Network Working Group M. Richardson
Internet-Draft SSW
Expires: December 27, 2007 June 25, 2007
An interface between applications and keying systems
draft-ietf-btns-abstract-api-00.txt
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 27, 2007.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
Abstract
The "BTNS" (Better Than Nothing Security) protocols specifies how to
use IKEv1 and IKEv2 to do unauthenticated IPsec. This document
explains in the abstract (no language bindings are provided) how an
application may learn that BTNS IPsec has been applied to a
conversation, such that the application can plan to do it's own
authentication using a channel binding. In addition, applications
can use this API (Application Programming Interface) to request BTNS
treatment of the applications' connections.
Table of Contents
1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Objects involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Scope of Protection Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Scope of Identity Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Validity period of Protection Token . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Validity period of Identity Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. pToken discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Properties of pToken objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Properties of iToken objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Accessor Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
12. TRACKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13.2. Non-normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 19
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
1. Overview
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [RFC2119].
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
2. Introduction
Purpose of this API.
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
3. Objects involved
There are two major kinds of objects that are defined by this
document. These are the Protection Token (pToken) and the Identity
Token (iToken). Both objects are abstracted into unique opaque
tokens which may be manipulated only indirectly by applications.
Each object has a series of attributes associated with it. The API
provides a mechanism to query the value of attributes of the token.
The attributes are where all of the content of the objects are.
Each token has a scope - the place and time in which it can be
considered valid. There are many conflicting qualities that one
would wish for the token, and the result is a different compromise
among these qualities for each token type. The tokens should be:
small
easy to allocate and deallocate
automatically cleaned up when an application terminates (both
properly and inproperly)
easily compared
easily passed back in a recvmsg(2) call as auxiliary data (for
pToken)
3.1. Scope of Protection Token
The protection token has a per-process (i.e. per-address space)
scope. The scope of the token is not related to the underlying
protection provided by IPsec. The token is a handle.
3.2. Scope of Identity Token
The identity token has a per-system scope, although two applications
running on the same system may not be able to compare it literally.
3.3. Validity period of Protection Token
The pToken is valid only within the scope of a single process. The
token may not be saved in any long term storage.
It is permitted for one protection token to be replaced with another
(equivalent) protection token due to a node moving, suspending and
resuming, or due to extended network outages, however the underlying
identity token would be guaranteed to be the same. This would most
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
likely occur with unconnected sockets, where due to the outage/
downtime, the keying system was unable to maintain a keying channel,
and had to re-create the keys from scratch.
3.4. Validity period of Identity Token
The iToken may be valid across the entire system, although it may
need to be turned into an external representation. Some forms of
identity token may be valid across systems, but in general an
identity token is only valid in reference to a local set of trust
anchors. (See [RFC2692]).
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
4. Namespace
All functions and macros defined by this API are prefixed with
"ipsec_" for functions and variables, and with "IPSEC_" if they are
macros or enumerated types. (cf. to appropriate POSIX section?)
Whenever sensible, the enumerated values defined in [RFC2367] are
used if appropriate.
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
5. pToken discovery
An application that receives a connection using accept(2), or with
recvmsg(2) needs to get a protection token that is associated with
the socket.
For connected sockets (such as TCP and some SCTP modes), the
protection token should not change during the lifetime of the socket,
so a simple process is appropriate.
For unconnected sockets (such as UDP and some SCTP modes), each
datagram received may be received may arrive from a different source,
and therefore may have different protections applied. A protection
token needs to be returned with each datagram, so it must be returned
as ancilliary data with recvmsg(2).
For connected sockets, the pToken will not change during the
connection. (see notes about rekeying). A simple function is
provided to return a pToken from a file descriptor. Many
implementions are likely to implement this using getsockopt(2), but
an interface in those terms is not specified in order to keep it more
abstract, and therefore more portable.
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
6. Properties of pToken objects
privacyProtected - boolean. readonly on responder, get/set on
initiator. set to false if the connection has either no privacy
configured (AH, ESP-null), or if the privacy configured is known
to be untrustworthy by the administrator. Returns true otherwise.
