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Versions: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 rfc2478                               
Internet-Draft                                 Eric Baize, Denis Pinkas
IETF Common Authentication Technology WG                           Bull
<draft-ietf-cat-snego-05.txt>                               16 May 1997



           The Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism



STATUS OF THIS MEMO

This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the
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ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).

Comments on this document should be sent to "cat-ietf@mit.edu", the
IETF Common Authentication Technology WG discussion list. Distribution
of this document is unlimited.


2.  ABSTRACT

This draft document specifies a Security Negotiation Mechanism for the
Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) which
is described in [1].

The GSS-API provides a generic interface which can be layered atop
different security mechanisms such that if communicating peers acquire
GSS-API credentials for the same security mechanism, then a security
context may be established between them (subject to policy). However,
GSS-API doesn't prescribe the method by which GSS-API peers can
establish whether they have a common security mechanism.

The Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism defined here
is a pseudo-security mechanism, represented by the object identifier
iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanism.snego (1.3.6.1.5.5.2) which
enables GSS-API peers to determine in-band whether their credentials
share common GSS-API security mechanism(s), and if so, to invoke
normal security context establishment for a selected common security
mechanism. This is most useful for applications that are based on
GSS-API implementations which support multiple security mechanisms.


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As most existing GSS-API security mechanisms can support different
options (such as differing cryptographic algorithms due to policy or
legislative constraints), the Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation
Mechanism allows to negotiate security mechanisms including their
options (i.e. variants). Mechanism options can be considered as
providing a type of "quality of protection" for security contexts.

To facilitate mechanism negotiation, the OID which currently defines a
security mechanism is "extended" to be able to specify options within a
security mechanism rather than simply the basic mechanism. When the OID
specifies the mechanism only and no explicit option, then this means
that the default option is used. The default option and the specific
options for a given mechanism are as defined in the IETF GSS-API
specification(s) for the mechanism.

This allows to negotiate basic security mechanisms, different options
within a given security mechanism or different options from several
basic security mechanisms.

In addition, a given security mechanism may still negotiate mechanism-
specific options during the context establishment for that mechanism,
i.e. after the mechanism has been selected by the negotiation process.

The simple and protected GSS-API mechanism negotiation is based on the
following negotiation model : the initiator proposes one or several
security mechanisms, the target either accepts the proposed security
mechanism, or chooses one from an offered set, or rejects the proposed
value(s). The target informs the initiator of its choice and may also
return mechanism specific information related to the chosen mechanism.

In its basic form this protocol requires an extra-round trip. Network
connection setup is a critical performance characteristic of any
network infrastructure and extra round trips over WAN links, packet
radio networks, etc. really make a difference. In order to avoid such
an extra round trip the initial security token of the preferred
mechanism for the initiator may be embedded in the initial token.
If the target preferred mechanism matches the initiator's preferred
mechanism, no additional round trips are incurred by using the
negotiation protocol.

The simple and protected GSS-API mechanism negotiation provides a
technique to protect the negotiation that must be used when the
underlying mechanism selected by the target is capable of integrity
protection.

When all the mechanisms proposed by the initiator support integrity
protection or when the selected mechanism supports integrity
protection, then the negotiation mechanism becomes protected since
this guarantees that the appropriate mechanism supported by both
peers has been selected.




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The Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism uses the
concepts developed in GSS-API specification [1], and requires the use
of new GSS-API context-level tokens : negotiation tokens. Callers
of the GSS-API do not need to be aware of the existence of the
negotiation tokens but only of the new pseudo-security mechanism.
A failure in the negotiation phase causes a major status code to be
returned: GSS_S_BAD_MECH.

3.  NEGOTIATION MODEL

3.1.  Negotiation description

The model for security mechanism negotiation reuses a subset of the
concepts specified in [2].

Each security mechanism represents one basic security mechanism along
with one option for this security mechanism (when no option is present
the default option is assumed).

 -  When one security mechanism is proposed by the initiator, it
    represents the only security mechanism option supported or
    selected (when the additional APIs defined in the Annex A
    are used) by the initiator.

