AAA Working Group Pat R. Calhoun
Internet-Draft Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Category: Standards Track William Bulley
<draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-07.txt> Merit Network, Inc.
Allan C. Rubens
Tut Systems, Inc.
Jeff Haag
Glen Zorn
Cisco Systems, Inc.
July 2001
Diameter NASREQ Application
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
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This document is an individual contribution for consideration by the
AAA Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force. Comments
should be submitted to the diameter@diameter.org mailing list.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2001. All Rights Reserved.
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Abstract
This document describes the Diameter application that is used for AAA
in a PPP/SLIP Dial-Up and Terminal Server Access environment. This
application, combined with the base protocol, satisfies the
requirements defined in the NASREQ AAA criteria specification and the
ROAMOPS AAA Criteria specification.
Given that it is expected that initial deployments of the Diameter
protocol in a dial-up environment will include legacy systems, this
application was carefully designed to ease the burden of servers that
must perform protocol conversion between RADIUS and Diameter. This
is achieved by re-using the RADIUS address space, eliminating the
need to perform attribute lookups.
Table of Contents
1.0 Introduction
1.1 Requirements language
1.2 Advertising application support
2.0 Supported AVPs
2.1 Diameter AVPs
2.1.1 NAS-Filter-Rule AVP
2.1.2 NAS-Session-Key AVP
2.1.3 NAS-Key-Direction AVP
2.1.4 NAS-Key-Type AVP
2.1.5 NAS-Key-Data AVP
2.1.6 NAS-Key-Binding AVP
2.2 Legacy RADIUS Attributes
2.2.1 NAS-IP-Address AVP
2.2.2 NAS-Identifier AVP
2.2.3 State AVP
3.0 Legacy RADIUS Authentication Support
3.1 Command-Codes Values
3.1.1 AA-Request (AAR) Command
3.1.1.1 User-Password AVP
3.1.1.2 CHAP-Password AVP
3.1.1.3 CHAP-Challenge AVP
3.1.1.4 ARAP-Password AVP
3.1.2 AA-Answer (AAA) Command
3.1.2.1 ARAP-Challenge-Response AVP
3.1.2.2 Password-Retry AVP
3.1.2.3 Prompt AVP
3.2 Reply-Message AVP
4.0 Extensible Authentication Protocol Support
4.1 Alternative Uses
4.2 Command-Codes Values
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4.2.1 Diameter-EAP-Request (DER) Command
4.2.2 Diameter-EAP-Answer (DEA) Command
4.3 EAP-Payload AVP
5.0 Diameter Session Termination
6.0 Call and Session Information
6.1 NAS-Port AVP
6.2 Filter-Id AVP
6.3 Callback-Number AVP
6.4 Callback-Id AVP
6.5 Idle-Timeout AVP
6.6 Called-Station-Id AVP
6.7 Calling-Station-Id AVP
6.8 NAS-Port-Type AVP
6.9 Port-Limit AVP
6.10 Connect-Info AVP
7.0 Service Specific Authorization AVPs
7.1 Service-Type AVP
7.2 Framed Access Authorization AVPs
7.2.1 Framed-Protocol AVP
7.2.2 Framed-Routing AVP
7.2.3 Framed-MTU AVP
7.2.4 Framed-Compression AVP
7.2.5 IP Access
7.2.5.1 Framed-IP-Address AVP
7.2.5.2 Framed-IP-Netmask AVP
7.2.5.3 Framed-IP-Route AVP
7.2.5.4 Framed-Interface-Id AVP
7.2.5.5 Framed-IPv6-Prefix AVP
7.2.5.6 Framed-IPv6-Route AVP
7.2.5.7 Framed-IPv6-Pool AVP
7.2.6 IPX Access
7.2.6.1 Framed-IPX-Network AVP
7.2.7 Appletalk Access
7.2.7.1 Framed-AppleTalk-Link AVP
7.2.7.2 Framed-AppleTalk-Network AVP
7.2.7.3 Framed-AppleTalk-Zone AVP
7.2.8 ARAP Access
7.2.8.1 ARAP-Features AVP
7.2.8.2 ARAP-Zone-Access AVP
7.2.8.3 ARAP-Security AVP
7.2.8.4 ARAP-Security-Data AVP
7.3 Non-Framed Access Authorization AVPs
7.3.1 Login-IP-Host AVP
7.3.2 Login-Service AVP
7.3.3 TCP Services
7.3.3.1 Login-TCP-Port AVP
7.3.4 LAT Services
7.3.4.1 Login-LAT-Service AVP
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7.3.4.2 Login-LAT-Node AVP
7.3.4.3 Login-LAT-Group AVP
7.3.4.4 Login-LAT-Port AVP
7.4 Tunneling AVP
7.4.1 Tunnel-Type AVP
7.4.2 Tunnel-Medium-Type AVP
7.4.3 Tunnel-Client-Endpoint AVP
7.4.4 Tunnel-Server-Endpoint AVP
7.4.5 Tunnel-Password AVP
7.4.6 Tunnel-Private-Group-ID AVP
7.4.7 Tunnel-Assignment-ID AVP
7.4.8 Tunnel-Preference AVP
7.4.9 Tunnel-Client-Auth-ID AVP
7.4.10 Tunnel-Server-Auth-ID AVP
8.0 Accounting Considerations
8.1 Accounting-Input-Octets AVP
8.2 Accounting-Output-Octets AVP
8.3 Accounting-Session-Time AVP
8.4 Accounting-Input-Packets AVP
8.5 Accounting-Output-Packets AVP
8.6 Accounting-Authentication-Type AVP
8.7 Acct-Tunnel-Connection AVP
8.8 Acct-Tunnel-Packets-Lost AVP
8.9 Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVP
9.0 RADIUS/Diameter Protocol Interactions
9.1 RADIUS request forwarded as Diameter request
9.2 Diameter request forwarded as RADIUS request
10.0 AVP Occurrence Table
10.1 NASREQ Command AVP Table
10.2 Accounting AVP Table
10.2.1 Framed Access
10.2.2 Non-Framed Access
11.0 IANA Considerations
11.1 Command Codes
11.2 AVP Codes
11.3 Application Identifier
11.4 NAS-Key-Binding AVP Values
11.5 NAS-Key-Direction AVP Values
11.6 NAS-Key-Type AVP Values
12.0 Security Considerations
13.0 References
14.0 Acknowledgements
15.0 Authors' Addresses
16.0 Full Copyright Statement
17.0 Expiration Date
1.0 Introduction
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This document describes the Diameter application that is used for AAA
in a PPP/SLIP Dial-Up and Terminal Server Access environment. This
application, combined with the base protocol [2], satisfies the
requirements defined in the NASREQ AAA criteria specification [24]
and the ROAMOPS AAA Criteria specification [4].
This document is divided into three main sections. The first section
defines the Diameter Command-Codes and AVPs that are needed to
support legacy authentication protocols, those that are typically
supported by RADIUS [1] servers. The second section defines the
Command-Codes and AVPs necessary for a Diameter node to support PPP's
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [25]. The third section
contains the Authorization AVPs that are needed for the various
services offered by a NAS, such as PPP dial-in, terminal server and
tunneling applications, such as L2TP [16].
Given that it is expected that initial deployments of the Diameter
protocol in a dial-up environment will include legacy systems, this
application was carefully designed to ease the burden of servers that
must perform protocol conversion between RADIUS and Diameter. This
is achieved by re-using the RADIUS address space, eliminating the
need to perform attribute lookups.
1.1 Requirements language
In this document, the key words "MAY", "MUST", "MUST NOT",
"optional", "recommended", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT", are to be
interpreted as described in [12].
1.2 Advertising application support
Diameter nodes conforming to this specification MAY advertise support
by including the value of one (1) in the Auth-Application-Id or the
Acct-Application-Id AVP of the Capabilities-Exchange-Request and
Capabilities-Exchange-Answer command [2].
2.0 Supported AVPs
This section lists all of the Diameter AVPs and the legacy RADIUS
attributes supported by this application.
2.1 Diameter AVPs
This section will define all of the AVPs that are not backward
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compatible with the RADIUS protocol [1]. A Diameter message that
includes one of these AVPs MAY cause interoperability issues should
the request traverse a AAA node that only supports the RADIUS
protocol. However, the Diameter protocol SHOULD NOT be hampered from
future developments due to the existing installed base.
The following table describes the Diameter AVPs defined in the NASREQ
application, their AVP Code values, types, possible flag values and
whether the AVP MAY be encrypted.
+---------------------+
| AVP Flag rules |
|----+-----+----+-----|----+
AVP Section | | |SHLD| MUST|MAY |
Attribute Name Code Defined Value Type |MUST| MAY | NOT| NOT|Encr|
-----------------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----|
EAP-Payload 402 4.3 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
NAS-Filter-Rule 400 2.1.1 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
NAS-Key-Binding 404 2.1.6 Enumerated | M | P | | V | Y |
NAS-Key-Data 405 2.1.5 OctetString| M | P | | V | N |
NAS-Key- 406 2.1.3 Enumerated | M | P | | V | N |
Direction | | | | | |
NAS-Key-Type 407 2.1.4 Enumerated | M | P | | V | N |
NAS-Session-Key 408 2.1.2 Grouped | M | P | | V | Y |
Tunneling 403 7.4 Grouped | M | P | | V | N |
2.1.1 NAS-Filter-Rule AVP
The NAS-Filter-Rule AVP (AVP Code 400) is of type IPFilterRule, and
provides filter rules that need to be configured on the NAS for the
user. One or more such AVPs MAY be present in an authorization
response.
2.1.2 NAS-Session-Key AVP
The NAS-Session-Key AVP (AVP Code 408) is of type Grouped, and
contains a session key distributed from Diameter servers to clients.
The keys MAY be used for integrity and/or confidentiality protection
between the NAS and the user. The keys MAY be distributed to the user
as part of an EAP authentication exchange. Its Data field has the
following ABNF grammar:
NAS-Session-Key ::= < AVP Header: 408 >
{ NAS-Key-Direction }
{ NAS-Key-Type }
{ NAS-Key }
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{ NAS-Key-Binding }
* [ AVP ]
If strong authentication and confidentiality of the session keys is
required, it is recommended that the CMS security application [13] be
used to protect the NAS-Session-Key AVP.
The NAS-Session-Key AVP MAY appear zero or more times in the AAA and
DEA messages. When more than one NAS-Session-Key AVP is present in a
message, either the NAS-Key-Type or the NAS-Key-Direction AVPs MUST
have different values. Otherwise, the AVPs would conflict with each
other.
The lifetime of the NAS-Session-Key AVP is found in the
Authorization-Lifetime AVP. If a re-authorization request is received
prior to the expiration of the lifetime, new keys will need to be
distributed.
2.1.3 NAS-Key-Direction AVP
The NAS-Key-Direction AVP (AVP Code 406) is of type Enumerated, and
specifies the direction that the traffic is to be protected with the
key. The following values are supported:
BIDIRECTIONAL 1
The key is used in both directions
UPLINK 2
The key is used for traffic from the user
DOWNLINK 3
The key is used for traffic sent to user
2.1.4 NAS-Key-Type AVP
The NAS-Key-Type AVP (AVP Code 407) is of type Enumerated, and
specifies how the key is to be used. The following values are
supported:
CIPHER_KEY 1
The key is used to encrypt data
INTEGRITY_KEY 2
The key is used to authenticate the data
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2.1.5 NAS-Key-Data AVP
The NAS-Key-Data AVP (AVP Code 405) is of type OctetString and
contains the session key to be used between the user and the access
device.
