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Versions: (draft-btw-add-home) 00 01 02 03 04 05         Standards Track
          06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13                                       
ADD                                                    M. Boucadair, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                    Orange
Intended status: Standards Track                           T. Reddy, Ed.
Expires: 9 January 2023                                           Akamai
                                                                 D. Wing
                                                                  Citrix
                                                                 N. Cook
                                                            Open-Xchange
                                                               T. Jensen
                                                               Microsoft
                                                             8 July 2022


  DHCP and Router Advertisement Options for the Discovery of Network-
                       designated Resolvers (DNR)
                         draft-ietf-add-dnr-10

Abstract

   The document specifies new DHCP and IPv6 Router Advertisement options
   to discover encrypted DNS resolvers (e.g., DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-
   TLS, DNS-over-QUIC).  Particularly, it allows a host to learn an
   authentication domain name together with a list of IP addresses and a
   set of service parameters to reach such encrypted DNS resolvers.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 9 January 2023.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.





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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Configuration Data for Encrypted DNS  . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.1.  ADN as the Reference Identifier for DNS
               Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.2.  Avoiding Dependency on External Resolvers . . . . . .   4
       3.1.3.  Single vs. Multiple IP Addresses  . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.4.  Why Not Separate Options for ADN and IP Addresses?  .   5
       3.1.5.  Service Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.6.  ADN Only Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.7.  Encrypted DNS Options Ordering  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.8.  DNR Validation Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.9.  Recommended DNR Information . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Handling Configuration Data Conflicts . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Connection Establishment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.4.  Multihoming Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  DHCPv6 Encrypted DNS Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Option Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  DHCPv6 Client Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  DHCPv4 Encrypted DNS Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Option Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  DHCPv4 Client Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  IPv6 RA Encrypted DNS Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  Option Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.2.  IPv6 Host Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.1.  Spoofing Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.2.  Deletion Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.3.  Passive Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.4.  Wireless Security - Authentication Attacks  . . . . . . .  17
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.1.  DHCPv6 Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.2.  DHCPv4 Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     8.3.  Neighbor Discovery Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   10. Contributing Authors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19



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   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23

1.  Introduction

   This document focuses on the support of encrypted DNS such as DNS-
   over-HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484], DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [RFC7858], or DNS-
   over-QUIC (DoQ) [RFC9250] in local networks.

   In particular, the document specifies how a local encrypted DNS
   resolver can be discovered by connected hosts by means of DHCPv4
   [RFC2132], DHCPv6 [RFC8415], and IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA)
   [RFC4861] options.  These options are designed to convey the
   following information: the DNS Authentication Domain Name (ADN), a
   list of IP addresses, and a set of service parameters.  This
   procedure is called Discovery of Network-designated Resolvers (DNR).

   The options defined in this document can be deployed in a variety of
   deployments (e.g., local networks with Customer Premises Equipment
   (CPEs) that may or may not be managed by an Internet Service Provider
   (ISP), or local networks with or without DNS forwarders).  It is out
   of the scope of this document to provide an inventory of such
   deployments.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document makes use of the terms defined in [RFC8499].  The
   following additional terms are used:

   Do53:  refers to unencrypted DNS.

   DNR:  refers to the Discovery of Network-designated Resolvers
      procedure.

   Encrypted DNS:  refers to a scheme where DNS exchanges are
      transported over an encrypted channel.  Examples of encrypted DNS
      are DoT, DoH, or DoQ.

   Encrypted DNS resolver:  refers to a DNS resolver that supports any
      encrypted DNS scheme.



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   Encrypted DNS options:  refers to the options defined in Sections 4,
      5, and 6.

   DHCP:  refers to both DHCPv4 and DHCPv6.

3.  Overview

   This document describes how a DNS client can discover local encrypted
   DNS resolvers using DHCP (Sections 4 and 5) and Neighbor Discovery
   protocol (Section 6): Encrypted DNS options.

   These options configure an authentication domain name, a list of IP
   addresses, and a set of service parameters of the encrypted DNS
   resolver.  More information about the design of these options is
   provided in the following subsections.

3.1.  Configuration Data for Encrypted DNS


3.1.1.  ADN as the Reference Identifier for DNS Authentication

   In order to allow for PKIX-based authentication between a DNS client
   and an encrypted DNS resolver, the Encrypted DNS options are designed
   to include an authentication domain name.  This ADN is presented as a
   reference identifier for DNS authentication purposes.  This design
   accommodates the current best practices for issuing certificates as
   per Section 1.7.2 of [RFC6125]:

      |  Some certification authorities issue server certificates based
      |  on IP addresses, but preliminary evidence indicates that such
      |  certificates are a very small percentage (less than 1%) of
      |  issued certificates.