 -  When several security mechanisms are proposed by the initiator,
    they represent a set of security mechanisms supported or selected
    (when the additional APIs defined in the Annex A are used) by the
    initiator.

The first negotiation token sent by the initiator contains an ordered
list of mechanisms and optionally the initial security token for the
desired mechanism of the initiator (i.e. the first of the list).

The first negotiation token sent by the target contains the result of
the negotiation (accept_completed, accept_incomplete or reject) and,
in case of accept, the agreed security mechanism along with optional
mechanism specific information. It may also include the response to
the initial security token for the desired mechanism of the initiator,
when the first proposed mechanism has been selected. Not all targets
must be able to respond to the initial security token for the desired
mechanism when it is present. The target can simply ignore it and
complete the negotiation without it. Implementations that can piggyback
the initial token will be rewarded by faster connection setup.

In case of a successful negotiation, the security mechanism represents
the value suitable for the target, and picked up from the list offered
by the initiator. The target selects the value according to a simple
selection criteria: it checks if the first entry from its own list is
present in the set offered by the initiator. If the entry is present,
then it is the agreed mechanism, if not then the second entry from its
own ordered list is checked and the process continues until all
entries have been checked. Thus, the target's mechanism preferences
have precedence when more than one common mechanism is available
between the target and initiator. The service flags that are requested

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by the initiator are not taken into consideration to make the selection
but are used to select the appropriate options, should these options be
supported by the mechanism. It is up to the initiator to verify that the
requested options are indeed supported when the context is established.

3.2.  Negotiation procedure

The negotiation procedure is summarised as follows:

(a) the GSS-API initiator invokes GSS_Init_sec_context as normal, but
requests (either explicitly, with the negotiation mechanism, or
through accepting a default, when the default is the negotiation
mechanism) that the Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism
be used;

(b) the initiator GSS-API implementation emits a negotiation token
containing the set of supported security mechanism for the credentials
used for this context establishment, and optionally the initial
security token for the preferred mechanism, and indicates
GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED status;

(c) The GSS-API initiator sends the token to the target application;

(d) The GSS-API target deposits the token through invoking
GSS_Accept_sec_context. The target GSS-API implementation emits a
negotiation token containing which if any of the proposed mechanisms
it supports (or has selected).

If the preferred mechanism selected by the target matches the preferred
mechanism identified by the initiator and the initiator provides a
preferredToken, the negotiation token response may contain also the
initial security token from that mechanism.

If the preferred mechanism is accepted, GSS_Accept_sec_context()
indicates GSS_COMPLETE when unilateral or mutual authentication has
been performed and involves a single token in either direction.

If a proposed mechanism other than the preferred mechanism is accepted,
or the preferred mechanism is accepted but involves multiple exchanges
(e.g. challenge-response authentication), then GSS_Accept_sec_context()
indicates GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED status.

If the proposed mechanism(s) are rejected, GSS_Accept_sec_context()
indicates GSS_S_BAD_MECH status. The security context initialisation
has failed.

(e) The GSS-API target returns the token to the initiator application;

(f) The GSS-API initiator deposits the token through invoking
GSS_Init_sec_context.

GSS_Init_sec_context() may then indicate GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED,
GSS_COMPLETE or GSS_S_BAD_MECH status.


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     The GSS_S_BAD_MECH status is returned when the negotiation token
     carries a reject result or when the negotiation token carries an
     accept result and the mechanism selected by the target is not
     included in the initial list sent by the initiator or the
     selected mechanism supports a MIC token but the MIC computed over
     the list of mechanisms sent by the initiator is missing or
     incorrect. If the negotiation token carries a reject result, the
     context establishment is impossible. For example, a rejection
     will occur if the target doesn't support the initiator's proposed
     mechanism type(s) and/or mechanism option(s). Upon failure of the
     mechanism negotiation procedure, the mech_type output parameter
     value is the negotiation mechanism type.