2.1.6 NAS-Key-Binding AVP
The NAS-Key-Binding AVP (AVP Code 404) is of type Enumerated, and
specifies the purpose for the key. A Diameter client MAY include this
AVP in a request to specify to the Diameter server the type of key it
desires. Responses that include the NAS-Session-Key AVP MUST include
this AVP which is used to specify the type of key found in the MAS-
Key-Data AVP. The following values are supported:
PPP DES 1
The key created is used to secure PPP links using DES [36]
PPP 3DES 2
The key created is used to secure PPP links using Triple DES
[37]
PPP MPPE 3
The key created is used to secure PPP links using MPPE [26]
802.11 WEP 4
The key created is used to secure 802.11 links using WEP
802.11 WEP2 5
The key created is used to secure 802.11 links using WEP/2
802.11 AES/OCB 6
The key created is used to secure 802.11 links using AES/OCB
2.2 Legacy RADIUS Attributes
The Diameter protocol reserves the first 255 AVP identifiers for
"legacy RADIUS" support. The following table contains the RADIUS
attributes supported by this Diameter application, their AVP code
values, types, possible flag values and whether the AVP MAY be
encrypted. RADIUS attributes not listed are not supported by the
Diameter protocol.
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+---------------------+
| AVP Flag rules |
|----+-----+----+-----|----+
AVP Section | | |SHLD| MUST|MAY |
Attribute Name Code Defined Value Type |MUST| MAY | NOT| NOT|Encr|
-----------------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----|
Accounting- 45 8.6 Unsigned32 | | P | | V | Y |
Authentication-Type | | | | | |
Accounting-EAP- 401 8.9 Enumerated | | P | | V | Y |
Auth-Method | | | | | |
Accounting-Input- 42 8.1 Unsigned32 | | P | | V | Y |
Octets | | | | | |
Accounting-Input- 47 8.4 Unsigned32 | | P | | V | Y |
Packets | | | | | |
Accounting- 43 8.2 Unsigned32 | | P | | V | Y |
Output-Octets | | | | | |
Accounting- 48 8.5 Unsigned32 | | P | | V | Y |
Output-Packets | | | | | |
Accounting- 46 8.3 Unsigned32 | | P | | V | Y |
Session-Time | | | | | |
Acct-Tunnel- 68 8.7 OctetString| | P | | V | Y |
Connection | | | | | |
Acct-Tunnel- 86 8.8 OctetString| | P | | V | Y |
Packets-Lost | | | | | |
ARAP-Challenge- 84 3.1.2.1 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Response | | | | | |
ARAP-Features 71 7.2.8.1 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
ARAP-Password 70 3.1.1.4 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
ARAP-Security 73 7.2.8.3 Unsigned32 | M | P | | V | Y |
ARAP-Security- 74 7.2.8.4 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Data | | | | | |
ARAP-Zone-Access 72 7.2.8.2 Enumerated | M | P | | V | Y |
Callback-Id 20 6.4 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Callback-Number 19 6.3 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Called-Station-Id 30 6.6 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Calling-Station- 31 6.7 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Id | | | | | |
CHAP-Challenge 60 3.1.1.3 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
CHAP-Password 3 3.1.1.2 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Connect-Info 77 6.10 OctetString| | P | | V | Y |
Filter-Id 11 6.2 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Framed-Appletalk- 37 7.2.7.1 Unsigned32 | M | P | | V | Y |
Link | | | | | |
Framed-Appletalk- 38 7.2.7.2 Unsigned32 | M | P | | V | Y |
Network | | | | | |
Framed-Appletalk- 39 7.2.7.3 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Zone | | | | | |
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+---------------------+
| AVP Flag rules |
|----+-----+----+-----|----+
AVP Section | | |SHLD| MUST|MAY |
Attribute Name Code Defined Value Type |MUST| MAY | NOT| NOT|Encr|
-----------------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----|
Framed- 13 7.2.4 Enumerated | M | P | | V | Y |
Compression | | | | | |
Framed- TBD 7.2.5.4 Unsigned64 | M | P | | V | Y |
Interface-Id | | | | | |
Framed-IPv6-Pool TBD 7.2.5.7 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Framed-IPv6- TBD 7.2.5.5 IPAddress | M | P | | V | Y |
Prefix | | | | | |
Framed-IPv6- TBD 7.2.5.6 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Route | | | | | |
Framed-IP-Address 8 7.2.5.1 IPAddress | M | P | | V | Y |
Framed-IP-Netmask 9 7.2.5.2 IPAddress | M | P | | V | Y |
Framed-IP-Route 22 7.2.5.3 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Framed-IPX- 23 7.2.6.1 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Network | | | | | |
Framed-MTU 12 7.2.3 Unsigned32 | M | P | | V | Y |
Framed-Protocol 7 7.2.1 Enumerated | M | P | | V | Y |
Framed-Routing 10 7.2.2 Enumerated | M | P | | V | Y |
Idle-Timeout 28 6.5 Unsigned32 | M | P | | V | Y |
Login-IP-Host 14 7.3.1 IPAddress | M | P | | V | Y |
Login-LAT-Group 36 7.3.4.3 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Login-LAT-Node 35 7.3.4.2 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Login-LAT-Port 63 7.3.4.4 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Login-LAT-Service 34 7.3.4.1 Unsigned32 | M | P | | V | Y |
Login-Service 15 7.3.2 Enumerated | M | P | | V | Y |
Login-TCP-Port 16 7.3.3.1 Unsigned32 | M | P | | V | Y |
NAS-Identifier 32 2.2.2 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
NAS-IP-Address 4 2.2.1 IPAddress | M | P | | V | Y |
NAS-Port 5 6.1.1 Unsigned32 | M | P | | V | Y |
NAS-Port-Type 61 6.8 Unsigned32 | M | P | | V | Y |
Password-Retry 75 3.1.2.2 Unsigned32 | | P | | V | Y |
Port-Limit 62 6.9 Unsigned32 | M | P | | V | Y |
Prompt 76 3.1.2.3 Enumerated | | P | | V | Y |
Reply-Message 18 3.2 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Service-Type 6 7.1 Enumerated | M | P | | V | Y |
State 24 2.2.3 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Tunnel- 82 7.4.7 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Assignment-Id | | | | | |
Tunnel-Client- 90 7.4.9 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Auth-ID | | | | | |
Tunnel-Client- 66 7.4.3 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Endpoint | | | | | |
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+---------------------+
| AVP Flag rules |
|----+-----+----+-----|----+
AVP Section | | |SHLD| MUST|MAY |
Attribute Name Code Defined Value Type |MUST| MAY | NOT| NOT|Encr|
-----------------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----|
Tunnel-Medium- 65 7.4.2 Enumerated | M | P | | V | Y |
Type | | | | | |
Tunnel-Password 69 7.4.5 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Tunnel-Preference 83 7.4.8 Unsigned32 | M | P | | V | Y |
Tunnel-Private- 81 7.4.6 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Group-ID | | | | | |
Tunnel-Server- 91 7.4.10 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Auth-ID | | | | | |
Tunnel-Server- 67 7.4.4 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Endpoint | | | | | |
Tunnel-Type 64 7.4.1 Enumerated | M | P | | V | Y |
User-Password 2 3.1.1.1 OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
The AVPs defined in this section SHOULD only used when a
Diameter/RADIUS gateway function is invoked, and are not used in the
Diameter protocol.
2.2.1 NAS-IP-Address AVP
The NAS-IP-Address AVP (AVP Code 4) [1] is of type IPAddress, and
contains the IP Address of the NAS providing service to the user.
When this AVP is present, the Origin-Host AVP DOES NOT represent the
NAS providing service to the user. Note that this AVP SHOULD only
added by a RADIUS/Diameter protocol gateway (see Section 9.0).
2.2.2 NAS-Identifier AVP
The NAS-Identifier AVP (AVP Code 32) [1] is of type DiameterIdentity,
and contains the Identity of the NAS providing service to the user.
When this AVP is present, the Origin-Host AVP DOES NOT represent the
NAS providing service to the user. Note that this AVP SHOULD only
added by a RADIUS/Diameter protocol gateway (see Section 9.0).
2.2.3 State AVP
The State AVP (AVP Code 24) is of type OctetString and is used to
transmit the contents of the RADIUS State attribute, and no
interpretation of the contents should be made. Note that this AVP
SHOULD only added by a RADIUS/Diameter protocol gateway (see Section
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9.0).
3.0 Legacy RADIUS Authentication Support
This section defines the new Command-Code [2] values required to
support the legacy authentication protocols (i.e. PAP, CHAP), as well
as the AVPs that are necessary to carry the authentication
information in the Diameter protocol. The functionality defined here
provides a RADIUS-like AAA service, over a more reliable and secure
transport, as defined in the base protocol [2].
Unlike the RADIUS protocol [1], the Diameter protocol does not
require authentication information to be contained in a request from
the client. Therefore, it is possible to send a request for
authorization only. The type of service depends upon the Auth-
Request-Type AVP. This difference MAY cause operational issues in
environments that need RADIUS interoperability, and it MAY be
necessary that protocol conversion gateways add some authentication
information when transmitting to a RADIUS server.
The Diameter protocol allows for users to be periodically re-
authenticated and/or re-authorized. In such instances, the Session-Id
AVP in the AAR message MUST be the same as the one present in the
original authentication/authorization message. A Diameter server
informs the NAS of the authorized session lifetime via the Session-
Timeout AVP [1].
A NAS MUST re-authenticate and/or authorize after the period provided
by the server. Furthermore, it is possible for Diameter servers to
issue an unsolicited re-authentication and/or re-authorization by
issuing an AA-Challenge-Ind message to the NAS. Upon receipt of such
a message, the NAS is instructed to issue a request to re-
authenticate and/or re-authorize the client.
3.1 Command-Codes Values
This section defines new Command-Code [2] values that MUST be
supported by all Diameter implementations that conform to this
specification. The following Command Codes are defined in this
section:
Command-Name Abbrev. Code Reference
--------------------------------------------------------
AA-Answer AAA 265 3.1.2
AA-Request AAR 265 3.1.1
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3.1.1 AA-Request (AAR) Command
The AA-Request message (AAR), indicated by the Command-Code field set
to 265 and the 'R' bit set in the Command Flags field, is used in
order to request authentication and/or authorization for a given PPP
user. The type of request is identified through the Auth-Request-Type
AVP, and the default mode is both authentication and authorization.
If Authentication is requested the User-Name attribute SHOULD be
present, as well as any additional authentication AVPs that would
carry the password information. A request for authorization only
SHOULD include the information from which the authorization will be
performed, such as the User-Name, or DNIS and ANI AVPs. Certain
networks MAY use different AVPs for authorization purposes. A request
for authorization will include some AVPs defined in sections 2.0, 6.0
and 7.0.
It is possible for a single session to be authorized only first, then
followed by an authentication request. However, the inverse SHOULD
NOT be permitted.
This AA-Request message MAY be the result of a multi-round
authentication exchange, which occurs when the AAA is received with
the Result-Code AVP set to DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. A subsequent
AAR message SHOULD be sent, with the User-Password AVP that includes
the user's response to the prompt, and MUST include any State AVPs
that were present in the AAA.