(XXX: False does not mean that there will be no IPsec, but that it
should not be considered useful)
integrityProtected - boolean. readonly on responder, get/set on
initiator. set to false if there is no data integrity protection
other than the UDP/TCP checksum.
compressionAvailable - boolean. readonly on responder, get/set on
initiator. Set to true if data count sent/received from socket
may not map linearly to data sent/received on wire.
iToken - object. readonly on responder. get/set on initiator. Set
to iToken object which represents identity of remote system.
auditString - string. readonly on responder and readonly on
initiator after connection establishment. Contains a string which
can be used in system auditing and logging functions which
describes the details of the IPsec SA that was negotiated. No
structure of this string may be assumed. No session keys are
disclosed by this string.
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
7. Properties of iToken objects
auditString - string. readonly on responder and readonly on
initiator after connection establishment. Contains a string which
can be used in system auditing and logging functions which
describes the remote identity, and the method by which it was
authenticated (i.e. it may list the CA or origin of a public key)
authenticationMethod - enumerated type. Indicates which method
was used to authenticate the peer, possible values are:
NONE - the peer was not authenticated in anyway
BTNS - the peer was authenticated using an inline key which was
not verified in anyway
LEAFOFFAITH - the peer was authenticated using a key which was
previously cached, but was previously received inline, and was
not verified in anyway.
PRESHAREDKEY - the peer was authenticated using a unique pre-
shared key
GROUPKEY - the peer was authenticated using a non-unique pre-
shared key
XAUTH - the type of phase1/PARENT-SA is not relevant, as the
peer was authenticated using a username/password.
EAP - the type of phase1/PARENT-SA is not relevant, as the peer
was authenticated using an EAP method. (Additional properties
may provide more information)
PKIX_TRUSTED - the peer was authenticated using a PKIX/X.509
certificate that was found in the trusted store.
PKIX_INLINE - the peer was authenticated using a PKIX/X.509
certificate that was transmitted inline, and was verified by
using a Certificate Authority that was found in the trusted
store.
PKIX_OFFLINE - the peer was authenticated using a PKIX/X.509
certificate that was retrieved out-of-band (such as by LDAP or
HTTP), and was verified by using a Certificate Authority that
was found in the trusted store.
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
certificateAuthorityDN - string. readonly. the Distinguished Name
(DN) of certificate authority that was used to verify the key (for
methods that involved PKIX)
certificateDN - string. readonly. the DN of the peer that was
authenticated
pubKeyID - string. readonly. a somewhat unique identifier for the
public key. A suggestion is to use the first 9 base64 digits of
the RFC3110 public key modulus, but this is a local matter.
channelBinding - binary blog. readonly. provides the concatenated
set of public keys
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
8. Accessor Functions
Methods to access the properties of the two objects are specific to
the language in which the bindings are done. See YYYY for
C-bindings.
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
9. Security Considerations
Probably lots to say here. Please help.
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
10. IANA Considerations
There are no registries created by this document. The names (and
language specific enum, if applicable) of the pToken and iToken
proprties are internal to a single system, and therefore do not need
standization.
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
11. Acknowledgments
stuff
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
12. TRACKING
Document RCS tracking info
$Revision: 1.1 $
$Log: ietf-btns-abstract-api-00.txt,v $
Revision 1.1 2007/06/25 15:37:06 mcr
added ietf-btns-abstract-api
Revision 1.1 2007/06/25 15:34:08 mcr
renamed drafts in Makefile
Revision 1.3 2007/05/14 19:56:37 mcr
added abstract
Revision 1.2 2007/05/12 20:38:56 mcr
fixed id string
Revision 1.1 2007/05/12 01:31:00 mcr
updates to abstract api document
Revision 1.4 2007/02/16 03:24:09 mcr
updated to make XML happy, and dates corrected
Revision 1.3 2007/02/16 03:04:44 mcr
C API document.
Revision 1.2 2006/03/21 22:02:47 mcr
added API requirements and skeleton of original API spec
Revision 1.1 2006/03/21 21:04:43 mcr
added documents from ipsp WG
Revision 1.1 2003/06/03 20:45:06 mcr
initial template
Figure 1: document tracking
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
13. References
13.1. Normative references
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2367] McDonald, D., Metz, C., and B. Phan, "PF_KEY Key
Management API, Version 2", RFC 2367, July 1998.
[RFC2692] Ellison, C., "SPKI Requirements", RFC 2692,
September 1999.
13.2. Non-normative references
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
Author's Address
Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
470 Dawson Avenue
Ottawa, ON K1Z 5V7
CA
Email: mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca
URI: http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft btns-abstract-api June 2007
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
Richardson Expires December 27, 2007 [Page 19]