     The GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED status is returned when the negotiation
     token carries an accept result and further tokens must be
     transferred in order to complete context establishment for the
     selected mechanism. In that case GSS_Init_sec_context() returns
     an initial context token as output_token (with the selected
     mechanism's context token encapsulated within that output_token).
     The initiator then sends the output_token to the target. The
     security context initialisation is then continued according to
     the standard GSS-API conventions for the selected mechanism,
     where the tokens of the selected mechanism are encapsulated until
     the GSS_COMPLETE is returned for both the initiator and the
     target. When GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED is returned, the mech_type
     output parameter is not yet valid.

     When GSS_COMPLETE is returned, the mech_type output parameter
     indicates the selected mechanism. When the final negotiation token
     does not contain a MIC, the initiator GSS-API implementation must
     check the returned/selected mechanism options with its originally
     submitted list of mechanism options and also verify that the
     selected mechanism is not able to support a MIC. When the final
     negotiation token contains a MIC over the initial mechanisms list
     sent by the initiator, the MIC must be verified.

Note that the *_req_flag input parameters for context establishment
are relative to the selected mechanism, as are the *_state output
parameters. i.e., these parameters are not applicable to the
negotiation process per se.

The initiator GSS-API calling application may need to know when the
negotiation exchanges were protected or not. For this, when
GSS_COMPLETE is returned, it can simply test the integ_avail flag.
When this flag is set it indicates that the negotiation was protected.

On receipt of a negotiation token on the target side, a GSS-API
implementation that does not support negotiation would indicate the
GSS_FAILURE status as if a particular basic security mechanism had
been requested but was not supported.

When GSS_Acquire_cred is invoked with the negotiation mechanism as
desired_mechs, an implementation-specific default credential is used
to carry on the negotiation. A set of mechanisms as specified locally

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by the system administrator is then available for negotiation. If there
is a desire for the caller to make its own choice, then an additional
API has to be used (see Appendix A).

4.  DATA ELEMENTS

4.1.  Mechanism Type

MechType::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

mechType
     The concept of mechType is extended to specify a basic security
     mechanism including its options. Each basic security mechanism
     is as defined in [1], and must provide a single default option
     which fully specifies the mechanism. The default option is
     represented by the OID of the mechanism itself (i.e. without any
     extension).

     The options are specified by extending the OID. This extension
     is defined in the same IETF GSS-API mechanism specification as
     the security mechanism context token specification.

4.2.  Negotiation Tokens

The syntax of the negotiation tokens follows the InitialContextToken
syntax defined in [1]. The security mechanism of the initial
negotiation token is identified by the Object Identifier
iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanism.snego (1.3.6.1.5.5.2).

4.2.1. Syntax

This section specifies the syntax of the corresponding
"innerContextToken" field for the first token and subsequent
negotiation tokens.

NegotiationToken ::= CHOICE {
                              negTokenInit  [0]  NegTokenInit,
                              negTokenTarg  [1]  NegTokenTarg }

MechType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

MechTypeList ::= SEQUENCE OF MechType

NegTokenInit ::= SEQUENCE {
                            mechTypes       [0] MechTypeList  OPTIONAL
                            reqFlags        [1] ContextFlags  OPTIONAL,
                            preferredToken  [2] OCTET STRING  OPTIONAL
                         }






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ContextFlags ::= BIT STRING {
        delegFlag       (0),
        mutualFlag      (1),
        replayFlag      (2),
        sequenceFlag    (3),
        anonFlag        (4),
}

negTokenInit
     Negotiation token sent by the initiator to the target, which
     contains, for the first token sent, one or more security
     mechanisms supported by the initiator and the service options
     (reqFlags) that are requested to establish the the context.
     The preferredToken is an optional field of the first token sent
     that all target implementations would not have to support. However
     for those targets that do support piggybacking the initial
     preferredToken, an optimistic negotiation response is possible.

     Further tokens, when needed, contain only the preferredToken
     which is a token specific to the selected mechanism.