3.1.2.  Avoiding Dependency on External Resolvers

   To avoid adding a dependency on another server to resolve the ADN,
   the Encrypted DNS options return the IP address(es) to locate the
   encrypted DNS resolver.  These encrypted DNS resolvers may be hosted
   on the same or distinct IP addresses.  Such a decision is deployment
   specific.

   In order to optimize the size of discovery messages when all DNS
   resolvers terminate on the same IP address, early versions of this
   document considered relying upon the discovery mechanisms specified
   in [RFC2132][RFC3646][RFC8106] to retrieve a list of IP addresses to
   reach their DNS resolvers.  Nevertheless, this approach requires a
   client that supports more than one encrypted DNS protocol (e.g., DoH
   and DoT) to probe that list of IP addresses.  To avoid such a



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   probing, the options defined in Sections 4, 5, and 6 associate an
   encrypted DNS protocol with an IP address.  No probing is required in
   such a design.

3.1.3.  Single vs. Multiple IP Addresses

   A list of IP addresses to reach an encrypted DNS resolver may be
   returned in an Encrypted DNS option to accommodate current
   deployments relying upon primary and backup resolvers.  Also, DNR can
   be used in contexts where other DNS redundancy schemes (e.g., anycast
   as in BCP 126 [RFC4786]) are used.

   Whether one or more IP addresses are returned in an Encrypted DNS
   option is deployment specific.  For example, a router embedding a
   recursive server or a forwarder has to include one single IP address
   pointing to one of its LAN-facing interfaces.  Typically, this IP
   address can be a private IPv4 address, a link-local address, a Unique
   Local IPv6 unicast Address (ULA), or a Global Unicast Address (GUA).

   If multiple IP addresses are to be returned in an Encrypted DNS
   option, these addresses are ordered in the preference for use by the
   client.

3.1.4.  Why Not Separate Options for ADN and IP Addresses?

   A single option is used to convey both the ADN and IP addresses
   because otherwise means to correlate an IP address conveyed in an
   option with an ADN conveyed in another option will be required if,
   for example, more than one ADN is supported by the network.

3.1.5.  Service Parameters

   Because distinct encrypted DNS protocols (e.g., DoT, DoH, and DoQ)
   may be provisioned by a network and that some of these protocols may
   make use of customized port numbers instead of default ones, the
   Encrypted DNS options are designed to return a set of service
   parameters.  These parameters are encoded following the same rules
   for encoding SvcParams in Section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].
   This encoding approach may increase the size of the options but it
   has the merit relying upon an existing IANA registry and, thus,
   accommodating new encrypted DNS protocols and service parameters that
   may be defined in the future.

   The following service parameters MUST be supported by a DNR
   implementation:

   alpn:  Used to indicate the set of supported protocols (Section 7.1
      of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https]).



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   port:  Used to indicate the target port number for the encrypted DNS
      connection (Section 7.2 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https]).

   In addition, the following service parameters are RECOMMENDED to be
   supported by a DNR implementation:

   ech:  Used to enable Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) (Section 7.3 of
      [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https]).

   dohpath:  Used to supply a relative DoH URI Template (Section 5.1 of
      [I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns]).


3.1.6.  ADN Only Mode

   The provisioning mode in which an ADN, a list of IP addresses, and a
   set of service parameters of the encrypted DNS resolver are supplied
   to a host SHOULD be used because the Encrypted DNS options are self-
   contained and do not require any additional DNS queries.  The reader
   may refer to [RFC7969] for an overview of advanced capabilities that
   are supported by DHCP servers to populate configuration data (e.g.,
   issue DNS queries).

   In contexts where putting additional complexity on requesting hosts
   is acceptable, returning an ADN only can be considered.  The supplied
   ADN will be processed by a host following the procedure in Section 5
   of [I-D.ietf-add-ddr].  Note that this mode may be subject to active
   attacks, which can be mitigated by DNSSEC.

3.1.7.  Encrypted DNS Options Ordering

   The DHCP options defined in Sections 4 and 5 follow the option
   ordering guidelines in Section 17 of [RFC7227].

   Likewise, the RA option (Section 6) adheres to the recommendations in
   Section 9 of [RFC4861].

3.1.8.  DNR Validation Checks

   On receipt of an Encrypted DNS option, the client makes the following
   validation checks:

   *  The ADN is encoded as per Section 10 of [RFC8415].

