DNS Working Group Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd
INTERNET-DRAFT IBM
Expires: June 2000 December 1999
draft-ietf-dnsind-tkey-03.txt
Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)
------ --- ------------- --- --- ----- ---
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
Status of This Document
This draft, file name draft-ietf-dnsind-tkey-03.txt, is intended to
be become a Proposed Standard RFC. Distribution of this document is
unlimited. Comments should be sent to the DNS working group mailing
list <namedroppers@internic.net> or to the author.
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months. Internet-Drafts may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by
other documents at any time. It is not appropriate to use Internet-
Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as a
``working draft'' or ``work in progress.''
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd [Page 1]
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Abstract
[draft-ietf-dnsind-tsig-*.txt] provides a means of authenticating
Domain Name System (DNS) queries and responses using shared secret
keys via the TSIG resource record. However, it provides no mechanism
for setting up such keys other than manual exchange. This document
describes a TKEY RR that can be used in a number of different modes
to establish shared secret keys between a DNS resolver and server.
Acknowledgments
The substantial comments and ideas of the following persons (listed
in alphabetic order) have been incorporated herein and are gratefully
acknowledged:
Olafur Gudmundsson (TIS)
Stuart Kwan (Microsoft)
Brian Wellington (TIS)
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Table of Contents
Status of This Document....................................1
Abstract...................................................2
Acknowledgments............................................2
Table of Contents..........................................3
1. Introduction............................................4
1.1 General Principles.....................................4
1.2 Overview of Contents...................................5
2. The TKEY Resource Record................................5
2.1 Key Naming.............................................7
3. Exchange via Resolver Query.............................8
3.1 Query for Server Assigned Keying.......................8
3.2 Query for Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying..............9
3.3 Query for GSS-API Established.........................11
3.4 Query for Querier Assigned Keying.....................11
3.5 Query for TKEY Deletion...............................12
4. Spontaneous Server Inclusion...........................12
4.1 Spontaneous GSS-API Exchange..........................12
4.2 Spontaneous Server Key Deletion.......................13
5. Methods of Encryption..................................13
6. IANA Considerations....................................14
7. Security Considerations................................14
Changes from Previous Draft...............................15
References................................................16
Author's Address..........................................17
Expiration and File Name..................................17
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1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical, distributed, highly
available database used for bi-directional mapping between domain
names and addresses, for email routing, and for other information
[RFC 1034, 1035]. It has been extended to provide for public key
security and dynamic update [RFC 2535, RFC 2136]. Familiarity with
these RFCs is assumed.
[draft-ietf-dnsind-tsig-*.txt] provides a means of efficiently
authenticating DNS messages using shared secret keys via the TSIG
resource record (RR) but provides no mechanism for setting up such
keys other than manual exchange. This document describes a TKEY RR
that can be used in a number of different modes to establish and
delete such shared secret keys between a DNS resolver and server.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
1.1 General Principles
TKEY is a meta-RR that is not stored or cached in the DNS and does
not appear in zone files. It supports a variety of modes for the
establishment and deletion of shared secret keys between DNS entities
such as resolvers and servers. The establishment of such a key
requires that state be maintained at both the resolver and the server
and the allocation of the resources to maintain such state may
require mutual agreement. In the absence of such agreement, servers
MUST return errors such as NotImp or Refused for an attempt to use
TKEY and resolvers are free to ignore any TKEY RRs they receive.
In all cases herein, the term "resolver" includes that part of a
server which makes full and incremental [RFC 1995] zone transfer
queries as well as other queries.
The shared secret keying material developed by using TKEY is a plain
octet sequence. The means by which this shared secret keying
material, exchanged via TKEY, is actually used in any particular TSIG
algorithm is algorithm dependent and is defined in connection with
that algorithm. For example, see [RFC 2104] for how TKEY agreed
shared secret keying material is used in HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT or
any other HMAC algorithm.
Note that TKEY established keying material and TSIGs that use it are
associated with DNS hosts. They are not associated with zones. They
may be used to authenticate queries and responses but they do not
provide zone based DNS data origin or denial authentication [RFC
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2535].