Message Format
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<AA-Request> ::= < Diameter Header: 265, REQ, PXY >
< Session-Id >
{ Auth-Application-Id }
{ Origin-Host }
{ Origin-Realm }
{ Destination-Realm }
{ Service-Type }
[ Destination-Host ]
[ NAS-Identifier ]
[ User-Name ]
[ User-Password ]
[ ARAP-Password ]
[ CHAP-Password ]
[ CHAP-Challenge ]
[ Idle-Timeout ]
[ State ]
[ Authorization-Lifetime ]
[ Auth-Grace-Period ]
[ Auth-Session-State ]
[ Session-Timeout ]
[ Origin-State-Id ]
[ NAS-Key-Binding ]
* [ AVP ]
* [ Proxy-Info ]
* [ Route-Record ]
3.1.1.1 User-Password AVP
The User-Password AVP (AVP Code 2) is of type OctetString and
contains the password of the user to be authenticated, or the user's
input in a multi-round authentication exchange.
This AVP MUST be encrypted using one of the methods described in [2]
or [13]. Unless this AVP is used for one-time passwords, the User-
Password AVP SHOULD NOT be used in non-trusted proxy environments.
The clear-text password (prior to encryption) MUST NOT be longer than
128 bytes in length.
3.1.1.2 CHAP-Password AVP
The CHAP-Password AVP (AVP Code 3) is of type Complex and contains
the response value provided by a PPP Challenge-Handshake
Authentication Protocol (CHAP) [6] user in response to the challenge.
If the CHAP-Password AVP is found in a message, the CHAP-Challenge
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AVP (see section 3.1.1.3) MUST be present as well.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
AVP Header (AVP Code = 3)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| CHAP Ident | Data ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The CHAP Ident field contains the one octet CHAP Identifier from the
user's CHAP response [6]. The Data field is 16 octets, and contains
the CHAP Response from the user. The actual computation of the CHAP
response can be found in [6].
3.1.1.3 CHAP-Challenge AVP
The CHAP-Challenge AVP (AVP Code 60) is of type OctetString and
contains the CHAP Challenge sent by the NAS to a PPP Challenge-
Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) [6] user.
3.1.1.4 ARAP-Password AVP
The ARAP-Password AVP (AVP Code 70) is of type OctetString and is
only present when the Framed-Protocol AVP (see Section 7.2.1) is
included in the message and is set to ARAP. This AVP MUST NOT be
present if the User-Password or CHAP-Password AVPs are present. See
[32] for more information on the contents of this AVP.
3.1.2 AA-Answer (AAA) Command
The AA-Answer (AAA) message, indicated by the Command-Code field set
to 265 and the 'R' bit cleared in the Command Flags field, is sent in
response to the AA-Request message. If authorization was requested, a
successful response will include the authorization AVPs appropriate
for the service being provided, as defined in section 2.0, 6.0 and
7.0
For authentication exchanges that require more than a single round
trip, the server MUST set the Result-Code AVP to
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. An AAA message with this result code MAY
include one or more Reply-Message and MAY include zero or one State
AVPs. When possible, authentication mechanisms that include more
than a single authentication round trip SHOULD use EAP (see section
4.0)
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If the Reply-Message AVP was present, the access device SHOULD
display the text message to the user, and MUST prompt the user for a
response. If the access device is unable to prompt the user for a
new response, which could be achieved via PAP, it MUST treat this
answer as an error, and deny access.
Message Format
<AA-Answer> ::= < Diameter Header: 265, PXY >
< Session-Id >
{ Auth-Application-Id }
{ Result-Code }
{ Origin-Host }
{ Origin-Realm }
{ Service-Type }
{ Destination-Host }
[ User-Name ]
[ Error-Reporting-Host ]
[ Idle-Timeout ]
[ Authorization-Lifetime ]
[ Auth-Grace-Period ]
[ Auth-Session-State ]
[ Re-Auth-Request-Type ]
[ Session-Timeout ]
[ State ]
* [ Reply-Message ]
[ Origin-State-Id ]
* [ NAS-Session-Key ]
* [ AVP ]
* [ Proxy-Info ]
* [ Route-Record ]
3.1.2.1 ARAP-Challenge-Response AVP
The ARAP-Challenge-Response AVP (AVP Code 84) is of type OctetString
and is only present when the Framed-Protocol AVP (see Section 7.2.1)
is included in the message and is set to ARAP. This AVP contains an 8
octet response to the dial-in client's challenge. The RADIUS server
calculates this value by taking the dial-in client's challenge from
the high order 8 octets of the ARAP-Password AVP and performing DES
encryption on this value with the authenticating user's password as
the key. If the user's password is less than 8 octets in length, the
password is padded at the end with NULL octets to a length of 8
before using it as a key.
3.1.2.2 Password-Retry AVP
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The Password-Retry AVP (AVP Code 75) is of type Unsigned32 and MAY be
included in the AA-Answer if the Result-Code indicates an
authentication failure. The value of this AVP indicates how many
authentication attempts a user may be permitted before being
disconnected. This AVP is primarily intended for use when the
Framed-Protocol AVP (see Section 7.2.1) is set to ARAP.
3.1.2.3 Prompt AVP
The Prompt AVP (AVP Code 76) is of type Enumerated, and MAY be
present in the AA-Answer message. When present, it is used by the NAS
to determine whether the user's response, when entered, should be
echoed.
The supported values are listed in [34].
3.2 Reply-Message AVP
The Reply-Message AVP (AVP Code 18) is of type UTF8String, and
contains text which MAY be displayed to the user. When used in an
AA-Answer message with a successful Result-Code AVP it indicates the
success message. When found in the same message with a Result-Code
other than Diameter-SUCCESS it contains the failure message.
The Reply-Message AVP MAY indicate a dialog message to prompt the
user before another AA-Request attempt. When used in an AA-Answer, it
MAY indicate a dialog message to prompt the user for a response.
Multiple Reply-Message's MAY be included and if any are displayed,
they MUST be displayed in the same order as they appear in the
message.
4.0 Extensible Authentication Protocol Support
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), described in [25],
provides a standard mechanism for support of extensible
authentication methods. Through the use of EAP, support for a number
of authentication schemes may be added, including smart and token
cards, Kerberos, Public Key, One Time Passwords, and others.
This section describes the Command-Codes values and AVPs that are
required for an EAP payload to be encapsulated within the Diameter
protocol. Since authentication occurs between the EAP client and its
home Diameter server, end-to-end authentication is achieved, reducing
the possibility for fraudulent authentication, such as replay and
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man-in-the-middle attacks. End-to-end authentication also provides
for mutual (bi-directional) authentication, which is not possible
with PAP and CHAP in a roaming PPP environment.
The EAP conversation between the authenticating peer and the access
device begins with the initiation of EAP within a link layer, such as
PPP or 802.1x. Once EAP has been initiated, the access device will
typically send to the Diameter server a Diameter-EAP-Request message
with a NULL EAP-Payload AVP, signifying an EAP-Start. The Port number
and the identity of the access device (e.g. Origin-Host or NAS-
Identifier) MUST be included in the Diameter-EAP-Request message.
If the Diameter home server supports EAP, it MUST respond with a
Diameter-EAP-Answer message containing an EAP-Payload AVP that
includes an encapsulated EAP payload [25], and the Result-Code AVP
set to DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH, signifying that a subsequent
request is expected. The EAP payload is forwarded by the access
device to the EAP client.
The initial Diameter-EAP-Answer in a multi-round exchange normally
includes an EAP-Request/Identity, requesting the EAP client to
identify itself. Upon receipt of the EAP client's EAP-Response [25],
the access device will then issue a second Diameter-EAP-Request
message, with the client's EAP payload encapsulated within the EAP-
Payload AVP.
A preferred approach is for the access device to issue the EAP-
Request/Identity message to the EAP client, and forward the EAP-
Response/Identity packet, encapsulated within the EAP-Payload AVP, as
a Diameter-EAP-Request to the Diameter server. This alternative
reduces the number of Diameter message round trips, and is compatible
with roaming environments, since the Destination-Realm is needed by
Diameter agents for routing purposes. Note that this alternative
cannot be universally employed, as there are circumstances where a
user's identity is not needed (such as when authorization occurs
based on a calling or called phone number).
The conversation continues until the Diameter server sends a
Diameter-EAP-Answer with a Result-Code AVP indicating success or
failure, and an optional EAP-Payload. The Result-Code AVP is used by
the access device to determine whether service is to be provided to
the EAP client. The access device MUST NOT rely on the contents of
the optional EAP-Payload to determine whether service is to be
provided.
A Diameter-EAP-Answer message containing an EAP-Payload of type EAP-
Success or EAP-Failure MUST NOT have the Result-Code AVP set to
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH.
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If authorization was requested, a successful Diameter-EAP-Answer MUST
also include the appropriate authorization AVPs required for the
service requested (see sections 2.0, 6.0 and 7.0). Diameter-EAP-
Answer messages whose Result-Code AVP is set to
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH MAY include authorization AVPs.
Unless the access device interprets the EAP-Response/Identity packet
returned by the authenticating peer, it will not have access to the
user's identity. Therefore, the Diameter Server SHOULD return the
user's identity by inserting it in the User-Name attribute of
subsequent Diameter-EAP-Answer packets. Without the user's identity,
the Session-Id AVP MAY be used for accounting and billing, however
operationally this MAY be very difficult to manage.
A home Diameter server MAY request EAP re-authentication by issuing
the Re-Auth-Request [2] message to the Diameter client.
Should an EAP authentication session be interrupted due to a home
server failure, the session MAY be directed to an alternate server,
but the authentication session will have to be restarted from the
beginning.
If a response is received with the Result-Code set to
DIAMETER_COMMAND_UNSUPPORTED [2], it is an indication that the
Diameter server in the home domain does not support EAP. If possible,
the access device MAY attempt to negotiate another authentication
protocol, such as PAP or CHAP. An access device SHOULD be cautious
when determining whether a less secure authentication protocol will
be used, since this could be a result of a bidding down attack.
4.1 Alternative uses
Currently the conversation between the backend authentication server
and the Diameter server is proprietary because of lack of
standardization. In order to increase standardization and provide
interoperability between Diameter vendors and backend security
vendors, it is recommended that Diameter-encapsulated EAP be used for
this conversation.
This has the advantage of allowing the Diameter server to support EAP
without the need for authentication-specific code within the Diameter
server. Authentication-specific code can then reside on a backend
authentication server instead.
In the case where Diameter-encapsulated EAP is used in a conversation
between a Diameter server and a backend authentication server, the
latter will typically return an Diameter-EAP-Answer/EAP-Payload/EAP-
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Success message without inclusion of the expected authorization AVPs
required in a successful response. This means that the Diameter
server MUST add these attributes prior to sending an Diameter-EAP-
Answer/EAP-Payload/EAP-Success message to the access device.
4.2 Command-Codes Values
This section defines new Command-Code [2] values that MUST be
supported by all Diameter implementations conforming to this
specification. The following Command Codes are defined in this
section:
Command-Name Abbrev. Code Reference
--------------------------------------------------------
Diameter-EAP-Answer DEA 268 4.2.2
Diameter-EAP-Request DER 268 4.2.1
4.2.1 Diameter-EAP-Request (DER) Command
The Diameter-EAP-Request (DER) command, indicated by the Command-Code
field set to 268 and the 'R' bit set in the Command Flags field, is
sent by a Diameter client to a Diameter server and conveys an EAP-
Response [25] from the EAP client. The Diameter-EAP-Request MUST
contain one EAP-Payload AVP, which contains the actual EAP payload.
An EAP-Payload AVP with no data MAY be sent to the Diameter server to
initiate an EAP authentication session.
The DER message MAY be the result of a multi-round authentication
exchange, which occurs when the DEA is received with the Result-Code
AVP set to DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. A subsequent DER message MUST
include any State AVPs that were present in the DEA. For re-
authentication, it is recommended that the Identity request be
skipped in order to reduce the number of authentication round trips.
This is only possible when the user's identity is already known by
the home Diameter server.
