Internet-Draft R. Housley
Intended status: Standards Track Vigil Security
Expires: 26 July 2017 26 January 2017
Use of EdDSA Signatures in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
<draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures-03.txt>
Abstract
This document specifies the conventions for using Edwards-curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) for Curve25519 and Curve448 in
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). For each curve, EdDSA
defines the PureEdDSA and HashEdDSA modes. However, the HashEdDSA
mode is not used with the CMS. In addition, no context string is
used with the CMS.
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1. Introduction
This document specifies the conventions for using the Edwards-curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [EDDSA] for Curve25519 and
Curve448 with the Cryptographic Message Syntax [CMS] signed-data
content type. For each curve, [EDDSA] defines the PureEdDSA and
HashEdDSA modes. However, the HashEdDSA mode is not used with the
CMS. In addition, no context string is used with CMS. EdDSA with
Curve25519 is referred to as Ed25519, and EdDSA with Curve448 is
referred to as Ed448. The CMS conventions for PureEdDSA with Ed25519
and Ed448 are described in this document.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [STDWORDS].
1.2. ASN.1
CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [X680], which uses the Basic
Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
[X690].
2. EdDSA Signature Algorithm
The Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [EDDSA] is a
variant of Schnorr's signature system with (possibly twisted) Edwards
curves. Ed25519 is intended to operate at around the 128-bit
security level, and Ed448 at around the 224-bit security level.
One of the parameters of the EdDSA algorithm is the "prehash"
function. This may be the identity function, resulting in an
algorithm called PureEdDSA, or a collision-resistant hash function,
resulting in an algorithm called HashEdDSA. In most situations the
CMS SignedData includes signed attributes, including the message
digest of the content. Since HashEdDSA offers no benefit when signed
attributes are present, only PureEdDSA is used with the CMS.
2.1. Algorithm Identifiers
Each algorithms are identified by an object identifier, and the
algorithm identifier may contain parameters if needed.
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The ALGORITHM definition is repeated here for convenience:
ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Type OPTIONAL }
WITH SYNTAX {
OID &id [PARMS &Type] }
2.2. EdDSA Algorithm Identifiers
The EdDSA signature algorithm is defined in [EDDSA], and the
conventions for encoding the public key are defined in
[CURDLE-PKIX].
The id-Ed25519 and id-Ed448 object identifiers are used to identify
EdDSA public keys in certificates. The object identifiers are
specified in [CURDLE-PKIX], and they are repeated here for
convenience:
sigAlg-Ed25519 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-Ed25519 }
sigAlg-Ed448 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-Ed448 }
id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 112 }
id-Ed448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 113 }
2.3. Message Digest Algorithm Identifiers
When the signer includes signed attributes, a message digest
algorithm is used to compute the message digest on the eContent
value. When signing with Ed25519, the message digest algorithm MUST
be SHA-512 [RFC4634]. When signing with Ed448, the message digest
algorithm MUST be SHAKE256 [FIPS202] with a 512-bit output value.
Signing with Ed25519 uses SHA-512 as part of the signing operation,
and signing with Ed448 uses SHAKE256 as part of the signing
operation.
For convenience, the object identifiers and parameter syntax for
these algorithms are repeated here:
hashAlg-SHA-512 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha512 }
hashAlg-SHAKE256 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-shake256 }
hashAlg-SHAKE256-LEN ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-shake256-len
PARMS ShakeOutputLen }
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hashalgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) 2 }
id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 3 }
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 12 }
id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 18 }
ShakeOutputLen ::= INTEGER -- Output length in bits
When using the id-sha512 or id-shake256 algorithm identifier, the
parameters MUST be absent.
When using the id-shake256-len algorithm identifier, the parameters
MUST be present, and the parameter MUST contain 512, encoded as a
positive integer value.
2.4. EdDSA Signatures
The id-Ed25519 and id-Ed448 object identifiers are also used for
signature values. When used to identify signature algorithms, the
AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be absent.
The data to be signed is processed using PureEdDSA, and then a
private key operation generates the signature value. As described in
Section 3.3 of [EDDSA], the signature value is the opaque value
ENC(R) || ENC(S). As described in Section 5.3 of [CMS], the
signature value is ASN.1 encoded as an OCTET STRING and included in
the signature field of SignerInfo.
3. Signed-data Conventions
The processing depends on whether the signer includes signed
attributes.
The inclusion of signed attributes is preferred, but the conventions
for signed-data without signed attributes are provided for
completeness.