Certain modes of TKEY perform encryption which may affect their
export or import status for some countries. The affected modes
specified in this document are the server assigned mode and the
resolver assigned mode.
There MUST NOT be more than one TKEY RR in a DNS query or response.
1.2 Overview of Contents
Section 2 below specifies the TKEY resource record and provides a
description of its constituent fields.
Section 3 discusses key agreement and deletion via DNS requests with
the Query opcode for type TKEY. This method is applicable to all
currently defined TKEY modes although in some cases it is not what
would intuitively be called a "query".
Section 4 discusses spontaneous inclusion of TKEY RRs in responses by
servers. This is applicable to key deletion and to the GSS-API mode.
Section 5 describes encryption methods for transmitting secret key
information.
Section 6 covers IANA considerations in assignment of TKEY modes.
Finally, Section 7 touches on some security considerations.
2. The TKEY Resource Record
The TKEY resource record (RR) has the structure given below. Its RR
type code is 249.
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Field Type Comment
----- ---- -------
NAME domain see description below
TTYPE u_int16_t TKEY
CLASS u_int16_t ignored, should be 255 (ANY)
TTL u_int32_t SHOULD be zero
RDLEN u_int16_t size of RDATA
RDATA: Algorithm: domain
Inception: u_int32_t
Expiration: u_int32_t
Mode: u_int16_t
Error: u_int16_t
Key Size: u_int16_t
Key Data: octet-stream
Other Size: u_int16_t
Other Data: octet-stream undefined by this protocol
The Name field relates to naming keys. Its meaning differs somewhat
with mode and context as explained in subsequent sections. Section
2.1 below gives key naming guidelines.
The TTL field SHOULD always be zero to be sure that older DNS
implementations do not cache TKEY RRs.
The algorithm name is a domain name with the same meaning as in
[draft-ietf-dnsind-tsig-*.txt]. The algorithm determines how the
secret keying material agreed to using the TKEY RR is actually used
to derive the algorithm specific key that is used.
The inception time and expiration time are in number of seconds since
the beginning of 1 January 1970 GMT ignoring leap seconds treated as
modulo 2**32 using ring arithmetic [RFC 1982]. In messages between a
DNS resolver to a DNS server where these fields are meaningful, they
are either the requested validity interval for the keying material
asked for or specify the validity interval of keying material
provided. See Security Considerations section in reference to replay
attacks.
The mode field specifies the general scheme for key agreement or
purpose of the TKEY DNS message. Server and resolvers supporting
this specification MUST implement the Diffie-Hellman key agreement
and the key deletion modes. All other modes are OPTIONAL. A server
supporting TKEY that receives a TKEY request with a mode it does not
support MUST return the BADMODE error. The following values of the
Mode octet are defined, available, or reserved:
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Value Description
----- -----------
0 - reserved
1 server/responder assignment
2 Diffie-Hellman exchange
3 GSS-API negotiation
4 resolver/querier assignment
5 key deletion
6-65534 - available, see IANA considerations section
65535 -reserved
The error code field is an extended RCODE. The following values are
defined:
Value Description
----- -----------
0 - no error
1-15 a DNS RCODE
16 BADSIG
17 BADKEY
18 BADTIME
19 BADMODE
20 BADNAME
21 BADALG
When an extended RCODE appears in the TKEY in a response, the DNS
header RCODE field indicates no error.
The key data size field is an unsigned 16 bit integer in network
order which specifies the size of the key exchange data field in
octets. The meaning of the key data depends on the mode.
The Other Size and Other Data fields are not used in this
specification but may be used in future extensions. The RDLEN field
MUST equal the length of the RDATA section through the end of Other
Data or the RR is to be considered malformed and rejected.
2.1 Key Naming
At any host only one octet string of keying material may be in place
at the same time for any particular key name. An attempt to
establish another set of keying material at a server for an existing
name SHOULD return a BADNAME error.
A reasonable key naming strategy is as follows:
If the key is generated as the result of a query with root as
its owner name, they the server SHOULD create a pseudo-random
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[RFC 1750] based unique name ending with a name of the server
host. For example 89n3mdg072pp.server.example.com. If
generation of a new pseudo-random name in each case is an
excessive computation load or entropy drain, a serial number
prefix can be added to a single pseudo-random name generated an
DNS server start time, such as
1001.89n3mdg072pp.server.example.com.