     The context flags should be filled in from the req_flags parameter
     of init_sec_context()

NegTokenTarg ::= SEQUENCE {
    negResult      [0] ENUMERATED {
                            accept_completed    (0),
                            accept_incomplete   (1),
                            reject              (2) }          OPTIONAL
    supportedMech  [1] MechType                                OPTIONAL
    MechSpecInfo   [2] OCTET STRING                            OPTIONAL
    preferredToken [3] OCTET STRING                            OPTIONAL
    mechListMIC    [4] OCTET STRING                            OPTIONAL
}

negTokenTarg
     Negotiation token returned by the target to the initiator which
     contains, for the first token returned, a global negotiation
     result, the security mechanism selected (if any) and optional
     information specific to the security mechanism selected by the
     target. The result accept_completed indicates that a context
     has been successfully established using the preferredToken that
     was initially sent by the initiator, while the result
     accept_incomplete indicates that additional token exchanges are
     needed.

          Note: For the case where (a) a single-token context setup
          is used and (b) the preferred mechanism does not support
          the integrity facility which would cause a mechListMIC to be
          generated and enclosed, this feature allows to make a
          difference between a preferredToken sent by the initiator
          but not processed by the target (accept_incomplete) and

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          a preferredToken sent by the initiator and processed by
          the target (accept_completed).

     For those targets that support piggybacking the initial
     preferredToken, an optimistic negotiation response is possible
     and includes in that case a preferredToken which may continue
     the authentication exchange (e.g. when mutual authentication has
     been requested or when unilateral authentication requires several
     round trips). Otherwise the preferredToken is used to carry the
     tokens specific to the mechanism selected.

     For subsequent tokens (if any) returned by the target, negResult,
     supportedMech and MechSpecInfo are not present.

     For the last token returned by the target, the mechListMIC, when
     present, is a MIC computed over the MechTypes using the selected
     mechanism.

negResult
     Result of the negotiation exchange, specified by the target.
     This can be either :
          accept_completed
               The target accepts the preferred security mechanism,
                and the context is established for the target or,
          accept_incomplete
               The target accepts one of the proposed security
               mechanisms and further exchanges are necessary, or,
          reject
               The target rejects all the proposed security
               mechanisms.

supportedMech
     This field has to be present when negResult is "accept_completed"
     or "accept_incomplete". It is a choice from the mechanisms offered
     by the initiator.

MechSpecInfo
     This field may be used to transmit mechanism specific
     information relative to the security mechanism selected
     by the target.

preferredToken
     This field may be used either to transmit the response to the
     preferredToken when sent by the initiator and when the first
     mechanism from the list has been selected by the target or
     to carry the tokens specific to the selected security mechanism.

mechListMIC
     If the selected mechanism is capable of integrity protection,
     this field must be present in the last message of the negotiation,
     (i.e., when the underlying mechanism returns a non-empty token
     and a major status of GSS_COMPLETE); it contains the result of a
     GetMIC of the MechTypes field in the initial NegTokenInit.

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    It allows to verify that the list initially sent by the initiator
    has been received unmodified by the target.

4.2.2. Processing of mechListMIC.

When the mechanism selected by the negotiation supports integrity
protection as a service, the mechListMIC must be used and validated.

In particular, the target that sends the last context establishment
token must also include the result of a gss_get_mic() of the
mechTypeList sent by the initiator in the first token; in addition,
the initiator that receives the last token must require that the
mechListMIC field be present and valid. In the absence of a valid
mechListMIC, the negotiation must fail as if the last context
establishment token was invalid.


5.  EXAMPLES : SECURITY MECHANISM NEGOTIATION

Follow some examples of security mechanism options negotiation between
an initiator (I) and a target (T).

5.1.  Initial steps

(I) supports two security mechanism types (GSS-MECH1 and GSS-MECH2),
and two options for GSS-MECH2 : OPTION1, identified by GSS-MECH2-
OPTION1 and OPTION2, identified by GSS-MECH2-OPTION2.

(I) invokes GSS_Init_sec_context() with :

Input
     mech_type = OID for negotiation mechanism or NULL, if the
     negotiation mechanism is the default mechanism.