   *  If additional data is supplied:

      -  the service parameters are encoded following the rules
         specified in Section 2.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].



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      -  the option includes at least one valid IP address and the
         "alpn" service parameter.

      -  the service parameters do not include "ipv4hint" or "ipv6hint"
         service parameters.

   If the checks fail, the receiver discards the received Encrypted DNS
   option(s).

3.1.9.  Recommended DNR Information

   Other mechanisms may be considered in other contexts (e.g., secure
   discovery) for the provisioning of encrypted DNS resolvers.  It is
   RECOMMENDED that at least the following DNR information is made
   available to a requesting host:

   *  A service priority whenever the discovery mechanism does not rely
      on implicit ordering if multiple instances of the encrypted DNS
      are used.

   *  An authentication domain name.

   *  A list of IP addresses to locate the encrypted DNS resolver.

   *  A set of service parameters.

3.2.  Handling Configuration Data Conflicts

   If the encrypted DNS is discovered by a host using both RA and DHCP,
   the rules discussed in Section 5.3.1 of [RFC8106] MUST be followed.

   DHCP/RA options to discover encrypted DNS resolvers (including, DoH
   URI Templates) takes precedence over Discovery of Designated
   Resolvers (DDR) [I-D.ietf-add-ddr] since DDR uses Do53 to an external
   DNS resolver, which is susceptible to both internal and external
   attacks whereas DHCP/RA is typically protected using the mechanisms
   discussed in Section 7.1.

3.3.  Connection Establishment

   If the local DNS client supports one of the discovered Encrypted DNS
   protocols identified by Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)
   protocol identifiers, the DNS client establishes an encrypted DNS
   session following the order of the discovered resolvers.

   The DNS client verifies the connection based on PKIX validation
   [RFC5280] of the DNS resolver certificate and uses the validation
   techniques as described in [RFC6125] to compare the authentication



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   domain name conveyed in the Encrypted DNS options to the certificate
   provided (see Section 8.1 of [RFC8310] for more details).  The DNS
   client uses Web PKI trust anchors by default unless configured
   otherwise to use explicit trust anchors.  ALPN-related considerations
   can be found in Section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].

3.4.  Multihoming Considerations

   Devices may be connected to multiple networks; each providing their
   own DNS configuration using the discovery mechanisms specified in
   this document.  Nevertheless, it is out of the scope of this
   specification to discuss DNS selection of multi-interface devices.
   The reader may refer to [RFC6731] for a discussion of issues and an
   example of DNS resolver selection for multi-interfaced devices.

4.  DHCPv6 Encrypted DNS Option


4.1.  Option Format

   The format of the DHCPv6 Encrypted DNS option is shown in Figure 1.

    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |       OPTION_V6_DNR           |         Option-length         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |       Service Priority        |         ADN Length            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                   authentication-domain-name                  ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |         Addr Length           |                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
   ~                        ipv6-address(es)                       ~
   |                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                               |                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
   ~                 Service Parameters (SvcParams)                ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                   Figure 1: DHCPv6 Encrypted DNS Option

   The fields of the option shown in Figure 1 are as follows:

   Option-code:  OPTION_V6_DNR (TBA1, see Section 8.1)

   Option-length:  Length of the enclosed data in octets.  The option
      length is ('ADN Length' + 4) when only an ADN is included in the
      option.



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   Service Priority:  The priority of this OPTION_V6_DNR instance
      compared to other instances.  This field is encoded following the
      rules specified in Section 2.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].

   ADN Length:  Length of the authentication-domain-name field in
      octets.

   authentication-domain-name (variable length):  A fully qualified
      domain name of the encrypted DNS resolver.  This field is
      formatted as specified in Section 10 of [RFC8415].

      An example of the authentication-domain-name encoding is shown in
      Figure 2.  This example conveys the FQDN "doh1.example.com.", and
      the resulting Option-length field is 18.

       +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
       | 0x04 |   d  |   o  |   h  |  1   | 0x07 |   e  |   x  |   a  |
       +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
       |   m  |   p  |   l  |   e  | 0x03 |   c  |   o  |   m  | 0x00 |
       +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+

          Figure 2: An Example of the DNS authentication-domain-name
                                   Encoding

   Addr Length:  Length of enclosed IPv6 addresses in octets.  When
      present, it MUST be a multiple of 16.

   ipv6-address(es) (variable length):  Indicates one or more IPv6
      addresses to reach the encrypted DNS resolver.  An address can be
      link-local, ULA, or GUA.  The format of this field is shown in
      Figure 3.