3.1. Signed-data Conventions With Signed Attributes
The SignedData digestAlgorithms field includes the identifiers of the
message digest algorithms used by one or more signer. There MAY be
any number of elements in the collection, including zero. When
signing with Ed25519, the digestAlgorithm SHOULD include id-sha512,
and if present, the algorithm parameters field MUST be absent. When
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signing with Ed448, the digestAlgorithm SHOULD include
id-shake256-len, and if present, the algorithm parameters field MUST
also be present, and the parameter MUST contain 512, encoded as a
positive integer value.
The SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field includes the identifier of the
message digest algorithms used by the signer. When signing with
Ed25519, the digestAlgorithm MUST be id-sha512, and the algorithm
parameters field MUST be absent. When signing with Ed448, the
digestAlgorithm MUST be id-shake256-len, the algorithm parameters
field MUST be present, and the parameter MUST contain 512, encoded as
a positive integer value.
The SignerInfo signedAttributes MUST include the message-digest
attribute as specified in Section 11.2 of [RFC5652]. When signing
with Ed25519, the message-digest attribute MUST contain the message
digest computed over the eContent value using SHA-512. When signing
with Ed448, the message-digest attribute MUST contain the message
digest computed over the eContent value using SHAKE256 with an output
length of 512 bits.
The SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field MUST contain either
id-Ed25519 or id-Ed448, depending on the elliptic curve that was used
by the signer. The algorithm parameters field MUST be absent.
The SignerInfo signature field contains the octet string resulting
from the EdDSA private key signing operation.
3.2. Signed-data Conventions Without Signed Attributes
The SignedData digestAlgorithms field includes the identifiers of the
message digest algorithms used by one or more signer. There MAY be
any number of elements in the collection, including zero. When
signing with Ed25519, list of identifiers MAY include id-sha512, and
if present, the algorithm parameters field MUST be absent. When
signing with Ed448, list of identifiers MAY include id-shake256, and
if present, the algorithm parameters field MUST be absent.
The SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field includes the identifier of the
message digest algorithms used by the signer. When signing with
Ed25519, the digestAlgorithm MUST be id-sha512, and the algorithm
parameters field MUST be absent. When signing with Ed448, the
digestAlgorithm MUST be id-shake256, and the algorithm parameters
field MUST be absent.
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NOTE: Either id-sha512 or id-shake256 is used as part to the
private key signing operation. However, the private key signing
operation does not take a message digest computed with one of
these algorithms as an input.
The SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field MUST contain either
id-Ed25519 or id-Ed448, depending on the elliptic curve that was used
by the signer. The algorithm parameters field MUST be absent.
The SignerInfo signature field contains the octet string resulting
from the EdDSA private key signing operation.
4. Implementation Considerations
The EdDSA specification [EDDSA] includes the following warning. It
deserves highlighting.
PureEdDSA requires two passes over the input. Many existing APIs,
protocols, and environments assume digital signature algorithms
only need one pass over the input, and may have API or bandwidth
concerns supporting anything else.
5. Security Considerations
Implementations must protect the EdDSA private key. Compromise of
the EdDSA private key may result in the ability to forge signatures.
The generation of EdDSA private key relies on random numbers. The
use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate
these values can result in little or no security. An attacker may
find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced
the keys, searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather
than brute force searching the whole key space. The generation of
quality random numbers is difficult. RFC 4086 [RANDOM] offers
important guidance in this area.
Unlike DSA and ECDSA, EdDSA does not require the generation of a
random value for each signature operation.
Using the same private key for different algorithms has the potential
of allowing an attacker to get extra information about the private
key. For this reason, the same private key SHOULD NOT be used with
more than one EdDSA set of parameters. For example, do not use the
same private key with PureEdDSA and HashEdDSA.
When computing signatures, the same hash function should be used for
all operations. This reduces the number of failure points in the
signature process.
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6. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Jim Schaad for the careful review and comment on the
draft document. Thanks to Quynh Dang with the object identifiers
that were assigned by NIST.
7. Normative References
[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 5652, September 2009.
[CURDLE-PKIX]
Josefsson, S., and J. Schaad, "Algorithm Identifiers for
Ed25519, Ed25519ph, Ed448, Ed448ph, X25519 and X448 for
use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure",
draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-02, 31 October 2016,
Work-in-progress.
[EDDSA] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", draft-irtf-cfrg-eddsa-08,
19 August 2016, Work-in-progress.
[FIPS202] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
Department of Commerce, "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based
Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS 202,
August 2015.
[RFC4634] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and HMAC-SHA)", RFC 4634, July 2006.
[STDWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[X680] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
Recommendation X.680, 2015.
[X690] ITU-T, "Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015.
8. Informative References
[RANDOM] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", RFC 4086, June 2005.
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Author Address
Russ Housley
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
housley@vigilsec.com
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