ACE M. Jones
Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track L. Seitz
Expires: May 10, 2019 RISE SICS
G. Selander
Ericsson AB
S. Erdtman
Spotify
H. Tschofenig
ARM Ltd.
November 6, 2018
Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)
draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-04
Abstract
This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT)
that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-
possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also
sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification
provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key
Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800), but using CBOR and
CWTs rather than JSON and JWTs.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 10, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key . 5
3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-
Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key 6
3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
This specification describes how a CBOR Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392] can
declare that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-
of-possession (PoP) key. Proof of possession of a key is also
sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification
provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key
Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" [RFC7800], but using CBOR
[RFC7049] and CWTs [RFC8392] rather than JSON [RFC7159] and JWTs
[JWT].
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This specification uses terms defined in the CBOR Web Token (CWT)
[RFC8392], CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152], and
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] specifications.
These terms are defined by this specification:
Issuer
Party that creates the CWT and binds the claims about the subject
to the proof-of-possession key.
Presenter
Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key
cryptography) or secret key (for symmetric key cryptography) to a
recipient.
In context of OAuth this party is also called OAuth Client.
Recipient
Party that receives the CWT containing the proof-of-possession key
information from the presenter.
In context of OAuth this party is also called OAuth Resource
Server.
3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys
By including a "cnf" (confirmation) claim in a CWT, the issuer of the
CWT declares that the presenter possesses a particular key and that
the recipient can cryptographically confirm that the presenter has
possession of that key. The value of the "cnf" claim is a CBOR map
and the members of that map identify the proof-of-possession key.
The presenter can be identified in one of several ways by the CWT,
depending upon the application requirements. For instance, some
applications may use the CWT "sub" (subject) claim [RFC8392], to
identify the presenter. Other applications may use the "iss" claim
to identify the presenter. In some applications, the subject
identifier might be relative to the issuer identified by the "iss"
(issuer) claim [RFC8392]. The actual mechanism used is dependent
upon the application. The case in which the presenter is the subject
of the CWT is analogous to Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation usage.
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3.1. Confirmation Claim
The "cnf" claim in the CWT is used to carry confirmation methods.
Some of them use proof-of-possession keys while others do not. This
design is analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
SubjectConfirmation element in which a number of different subject
confirmation methods can be included (including proof-of-possession
key information).
The set of confirmation members that a CWT must contain to be
considered valid is context dependent and is outside the scope of
this specification. Specific applications of CWTs will require
implementations to understand and process some confirmation members
in particular ways. However, in the absence of such requirements,
all confirmation members that are not understood by implementations
MUST be ignored.
This specification establishes the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods"
registry for these members in Section 7.2 and registers the members
defined by this specification. Other specifications can register
other members used for confirmation, including other members for
conveying proof-of-possession keys using different key
representations.
The "cnf" claim value MUST represent only a single proof-of-
possession key. At most one of the "COSE_Key" and
"Encrypted_COSE_Key" confirmation values defined in Figure 1 may be
present. Note that if an application needs to represent multiple
proof-of-possession keys in the same CWT, one way for it to achieve
this is to use other claim names, in addition to "cnf", to hold the
additional proof-of-possession key information. These claims could
use the same syntax and semantics as the "cnf" claim. Those claims
would be defined by applications or other specifications and could be
registered in the IANA "CBOR Web Token Claims" registry
[IANA.CWT.Claims].