      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                                               |
      |                         ipv6-address                          |
      |                                                               |
      |                                                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                              ...                              |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                 Figure 3: Format of the IPv6 Addresses Field

   Service Parameters (SvcParams) (variable length):  Specifies a set of
      service parameters that are encoded following the rules in
      Section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].  Service parameters
      may include, for example, a list of ALPN protocol identifiers or
      alternate port numbers.  This field MUST include at least "alpn"



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      SvcParam (Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns]).  The service
      parameters MUST NOT include "ipv4hint" or "ipv6hint" SvcParams as
      they are superseded by the included IP addresses.

      If no port service parameter is included, this indicates that
      default port numbers should be used.  As a reminder, the default
      port number is 853 for DoT, 443 for DoH, and 853 for DoQ.

      The length of this field is ('Option-length' - 6 - 'ADN Length' -
      'Addr Length').


4.2.  DHCPv6 Client Behavior

   To discover an encrypted DNS resolver, the DHCPv6 client MUST include
   OPTION_V6_DNR in an Option Request Option (ORO), as in Sections
   18.2.1, 18.2.2, 18.2.4, 18.2.5, 18.2.6, and 21.7 of [RFC8415].

   The DHCPv6 client MUST be prepared to receive multiple instances of
   the OPTION_V6_DNR option; each option is to be treated as a separate
   encrypted DNS resolver.  These instances SHOULD be processed
   following their service priority (i.e., smaller service priority
   indicates a higher preference).

   The DHCPv6 client MUST silently discard any OPTION_V6_DNR that fails
   to pass the validation steps defined in Section 3.1.8.

   The DHCPv6 client MUST silently discard multicast and host loopback
   addresses conveyed in OPTION_V6_DNR.

5.  DHCPv4 Encrypted DNS Option

5.1.  Option Format

   The format of the DHCPv4 Encrypted DNS option is illustrated in
   Figure 4.

                 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                |     TBA2      |     Length    |
                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                ~      DNR Instance Data #1     ~
                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   ---
                .              ...              .    |
                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ optional
                ~      DNR Instance Data #n     ~    |
                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   ---




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                   Figure 4: DHCPv4 Encrypted DNS Option

   The fields of the option shown in Figure 4 are as follows:

   Code:  OPTION_V4_DNR (TBA2, see Section 8.2).

   Length:  Indicates the length of the enclosed data in octets.

   DNR Instance Data:  Includes the configuration data of an encrypted
      DNS resolver.  The format of this field is shown in Figure 5.

                       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                      |    DNR Instance Data Length   |
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                      |       Service Priority        |
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                      |   ADN Length  |               |
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+               |
                      ~  authentication-domain-name   ~
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                      |  Addr Length  |               |
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+               |
                      ~        IPv4 Address(es)       ~
                      |               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                      |               |               |
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+               |
                      ~Service Parameters (SvcParams) ~
                      |                               |
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                      Figure 5: DNR Instance Data Format

      When several encrypted DNS resolvers are to be included, the "DNR
      Instance Data" field is repeated.

   The fields shown in Figure 5 are as follows:

   DNR Instance Data Length:  Length of all following data in octets.
      This field is set to ('ADN Length' + 3) when only an ADN is
      provided for a DNR instance.

   Service Priority:  The priority of this instance compared to other
      DNR instances.  This field is encoded following the rules
      specified in Section 2.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].

   ADN Length:  Length of the authentication-domain-name in octets.




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   authentication-domain-name (variable length):  The authentication
      domain name of the encrypted DNS resolver.  This field is
      formatted as specified in Section 10 of [RFC8415].  An example is
      provided in Figure 2.

   Addr Length:  Length of included IPv4 addresses in octets.  When
      present, it MUST be a multiple of 4.

   IPv4 Address(es) (variable length):  Indicates one or more IPv4
      addresses to reach the encrypted DNS resolver.  Both private and
      public IPv4 addresses can be included in this field.  The format
      of this field is shown in Figure 6.  This format assumes that an
      IPv4 address is encoded as a1.a2.a3.a4.

                 0     8     16    24    32    40    48
                 +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+--
                 |  a1 |  a2 |  a3 |  a4 |  a1 |  a2 | ...
                 +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+--
                   IPv4 Address 1          IPv4 Address 2 ...