If the key is generated as the result of a query with a non-root
name, say 1001.foo.example.net, then use the concatenation of
that with a name of the server host. For example
1001.foo.example.net.server.example.com.
3. Exchange via Resolver Query
One method for a resolver and a server to agree about shared secret
keying material for use in TSIG is through DNS requests from the
resolver which are syntactically DNS queries for type TKEY. Such
queries MUST be accompanied by a TKEY RR in the additional
information section to indicate the mode in use and accompanied by
other information where required.
For a TKEY appearing in a query, the TKEY RR name SHOULD be a domain
locally unique at the resolver (or globally unique), less than 128
octets long, and meaningful to the resolver to assist in
distinguishing keys and/or key agreement sessions. (For resolvers
not wishing to make this use of the name, it may be specified as root
to minimize length.) For TKEY(s) appearing in a response to a query,
the TKEY RR name SHOULD be a globally unique server assigned domain.
If the TKEY in a response is the result of a query containing a TKEY
with a non-root name, that query TKEY name SHOULD be incorporated as
a prefix of the response TKEY name. See section 2.1 suggesting a
more specific naming strategy.
Type TKEY queries SHOULD NOT be flagged as recursive and servers MAY
ignore the recursive header bit in TKEY queries they receive.
3.1 Query for Server Assigned Keying
In server assigned keying, the DNS server host generates the keying
material and it is sent to the resolver encrypted under a resolver
host public key. See section 5 for description of encryption
methods.
A resolver sends a query for type TKEY accompanied by a TKEY RR
specifying the "server assignment" mode and a resolver host KEY RR to
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be used in encrypting the response, both in the additional
information section. The TKEY algorithm field is set to the signature
algorithm the resolver plans to use. It is RECOMMENDED that any "key
data" optionally provided in the query TKEY RR by the resolver be
strongly mixed with server generated randomness [RFC 1750] to derive
the keying material to be used. The KEY RR that appears in the query
SHOULD have a zero TTL and it need not be accompanied by a SIG(KEY)
RR. If the query is signed by the resolver host with a TSIG RR
[draft-ietf-dnsind-tsig-*.txt] or SIG(0) RR and that signature is
verified, then any SIG(KEY) provided in the query SHOULD be ignored.
The KEY RR in such a query SHOULD have a name that corresponds to the
resolver host but it is only essential that it be a public key for
which the resolver has the corresponding private key so it can
decrypt the response data.
The server response contains a TKEY RR in its answer section with the
server assigned mode and echoes back the KEY RR provided in the query
in its additional information section.
If the error field is zero, the key data portion of the response TKEY
RR will be the server assigned keying data encrypted under the public
key in the resolver provided KEY RR. In this case, the name of the
answer TKEY RR will be the server assigned name of the key and SHOULD
be globally unique.
If the error field of the response TKEY is non-zero, the query failed
for the reason given. FORMERR is given if the query specified no
encryption key.
The inception and expiry times in the query TKEY RR are those
requested for the keying material. The inception and expiry times in
the response TKEY are the maximum period the server will consider the
keying material valid. Servers may pre-expire keys so this is not a
guarantee.
NOTE: Accepting and responding to an unsigned query of this mode may
drain some entropy from an entropy pool being maintained by the
server and used for secret key generation and so might enable an
entropy exhaustion attack. In addition, some significant amount
of computational resources may be used in the public key
encryption of response data. To protect against these effects,
a server SHOULD require such a query to be signed and MAY rate
limit responses.
3.2 Query for Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange is means whereby two parties can
derive some shared secret information without requiring any secrecy
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of the messages they exchange [Schneier]. Provisions have been made
for the storage of DH public keys in the DNS [RFC 2539].
A client sends a query for type TKEY accompanied by a TKEY RR in the
additional information section specifying the "Diffie-Hellman" mode
and accompanied by a KEY RR also in the additional information
section specifying a client host Diffie-Hellman key. The TKEY RR
algorithm field is set to the signature algorithm the resolver plans
to use. The "key data" provided in the TKEY is used as a nonce to
avoid always deriving the same keying material for the same pair of
DH KEYs.