/--------------------+-----+-------------------------------\
| Name | Key | Value type |
|--------------------+-----+-------------------------------|
| COSE_Key | 1 | COSE_Key |
| Encrypted_COSE_Key | 2 | COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0 |
| kid | 3 | binary string |
\--------------------+-----+-------------------------------/
Figure 1: Summary of the cnf names, keys, and value types
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3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the
"COSE_Key" member is a COSE_Key [RFC8152] representing the
corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example (using
CBOR diagnostic notation) demonstrates such a declaration in the CWT
Claims Set of a CWT:
{
/iss/ 1 : "coaps://server.example.com",
/aud/ 3 : "coaps://client.example.org",
/exp/ 4 : 1361398824,
/cnf/ 8 :{
/COSE_Key/ 1 :{
/kty/ 1 : /EC/ 2,
/crv/ -1 : /P-256/ 1,
/x/ -2 : h'd7cc072de2205bdc1537a543d53c60a6acb62eccd890c7fa27c9
e354089bbe13',
/y/ -3 : h'f95e1d4b851a2cc80fff87d8e23f22afb725d535e515d020731e
79a3b4e47120'
}
}
}
The COSE_Key MUST contain the required key members for a COSE_Key of
that key type and MAY contain other COSE_Key members, including the
"kid" (Key ID) member.
The "COSE_Key" member MAY also be used for a COSE_Key representing a
symmetric key, provided that the CWT is encrypted so that the key is
not revealed to unintended parties. The means of encrypting a CWT is
explained in [RFC8392]. If the CWT is not encrypted, the symmetric
key MUST be encrypted as described in Section 3.3.
3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the
"Encrypted_COSE_Key" member is an encrypted COSE_Key [RFC8152]
representing the symmetric key encrypted to a key known to the
recipient using COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0.
The following example (using CBOR diagnostic notation, with
linebreaks for readability) illustrates a symmetric key that could
subsequently be encrypted for use in the "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member:
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{
/kty/ 1 : /Symmetric/ 4,
/alg/ 3 : /HMAC256/ 5,
/k/ -1 : h'6684523ab17337f173500e5728c628547cb37df
e68449c65f885d1b73b49eae1A0B0C0D0E0F10'
}
The COSE_Key representation is used as the plaintext when encrypting
the key.
The following example CWT Claims Set of a CWT (using CBOR diagnostic
notation, with linebreaks for readability) illustrates the use of an
encrypted symmetric key as the "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member value:
{
/iss/ 1 : "coaps://server.example.com",
/sub/ 2 : "24400320",
/aud/ 3: "s6BhdRkqt3",
/exp/ 4 : 1311281970,
/iat/ 5 : 1311280970,
/cnf/ 8 : {
/COSE_Encrypt0/ 2 : [
/protected header / h'A1010A' /{ \alg\ 1:10 \AES-CCM-16-64-128\}/,
/unprotected header/ { / iv / 5: h'636898994FF0EC7BFCF6D3F95B'},
/ciphertext/ h'0573318A3573EB983E55A7C2F06CADD0796C9E584F1D0E3E
A8C5B052592A8B2694BE9654F0431F38D5BBC8049FA7F13F'
]
}
}
The example above was generated with the key:
h'6162630405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10'
3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key
The proof-of-possession key can also be identified by the use of a
Key ID instead of communicating the actual key, provided the
recipient is able to obtain the identified key using the Key ID. In
this case, the issuer of a CWT declares that the presenter possesses
a particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
proof of possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf"
claim in the CWT whose value is a CBOR map with the CBOR map
containing a "kid" member identifying the key.
The following example (using CBOR diagnostic notation) demonstrates
such a declaration in the CWT Claims Set of a CWT:
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{
/iss/ 1 : "coaps://server.example.com",
/aud/ 3 : "coaps://client.example.org",
/exp/ 4 : 1361398824,
/cnf/ 8 : {
/kid/ 2 : h'dfd1aa976d8d4575a0fe34b96de2bfad'
}
}
The content of the "kid" value is application specific. For
instance, some applications may choose to use a cryptographic hash of
the public key value as the "kid" value.
3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified
Proof of possession is often demonstrated by having the presenter
sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by
the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a
"challenge".
The means of communicating the nonce and the nature of its contents
are intentionally not described in this specification, as different
protocols will communicate this information in different ways.
Likewise, the means of communicating the signed nonce is also not
specified, as this is also protocol specific.
