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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 rfc1928                                     
Socks Protocol Version 5
Expires: In Six Months                                                 M. Leech
<draft-ietf-aft-socks-protocol-v5-02.txt>                              M. Ganis
                                                                       Y. Lee
                                                                       R. Kuris
                                                                       D. Koblas
                                                                       L. Jones

                        SOCKS Protocol Version 5

Status of this Memo

     This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
     documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
     and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
     working documents as Internet-Drafts.

     Internet-Drafts are draft document valid for a maximum of six
     months and may be updated, replaced or obsoleted by other documents
     at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
     reference material or to cite them other than as "work in

     To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the
     "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow
     Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net
     (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific


     This memo describes a protocol that is an evolution of the previous
     version of the protocol, version 4 [1]. This new protocol stems
     from active discussions and prototype implementations.  The key
     contributors are: Marcus Leech: Bell-Northern Research, David
     Koblas: Independent Consultant, Ying-Da Lee: NEC Systems
     Laboratory, LaMont Jones: Hewlett-Packard Company, Ron Kuris: Unify
     Corporation, Matt Ganis: International Business Machines.

1.  Introduction

     The use of network firewalls, systems that effectively isolate an
     organizations internal network structure from an exterior network,
     such as the INTERNET is becoming increasingly popular.  These
     firewall systems typically act as application-layer gateways
     between networks, usually offering controlled TELNET, FTP, and SMTP

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     access.  With the emergence of more sophisticated application layer
     protocols designed to facilitate global information discovery,
     there exists a need to provide a general framework for these
     protocols to transparently and securely traverse a firewall.

     There exists, also, a need for strong authentication of such
     traversal in as fine-grained a manner as is practical. This
     requirement stems from the realization that client-server
     relationships emerge between the networks of various organizations,
     and that such relationships need to be controlled and often
     strongly authenticated.

     The protocol described here is designed to provide a framework for
     client-server applications in both the TCP and UDP domains to
     conveniently and securely use the services of a network firewall.
     The protocol is conceptually a "shim-layer" between the application
     layer and the transport layer, and as such does not provide
     network-layer gateway services, such as forwarding of ICMP

2.  Existing practice

     There currently exists a protocol, SOCKS Version 4, that provides
     for unsecured firewall traversal for TCP-based client-server
     applications, including TELNET, FTP and the popular information-
     discovery protocols such as HTTP, WAIS and GOPHER.

     This new protocol extends the SOCKS Version 4 model to include UDP,
     and extends the framework to include provisions for generalized
     strong authentication schemes, and extends the addressing scheme to
     encompass domain-name and V6 IP addresses.

     The implementation of the SOCKS protocol typically involves the
     recompilation or relinking of TCP-based client applications to use
     the appropriate encapsulation routines in the SOCKS library.

3.  Procedure for TCP-based clients

     When a TCP-based client wishes to establish a connection to an
     object that is reachable only via a firewall (such determination is
     left up to the implementation), it must open a TCP connection to
     the appropriate SOCKS port on the SOCKS server system.  The SOCKS
     service is conventionally located on TCP port 1080.  If the
     connection request succeeds, the client enters a negotiation for
     the authentication method to be used, authenticates with the chosen
     method, then sends a relay request.  The SOCKS server evaluates the
     request, and either establishes the appropriate connection or

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     denies it.

     The client connects to the server, and sends a version
     identifier/method selection message:

                   |VER | NMETHODS | METHODS  |
                   | 1  |    1     | 1 to 255 |

     The VER field is set to X'05' for this version of the
     protocol.  The NMETHODS field contains the number of
     method identifier octets that appear in the METHODS

     The server selects from one of the methods given in
     METHODS, and sends a METHOD selection message:

                         |VER | METHOD |
                         | 1  |   1    |

     If the selected METHOD is X'FF', none of the methods
     listed by the client are acceptable, and the client
     MUST close the connection.

     The values currently defined for METHOD are:

          o  X'01' GSSAPI
          o  X'02' USERNAME/PASSWORD

          o  X'03' to X'7F' IANA ASSIGNED



     The client and server then enter a method-specific sub-
     negotiation.  Descriptions of the method-dependent sub-
     negotiations appear in separate drafts.

     Developers of new METHOD support for this protocol

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     should contact IANA for a METHOD number.  The ASSIGNED
     NUMBERS document should be referred to for a current
     list of METHOD numbers and their corresponding proto-

     Compliant implementations MUST support both GSSAPI and
     USERNAME/PASSWORD authentication methods.