The server response contains a TKEY in its answer section with the
Diffie-Hellman mode. The "key data" provided in this TKEY is used as
an additional nonce to avoid always deriving the same keying material
for the same pair of DH KEYs. If the error field is non-zero, the
query failed for the reason given. FORMERR is given if the query
included no DH KEY and BADKEY is given if the query included an
incompatible DH KEY.
If the error field is zero, the client host supplied Diffie-Hellman
KEY should be echoed back and a server host Diffie-Hellman KEY RR
will also be present in the response. Both parties can then
calculate the same shared secret quantity from the pair of Diffie-
Hellman keys used [Schneier], provided they use the same modulus, and
the data in the TKEY RRs. The TKEY RR data is mixed with the DH
result as follows:
keying material =
XOR ( DH value, MD5 ( query data | DH value ) |
MD5 ( server data | DH value ) )
where XOR is a byte wise left justified xor padding the shorter octet
stream with zeros, DH value is the Diffie-Hellman value derived from
the KEY RRs, "query data" and "server data" are the TKEY RR data
fields sent by those parties, and "|" is concatenation. These "query
data" and "server data" nonces are suffixed by the DH value, digested
by MD5, the results concatenated, and then XORed with the DH value.
The inception and expiry times in the query TKEY RR are those
requested for the keying material. The inception and expiry times in
the response TKEY RR are the maximum period the server will consider
the keying material valid. Servers may pre-expire keys so this is
not a guarantee.
NOTE: Accepting and responding to an unsigned query of this mode may
use significant computation at the server; however, if the
server requires that the request be signed and if no shared
secret is in place to permit a TSIG [draft-ietf-dnsind-tsig-
*.txt] to be used on the request, it would be necessary to use a
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SIG(0) the verification of which would impose its own
computational load.
3.3 Query for GSS-API Established
This is described in a separate document which should be seen for the
full description. Basically the resolver and server can exchange
queries and responses for type TKEY with a TKEY RR specifying the
GSS-API mode in the additional information section and a GSS-API
token in the key data portion.
Any issues of possible encryption of parts the GSS-API token data
being transmitted are handled by the GSS-API level. In addition, the
GSS-API level provides its own authentication so that this mode of
TKEY query and response MAY be, but do not need to be, signed with
TSIG RR or SIG(0) RR.
The inception and expiry time in a GSS-API mode TKEY RR are ignored.
3.4 Query for Querier Assigned Keying
Optionally, a server can accept resolver assigned keys. The keying
material must be encrypted under a server host key for protection in
transmission as described in Section 5.
The resolver sends a TKEY query with a TKEY RR that specifies the
keying data and a KEY RR specifying the server host public key used
to encrypt the data both in the additional information section. The
name of the key and the keying data are completely controlled by the
sending resolver so a globally unique key name SHOULD be used. The
server SHOULD require that this request be signed with a TSIG, if
there already exists an appropriate shared secret, or a SIG(0) by the
querying host. The KEY RR used MUST be one for which the server has
the corresponding private key or it will not be able to decrypt the
keying material and will return a FORMERR.
The query TKEY RR inception and expiry give the time period the
querier intends to consider the keying material valid. The server
can return a lesser time interval to advise that it will not maintain
state for that long and can pre-expire keys in any case.
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3.5 Query for TKEY Deletion
Keys established via TKEY can be treated as soft state. Since DNS
transactions are originated by the resolver, the resolver can simply
toss keys, although it may have to go through another key exchange if
it later needs one. Similarly, the server can discard keys although
that will result in an error on receiving a query with a TSIG using
the discarded key.
To avoid attempted reliance in queries on keys no longer in effect,
servers MUST implement key deletion whereby the server "discards" a
key on receipt from a resolver of an authenticated delete request for
a TKEY RR with the key's name. If the server has no record of a key
with that name, it returns BADNAME.
Key deletion TKEY queries MUST be signed. This signature may be a
TSIG RR using the key to be deleted.
For querier assigned and Diffie-Hellman keys, the server MUST truly
"discard" all active state associated with the key. For server
assigned keys, the server MAY simply mark the key as no longer
retained by the client and may re-send it in response to a future
query for server assigned keying material.