                 Figure 6: Format of the IPv4 Addresses Field

   Service Parameters (SvcParams) (variable length):  Specifies a set of
      service parameters that are encoded following the rules in
      Section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].  Service parameters
      may include, for example, a list of ALPN protocol identifiers or
      alternate port numbers.  This field MUST include at least "alpn"
      SvcParam (Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns]).  The service
      parameters MUST NOT include "ipv4hint" or "ipv6hint" SvcParams as
      they are superseded by the included IP addresses.

      If no port service parameter is included, this indicates that
      default port numbers should be used.

      The length of this field is ('DNR Instance Data Length' - 4 - 'ADN
      Length' - 'Addr Length').

   OPTION_V4_DNR is a concatenation-requiring option.  As such, the
   mechanism specified in [RFC3396] MUST be used if OPTION_V4_DNR
   exceeds the maximum DHCPv4 option size of 255 octets.

5.2.  DHCPv4 Client Behavior

   To discover an encrypted DNS resolver, the DHCPv4 client requests the
   encrypted DNS resolver by including OPTION_V4_DNR in a Parameter
   Request List option [RFC2132].





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   The DHCPv4 client MUST be prepared to receive multiple DNR instance
   data in the OPTION_V4_DNR option; each instance is to be treated as a
   separate encrypted DNS resolver.  These instances SHOULD be processed
   following their service priority (i.e., smaller service priority
   indicates a higher preference).

   The DHCPv4 client MUST silently discard any OPTION_V4_DNR that fails
   to pass the validation steps defined in Section 3.1.8.

   The DHCPv4 client MUST silently discard multicast and host loopback
   addresses conveyed in OPTION_V4_DNR.

6.  IPv6 RA Encrypted DNS Option


6.1.  Option Format

   This section defines a new Neighbor Discovery option [RFC4861]: IPv6
   RA Encrypted DNS option.  This option is useful in contexts similar
   to those discussed in Section 1.1 of [RFC8106].

   The format of the IPv6 RA Encrypted DNS option is illustrated in
   Figure 7.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     TBA3      |     Length    |        Service Priority       |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                           Lifetime                            |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |          ADN Length           |                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
     ~                   authentication-domain-name                  ~
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |         Addr Length           |                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
     ~                        ipv6-address(es)                       ~
     |                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               |     SvcParams Length          |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     ~                 Service Parameters (SvcParams)                ~
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                     Figure 7: RA Encrypted DNS Option

   The fields of the option shown in Figure 7 are as follows:




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   Type:  8-bit identifier of the Encrypted DNS option as assigned by
      IANA (TBA3, see Section 8.3).

   Length:  8-bit unsigned integer.  The length of the option (including
      the Type and Length fields) is in units of 8 octets.

   Service Priority:  The priority of this Encrypted DNS option instance
      compared to other instances.  This field is encoded following the
      rules specified in Section 2.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].

   Lifetime:  32-bit unsigned integer.  The maximum time in seconds
      (relative to the time the packet is received) over which the
      discovered Authentication Domain Name is valid.

      The value of Lifetime SHOULD by default be at least 3 *
      MaxRtrAdvInterval, where MaxRtrAdvInterval is the maximum RA
      interval as defined in [RFC4861].

      A value of all one bits (0xffffffff) represents infinity.

      A value of zero means that this Authentication Domain Name MUST no
      longer be used.

   ADN Length:  16-bit unsigned integer.  This field indicates the
      length of the authentication-domain-name field in octets.

   authentication-domain-name (variable length):  The authentication
      domain name of the encrypted DNS resolver.  This field is
      formatted as specified in Section 10 of [RFC8415].

   Addr Length:  16-bit unsigned integer.  This field indicates the
      length of enclosed IPv6 addresses in octets.  When present, it
      MUST be a multiple of 16.

   ipv6-address(es) (variable length):  One or more IPv6 addresses of
      the encrypted DNS resolver.  An address can be link-local, ULA, or
      GUA.

      All of the addresses share the same Lifetime value.  Similar to
      [RFC8106], if it is desirable to have different Lifetime values
      per IP address, multiple Encrypted DNS options may be used.

      The format of this field is shown in Figure 3.

   SvcParams Length:  16-bit unsigned integer.  This field indicates the
      length of the Service Parameters field in octets.

   Service Parameters (SvcParams) (variable length):  Specifies a set of



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      service parameters that are encoded following the rules in
      Section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].  Service parameters
      may include, for example, a list of ALPN protocol identifiers or
      alternate port numbers.  This field MUST include at least "alpn"
      SvcParam (Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns]).  The service
      parameters MUST NOT include "ipv4hint" or "ipv6hint" SvcParams as
      they are superseded by the included IP addresses.