Output
     major_status = GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED
     output_token = negTokenInit

The negotiation token (negTokenInit) contains three security mechanisms
with :
     mechType = GSS-MECH1 or
     mechType = GSS-MECH2-OPTION1 or
     mechType = GSS-MECH2-OPTION2

(I) sends to (T) the negotiation token.


5.2      Successful negotiation steps

(T) supports GSS-MECH2-OPTION1.
(T) receives the negotiation token (negTokenInit) from (I)
(T) invokes GSS_Accept_sec_context() with :


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Input
     input_token = negTokenInit

Output
     major_status = GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED
     output_token = negTokenTarg

The negotiation token (negTokenTarg) contains :
     negResult = accept (the negotiation result)
     supportedMech : mechType = GSS-MECH2-OPTION1

(T) returns the negotiation token (negTokenTarg) to (I)
(I) invokes GSS_Init_sec_context() with :

Input
     input_token = negTokenTarg

Output
     major_status = GSS_COMPLETE
     output_token = initialContextToken (initial context token
                                         for GSS-MECH2-OPTION1)
     mech_type = GSS-MECH2-OPTION1

The subsequent steps are security mechanism specific, and work as
specified in [1].  The output tokens from the security mechanism are
encapsulated in a NegTokenTarg message (with the supportedMech and
MechSpecInfo fields omitted, and the mechListMIC included with the
last token).

5.3.  Failed negotiation steps

(T) supports GSS-MECH3.
(T) receives the negotiation token (negTokenInit) from (I)
(T) invokes GSS_Accept_sec_context() with :

Input
     input_token = negTokenInit

Output
     major_status = GSS_S_BAD_MECH
     output_token = negTokenTarg

The negotiation token (negTokenTarg) contains :

     negResult = reject (the negotiation result)

(T) returns the negotiation token (negTokenTarg) to (I)
(I) invokes GSS_Init_sec_context() with :

Input
     input_token = negTokenTarg



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Output
     major_status = GSS_S_BAD_MECH

The security context establishment has failed.

5.4 Successful Negotiation with preferred mechanism info

(I) supports two security mechanism types (GSS-MECH1 and GSS-MECH2),
and two options for GSS-MECH2 : OPTION1, identified by GSS-MECH2-
OPTION1 and OPTION2, identified by GSS-MECH2-OPTION2.

(I) invokes GSS_Init_sec_context() with :

Input
     mech_type = OID for negotiation mechanism or NULL, if the
     negotiation mechanism is the default mechanism.

Output
     major_status = GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED
     output_token = negTokenInit

The negotiation token (negTokenInit) contains three security mechanisms
with :
     mechType = GSS-MECH1 or
     mechType = GSS-MECH2-OPTION1 or
     mechType = GSS-MECH2-OPTION2

     preferredToken = output_token from GSS_Init_sec_context
    ( first mechType) as described in [1]

(I) sends to (T) the negotiation token.

(T) supports GSS-MECH1.
(T) receives the negotiation token (negTokenInit) from (I)
(T) invokes GSS_Accept_sec_context() with :

Input
     input_token = negTokenInit

Output
     major_status = GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED
     output_token = negTokenTarg

The negotiation token (negTokenTarg) contains :
     negResult = accept (the negotiation result)
     supportedMech : mechType = GSS-MECH1
     MechSpecInfo = mechanism specific information for
                    the preferred mechanism
     preferredToken = output_token from
                      GSS_Accept_sec_context(preferredToken )

(T) returns the negotiation token (negTokenTarg) to (I)
(I) invokes GSS_Init_sec_context() with :

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Input
     input_token = negTokenTarg

Output
     major_status = GSS_COMPLETE or GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED as needed
     output_token = ContextToken (initial or subsequent context token
                    for GSS-MECH1)
     mech_type = GSS-MECH1

Specific implementations of the protocol can support the optimistic
negotiation by completing the security context establishment using the
agreed upon mechanism as described in [1].  As described above in
section 5.2, the output tokens from the security mechanism are
encapsulated in a NegTokenTarg message (with the negResult,
supportedMech and MechSpecInfo fields omitted, and the mechListMIC
included with the last token).