4.  Requests

     Once the method-dependent subnegotiation has completed,
     the client sends the request details.  If the negoti-
     ated method includes encapsulation for purposes of
     integrity checking and/or confidentiality, these
     requests MUST be encapsulated in the method-dependent

     The SOCKS request is formed as follows:

        |VER | CMD |  RSV  | ATYP | DST.ADDR | DST.PORT |
        | 1  |  1  | X'00' |  1   | Variable |    2     |


          o  VER    protocol version: X'05'
          o  CMD
             o  CONNECT X'01'
             o  BIND X'02'
             o  UDP ASSOCIATE X'03'
             o  UDP DESTROY X'04'
          o  RSV    RESERVED
          o  ATYP   address type of following address
             o  IP V4 address: X'01'
             o  DOMAINNAME: X'03'
             o  IP V6 address: X'04'
          o  DST.ADDR       desired destination address
          o  DST.PORT       desired destination port in network octet order

     The SOCKS server will typically evaluate the request
     based on source and destination addresses, and return
     one or more reply messages, as appropriate for the
     request type.

5.  Addressing

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     In an address field (DST.ADDR, BND.ADDR), the ATYP
     field specifies the type of address contained within
     the field:

          o  X'01'

     the address is a version-4 IP address, with a length of
     4 octets

          o  X'03'

     the address field contains a DNS-style domain name.
     The first octet of the address field contains the
     length of the domain name.

          o  X'04'

     the address is a version-6 IP address, with a length of
     16 octets.

6.  Replies

     The SOCKS request information is sent by the client as
     soon as it has established a connection to the SOCKS
     server, and completed the authentication negotiations.
     The server evaluates the request, and returns a reply
     formed as follows:

        |VER | REP |  RSV  | ATYP | BND.ADDR | BND.PORT |
        | 1  |  1  | X'00' |  1   | Variable |    2     |


          o  VER    protocol version: X'05'
          o  REP    Reply field:
             o  X'00' succeeded
             o  X'01' general SOCKS server failure
             o  X'02' connection not allowed by ruleset
             o  X'03' Network unreachable
             o  X'04' Host unreachable
             o  X'05' Connection refused
             o  X'06' TTL expired
             o  X'07' to X'FF' unassigned

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          o  RSV    RESERVED
          o  ATYP   address type of following address
             o  IP V4 address: X'01'
             o  DOMAINNAME: X'03'
             o  IP V6 address: X'04'
          o  BND.ADDR       server bound address
          o  BND.PORT       server bound port in network octet order

     Fields marked RESERVED (RSV) must be set to X'00'.

     If the chosen method includes encapsulation for pur-
     poses of authentication, integrity and/or confidential-
     ity, the replies are encapsulated in the method-
     dependent encapsulation.


     In the reply to a CONNECT, BND.PORT contains the port
     number that the server assigned to connect to the tar-
     get host, while BND.ADDR contains the associated IP
     address.  The supplied BND.ADDR is often different from
     the IP address that the client uses to reach the SOCKS
     server, since such servers are often multi-homed.  It
     is expected that the SOCKS server will use DST.ADDR and
     DST.PORT, and the client-side source address and port
     in evaluating the CONNECT request.


     The BIND request is used in protocols which require the
     client to accept connections from the server.  FTP is a
     well-known example, which uses the primary client-to-
     server connection for commands and status reports, but
     may use a server-to-client connection for transferring
     data on demand (e.g. LS, GET, PUT).

     It is expected that the client side of an application
     protocol will use the BIND request only to establish
     secondary connections after a primary connection is
     established using CONNECT.  In is expected that a SOCKS
     server will use DST.ADDR and DST.PORT in evaluating the
     BIND request.

     Two replies are sent from the SOCKS server to the
     client during a BIND operation.  The first is sent
     after the server creates and binds a new socket.  The
     BND.PORT field contains the port number that the SOCKS
     server assigned to listen for an incoming connection.

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     The BND.ADDR field contains the associated IP address.
     The client will typically use these pieces of informa-
     tion to notify (via the primary or control connection)
     the application server of the rendezvous address.  The
     second reply occurs only after the anticipated incoming
     connection succeeds or fails.

     In the second reply, the BND.PORT and BND.ADDR fields
     contain the address and port number of the connecting


     The UDP ASSOCIATE request is used to establish an asso-
     ciation within the UDP relay process to handle UDP
     datagrams.  The DST.ADDR field is ignored in a UDP
     ASSOCIATE request, while the DST.PORT field contains
     the idle-timeout time, in minutes, that an association
     is allowed to exist without explicit client-side activ-
     ity.  If DST.PORT is zero, the SOCKS server SHOULD use
     an administrator-defined default.

     In the reply to a UDP ASSOCIATE request, the BND.PORT
     and BND.ADDR fields indicate the port number/address
     where the client may send UDP request messages to be
     relayed.  Once a UDP ASSOCIATE request has been pro-
     cessed, the SOCKS client MUST terminate the connection.