      If no port service parameter is included, this indicates that
      default port numbers should be used.

   The option MUST be padded with zeros so that the full enclosed data
   is a multiple of 8 octets (Section 4.6 of [RFC4861]).

6.2.  IPv6 Host Behavior

   The procedure for DNS configuration is the same as it is with any
   other Neighbor Discovery option [RFC4861].  In addition, the host
   follows the same procedure as the one described in Section 5.3.1 of
   [RFC8106] for processing received Encrypted DNS options with the
   formatting requirements in Section 6.1 and validation checks in
   Section 3.1.8 substituted for the length and fields validation.

   The host MUST be prepared to receive multiple Encrypted DNS options
   in RAs.  These instances SHOULD be processed following their service
   priority (i.e., smaller service priority indicates a higher
   preference).

   The host MUST silently discard multicast and host loopback addresses
   conveyed in the Encrypted DNS options.

7.  Security Considerations

7.1.  Spoofing Attacks

   DHCP/RA messages are not encrypted or protected against modification
   within the LAN.  Unless mitigated (described below), the content of
   DHCP and RA messages can be spoofed or modified by active attackers,
   such as compromised devices within the local network.  An active
   attacker (Section 3.3 of [RFC3552]) can spoof the DHCP/RA response to
   provide the attacker's encrypted DNS resolver.  Note that such an
   attacker can launch other attacks as discussed in Section 22 of
   [RFC8415].  The attacker can get a domain name with a domain-
   validated public certificate from a CA and host an encrypted DNS
   resolver.






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   Attacks of spoofed or modified DHCP responses and RA messages by
   attackers within the local network may be mitigated by making use of
   the following mechanisms:

   *  DHCPv6-Shield [RFC7610]: the router (e.g., a border router, a CPE)
      discards DHCP response messages received from any local endpoint.

   *  RA-Guard [RFC7113]: the router discards RAs messages received from
      any local endpoint.

   *  Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) solution for DHCP
      [RFC7513]: the router filters packets with forged source IP
      addresses.

   The above mechanisms would ensure that the endpoint receives the
   correct configuration information of the encrypted DNS resolvers
   selected by the DHCP server (or RA sender), but cannot provide any
   information about the DHCP server or the entity hosting the DHCP
   server (or RA sender) .

   Encrypted DNS sessions with rogue resolvers that spoof the IP address
   of a DNS resolver will fail because the DNS client will fail to
   authenticate that rogue resolver based upon PKIX authentication
   [RFC6125], particularly the authentication domain name in the
   Encrypted DNS Option.  DNS clients that ignore authentication
   failures and accept spoofed certificates will be subject to attacks
   (e.g., redirect to malicious resolvers, intercept sensitive data).

   By default, Encrypted DNS connections received from outside the local
   network MUST be discarded by the encrypted DNS forwarder in a CPE.
   This behavior adheres to REQ#8 in [RFC6092]; it MUST apply for both
   IPv4 and IPv6.  This recommendation is meant to isolate local network
   DNS resolver services from the public Internet and prevent external
   attacks against the local Encrypted DNS resolver.

7.2.  Deletion Attacks

   If the DHCP responses or RAs are dropped by the attacker, the client
   can fallback to use a preconfigured encrypted DNS resolver.  However,
   the use of policies to select resolvers is out of the scope of this
   document.

   Note that deletion attack is not specific to DHCP/RA.








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7.3.  Passive Attacks

   A passive attacker (Section 3.2 of [RFC3552]) can identify a host is
   using DHCP/RA to discover an encrypted DNS resolver and can infer
   that host is capable of using DoH/DoT/DoQ to encrypt DNS messages.
   However, a passive attacker cannot spoof or modify DHCP/RA messages.

7.4.  Wireless Security - Authentication Attacks

   Wireless LAN (WLAN) as frequently deployed in local networks (e.g.,
   home networks) is vulnerable to various attacks (e.g., [Evil-Twin],
   [Krack], [Dragonblood]).  Because of these attacks, only
   cryptographically authenticated communications are trusted on WLANs.
   This means that an information (e.g., NTP server, DNS resolver,
   domain search list) provided by such networks via DHCP, DHCPv6, or RA
   are untrusted because DHCP and RA messages are not authenticated.

   If the pre-shared key (PSK) is the same for all clients that connect
   to the same WLAN (e.g., WPA-PSK), the shared key will be available to
   all nodes, including attackers.  As such, it is possible to mount an
   active on-path attack.  On-path attacks are possible within local
   networks because such a WLAN authentication lacks peer entity
   authentication.