Message Format
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<Diameter-EAP-Request> ::= < Diameter Header: 268, REQ, PXY >
< Session-Id >
{ Auth-Application-Id }
{ Origin-Host }
{ Origin-Realm }
{ Destination-Realm }
{ Service-Type }
{ EAP-Payload }
[ Destination-Host ]
[ Authorization-Lifetime ]
[ Auth-Grace-Period ]
[ Auth-Session-State ]
[ Session-Timeout ]
[ User-Name ]
[ Idle-Timeout ]
[ NAS-IP-Address ]
[ NAS-Identifier ]
[ State ]
[ Origin-State-Id ]
[ NAS-Key-Binding ]
* [ AVP ]
* [ Proxy-Info ]
* [ Route-Record ]
4.2.2 Diameter-EAP-Answer (DEA) Command
The Diameter-EAP-Answer (DEA) message, indicated by the Command-Code
field set to 268 and the 'R' bit cleared in the Command Flags field,
is sent by the Diameter server to the client for one of the following
reasons:
1) The message is part of a multi-round authentication exchange,
and the server is expecting a subsequent Diameter-EAP-Request.
This is indicated by setting the Result-Code to
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH, and MAY include zero or more State
AVPs.
2) the EAP client has been successfully authenticated and
authorized, in which case the message MUST include the Result-
Code AVP indicating success, and SHOULD include an EAP-Payload
of type EAP-Success. This event MUST cause the access device
to provide service to the EAP client.
3) The EAP client has not been successfully authenticated and/or
authorized, and the Result-Code AVP is set to indicate failure.
This message SHOULD include an EAP-Payload, but this AVP is not
used to determine whether service is to be provided.
If the message from the Diameter client included a request for
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authorization, a successful response MUST include the authorization
AVPs that are relevant to the service being provided.
Message Format
<Diameter-EAP-Answer> ::= < Diameter Header: 268, PXY >
< Session-Id >
{ Auth-Application-Id }
{ Result-Code }
{ Origin-Host }
{ Origin-Realm }
{ Destination-Host }
{ Service-Type }
[ Error-Reporting-Host ]
[ EAP-Payload ]
[ User-Name ]
[ Idle-Timeout ]
[ Authorization-Lifetime ]
[ Auth-Grace-Period ]
[ Auth-Session-State ]
[ Re-Auth-Request-Type ]
[ Session-Timeout ]
[ Origin-State-Id ]
* [ NAS-Session-Key ]
* [ AVP ]
* [ Proxy-Info ]
* [ Route-Record ]
4.3 EAP-Payload AVP
The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 402) is of type OctetString and is used
to encapsulate the actual EAP payload [25] that is being exchanged
between the EAP client and the home Diameter server.
5.0 Diameter Session Termination
When a Network Access Server (NAS) receives an indication that a
user's session is being disconnected (e.g. LCP Terminate is
received), the NAS MUST issue a Session-Termination-Request (STR) [2]
to its Diameter Server. This will ensure that any resources
maintained on the servers is freed appropriately.
Further, a NAS that receives a Abort-Session-Request (ASR) [2] MUST
issue an STR if the session requested is active, and disconnect the
PPP (or tunneling) session.
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6.0 Call and Session Information
This section contains the authorization AVPs that are needed to
identify call and session information, and allows the server to set
constraints on a session.
6.1 NAS-Port AVP
The NAS-Port AVP (AVP Code 5) is of type Unsigned32 and contains the
physical port number of the NAS which is authenticating the user, and
is normally only present in an authentication and/or authorization
request. Note that this is using "port" in its sense of a physical
connection on the NAS, not in the sense of a TCP or UDP port number.
Either NAS-Port or NAS-Port-Type (AVP Code 61) or both SHOULD be
present in the request, if the NAS differentiates among its ports.
6.2 Filter-Id AVP
The Filter-Id AVP (AVP Code 11) is of type UTF8String, and contains
the name of the filter list for this user. Zero or more Filter-Id
AVPs MAY be sent in an authorization answer.
Identifying a filter list by name allows the filter to be used on
different NASes without regard to filter-list implementation details.
However, this AVP is not roaming friendly since filter naming differs
from one service provider to another.
In non-RADIUS environments, it is strongly recommended that the NAS-
Filter-Rule AVP be used instead.
6.3 Callback-Number AVP
The Callback-Number AVP (AVP Code 19) is of type UTF8String, and
contains a dialing string to be used for callback. It MAY be used in
an authentication and/or authorization request as a hint to the
server that a Callback service is desired, but the server is not
required to honor the hint in the corresponding response.
The codification of the range of allowed usage of this field is
outside the scope of this specification.
6.4 Callback-Id AVP
The Callback-Id AVP (AVP Code 20) is of type UTF8String, and contains
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the name of a place to be called, to be interpreted by the NAS. This
AVP MAY be present in an authentication and/or authorization
response.
This AVP is not roaming friendly since it assumes that the Callback-
Id is configured on the NAS. It is therefore preferable to use the
Callback-Number AVP instead.
6.5 Idle-Timeout AVP
The Idle-Timeout AVP (AVP Code 28) is of type Unsigned32 and sets the
maximum number of consecutive seconds of idle connection allowed to
the user before termination of the session or prompt. It MAY be used
in an authentication and/or authorization request (or challenge) as a
hint to the server that an idle timeout is desired, but the server is
not required to honor the hint in the corresponding response.
6.6 Called-Station-Id AVP
The Called-Station-Id AVP (AVP Code 30) is of type UTF8String, and
allows the NAS to send in the request the phone number that the user
called, using Dialed Number Identification (DNIS) or a similar
technology. Note that this may be different from the phone number the
call comes in on. It SHOULD only be present in authentication and/or
authorization requests.
If the Auth-Request-Type AVP is set to authorization-only and the
User-Name AVP is absent, the Diameter Server MAY perform
authorization based on this field. This can be used by a NAS to
request whether a call should be answered based on the DNIS.
The codification of the range of allowed usage of this field is
outside the scope of this specification.
6.7 Calling-Station-Id AVP
The Calling-Station-Id AVP (AVP Code 31) is of type UTF8String, and
allows the NAS to send in the request the phone number that the call
came from, using Automatic Number Identification (ANI) or a similar
technology. It SHOULD only be present in authentication and/or
authorization requests.
If the Auth-Request-Type AVP is set to authorization-only and the
User-Name AVP is absent, the Diameter Server MAY perform
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authorization based on this field. This can be used by a NAS to
request whether a call should be answered based on the ANI.
The codification of the range of allowed usage of this field is
outside the scope of this specification.
6.8 NAS-Port-Type AVP
The NAS-Port-Type AVP (AVP Code 61) is of type Unsigned32 and
contains the type of the physical port of the NAS which is
authenticating the user. It can be used instead of or in addition to
the NAS-Port (5) AVP. This AVP SHOULD only be used in authentication
and/or authorization requests. This AVP MAY be combined with the
NAS-Port AVP to assist in differentiating its ports.
The supported values are defined in [34].
6.9 Port-Limit AVP
The Port-Limit AVP (AVP Code 62) is of type Unsigned32 and sets the
maximum number of ports to be provided to the user by the NAS. It
MAY be used in an authentication and/or authorization request as a
hint to the server that multilink PPP [9] service is desired, but the
server is not required to honor the hint in the corresponding
response.
6.10 Connect-Info AVP
The Connect-Info AVP (AVP Code 77) is of type UTF8String, and is sent
in the AA-Request message, and indicates the nature of the user's
connection. The connection speed SHOULD be included at the beginning
of the first Connect-Info AVP in the message. If the transmit and
receive connection speeds differ, they may both be included in the
first AVP with the transmit speed first (the speed the NAS modem
transmits at), a slash (/), the receive speed, then optionally other
information.
7.0 Service Specific Authorization AVPs
This section contains the RADIUS authorization AVPs that are
supported in the Diameter protocol. The Service-Type AVP MUST be
present in all messages, and based on the value of the Service-Type
AVP, additional AVPs defined in sections 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 MAY be
present.
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7.1 Service-Type AVP
The Service-Type AVP (AVP Code 6) is of type Enumerated and contains
the type of service the user has requested, or the type of service to
be provided. One such AVP MAY be present in an authentication and/or
authorization request or response. A NAS is not required to implement
all of these service types, and MUST treat unknown or unsupported
Service-Types as though a response with a Result-Code other than
Diameter-SUCCESS had been received instead.
When used in a request, the Service-Type AVP SHOULD be considered to
be a hint to the server that the NAS has reason to believe the user
would prefer the kind of service indicated, but the server is not
required to honor the hint. The following values have been defined
for the Service-Type AVP:
The complete list of defined values can be found in [1] and [34]. The
following values are extracted from [1], and are listed here since
they are further qualified:
Login 1
The user should be connected to a host. The message MAY include
additional AVPs defined in section 7.3.
Framed 2
A Framed Protocol should be started for the User, such as PPP
or SLIP. The message MAY include additional AVPs defined in
section 7.2, or 7.4 for tunneling services.
Callback Login 3
The user should be disconnected and called back, then connected
to a host. The message MAY include additional AVPs defined in
section 7.3.
Callback Framed 4
The user should be disconnected and called back, then a Framed
Protocol should be started for the User, such as PPP or SLIP.
The message MAY include additional AVPs defined in section 7.2,
or 7.4 for tunneling services.
7.2 Framed Access Authorization AVPs
This section contains the authorization AVPs that are necessary to
support framed access, such as PPP, SLIP, etc. AVPs defined in this
section MAY be present in a message if the Service-Type AVP was set
to "Framed" or "Callback Framed".
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7.2.1 Framed-Protocol AVP
The Framed-Protocol AVP (AVP Code 7) is of type Enumerated and
contains the framing to be used for framed access. This AVP MAY be
present in both requests and responses. The supported values are
listed in [34].
7.2.2 Framed-Routing AVP
The Framed-Routing AVP (AVP Code 10) is of type Enumerated and
contains the routing method for the user, when the user is a router
to a network. This AVP SHOULD only be present in authorization
responses. The supported values are listed in [34].
7.2.3 Framed-MTU AVP
The Framed-MTU AVP (AVP Code 12) is of type Unsigned32 and contains
the Maximum Transmission Unit to be configured for the user, when it
is not negotiated by some other means (such as PPP). This AVP SHOULD
only be present in authorization responses. The MTU value MUST be
between the range of 64 and 65535.
7.2.4 Framed-Compression AVP
The Framed-Compression AVP (AVP Code 13) is of type Enumerated and
contains the compression protocol to be used for the link. It MAY be
used in an authorization request as a hint to the server that a
specific compression type is desired, but the server is not required
to honor the hint in the corresponding response.
More than one compression protocol AVP MAY be sent. It is the
responsibility of the NAS to apply the proper compression protocol to
appropriate link traffic.
The supported values are listed in [34].
7.2.5 IP Access
The AVPs defined in this section are used when the user requests, or
is being granted, access to IP. They are only present if the Framed-
Protocol AVP (see Section 7.2.1) is set to PPP, SLIP, Gandalf
proprietarySingleLink/MultiLink protocol, or X.75 Synchronous.
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7.2.5.1 Framed-IP-Address AVP
The Framed-IP-Address AVP (AVP Code 8) is of type IPAddress and
contains the address to be configured for the user. It MAY be used in
an authorization request as a hint to the server that a specific
address is desired, but the server is not required to honor the hint
in the corresponding response.
Two addresses have special significance; 0xFFFFFFFF and 0xFFFFFFFE.