Note that another means of proving possession of the key when it is a
symmetric key is to encrypt the key to the recipient. The means of
obtaining a key for the recipient is likewise protocol specific.
4. Security Considerations
All of the security considerations that are discussed in [RFC8392]
also apply here. In addition, proof of possession introduces its own
unique security issues. Possessing a key is only valuable if it is
kept secret. Appropriate means must be used to ensure that
unintended parties do not learn private key or symmetric key values.
Applications utilizing proof of possession SHOULD also utilize
audience restriction, as described in Section 4.1.3 of [JWT], as it
provides additional protections. Audience restriction can be used by
recipients to reject messages intended for different recipients.
A recipient might not understand the "cnf" claim. Applications that
require the proof-of-possession keys communicated with it to be
understood and processed MUST ensure that the parts of this
specification that they use are implemented.
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CBOR Web Tokens with proof-of-possession keys are used in context of
an architecture, such as the ACE OAuth Framework
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], in which protocols are used by a
presenter to request these tokens and to subsequently use them with
recipients. To avoid replay attacks when the proof-of-possession
tokens are sent to presenters, a security protocol, which uses
mechansims such as nonces or timestamps, has to be utilized. Note
that a discussion of the architecture or specific protocols that CWT
proof-of-possession tokens are used with is beyond the scope of this
specification.
As is the case with other information included in a CWT, it is
necessary to apply data origin authentication and integrity
protection (via a keyed message digest or a digital signature). Data
origin authentication ensures that the recipient of the CWT learns
about the entity that created the CWT since this will be important
for any policy decisions. Integrity protection prevents an adversary
from changing any elements conveyed within the CWT payload. Special
care has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the CWT
since those not only require integrity protection but also
confidentiality protection.
As described in Section 6 (Key Identification) and Appendix D (Notes
on Key Selection) of [JWS], it is important to make explicit trust
decisions about the keys. Proof-of-possession signatures made with
keys not meeting the application's trust criteria MUST NOT be relied
upon.
5. Privacy Considerations
A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the
same key is used with multiple parties. Thus, for privacy reasons,
it is recommended that different proof-of-possession keys be used
when interacting with different parties.
6. Operational Considerations
The use of CWTs with proof-of-possession keys requires additional
information to be shared between the involved parties in order to
ensure correct processing. The recipient needs to be able to use
credentials to verify the authenticity, integrity, and potentially
the confidentiality of the CWT and its content. This requires the
recipient to know information about the issuer. Likewise, there
needs to be agreement between the issuer and the recipient about the
claims being used (which is also true of CWTs in general).
When an issuer creates a CWT containing a Key ID claim, it needs to
make sure that it does not issue another CWT containing the same Key
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ID with a different content, or for a different subject, within the
lifetime of the CWTs, unless intentionally desired. Failure to do so
may allow one party to impersonate another party, with the potential
to gain additional privileges. Likewise, if PoP keys are used for
multiple different kinds of CWTs in an application and the PoP keys
are identified by Key IDs, care must be taken to keep the keys for
the different kinds of CWTs segregated so that an attacker cannot
cause the wrong PoP key to be used by using a valid Key ID for the
wrong kind of CWT.
7. IANA Considerations
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries
established by this specification.
Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis
after a three-week review period on the cwt-reg-review@ietf.org
mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts.
However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication,
the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are
satisfied that such a specification will be published. [[ Note to
the RFC Editor: The name of the mailing list should be determined in
consultation with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name: cwt-reg-
review@ietf.org. ]]
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to Register CWT Confirmation
Method: example"). Registration requests that are undetermined for a
period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention
(using the iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts include
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general
applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application,
and evaluating the security properties of the item being registered
and whether the registration makes sense.
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification in order to enable broadly informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other
Experts.
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7.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration
This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA "CBOR Web
Token Claims" registry [IANA.CWT.Claims] established by [RFC8392].