   This leads to the need for provisioning unique credentials for
   different clients.  Endpoints can be provisioned with unique
   credentials (username and password, typically) provided by the local
   network administrator to mutually authenticate to the local WLAN
   Access Point (e.g., 802.1x Wireless User Authentication on OpenWRT
   [dot1x], EAP-pwd [RFC8146]).  Not all endpoint devices (e.g., IoT
   devices) support 802.1x supplicant and need an alternate mechanism to
   connect to the local network.  To address this limitation, unique
   pre-shared keys can be created for each such devices and WPA-PSK is
   used (e.g., [IPSK]).

8.  IANA Considerations


8.1.  DHCPv6 Option

   IANA is requested to assign the following new DHCPv6 Option Code in
   the registry maintained in [DHCPV6].









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    +=======+===============+============+===========+================+
    | Value | Description   | Client ORO | Singleton | Reference      |
    |       |               |            | Option    |                |
    +=======+===============+============+===========+================+
    | TBA1  | OPTION_V6_DNR | Yes        | No        | [ThisDocument] |
    +-------+---------------+------------+-----------+----------------+

                    Table 1: DHCPv6 Encrypted DNS Option


8.2.  DHCPv4 Option

   IANA is requested to assign the following new DHCP Option Code in the
   registry maintained in [BOOTP].

   +======+===============+=============+============+================+
   | Tag  | Name          | Data Length | Meaning    | Reference      |
   +======+===============+=============+============+================+
   | TBA2 | OPTION_V4_DNR | N           | Encrypted  | [ThisDocument] |
   |      |               |             | DNS Server |                |
   +------+---------------+-------------+------------+----------------+

                   Table 2: DHCPv4 Encrypted DNS Option

8.3.  Neighbor Discovery Option

   IANA is requested to assign the following new IPv6 Neighbor Discovery
   Option type in the "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Option Formats" sub-
   registry under the "Internet Control Message Protocol version 6
   (ICMPv6) Parameters" registry maintained in [ND].

             +======+======================+================+
             | Type | Description          | Reference      |
             +======+======================+================+
             | TBA3 | Encrypted DNS Option | [ThisDocument] |
             +------+----------------------+----------------+

             Table 3: Neighbor Discovery Encrypted DNS Option



9.  Acknowledgements

   Many thanks to Christian Jacquenet and Michael Richardson for the
   review.

   Thanks to Stephen Farrell, Martin Thomson, Vittorio Bertola, Stephane
   Bortzmeyer, Ben Schwartz, Iain Sharp, and Chris Box for the comments.



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   Thanks to Mark Nottingham for the feedback on HTTP redirection that
   was discussed in previous versions of this specification.

   The use of DHCP to retrieve an authentication domain name was
   discussed in Section 7.3.1 of [RFC8310] and
   [I-D.pusateri-dhc-dns-driu].

   Thanks to Bernie Volz for the review of the DHCP part.

   Thanks to Andrew Campling for the Shepherd review and Eric Vyncke for
   the AD review.

   Thanks to Rich Salz for the secdir review.

10.  Contributing Authors


   Nicolai Leymann
   Deutsche Telekom
   Germany
   Email: n.leymann@telekom.de


   Zhiwei Yan
   CNNIC
   No.4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
   Beijing
   100190
   China
   Email: yan@cnnic.cn


11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns]
              Schwartz, B., "Service Binding Mapping for DNS Servers",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-add-svcb-dns-
              06, 5 July 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
              ietf-add-svcb-dns-06.txt>.










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   [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https]
              Schwartz, B., Bishop, M., and E. Nygren, "Service binding
              and parameter specification via the DNS (DNS SVCB and
              HTTPS RRs)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              dnsop-svcb-https-10, 24 May 2022,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-
              https-10.txt>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2132]  Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor
              Extensions", RFC 2132, DOI 10.17487/RFC2132, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2132>.

   [RFC3396]  Lemon, T. and S. Cheshire, "Encoding Long Options in the
              Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4)", RFC 3396,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3396, November 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3396>.

   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.

   [RFC8106]  Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli,
              "IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration",
              RFC 8106, DOI 10.17487/RFC8106, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8106>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8415]  Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
              Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
              "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
              RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [BOOTP]    "BOOTP Vendor Extensions and DHCP Options",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-dhcp-parameters/
              bootp-dhcp-parameters.xhtml#options>.