The value 0xFFFFFFFF indicates that the NAS should allow the user to
select an address (e.g. Negotiated). The value 0xFFFFFFFE indicates
that the NAS should select an address for the user (e.g. Assigned
from a pool of addresses kept by the NAS).
7.2.5.2 Framed-IP-Netmask AVP
The Framed-IP-Netmask AVP (AVP Code 9) is of type IPAddress and
contains the IP netmask to be configured for the user when the user
is a router to a network. It MAY be used in an authorization request
as a hint to the server that a specific netmask is desired, but the
server is not required to honor the hint in the corresponding
response. This AVP MUST be present in a response if the request
included this AVP with a value of 0xFFFFFFFF.
7.2.5.3 Framed-IP-Route AVP
The Framed-IP-Route AVP (AVP Code 22) is of type UTF8String, and
contains the routing information to be configured for the user on the
NAS. Zero or more such AVPs MAY be present in an authorization
response.
The string MUST contain a destination prefix in dotted quad form
optionally followed by a slash and a decimal length specifier stating
how many high order bits of the prefix should be used. That is
followed by a space, a gateway address in dotted quad form, a space,
and one or more metrics separated by spaces. For example,
"192.168.1.0/24 192.168.1.1 1".
The length specifier may be omitted in which case it should default
to 8 bits for class A prefixes, 16 bits for class B prefixes, and 24
bits for class C prefixes. For example, "192.168.1.0 192.168.1.1 1".
Whenever the gateway address is specified as "0.0.0.0" the IP address
of the user SHOULD be used as the gateway address.
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7.2.5.4 Framed-Interface-Id AVP
The Framed-Interface-Id AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type Unsigned64 and
contains the IPv6 interface identifier to be configured for the user.
It MAY be used in authorization requests as a hint to the server that
a specific interface id is desired, but the server is not required to
honor the hint in the corresponding response.
7.2.5.5 Framed-IPv6-Prefix AVP
The Framed-IPv6-Prefix AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type IPAddress and
contains the IPv6 prefix to be configured for the user. One or more
AVPs MAY be used in authorization requests as a hint to the server
that a specific IPv6 prefixes are desired, but the server is not
required to honor the hint in the corresponding response.
7.2.5.6 Framed-IPv6-Route AVP
The Framed-IPv6-Route AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type UTF8String, and
contains the routing information to be configured for the user on the
NAS. Zero or more such AVPs MAY be present in an authorization
response.
The string MUST contain an IPv6 address prefix followed by a slash
and a decimal length specifier stating how many high order bits of
the prefix should be used. That is followed by a space, a gateway
address in hexadecimal notation, a space, and one or more metrics
separated by spaces. For example:
"2000:0:0:106::/64 2000::106:a00:20ff:fe99:a998 1".
Whenever the gateway address is the IPv6 unspecified address the IP
address of the user SHOULD be used as the gateway address, such as:
"2000:0:0:106::/64 :: 1".
7.2.5.7 Framed-IPv6-Pool AVP
The Framed-IPv6-Pool AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type UTF8String, and
contains the name of an assigned pool that SHOULD be used to assign
an IPv6 prefix for the user. If the access device does not support
multiple prefix pools, it MUST ignore this AVP.
7.2.6 IPX Access
The AVPs defined in this section are used when the user requests, or
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is being granted, access to IPX. They are only present if the
Framed-Protocol AVP (see Section 7.2.1) is set to PPP, Xylogics
proprietary IPX/SLIP, Gandalf proprietarySingleLink/MultiLink
protocol, or X.75 Synchronous.
7.2.6.1 Framed-IPX-Network AVP
The Framed-IPX-Network AVP (AVP Code 23) is of type UTF8String, and
contains the IPX Network number to be configured for the user. It MAY
be used in an authorization request as a hint to the server that a
specific address is desired, but the server is not required to honor
the hint in the corresponding response.
Two addresses have special significance; 0xFFFFFFFF and 0xFFFFFFFE.
The value 0xFFFFFFFF indicates that the NAS should allow the user to
select an address (e.g. Negotiated). The value 0xFFFFFFFE indicates
that the NAS should select an address for the user (e.g. assigned
from a pool of one or more IPX networks kept by the NAS).
7.2.7 Appletalk Access
The AVPs defined in this section are used when the user requests, or
is being granted, access to Appletalk. They are only present if the
Framed-Protocol AVP (see Section 7.2.1) is set to PPP, Gandalf
proprietary SingleLink/MultiLink protocol, or X.75 Synchronous.
7.2.7.1 Framed-AppleTalk-Link AVP
The Framed-AppleTalk-Link AVP (AVP Code 37) is of type Unsigned32 and
contains the AppleTalk network number which should be used for the
serial link to the user, which is another AppleTalk router. This AVP
MUST only be present in an authorization response and is never used
when the user is not another router.
Despite the size of the field, values range from zero to 65535. The
special value of zero indicates that this is an unnumbered serial
link. A value of one to 65535 means that the serial line between the
NAS and the user should be assigned that value as an AppleTalk
network number.
7.2.7.2 Framed-AppleTalk-Network AVP
The Framed-AppleTalk-Network AVP (AVP Code 38) is of type Unsigned32
and contains the AppleTalk Network number which the NAS should probe
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to allocate an AppleTalk node for the user. This AVP MUST only be
present in an authorization response and is never used when the user
is not another router. Multiple instances of this AVP indicate that
the NAS may probe using any of the network numbers specified.
Despite the size of the field, values range from zero to 65535. The
special value zero indicates that the NAS should assign a network for
the user, using its default cable range. A value between one and
65535 (inclusive) indicates the AppleTalk Network the NAS should
probe to find an address for the user.
7.2.7.3 Framed-AppleTalk-Zone AVP
The Framed-AppleTalk-Zone AVP (AVP Code 39) is of type OctetString
and contains the AppleTalk Default Zone to be used for this user.
This AVP MUST only be present in an authorization response. Multiple
instances of this AVP in the same message are not allowed.
The codification of the range of allowed usage of this field is
outside the scope of this specification.
7.2.8 ARAP Access
The AVPs defined in this section are used when the user requests, or
is being granted, access to ARAP. They are only present if the
Framed-Protocol AVP (see Section 7.2.1) is set to AppleTalk Remote
Access Protocol (ARAP).
7.2.8.1 ARAP-Features AVP
The ARAP-Features AVP (AVP Code 71) is of type OctetString, and MAY
be present in the AA-Accept message if the Framed-Protocol AVP is set
to the value of ARAP. See [32] for more information of the format of
this AVP.
7.2.8.2 ARAP-Zone-Access AVP
The ARAP-Zone-Access AVP (AVP Code 72) is of type Enumerated, and MAY
be present in the AA-Accept message if the Framed-Protocol AVP is set
to the value of ARAP.
The supported values are listed in [34], and are defined in [32].
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7.2.8.3 ARAP-Security AVP
The ARAP-Security AVP (AVP Code 73) is of type Unsigned32, and MAY be
present in the AA-Answer message if the Framed-Protocol AVP is set to
the value of ARAP, and the Result-Code AVP is set to
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. See [32] for more information of the
format of this AVP.
7.2.8.4 ARAP-Security-Data AVP
The ARAP-Security AVP (AVP Code 74) is of type OctetString, and MAY
be present in the AA-Request or AA-Answer message if the Framed-
Protocol AVP is set to the value of ARAP, and the Result-Code AVP is
set to DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. This AVP contains the security
module challenge or response associated with the ARAP Security Module
specified in ARAP-Security.
7.3 Non-Framed Access Authorization AVPs
This section contains the authorization AVPs that are needed to
support terminal server functionality. AVPs defined in this section
MAY be present in a message if the Service-Type AVP was set to
"Login" or "Callback Login".
7.3.1 Login-IP-Host AVP
The Login-IP-Host AVP (AVP Code 14) is of type IPAddress and contains
the system with which to connect the user, when the Login-Service AVP
is included. It MAY be used in an authorization request as a hint to
the server that a specific host is desired, but the server is not
required to honor the hint in the corresponding response.
Two addresses have special significance; 0xFFFFFFFF and 0xFFFFFFFE.
The value 0xFFFFFFFF indicates that the NAS SHOULD allow the user to
select an address. The value zero indicates that the NAS SHOULD
select a host to connect the user to.
7.3.2 Login-Service AVP
The Login-Service AVP (AVP Code 15) is of type Enumerated and
contains the service which should be used to connect the user to the
login host. This AVP SHOULD only be present in authorization
responses.
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The supported values are listed in [34].
7.3.3 TCP Services
The AVP described in this section MAY be present if the Login-Service
AVP is set to Telnet, Rlogin, TCP Clear or TCP Clear Quiet.
7.3.3.1 Login-TCP-Port AVP
The Login-TCP-Port AVP (AVP Code 16) is of type Unsigned32 and
contains the TCP port with which the user is to be connected, when
the Login-Service AVP is also present. This AVP SHOULD only be
present in authorization responses. The value MUST NOT be greater
than 65535.
7.3.4 LAT Services
The AVP described in this section MAY be present if the Login-Service
AVP is set to LAT.
7.3.4.1 Login-LAT-Service AVP
The Login-LAT-Service AVP (AVP Code 34) is of type OctetString and
contains the system with which the user is to be connected by LAT. It
MAY be used in an authorization request as a hint to the server that
a specific service is desired, but the server is not required to
honor the hint in the corresponding response. This AVP MUST only be
present in the response if the Login-Service AVP states that LAT is
desired.
Administrators use the service attribute when dealing with clustered
systems, such as a VAX or Alpha cluster. In such an environment
several different time sharing hosts share the same resources (disks,
printers, etc.), and administrators often configure each to offer
access (service) to each of the shared resources. In this case, each
host in the cluster advertises its services through LAT broadcasts.
Sophisticated users often know which service providers (machines) are
faster and tend to use a node name when initiating a LAT connection.
Alternately, some administrators want particular users to use certain
machines as a primitive form of load balancing (although LAT knows
how to do load balancing itself).
The String field contains the identity of the LAT service to use.
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The LAT Architecture allows this string to contain $ (dollar), -
(hyphen), . (period), _ (underscore), numerics, upper and lower case
alphabetics, and the ISO Latin-1 character set extension [8]. All LAT
string comparisons are case insensitive.
7.3.4.2 Login-LAT-Node AVP
The Login-LAT-Node AVP (AVP Code 35) is of type OctetString and
contains the Node with which the user is to be automatically
connected by LAT. It MAY be used in an authorization request as a
hint to the server that a specific LAT node is desired, but the
server is not required to honor the hint in the corresponding
response. This AVP MUST only be present in a response if the
Service-Type AVP is set to LAT.
The String field contains the identity of the LAT service to use.
The LAT Architecture allows this string to contain $ (dollar), -
(hyphen), . (period), _ (underscore), numerics, upper and lower case
alphabetics, and the ISO Latin-1 character set extension [8]. All LAT
string comparisons are case insensitive.
7.3.4.3 Login-LAT-Group AVP
The Login-LAT-Group AVP (AVP Code 36) is of type OctetString and
contains a string identifying the LAT group codes which this user is
authorized to use. It MAY be used in an authorization request as a
hint to the server that a specific group is desired, but the server
is not required to honor the hint in the corresponding response. This
AVP MUST only be present in a response if the Service-Type AVP is set
to LAT.
LAT supports 256 different group codes, which LAT uses as a form of
access rights. LAT encodes the group codes as a 256 bit bitmap.
Administrators can assign one or more of the group code bits at the
LAT service provider; it will only accept LAT connections that have
these group codes set in the bit map. The administrators assign a
bitmap of authorized group codes to each user; LAT gets these from
the operating system, and uses these in its requests to the service
providers.
