apply these policies and create a new offer in
step (5).
In step (5) P B also requests the disclosure of the addresses used in
the offer and answer and receives them from UA B in step (6). Since
UA B has not received policies from P B yet, the answer in step (6)
is a dummy answer that needs to be updated later.
In step (7) UA A creates a PRACK containing a MIOAanswer which is
still based on the dummy answer. P B uses this PRACK message to
transmit the addresses and ports it wants UA B to use in its session
description to UA B. To make these addresses and ports known to UA A,
UA B creates an new offer and sends an UPDATE in step (8) to which UA
A responds in step (9). UA A also creates a new MIOAanswer for P A
that is now based on the actual session description used in the
session.
4.1.1.3 Offer in Response
The piggyback model call flows for INVITEs that carry the session
description offer in the response are analogous to the above call
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flows. However, these flow are generally more complex that the flows
described above for the offer in request scenario.
4.1.2 Separate Channel Model
The idea behind the Separate Channel Model is that user agents
retrieve session-specific policies through a separate channel before
they create the session description offer/answer. The channel can be
implemented in different ways, based on SIP or on another protocol.
In this document we simply make the assumption that this channel
enables a UA to send a MIO to the policy server and to retrieve a MFO
as a response.
4.1.2.1 Offer in Request
The call flow in Figure 4 depicts the separate channel model for
INVITE requests carrying a session description offer. PS A and PS B
are the policy servers in the respective domains. They can be
co-located with the proxies P A and P B but do not have to be.
UA A P A P B UA B
| | | |
| INVITE offer | | |
|--------------->| | | (1)
| 488 | | |
| + DiscloseInfA | | |
|<---------------| | | (2)
| ACK | | |
|--------------->| | |
| | PS A | |
| Sep.Channel | | |
| + MIOAoffer | | |
|------------------>| | | (3)
| Sep.Channel | | |
| + MFOAoffer | | |
|<------------------| | | (4)
| | | |
| | | |
| INVITE offer | INVITE offer | INVITE offer |
| | | + DiscloseInfB |
|--------------->|--------------->|--------------->| (5)
| | | |
| | PS B | |
| | | |
| | | Sep.Channel |
| | | + MIOBoffer |
| | | + MIOBanswer |
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| | |<------------------| (6)
| | | Sep.Channel |
| | | + MFOBanswer |
| | |------------------>| (7)
| | | |
| | | |
| OK answer | OK answer | OK answer |
|<---------------|<---------------|<---------------| (8)
| ACK |
|------------------------------------------------->|
| | | |
| Sep.Channel | | |
| + MIOAanswer | | |
|------------------>| | | (9)
| | | |
| | | |
Figure 4
Steps (1) and (2) are needed if P A detects that UA A has not
requested policies for the current session before creating the SDP
offer. In this case, P A returns a 488 response that contains the
address to which UA A should establish a channel to and information
about what should be disclosed in an MIO. These steps can be avoided,
for example, by providing the information about what to disclosure to
where as part of the device configuration.
In step (3) UA A establishes a channel to PS A and submits a
MIOAoffer in which it reveals the addresses and ports it is going to
use in the offer. PS A uses this information in its function as
MIDCOM agent and returns the addresses and ports UA A should include
in its offer in an MFOAoffer in step (4).
In step (5) UA A decides to accept the policies in MFOAoffer and
creates the offer using the given addresses and ports. P B inserts
disclosure information for UA B into this message.
Before creating an answer, UA B retrieves the policies that apply to
this session by establishing a channel to its policy server in step
(6). It submits the addresses and ports from the offer in MIOBoffer
and the addresses and ports it is going to use in its answer in
MIOBanswer. PS B returns the addresses and ports to be used in the
answer in MFOBanswer in step (7). If UA B decides to accept these
policies, it creates an answer in step (8). If not, UA B can return a
final response rejecting the INVITE.
In step (9), UA A submits MIOAanswer to the local policy server
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disclosing the addresses and ports received in the answer from UA B.
4.1.2.2 Offer in Response
The call flow for an INVITE carrying the offer in the response is
depicted in Figure 5. In contrast to call flow Figure 4, UA A has to
wait until it receives an offer from UA B before it can retrieve the
policies for the current session.
UA A P/M A P/M B UA B
| | | |
| INVITE | INVITE | INVITE |
| | | + DiscloseInfB |
|--------------->|--------------->|--------------->| (1)
| | | |
| | PS B | |
| | | Sep.Channel |
| | | + MIOBoffer |
| | |<------------------| (2)
| | | Sep.Chanel |
| | | + MFOBoffer |
| | |------------------>| (3)
| | | |
| | | |
| 183 offer | 183 offer | 183 offer |
| + DiscloseInfA | | |
|<---------------|<---------------|<---------------| (4)
| PRACK answer |
|------------------------------------------------->| (5)
| OK |
|<-------------------------------------------------|
| | | |
| | PS A | |
| Sep.Channel | | |
| + MIOAoffer | | |
| + MIOAanswer | | |
|------------------>| | | (6)
| Sep.Channel | | |
| + MFOAanswer | | |
|<------------------| | | (7)
| | | |
| | | |
| UPDATE offer' |
|------------------------------------------------->| (8)
| OK answer' |
|<-------------------------------------------------|
| | | |
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| | | |
| | | Sep.Channel |
| | | + MIOBanswer |
| | |<------------------| (9)
| | | |
| | | |
| OK | OK | OK |
|<---------------|<---------------|<---------------|
| ACK |
|------------------------------------------------->|
| |
Figure 5
After receiving the 183 response in step (4), UA A must respond
immediately with a PRACK to avoid the expiration of timer T1 in UA B
and the retransmission of the 183. UA A therefore creates a PRACK
with an answer that does not yet consider session-specific policies.