     The UDP DESTROY request is used to destroy an existing
     association within the UDP relay process.  The DST.ADDR
     and DST.PORT fields contain the address and port number
     of the UDP relay process corresponding to the associa-
     tion to destroy.  Once a UDP ASSOCIATE request has been
     processed, the SOCKS client MUST terminate the connec-

     When a reply (REP value other than X'00') indicates a
     failure, the SOCKS server MUST terminate the TCP con-
     nection shortly after sending the reply.  This must be
     no more than 10 seconds after detecting the condition
     that caused a failure.

     If the reply code (REP value of X'00') indicates a suc-
     cess, and the request was either a BIND or a CONNECT,
     the client may now start passing data.  If the selected
     authentication method supports encapsulation for the

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     purposes of integrity, authentication and/or confiden-
     tiality, the data are encapsulated using the method-
     dependent encapsulation.  Similarly, when data arrives
     at the SOCKS server for the client, the server MUST
     encapsulate the data as appropriate for the authentica-
     tion method in use.

7.  Procedure for UDP-based clients

     A UDP-based client MUST send its datagrams to the UDP
     relay server at the UDP port indicated by BND.PORT in
     the reply to the UDP ASSOCIATE request.  If the
     selected authentication method provides encapsulation
     for the purposes of authenticity, integrity, and/or
     confidentiality, the datagram MUST be encapsulated
     using the appropriate encapsulation.  Each UDP datagram
     carries a UDP request header with it:

      |RSV | FRAG | ATYP | DST.ADDR | DST.PORT |   DATA   |
      | 1  |  2   |  1   | Variable |    2     | Variable |

     The fields in the UDP request header are:

          o  RSV  Reserved X'0000'
          o  FRAG    Current fragment number
          o  ATYP    address type of following addresses:
             o  IP V4 address: X'01'
             o  DOMAINNAME: X'03'
             o  IP V6 address: X'04'
          o  DST.ADDR       desired destination address
          o  DST.PORT       desired destination port
          o  DATA     user data

     When a UDP relay server decides to relay a UDP data-
     gram, it does so silently, without any notification to
     the requesting client.  Similarly, it will drop data-
     grams it cannot or will not relay.  When a UDP relay
     server receives a reply datagram from a remote host, it
     MUST encapsulate that datagram using the above UDP
     request header, and any authentication-method-dependent

     The UDP relay server MUST acquire from the SOCKS server
     the expected IP address of the client that will send

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     datagrams to the BND.PORT given in the reply to UDP
     ASSOCIATE.  It MUST drop any datagrams arriving from
     any source IP address other than the one recorded for
     the particular association.

     The FRAG field indicates whether or not this datagram
     is one of a number of fragments.  The high-order bit
     indicates end-of-fragment sequence, while a value of
     X'00' indicates that this datagram is standalone.  Val-
     ues between 1 and 127 indicate the fragment position
     within a fragment sequence.  Each receiver will have a
     REASSEMBLY QUEUE and a REASSEMBLY TIMER associated with
     these fragments.  The reassembly queue must be reini-
     tialized and the associated fragments abandoned when-
     ever the REASSEMBLY TIMER expires, or a new datagram
     arrives carrying a FRAG field whose value is less than
     the highest FRAG value processed for this fragment
     sequence.  The reassembly timer MUST be no less than 5
     seconds.  It is recommended that fragmentation be
     avoided by applications wherever possible.

     Implementation of fragmentation is optional; an imple-
     mentation that does not support fragmentation MUST drop
     any datagram whose FRAG field is other than X'00'.

     The programming interface for a SOCKS-aware UDP MUST
     report an available buffer space for UDP datagrams that
     is smaller than the actual space provided by the oper-
     ating system:

          o  if ATYP is X'01' - 10+method_dependent octets smaller
          o  if ATYP is X'03' - 262+method_dependent octets smaller
          o  if ATYP is X'04' - 20+method_dependent octets smaller

     The ASSOCIATION established with a UDP ASSOCIATE
     request has a specific lifetime.  The UDP server SHOULD
     refresh the lifetime every time a valid datagram
     arrives from the client at the UDP relay server.

8.  Security Considerations

     This document describes a protocol for the application-
     layer traversal of IP network firewalls.  The security
     of such traversal is highly dependent on the particular
     authentication and encapsulation methods provided in a
     particular implementation, and selected during negotia-
     tion between SOCKS client and SOCKS server.

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     Careful consideration should be given by the adminis-
     trator to the selection of authentication methods.

9.  References

     [1] Koblas, D., "SOCKS", Proceedings: 1992 Usenix Secu-
     rity Symposium

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Authors Address

     Marcus Leech
     Bell-Northern Research
     P.O. Box 3511, Stn. C,
     Ottawa, ON
     CANADA K1Y 4H7

     Email: mleech@bnr.ca
     Phone: (613) 763-9145

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