The codification of the range of allowed usage of this field is
outside the scope of this specification.
7.3.4.4 Login-LAT-Port AVP
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The Login-LAT-Port AVP (AVP Code 63) is of type OctetString and
contains the Port with which the user is to be connected by LAT. It
MAY be used in an authorization request as a hint to the server that
a specific port is desired, but the server is not required to honor
the hint in the corresponding response. This AVP MUST only be present
in a response if the Service-Type AVP is set to LAT.
The String field contains the identity of the LAT service to use.
The LAT Architecture allows this string to contain $ (dollar), -
(hyphen), . (period), _ (underscore), numerics, upper and lower case
alphabetics, and the ISO Latin-1 character set extension [8]. All LAT
string comparisons are case insensitive.
7.4 Tunneling AVP
The Tunneling AVP (AVP Code 403) is of type Grouped and contains AVPs
used to describe a tunnel. Its Data field has the following ABNF
grammar:
Tunneling ::= < AVP Header: 403 >
{ Tunnel-Type }
{ Tunnel-Medium-Type }
{ Tunnel-Client-Endpoint }
{ Tunnel-Server-Endpoint }
[ Tunnel-Preference ]
[ Tunnel-Client-Auth-ID ]
[ Tunnel-Server-Auth-ID ]
[ Tunnel-Assignment-ID ]
[ Tunnel-Password ]
[ Tunnel-Private-Group-ID ]
7.4.1 Tunnel-Type AVP
The Tunnel-Type AVP (AVP Code 64) is of type Enumerated and contains
the tunneling protocol(s) to be used (in the case of a tunnel
initiator) or the tunneling protocol in use (in the case of a tunnel
terminator). It MAY be used in an authorization request as a hint to
the server that a specific tunnel type is desired, but the server is
not required to honor the hint in the corresponding response.
The Tunnel-Type SHOULD also be present in the corresponding ADIF
Record within the Accounting-Request.
A tunnel initiator is not required to implement any of these tunnel
types; if a tunnel initiator receives a response that contains only
unknown or unsupported Tunnel-Types, the tunnel initiator MUST behave
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as though a response was received with the Result-Code indicating a
failure.
The supported values are listed in [34].
7.4.2 Tunnel-Medium-Type AVP
The Tunnel-Medium-Type AVP (AVP Code 65) is of type Enumerated and
contains the transport medium to use when creating a tunnel for those
protocols (such as L2TP) that can operate over multiple transports.
It MAY be used in an authorization request as a hint to the server
that a specific medium is desired, but the server is not required to
honor the hint in the corresponding response.
The Value field contains one of the values listed under "Address
Family Numbers" in [10]. The value of most importance is (1) for IPv4
and (2) for IPv6.
7.4.3 Tunnel-Client-Endpoint AVP
The Tunnel-Client-Endpoint AVP (AVP Code 66) is of type UTF8String,
and contains the address of the initiator end of the tunnel. It MAY
be used in an authorization request as a hint to the server that a
specific endpoint is desired, but the server is not required to honor
the hint in the corresponding response.
This AVP SHOULD be included in the ADIF Record of the corresponding
Accounting-Request messages, in which case it indicates the address
from which the tunnel was initiated. This AVP, along with the
Tunnel-Server-Endpoint and Session-Id AVP [2], MAY be used to provide
a globally unique means to identify a tunnel for accounting and
auditing purposes.
If Tunnel-Medium-Type is IPv4 (1), then this string is either the
fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the tunnel client machine, or
it is a "dotted-decimal" IP address. Conformant implementations MUST
support the dotted-decimal format and SHOULD support the FQDN format
for IP addresses.
If Tunnel-Medium-Type is IPv6 (2), then this string is either the
FQDN of the tunnel client machine, or it is a text representation of
the address in either the preferred or alternate form [5].
Conformant implementations MUST support the preferred form and SHOULD
support both the alternate text form and the FQDN format for IPv6
addresses.
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If Tunnel-Medium-Type is neither IPv4 nor IPv6, this string is a tag
referring to configuration data local to the Diameter client that
describes the interface and medium-specific address to use.
7.4.4 Tunnel-Server-Endpoint AVP
The Tunnel-Server-Endpoint AVP (AVP Code 67) is of UTF8String, and
contains the address of the server end of the tunnel. It MAY be used
in an authorization request as a hint to the server that a specific
endpoint is desired, but the server is not required to honor the hint
in the corresponding response.
This AVP SHOULD be included in the ADIF Record of the corresponding
Accounting-Request messages, in which case it indicates the address
from which the tunnel was initiated. This AVP, along with the
Tunnel-Client-Endpoint and Session-Id AVP [2], MAY be used to provide
a globally unique means to identify a tunnel for accounting and
auditing purposes.
If Tunnel-Medium-Type is IPv4 (1), then this string is either the
fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the tunnel client machine, or
it is a "dotted-decimal" IP address. Conformant implementations MUST
support the dotted-decimal format and SHOULD support the FQDN format
for IP addresses.
If Tunnel-Medium-Type is IPv6 (2), then this string is either the
FQDN of the tunnel client machine, or it is a text representation of
the address in either the preferred or alternate form [5].
Conformant implementations MUST support the preferred form and SHOULD
support both the alternate text form and the FQDN format for IPv6
addresses.
If Tunnel-Medium-Type is not IPv4 or IPv6, this string is a tag
referring to configuration data local to the Diameter client that
describes the interface and medium-specific address to use.
7.4.5 Tunnel-Password AVP
The Tunnel-Password AVP (AVP Code 69) is of type OctetString and may
contain a password to be used to authenticate to a remote server.
This AVP MUST only be present in authorization responses in an
encrypted form, using one of the methods described in [2] and [13].
7.4.6 Tunnel-Private-Group-ID AVP
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The Tunnel-Private-Group-ID AVP (AVP Code 81) is of type UTF8String,
and contains the group ID for a particular tunneled session. The
Tunnel-Private-Group-ID AVP MAY be included in an authorization
request if the tunnel initiator can pre-determine the group resulting
from a particular connection and SHOULD be included in the
authorization response if this tunnel session is to be treated as
belonging to a particular private group. Private groups may be used
to associate a tunneled session with a particular group of users.
For example, it MAY be used to facilitate routing of unregistered IP
addresses through a particular interface. This value SHOULD be
included the corresponding ADIF-Record in the Accounting-Request
which pertain to a tunneled session.
7.4.7 Tunnel-Assignment-ID AVP
The Tunnel-Assignment-ID AVP (AVP Code 82) is of type OctetString and
is used to indicate to the tunnel initiator the particular tunnel to
which a session is to be assigned. Some tunneling protocols, such as
PPTP and L2TP, allow for sessions between the same two tunnel
endpoints to be multiplexed over the same tunnel and also for a given
session to utilize its own dedicated tunnel. This attribute provides
a mechanism for Diameter to be used to inform the tunnel initiator
(e.g. PAC, LAC) whether to assign the session to a multiplexed
tunnel or to a separate tunnel. Furthermore, it allows for sessions
sharing multiplexed tunnels to be assigned to different multiplexed
tunnels.
A particular tunneling implementation may assign differing
characteristics to particular tunnels. For example, different
tunnels may be assigned different QOS parameters. Such tunnels may
be used to carry either individual or multiple sessions. The
Tunnel-Assignment-ID attribute thus allows the Diameter server to
indicate that a particular session is to be assigned to a tunnel that
provides an appropriate level of service. It is expected that any
QOS-related Diameter tunneling attributes defined in the future that
accompany this attribute will be associated by the tunnel initiator
with the ID given by this attribute. In the meantime, any semantic
given to a particular ID string is a matter left to local
configuration in the tunnel initiator.
The Tunnel-Assignment-ID AVP is of significance only to Diameter and
the tunnel initiator. The ID it specifies is intended to be of only
local use to Diameter and the tunnel initiator. The ID assigned by
the tunnel initiator is not conveyed to the tunnel peer.
This attribute MAY be included in authorization responses. The tunnel
initiator receiving this attribute MAY choose to ignore it and assign
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the session to an arbitrary multiplexed or non-multiplexed tunnel
between the desired endpoints. This attribute SHOULD also be
included in the corresponding ADIF-Record in the Accounting-Request
messages which pertain to a tunneled session.
If a tunnel initiator supports the Tunnel-Assignment-ID AVP, then it
should assign a session to a tunnel in the following manner:
- If this AVP is present and a tunnel exists between the specified
endpoints with the specified ID, then the session should be
assigned to that tunnel.
- If this AVP is present and no tunnel exists between the
specified endpoints with the specified ID, then a new tunnel
should be established for the session and the specified ID
should be associated with the new tunnel.
- If this AVP is not present, then the session is assigned to an
unnamed tunnel. If an unnamed tunnel does not yet exist between
the specified endpoints then it is established and used for this
and subsequent sessions established without the Tunnel-
Assignment-ID attribute. A tunnel initiator MUST NOT assign a
session for which a Tunnel-Assignment-ID AVP was not specified
to a named tunnel (i.e. one that was initiated by a session
specifying this AVP).
Note that the same ID may be used to name different tunnels if such
tunnels are between different endpoints.
7.4.8 Tunnel-Preference AVP
The Tunnel-Preference AVP (AVP Code 83) is of type Unsigned32 and is
used to identify the relative preference assigned to each tunnel when
more than one set of tunneling AVPs is returned within separate
Grouped-AVP AVPs. It MAY be used in an authorization request as a
hint to the server that a specific preference is desired, but the
server is not required to honor the hint in the corresponding
response.
For example, suppose that AVPs describing two tunnels are returned by
the server, one with a Tunnel-Type of PPTP and the other with a
Tunnel-Type of L2TP. If the tunnel initiator supports only one of
the Tunnel-Types returned, it will initiate a tunnel of that type.
If, however, it supports both tunnel protocols, it SHOULD use the
value of the Tunnel-Preference AVP to decide which tunnel should be
started. The tunnel having the numerically lowest value in the Value
field of this AVP SHOULD be given the highest preference. The values
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assigned to two or more instances of the Tunnel-Preference AVP within
a given authorization response MAY be identical. In this case, the
tunnel initiator SHOULD use locally configured metrics to decide
which set of AVPs to use.
7.4.9 Tunnel-Client-Auth-ID AVP
The Tunnel-Client-Auth-ID AVP (AVP Code 90) is of type Unsigned32 and
specifies the name used by the tunnel initiator during the
authentication phase of tunnel establishment. It MAY be used in an
authorization request as a hint to the server that a specific
preference is desired, but the server is not required to honor the
hint in the corresponding response. This AVP MUST be present in the
authorization response if an authentication name other than the
default is desired. This AVP SHOULD be included in the corresponding
ADIF-Record of the Accounting-Request messages which pertain to a
tunneled session.
7.4.10 Tunnel-Server-Auth-ID AVP
The Tunnel-Server-Auth-ID AVP (AVP Code 91) is of type OctetString
and specifies the name used by the tunnel terminator during the
authentication phase of tunnel establishment. It MAY be used in an
authorization request as a hint to the server that a specific
preference is desired, but the server is not required to honor the
hint in the corresponding response. This AVP MUST be present in the
authorization response if an authentication name other than the
default is desired. This AVP SHOULD be included in the corresponding
ADIF-Record of the Accounting-Request messages which pertain to a
tunneled session.
8.0 Accounting AVPs
This section contains a description of the AVPs defined in this
document that are to be included in Diameter accounting messages [2].
8.1 Accounting-Input-Octets AVP
The Accounting-Input-Octets AVP (AVP Code 42) is of type Unsigned64,
and contains the number of octets in IP packets received by the user.