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   [DHCPV6]   "DHCPv6 Option Codes", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/
              dhcpv6-parameters/dhcpv6-parameters.xhtml#dhcpv6-
              parameters-2>.

   [dot1x]    Cisco, "Basic 802.1x Wireless User Authentication",
              <https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/network/wifi/
              wireless.security.8021x>.

   [Dragonblood]
              The Unicode Consortium, "Dragonblood: Analyzing the
              Dragonfly Handshake of WPA3 and EAP-pwd",
              <https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/dragonblood.pdf>.

   [Evil-Twin]
              The Unicode Consortium, "Evil twin (wireless networks)",
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
              Evil_twin_(wireless_networks)>.

   [I-D.ietf-add-ddr]
              Pauly, T., Kinnear, E., Wood, C. A., McManus, P., and T.
              Jensen, "Discovery of Designated Resolvers", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-add-ddr-08, 5 July
              2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-add-ddr-
              08.txt>.

   [I-D.pusateri-dhc-dns-driu]
              Pusateri, T. and W. Toorop, "DHCPv6 Options for private
              DNS Discovery", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              pusateri-dhc-dns-driu-00, 2 July 2018,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-pusateri-dhc-dns-
              driu-00.txt>.

   [IPSK]     Cisco, "Identity PSK Feature Deployment Guide",
              <https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/wireless/
              controller/technotes/8-5/
              b_Identity_PSK_Feature_Deployment_Guide.html>.

   [Krack]    The Unicode Consortium, "Key Reinstallation Attacks",
              2017, <https://www.krackattacks.com/>.

   [ND]       "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Option Formats",
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/icmpv6-parameters/
              icmpv6-parameters.xhtml#icmpv6-parameters-5>.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.



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   [RFC3646]  Droms, R., Ed., "DNS Configuration options for Dynamic
              Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3646,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3646, December 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3646>.

   [RFC4786]  Abley, J. and K. Lindqvist, "Operation of Anycast
              Services", BCP 126, RFC 4786, DOI 10.17487/RFC4786,
              December 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4786>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6092]  Woodyatt, J., Ed., "Recommended Simple Security
              Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for
              Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service", RFC 6092,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6092, January 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6092>.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
              2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.

   [RFC6731]  Savolainen, T., Kato, J., and T. Lemon, "Improved
              Recursive DNS Server Selection for Multi-Interfaced
              Nodes", RFC 6731, DOI 10.17487/RFC6731, December 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6731>.

   [RFC7113]  Gont, F., "Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router
              Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)", RFC 7113,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7113, February 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7113>.

   [RFC7227]  Hankins, D., Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Jiang, S., and
              S. Krishnan, "Guidelines for Creating New DHCPv6 Options",
              BCP 187, RFC 7227, DOI 10.17487/RFC7227, May 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7227>.

   [RFC7513]  Bi, J., Wu, J., Yao, G., and F. Baker, "Source Address
              Validation Improvement (SAVI) Solution for DHCP",
              RFC 7513, DOI 10.17487/RFC7513, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7513>.




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   [RFC7610]  Gont, F., Liu, W., and G. Van de Velde, "DHCPv6-Shield:
              Protecting against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers", BCP 199,
              RFC 7610, DOI 10.17487/RFC7610, August 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7610>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC7969]  Lemon, T. and T. Mrugalski, "Customizing DHCP
              Configuration on the Basis of Network Topology", RFC 7969,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7969, October 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7969>.

   [RFC8146]  Harkins, D., "Adding Support for Salted Password Databases
              to EAP-pwd", RFC 8146, DOI 10.17487/RFC8146, April 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8146>.

   [RFC8310]  Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles
              for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8310>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.

   [RFC8499]  Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
              Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
              January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.

   [RFC9250]  Huitema, C., Dickinson, S., and A. Mankin, "DNS over
              Dedicated QUIC Connections", RFC 9250,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9250, May 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9250>.

Authors' Addresses

   Mohamed Boucadair (editor)
   Orange
   35000 Rennes
   France
   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com







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   Tirumaleswar Reddy (editor)
   Akamai
   Embassy Golf Link Business Park
   Bangalore 560071
   Karnataka
   India
   Email: kondtir@gmail.com


   Dan Wing
   Citrix Systems, Inc.
   United States of America
   Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com


   Neil Cook
   Open-Xchange
   United Kingdom
   Email: neil.cook@noware.co.uk


   Tommy Jensen
   Microsoft
   United States of America
   Email: tojens@microsoft.com


























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