6.  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Acknowledgments are due to Piers McMahon and Tom Parker of ICL,
Stephen Farrell of SSE, Doug Rosenthal of EINet and John Linn of
Openvision for reviewing earlier versions of this document and for
providing useful inputs. Acknowledgments are also due to Peter Brundrett
of Microsoft for his proposal for an optimistic negotiation, and for
Bill Sommerfeld of Hewlett-Packard for his proposal for protecting
the negotiation.

7.  SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

The purpose of the generic simple GSS-API mechanism negotiation
mechanism is to enable peers to agree on the value for a security
mechanism and security related options required for initialising
security services.

When the mechanism selected by the target from the list supplied by
the initiator supports integrity protection, then the negotiation is
protected.

When one of the mechanisms proposed by the initiator does not support
integrity protection, then the negotiation is exposed to all threats a non
secured service is exposed. In particular, an active attacker can force to
use a security mechanism which is not the common preferred one (when
multiple security mechanisms are shared between peers) but which is
acceptable anyway to the target.

In any case, the communicating peers may be exposed to the denial of
service threat.







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APPENDIX A


GSS-API NEGOTIATION SUPPORT API

In order to provide to a GSS-API caller (either the initiator or the
target or both) the ability to choose among the set of supported
mechanisms a reduced set of mechanisms for negotiation, two
additional APIs are defined:

GSS_Get_neg_mechs() indicates the set of security mechanisms available
on the local system to the caller for negotiation.

GSS_Set_neg_mechs() specifies the set of security mechanisms to be
used on the local system by the caller for negotiation.


A.1.  GSS_Get_neg_mechs call

Input:
     cred_handle        OCTET STRING - NULL specifies default credentials

Outputs:
     major_status INTEGER,
     minor_status INTEGER,
     mech_option_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

Return major_status codes :
     GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the set of security mechanism
     options available for negotiation has been returned in
     mech_option_set.
     GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not
     be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Allows callers to determine the set of security mechanism options
available for negotiation. This call is intended for support of
specialised callers who need to reduce the set of negotiable security
mechanism options from the set of supported security mechanisms
available to the caller (based on available credentials).

Note: The GSS_Indicate_mechs() function indicates the full set of mechanism
types available on the local system. Since this call does not use a
credential handle as an input parameter, the returned set is not
necessarily available for all credentials.








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A.2.  GSS_Set_neg_mechs call

Input:
     cred_handle        OCTET STRING - NULL specifies default credentials
     mech_option_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

Outputs:
     major_status INTEGER,
     minor_status INTEGER,

Return major_status codes :
     GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the set of security mechanisms
     available for negotiation has been set to mech_option_set.
     GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be
     performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level.

Allows callers to specify the set of security mechanism options that
may be negotiated with a particular credential: A NULL mech_option_set
specifies that only the default mech_type with the default option is
available for the GSS-API implementation. This call is intended for
support of specialised callers who need to restrict the set of
negotiable security mechanism options from the set of all security
mechanism options available to the caller (based on available
credentials). Note that if more than one mechanism is specified in
mech_option_set, the order in which those mechanisms are specified
implies a relative mechanism preference for the target.


REFERENCES

       [1] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
           Interface", RFC 2078, OpenVision, January 1997. Available on
           ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2078.txt

       [2] Standard ECMA-206, "Association Context Management including
           Security Context Management", December 1993.  Available on
           http://www.ecma.ch


AUTHORS'S ADDRESSES

   Eric Baize                     Internet email: E.Baize@ma02.bull.com
   Bull HN - MA02/211S                          Phone: +1 508 294 61 37
   Technology Park                                Fax: +1 508 294 61 09
   Billerica, MA 01821 - USA

   Denis Pinkas                   Internet email: D.Pinkas@frcl.bull.fr
   Bull                                        Phone: +33 1 30 80 34 87
   Rue Jean-Jaures                               Fax: +33 1 30 80 33 21
   BP 68
   78340 Les Clayes-sous-Bois - FRANCE



Baize, Pinkas       Document Expiration:  16 November 1997    [Page 14]