8.2 Accounting-Output-Octets AVP
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The Accounting-Output-Octets AVP (AVP Code 43) is of type Unsigned64,
and contains the number of octets in IP packets sent to the user.
8.3 Accounting-Session-Time AVP
The Accounting-Session-Time AVP (AVP Code 46) is of type Unsigned32,
and indicates the length of the current session in seconds.
8.4 Accounting-Input-Packets AVP
The Accounting-Input-Packets (AVP Code 47) is of type Unsigned64, and
contains the number of IP packets received by the user.
8.5 Accounting-Output-Packets AVP
The Accounting-Output-Packets (AVP Code 48) is of type Unsigned64,
and contains the number of IP packets sent to the user.
8.6 Accounting-Authentication-Type AVP
The Accounting-Authentication-Type AVP (AVP Code 45) is of type
Unsigned32, and specifies how the user was authenticated. The
supported values are listed in [34].
8.7 Acct-Tunnel-Connection AVP
The Acct-Tunnel-Connection AVP (AVP Code 68) is of type OctetString,
and contains the identifier assigned to the tunnel session. This AVP,
along with the Tunnel-Client-Endpoint and Tunnel-Server-Endpoint
AVPs, may be used to provide a means to uniquely identify a tunnel
session for auditing purposes.
The format of the identifier in this AVP depends upon the value of
the Tunnel-Type AVP. For example, to fully identify an L2TP tunnel
connection, the L2TP Tunnel ID and Call ID might be encoded in this
field. The exact encoding of this field is implementation dependent.
8.8 Acct-Tunnel-Packets-Lost AVP
The Acct-Tunnel-Packets-Lost AVP (AVP Code 86) is of type Unsigned32
and contains the number of packets lost on a given link.
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8.9 Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVP
This Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVP (AVP Code 401) is of type
Enumerated, and uses the EAP Type name space defined in [25].
9.0 RADIUS/Diameter Protocol Interactions
This section describes some basic guidelines that may be used by
servers that act as protocol gateways. Note that this document does
not restrict implementations from creating other methods, as long as
the bridging function doesn't break the RADIUS nor the Diameter
protocol.
There are essentially two different situations that must be handled;
one where a RADIUS request is received that must be forwarded as a
Diameter request, and the inverse. Note that this section uses two
different terms; AVP and attribute. The former is used to signify a
Diameter AVP, while the latter is used to signify a RADIUS attribute.
9.1 RADIUS request forwarded as Diameter request
This section describes the actions that should be followed when a
protocol Gateway receives a RADIUS message that is to be translated
to a Diameter message.
It is important to note that RADIUS servers are inherently stateless,
and this section maintains that assumption. It is quite possible for
the RADIUS messages that comprises the session (i.e. authentication
and accounting messages) be handled by different protocol gateways in
the proxy network. Therefore a RADIUS->Diameter protocol gateway
cannot maintain session state information.
When a protocol gateway receives a RADIUS message, the following
steps should be taken:
- If the NAS-IP-Address attribute is present in the RADIUS
message, the name MUST be translated to its corresponding FQDN,
and encoded in the Diameter message's Origin-Host AVP. If the
NAS-Identifier attribute is present, the data can be used in the
Origin-Host AVP.
- The Origin-Host AVP is added with the local server's identity.
This will ensure that the corresponding response will be
returned to the correct gateway server. The aaa protocol
specified in the identity would be set to "radius".
- The Destination-Realm AVP is created from the information found
in the RADIUS User-Name attribute.
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- The Gateway Server must maintain state information relevant to
the RADIUS request, such as the Identifier field in the RADIUS
header, any existing RADIUS Proxy-State attribute as well as the
source IP address and port number of the UDP packet. These may
be maintained locally in a state table, or may be saved in a
Proxy-Info AVP.
- If the Acct-Session-Id attribute was found in the request, the
contents are inserted in the Acct-Session-Id AVP.
- If the RADIUS request contained a State attribute, and the
prefix of the data is "Diameter/", the data following the prefix
contains the Diameter Session-Id. If no such attributes are
present, and the RADIUS command is an Access-Request, a new
Session-Id is created. The Session-Id is included in the
Session-Id AVP.
- If the RADIUS message received is an Accounting-Request, with
the Acct-Status-Type attribute set to STOP, the local server
MUST issue a Session-Termination-Request message once the
Diameter Accounting-Answer has been received.
The corresponding Diameter response is always guaranteed to be
received by the same protocol gateway that translated the original
request, due to the contents of the Origin-Host AVP in the Diameter
request. The following steps are applied to the response message
during the Diameter to RADIUS translation:
- If the Diameter Command-Code is set to AA-Answer and the
Result-Code AVP is set to DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH, the gateway
must send a RADIUS Access-Challenge with the Diameter Session-Id
and the Origin-Host AVPs encapsulated in the RADIUS State
attribute, with the prefix "Diameter/". This is necessary in
order to ensure that the protocol gateway that will receive the
subsequent RADIUS Access-Request will have access to the Session
Identifier, and be able to set the Destination-Host to the
correct value. If the Multi-Round-Time-Out AVP is present, the
value of the AVP MUST be inserted in the RADIUS Session-Timeout
AVP.
- If the Command-Code is set to AA-Answer, the Diameter Session-Id
AVP is saved in a new RADIUS Class attribute, whose format
consists of the string "Diameter/" followed by the Diameter
Session Identifier. This will ensure that the subsequent
Accounting messages, which could be received by any protocol
gateway, would have access to the original Diameter Session
Identifier.
- If a Proxy-State attribute was present in the RADIUS request,
the same attribute is added in the response. This information
may be found in the Proxy-Info AVP, or in a local state table.
- If state information regarding the RADIUS request was saved in a
Proxy-Info AVP, the RADIUS Identifier and UDP IP Address and
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port number are extracted and used in issuing the RADIUS reply.
9.2 Diameter request forwarded as RADIUS request
When a server receives a Diameter request that is to be forwarded to
a RADIUS entity, the following steps are an example of the steps that
may be followed:
- The Origin-Host AVP's value is inserted in the NAS-Identifier
attribute.
- The following information MUST be present in the corresponding
Diameter response, and therefore MUST be saved either in a local
state table, or it MAY be encoded in a RADIUS Proxy-State
attribute:
1. Origin-Host AVP
2. Session-Id AVP
3. Proxy-Info AVP
4. Route-Record AVPs (in the proper order)
5. Any other AVP that MUST be present in the response, and
has no corresponding RADIUS attribute.
When the corresponding response is received by the gateway server,
which is guaranteed in the RADIUS protocol, the following steps may
be followed:
- If the RADIUS code is set to Access-Challenge, a Diameter AA-
Answer message is created with the Result-Code set to
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. If the Session-Timeout AVP is present
in the RADIUS message, its value is inserted in the Multi-
Round-Time-Out AVP.
- If a Proxy-Info AVP is present, extract the encoded information,
otherwise retrieve the information from the local state table.
- The request's Origin-Host information is added to the
Destination-Host AVP.
- The Session-Id information is added to the Session-Id AVP.
- The Route-Record AVPs MUST be added to the Diameter message, in
the same order they were present in the request.
- If a Proxy-Info AVP was present in the request, the same AVP
MUST be added to the response.
- If the RADIUS State attributes are present, these attributes
must be present in the Diameter response.
- Any other AVPs that were saved, and MUST be present in the
response, are added to the message.
10.0 AVP Occurrence Table
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The following tables presents the AVPs defined in this document, and
specifies in which Diameter messages they MAY, or MAY NOT be present.
Note that AVPs that can only be present within a Grouped AVP are not
represented in this table.
The table uses the following symbols:
0 The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message.
0+ Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the
message.
0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the
message.
1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message.
10.1 NASREQ Command AVP Table
The table in this section is limited to the Command Codes defined in
this specification.
+-----------------------+
| Command-Code |
|-----+-----+-----+-----+
Attribute Name | AAR | AAA | DER | DEA |
------------------------------|-----+-----+-----+-----|
ARAP-Challenge-Response | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
ARAP-Features | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
ARAP-Password | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 |
ARAP-Security | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 |
ARAP-Security-Data | 0+ | 0 | 0+ | 0 |
ARAP-Zone-Access | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
Auth-Application-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Auth-Grace-Period | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Auth-Session-State | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Authorization-Lifetime | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Callback-Id | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
Callback-Number | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Called-Station-Id | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 |
Calling-Station-Id | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 |
CHAP-Challenge | 0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
CHAP-Password | 0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Connect-Info | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 |
Destination-Host | 0+ | 1 | 0+ | 1 |
Destination-Realm | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
Error-Message | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
Error-Reporting-Host | 0 | 0+ | 0 | 0+ |
Filter-Id | 0 | 0+ | 0 | 0+ |
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+-----------------------+
| Command-Code |
|-----+-----+-----+-----+
Attribute Name | AAR | AAA | DER | DEA |
------------------------------|-----+-----+-----+-----|
Framed-Appletalk-Link | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
Framed-Appletalk-Network | 0 | 0+ | 0 | 0+ |
Framed-Appletalk-Zone | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
Framed-Compression | 0+ | 0+ | 0+ | 0+ |
Framed-Interface-Id | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-IPv6-Prefix | 0+ | 0+ | 0+ | 0+ |
Framed-IPv6-Pool | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-IPv6-Route | 0+ | 0+ | 0+ | 0+ |
Framed-IP-Address | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-IP-Netmask | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-IP-Route | 0 | 0+ | 0 | 0+ |
Framed-IPX-Network | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
Framed-MTU | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
Framed-Protocol | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 |
Framed-Routing | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 |
Idle-Timeout | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Login-IP-Host | 0+ | 0+ | 0 | 0 |
Login-LAT-Group | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0 | 0 |
Login-LAT-Node | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0 | 0 |
Login-LAT-Port | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0 | 0 |
Login-LAT-Service | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0 | 0 |
Login-Service | 0 | 0+ | 0 | 0 |
Login-TCP-Port | 0 | 0+ | 0 | 0 |
NAS-Filter-Rule | 0 | 0+ | 0 | 0+ |
NAS-IP-Address | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
NAS-Key-Binding | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 |
NAS-Port | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
NAS-Port-Type | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 |
NAS-Session-Key | 0 | 0+ | 0 | 0+ |
Origin-Host | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Origin-Realm | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Origin-State-Id | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Password-Retry | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0 |
Port-Limit | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 |
Prompt | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0 |
Proxy-Info | 0+ | 0+ | 0+ | 0+ |
Redirect-Host | 0 | 0+ | 0 | 0+ |
Redirect-Host-Usage | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
Redirect-Max-Cache-Time | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
Reply-Message | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
Re-Auth-Request-Type | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
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+-----------------------+
| Command-Code |
|-----+-----+-----+-----+
Attribute Name | AAR | AAA | DER | DEA |
------------------------------|-----+-----+-----+-----|
Route-Record | 0+ | 0+ | 0+ | 0+ |
Service-Type | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Timeout | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
State | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0 | 0-1 |
Tunneling | 0+ | 0+ | 0+ | 0+ |
User-Name | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
User-Password | 0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
10.2 Accounting AVP Table
The tables in this section are used to represent which AVPs defined
in this document are to be present in the Accounting messages,
defined in [1].
10.2.1 Framed Access
The table in this section is used when the Service-Type specifies
Framed Access.