7.1.1. Registry Contents
o Claim Name: "cnf"
o Claim Description: Confirmation
o JWT Claim Name: "cnf"
o Claim Key: TBD (maybe 8)
o Claim Value Type(s): map
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]
7.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry
This specification establishes the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods"
registry for CWT "cnf" member values. The registry records the
confirmation method member and a reference to the specification that
defines it.
7.2.1. Registration Template
Confirmation Method Name:
The human-readable name requested (e.g., "kid").
Confirmation Method Description:
Brief description of the confirmation method (e.g., "Key
Identifier").
JWT Confirmation Method Name:
Claim Name of the equivalent JWT confirmation method value, as
registered in [IANA.JWT.Claims]. CWT claims should normally have
a corresponding JWT claim. If a corresponding JWT claim would not
make sense, the Designated Experts can choose to accept
registrations for which the JWT Claim Name is listed as "N/A".
Confirmation Key:
CBOR map key value for the confirmation method.
Confirmation Value Type(s):
CBOR types that can be used for the confirmation method value.
Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
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Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
included but is not required.
7.2.2. Initial Registry Contents
o Confirmation Method Name: "COSE_Key"
o Confirmation Method Description: COSE_Key Representing Public Key
o JWT Confirmation Method Name: "jwk"
o Confirmation Key: 1
o Confirmation Value Type(s): COSE_Key structure
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of [[ this document ]]
o Confirmation Method Name: "Encrypted_COSE_Key"
o Confirmation Method Description: Encrypted COSE_Key
o JWT Confirmation Method Name: "jwe"
o Confirmation Key: 2
o Confirmation Value Type(s): COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0
structure (with an optional corresponding COSE_Encrypt or
COSE_Encrypt0 tag)
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of [[ this document ]]
o Confirmation Method Name: "kid"
o Confirmation Method Description: Key Identifier
o JWT Confirmation Method Name: "kid"
o Confirmation Key: 3
o Confirmation Value Type(s): binary string
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of [[ this document ]]
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[IANA.CWT.Claims]
IANA, "CBOR Web Token Claims",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
Framework (ACE-OAuth)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-16
(work in progress), October 2018.
[IANA.JWT.Claims]
IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-
2.0-os, March 2005,
<http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/>.
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[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the following people for their reviews of the
specification: Roman Danyliw, Michael Richardson, and Jim Schaad.
Ludwig Seitz and Goeran Selander worked on this document as part of
the CelticPlus project CyberWI, with funding from Vinnova.
Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-04
o Addressed additional WGLC comments by Jim Schaad and Roman
Danyliw.
-03
o Addressed review comments by Jim Schaad, see https://www.ietf.org/
mail-archive/web/ace/current/msg02798.html
o Removed unnecessary sentence in the introduction regarding the use
any strings that could be case-sensitive.
o Clarified the terms Presenter and Recipient.
o Clarified text about the confirmation claim.
-02
o Changed "typically" to "often" when describing ways of performing
proof of possession.
o Changed b64 to hex encoding in an example.
o Changed to using the RFC 8174 boilerplate instead of the RFC 2119
boilerplate.
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-01
o Now uses CBOR diagnostic notation for the examples.
o Added a table summarizing the "cnf" names, keys, and value types.
o Addressed some of Jim Schaad's feedback on -00.
-00
o Created the initial working group draft from draft-jones-ace-cwt-
proof-of-possession-01.
Authors' Addresses
Michael B. Jones
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/
Ludwig Seitz
RISE SICS
Scheelevaegen 17
Lund 223 70
Sweden
Email: ludwig@ri.se
Goeran Selander
Ericsson AB
Faeroegatan 6
Kista 164 80
Sweden
Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com
Samuel Erdtman
Spotify
Email: erdtman@spotify.com
Jones, et al. Expires May 10, 2019 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Proof-of-Possession Key for CWTs November 2018
Hannes Tschofenig
ARM Ltd.
Hall in Tirol 6060
Austria
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com
Jones, et al. Expires May 10, 2019 [Page 15]