It then retrieves the policies for the current session in steps (6)
and (7) in which it gets the external addresses and ports from PS A
in MFOAanswer. It creates a new offer and sends it to UA B in the
UPDATE shown in step (7).
ISSUE: If it can be assumed that UA A and the policy server are
located in the same network, there might be enough time for UA A
to retrieve policies before generating the PRACK. The sequence of
steps would then be (1)-(3),(5)-(6),(4) without a need for the
UPDATE in step (7). Is this a reasonable assumption?
4.2 Codec Selection
In this scenario, session-specific policies are used to limit the set
of codecs a UA can use. By using session-specific policies, a network
provider does not need to reveal the list of allowed codecs to the
UA. Instead it can limit the use of certain codecs only if endpoints
announce them in an SDP description.
Session policies are needed to accomplish the following tasks for
codec selection:
o Enable a proxy to examine the codecs listed in the session
description offer (independent of whether the offer was created by
the local or the remote UA).
o Enable proxies to remove codecs from the offer (independent of
whether the offer was created by the local or the remote UA).
The call flows for both models are analogous to the NAT scenario,
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with the difference that the policy servers do not not provide
policies for the answer. Instead, they both provide policies for the
session description offer. Also, MIOs contain lists of codecs and
MFOs identify those codecs that should not be used.
5. Discussion
5.1 Disclosure of Session Descriptions and Policies
In the piggyback model (alternative 1), all MIOs and MFOs travel
through the network. End-to-middle and middle-to-end encryption can
be used to prevent unauthorized network entities from examining them.
However, even with encryption, UAs need to disclose MIOs to all
policy-enabled proxies even if they are located in remote networks.
Moreover, proxies must disclose their policies to UAs in remote
networks and to other proxies that are interested in examining or
modifying the same aspect of a session description.
In the piggyback model (alternative 2), the MIOs and MFOs are
piggybacked on messaged which are destined at entities outside of the
local network. By rejecting messages and removing headers, the
proxies keep the MIOs and MFOs within the local network.
End-to-middle and middle-to-end encryption can be used to further
protect the MIOs and MFOs so that they can't be examined by
unauthorized entities even if these packets accidentally leave the
local network.
In the separate channel model, UAs exchange MIOs and MFOs on a
separate channel directly with the policy server. UAs can therefore
disclose different aspects of a session description to each server.
Each server can return policies directly to the UA. End-to-end
encryption can be used to secure these transmissions. If UA and the
policy server are in the same network, the MIOs and MFOs never exit
that network.
5.2 UA Support of Policies
In the piggyback model (alternative 1) both UAs need to support
policies, even if they are only used in one of the domains.
In the piggyback model (alternative 2) and the separate channel
model, it is sufficient if one of the UAs supports policies.
5.3 Re-Use of Document Formats and Mechanisms
The piggyback model (both alternatives) requires that proxy servers
insert MFOs into SIP messages. The current standards require the use
of headers for this purpose, since a proxy is not allowed to add body
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elements to a message. As a consequence, standard document formats
that could be used in MIME bodies can't be used for MFOs in the
piggyback model. In addition, S/MIME encryption doesn't apply.
In the separate channel model, MIOs and MFOs are exchanged over a
separate channel which is potentially able to carry arbitrary
documents. This enables the use of existing document formats for MIOs
and MFOs and the use of encryption. In particular, the document
formats that are defined for session-independent policies [2] can be
re-used for session-specific policies. This greatly simplifies UAs
which support both types of policies.
5.4 Asynchronous Policies
Some scenarios require that a policy server can update the session
policies at any time for ongoing sessions.
In the piggyback model (both alternatives), the exchange of policies
is tied to UA initiated offer/answer exchanges of session
descriptions (i.e. INVITE, re-INVITE or UPDATE). For this reason, a
proxy can't introduce new policies at arbitrary times during a
session.
In the separate channel model, the policy server can send updates for
the current policy at any time, independent of messages exchanged
between the UAs.
5.5 Separation of Tasks
It is generally desirable to develop separate solutions for different
tasks. In the piggyback model (both alternatives), the task of
exchanging MIOs and MFOs between UA and policy server is coupled to
the task of exchanging the offer/answer between UAC and UAS. This
increases the complexity of call flows, in particular if the
transmission of MIO/MFOs is spread across different SIP transactions,
and leads lower re-usability of solutions for each task.
The separate channel model provides a clear separation of tasks.
6 References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[2] Hilt, V., Camarillo, G. and J. Rosenberg, "Session-Independent
Policies for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
draft-hilt-sipping-session-indep-policy-01 (work in progress),
May 2004.
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[3] Hilt, V. and J. Rosenberg, "A Framework for Session-Specific
Intermediary Session Policies in SIP",
draft-hilt-sipping-session-spec-policy-00 (work in progress),
September 2003.
[4] Petrie, D., "A Framework for Session Initiation Protocol User
Agent Profile Delivery", draft-ietf-sipping-config-framework-03
(work in progress), May 2004.
[5] Rosenberg, J., "Requirements for Session Policy for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
draft-ietf-sipping-session-policy-req-01 (work in progress),
February 2004.
[6] Srisuresh, P., Kuthan, J., Rosenberg, J., Molitor, A. and A.
Rayhan, "Middlebox communication architecture and framework",
RFC 3303, August 2002.
Authors' Addresses
Volker Hilt
Bell Labs/Lucent Technologies
101 Crawfords Corner Rd
Holmdel, NJ 07733
USA
EMail: volkerh@bell-labs.com
Gonzalo Camarillo
Ericsson
Hirsalantie 11
Jorvas 02420
Finland
EMail: Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Jonathan Rosenberg and Allison Mankin.
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