+-----------+
| Command |
| Code |
|-----+-----+
Attribute Name | ACR | ACA |
------------------------------|-----+-----+
Accounting-Authentication-Type| 1 | 0-1 |
Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method | 1 | 0-1 |
Accounting-Input-Octets | 1 | 1 |
Accounting-Input-Packets | 1 | 1 |
Accounting-Output-Octets | 1 | 1 |
Accounting-Output-Packets | 1 | 1 |
Accounting-Session-Time | 1 | 1 |
Accounting-State | 0 | 0 |
Acct-Tunnel-Connection | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Acct-Tunnel-Packets-Lost | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-AppleTalk-Link | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-AppleTalk-Network | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-AppleTalk-Zone | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-Compression | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-IP-Address | 0-1 | 0-1 |
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+-----------+
| Command |
| Code |
|-----+-----+
Attribute Name | ACR | ACA |
------------------------------|-----+-----+
Framed-IP-Netmask | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-IPX-Network | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-MTU | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-Protocol | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-Route | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-Routing | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Service-Type | 1 | 1 |
Tunnel-Assignment-ID | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Tunnel-Client-Endpoint | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Tunnel-Medium-Type | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Tunnel-Private-Group-ID | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Tunnel-Server-Endpoint | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Tunnel-Type | 0-1 | 0-1 |
------------------------------|-----+-----+
10.2.2 Non-Framed Access
The table in this section is used when the Service-Type specifies
Non-Framed Access.
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+-----------+
| Command |
| Code |
|-----+-----+
Attribute Name | ACR | ACA |
------------------------------|-----+-----+
Accounting-Authentication-Type| 1 | 0-1 |
Accounting-Input-Octets | 1 | 1 |
Accounting-Input-Packets | 1 | 1 |
Accounting-Output-Octets | 1 | 1 |
Accounting-Output-Packets | 1 | 1 |
Accounting-Session-Time | 1 | 1 |
Accounting-State | 0 | 0 |
Login-IP-Host | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Login-LAT-Service | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Login-LAT-Node | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Login-LAT-Group | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Login-LAT-Port | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Login-Service | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Login-TCP-Port | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Service-Type | 1 | 1 |
------------------------------|-----+-----+
11.0 IANA Considerations
This section contains the namespaces that have either been created in
this specification, or the values assigned to existing namespaces
managed by IANA.
11.1 Command Codes
This specification assigns the values 265 and 268 from the Command
Code namespace defined in [2]. See sections 3.1 and 4.2 for the
assignment of the namespace in this specification.
11.2 AVP Codes
This specification assigns the values 400-408 from the AVP Code
namespace defined in [2]. See section 2.1 for the assignment of the
namespace in this specification.
This specification also makes use of AVPs in the 0-255 range, which
are defined in [34]. AVPs listed in sections 2.2, 7.2.5.4, 7.2.5.5,
7.2.5.6 and 7.2.5.7 have the AVP Code set to TBD. IANA needs to
replace TBD with the actual values assigned to these AVPs, which are
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defined in [38].
11.3 Application Identifier
This specification assigns the value one (1) to the Application
Identifier namespace defined in [1]. See section 1.2 for more
information.
11.4 NAS-Key-Binding AVP Values
As defined in Section 2.1.6, the NAS-Key-Binding AVP (AVP Code 404)
defines the values 1-6. All remaining values, other than zero, are
available for assignment via a Designated Expert [12].
11.5 NAS-Key-Direction AVP Values
As defined in Section 2.1.3, the NAS-Key-Direction AVP (AVP Code 406)
defines the values 1-3. All remaining values, other than zero, are
available for assignment via IETF Consensus [12].
11.6 NAS-Key-Type AVP Values
As defined in Section 2.1.4, the NAS-Key-Type AVP (AVP Code 407)
defines the values 1-2. All remaining values, other than zero, are
available for assignment via IETF Consensus [12].
12.0 Security Considerations
This document does not contain any security protocol, but does
discuss how PPP authentication protocols can be carried within the
Diameter protocol. The PPP authentication protocols that are
described are PAP, CHAP and EAP.
The use of PAP SHOULD be discouraged, since it exposes user's
passwords to possibly non-trusted entities. PAP is also frequently
used for use with One-Time Passwords (OTP), which does not expose any
security risks. However, it is highly recommended that OTP be
supported through the EAP protocol.
This document also describes how CHAP can be carried within the
Diameter protocol, which is required for backward RADIUS
compatibility. The CHAP protocol, as used in a RADIUS environment,
facilitates authentication replay attacks, and therefore SHOULD NOT
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be used when EAP is available.
This specification also defines a method by which the home Diameter
server can create and distribute registration keys to be used to
authenticate link layer messages (e.g. PPP ECP). The keys SHOULD be
be protected using the methods defined in [13].
13.0 References
[1] C. Rigney, A. Rubens, W. Simpson, S. Willens, "Remote Authenti-
cation Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June 2000.
[2] P. Calhoun, H. Akhtar, J. Arkko, E. Guttman, A. Rubens, "Diame-
ter Base Protocol", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-07.txt, IETF work in
progress, July 2001.
[3] Aboba, Beadles, "The Network Access Identifier." RFC 2486. Janu-
ary 1999.
[4] Aboba, Zorn, "Criteria for Evaluating Roaming Protocols", RFC
2477, January 1999.
[5] Hinden, R., Deering, S., "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture",
RFC 2373, July 1998
[6] W. Simpson, "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
(CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.
[7] Jacobson, "Compressing TCP/IP headers for low-speed serial
links", RFC 1144, February 1990.
[8] ISO 8859. International Standard -- Information Processing --
8-bit Single-Byte Coded Graphic Character Sets -- Part 1: Latin
Alphabet No. 1, ISO 8859-1:1987.
<URL:http://www.iso.ch/cate/d16338.html>
[9] Sklower, Lloyd, McGregor, Carr, "The PPP Multilink Protocol
(MP)", RFC 1717, November 1994.
[10] Reynolds, J., Postel, J., "Assigned Numbers", STD 2, RFC 1700,
October 1994
[11] G. Zorn, B. Aboba, D. Mitton, "RADIUS Accounting Modifications
for Tunnel Protocol Support", RFC 2867, June 2000.
[12] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Calhoun et al. expires January 2002 [Page 51]
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Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[13] P. Calhoun, W. Bulley, S. Farrell, "Diameter CMS Security Appli-
cation", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-cms-sec-02.txt, IETF work in
progress, July 2001.
[14] Hamzeh, K., Pall, G., Verthein, W., Taarud, J., Little, W.,
Zorn, G., "Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP)", RFC 2637,
July 1999
[15] Valencia, A., Littlewood, M., Kolar, T., "Cisco Layer Two For-
warding (Protocol) 'L2F'", RFC 2341, May 1998
[16] Townsley, W. M., Valencia, A., Rubens, A., Pall, G. S., Zorn,
G., Palter, B., "Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP)", RFC 2661,
August 1999
[17] Hamzeh, K., "Ascend Tunnel Management Protocol - ATMP", RFC
2107, February 1997
[18] Kent, S., Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998
[19] Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation within IP", RFC 2003, October
1996
[20] Perkins, C., "Minimal Encapsulation within IP", RFC 2004,
October 1996
[21] Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
1827, August 1995
[22] Hanks, S., Li, T., Farinacci, D., Traina, P., "Generic Routing
Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 1701, October 1994
[23] Simpson, W., "IP in IP Tunneling", RFC 1853, October 1995
[24] M. Beadles, D. Mitton, "Criteria for Evaluating Network Access
Server Protocols", draft-ietf-nasreq-criteria-06.txt, IETF work
in progress, June 2001.
[25] L. J. Blunk, J. R. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP)." RFC 2284, March 1998.
[26] G. Pall, G. Zorn, "Microsoft Point-To-Point Encryption (MPPE)
Protocol", RFC 3078, March 2001.
[27] Narten, Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Calhoun et al. expires January 2002 [Page 52]
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Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998
[28] G. Zorn, D. Mitton, B. Aboba, "RADIUS Accounting Modifications
for Tunnel Protocol Support", RFC 2867, June 2000.
[29] F. Yergeau, "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC
2279, January 1998.
[30] P. Calhoun, C. Perkins, "Diameter Mobile IP Application",
draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-mobileip-07.txt, IETF work in progress,
July 2001.
[31] G. Zorn, D. Leifer, A. Rubens, J. Shriver, M. Holdrege, I. Goy-
ret, "RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol Support", RFC 2868,
June 2000.
[32] C. Rigney, W. Willats, P. Calhoun, "RADIUS Extensions", RFC
2869, June 2000.
[33] G. Zorn, D. Leifer, A. Rubens, J. Shriver, M. Holdrege, I. Goy-
ret, "RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol Support", RFC 2868,
June 2000.
[34] IANA, "RADIUS Types", http://www.isi.edu/in-
notes/iana/assignments/radius-types
[35] C. Rigney, "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.
[36] K. Sklower, G. Meyer, "The PPP DES Encryption Protocol, Version
2 (DESE-bis)", RFC 2419, September 1998.
[37] H. Kummert, "The PPP Triple-DES Encryption Protocol (3DESE)",
RFC 2402, September 1998.
[38] B. Aboba, G. Zorn, D. Mitton, "RADIUS and IPv6", draft-aboba-
radius-ipv6-10.txt, IETF work in progress, June 2001.
14.0 Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Carl Rigney, Allan C. Rubens, William
Allen Simpson, and Steve Willens for their work on the original
RADIUS, from which much of the concepts in this specification were
derived from. Also Carl Rigney and Ward Willats for [32], and Glen
Zorn, Dory Leifer, Allan C. Rubens, John Shriver, Matt Holdrege and
Ignacio Goyret for their work on [33]. This document stole text and
concepts from both [32] and [33]. Thanks goes to Carl Williams for
providing IPv6 specific text.
Calhoun et al. expires January 2002 [Page 53]
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The authors would also like to acknowledge the following people for
their contribution in the development of the Diameter protocol:
Bernard Aboba, Jari Arkko, William Bulley, Daniel C. Fox, Lol Grant,
Nancy Greene, Peter Heitman, Paul Krumviede, Fergal Ladley, Ryan
Moats, Victor Muslin, Kenneth Peirce, Sumit Vakil, John R. Vollbrecht
and Jeff Weisberg
15.0 Authors' Addresses
Questions about this memo can be directed to:
Pat R. Calhoun
Network and Security Research Center, Sun Labs
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
15 Network Circle
Menlo Park, California, 94025
USA
Phone: +1 650-786-7733
Fax: +1 650-786-6445
E-mail: pcalhoun@eng.sun.com
William Bulley
Merit Network, Inc.
Building One, Suite 2000
4251 Plymouth Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105-2785
USA
Phone: +1 734-764-9993
Fax: +1 734-647-3185
E-mail: web@merit.edu
Allan C. Rubens
Tut Systems, Inc.
220 E. Huron, Suite 260
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
USA
Phone: +1 734-995-1697
E-Mail: arubens@tutsys.com
Jeff Haag
Calhoun et al. expires January 2002 [Page 54]
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Cisco Systems
7025 Kit Creek Road
PO Box 14987
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
Phone: 1-919-392-2353
E-Mail: haag@cisco.com
Glen Zorn
Cisco Systems, Inc.
500 108th Avenue N.E., Suite 500
Bellevue, WA 98004
USA
Phone: +1 425 438 8218
E-Mail: gwz@cisco.com
16.0 Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this docu-
ment itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the
copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of develop-
ing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights
defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as
required to translate it into languages other than English. The lim-
ited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked
by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This document
and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis
and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DIS-
CLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT
INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
17.0 Expiration Date
This memo is filed as <draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-07.txt> and
Calhoun et al. expires January 2002 [Page 55]
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expires in January 2002.
Calhoun et al. expires January 2002 [Page 56]