4. Spontaneous Server Inclusion
A DNS server may include a TKEY RR spontaneously as additional
information in responses. This SHOULD only be done if the server
knows the querier understands TKEY and has this option implemented.
This technique can be used for GSS-API exchange, and to delete a key.
A disadvantage of this technique is that there is no way for the
server to get any immediate error or success indication back and, in
the case of UDP, no way to even know if the DNS response reached the
resolver.
4.1 Spontaneous GSS-API Exchange
A server can spontaneously include in the additional information
section of a response, a GSS-API mode TKEY RR. The information in
the key data section of such a TKEY is a GSS-API token which SHOULD
be fed by the resolver to its local GSS-API implementation. If such
a response is signed, the signature must verify before processing the
data. To the extent that GSS-API provides its own security, such a
response may not need to be signed. To the extent that GSS-API
handles duplicated messages, such a spontaneous TKEY can be sent
repeatedly, until, for example, a response via a GSS-API mode TKEY
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query is received.
4.2 Spontaneous Server Key Deletion
A server can optionally tell a client that it has deleted a symmetric
key by spontaneously including a TKEY RR in the additional
information section of a response with the key's name and specifying
the key deletion mode. Such a response SHOULD be signed. If
authenticated, it "deletes" the key with the given name. The
inception and expiry times of the delete TKEY RR are ignored. Failure
by a client to receive or properly process such additional
information in a response would mean that the client might use a key
that the server had discarded and would then get an error indication.
For server assigned and Diffie-Hellman keys, the client must truly
"discard" all active state associated with the key. For querier
assigned keys, the queries MAY simply mark the key as no longer
retained by the server and may re-send it in a future query
specifying querier assigned keying material.
5. Methods of Encryption
For the server assigned and resolver assigned key agreement, the
keying material is sent within the key data field of a TKEY RR
encrypted under the public key in an accompanying KEY RR [RFC 2535].
This KEY RR MUST be for a public key algorithm where the public and
private keys can be used for encryption and the corresponding
decyrption which recovers the originally encrypted data. The KEY RR
MUST correspond to a name for the decrypting host such that the
decrypting host has the corresponding private key to decrypt the
data. The secret keying material being sent will generally be fairly
short, usually less than 256 bits, because that is adequate for very
strong protection with modern keyed hash or symmetric algorithms.
If the KEY RR specifies the RSA algorithm, then the keying material
is encrypted as per the description of RSA encryption in PKCS#1 [RFC
2437]. (Note, the secret keying material being sent is directly RSA
encrypted in PKCS#1 format, It is not "enveloped" under some other
symmetric algorithm.) In the unlikely event that the keying material
will not fit within one RSA modulus of the chosen public key,
additional RSA encryption blocks are included. The length of each
block is clear from the public RSA key specified and the PKCS#1
padding makes it clear what part of the encrypted data is actually
keying material and what part is formatting or the required at least
eight bytes of random [RFC 1750] padding.
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6. IANA Considerations
This section is to be interpreted as provided in [RFC 2434].
Mode field values 0x0000 through 0x00FF, and 0XFF00 through 0XFFFF
can only be assigned by an IETF standards action (and 1 through 5 are
assigned by this Proposed Standard). Special consideration should be
given before the allocation of meaning for Mode field values 0x0000
and 0xFFFF.
Mode field values 0x0100 through 0x0FFF and 0xF0000 through 0xFEFF
are allocated by an IETF consensus.
Mode field values 0x1000 through 0xEFFF are allocated based on RFC
documentation of their use.
Mode values should not be changed when the status of their use
changes. I.E. a mode value assigned for an Experimental Standard
should not be changed later just because that standard's status is
changed to Proposed.
7. Security Considerations
To avoid different interpretations of the inception and expiration
times in TKEY RRs, resolvers and servers exchanging them must have
the same idea of what time it is. One way of doing this is with the
NTP protocol [RFC 2030] but that or any other time synchronization
MUST be done securely.
TKEY queries SHOULD be signed and those using the querier
establishment mode MUST be signed to authenticate their origin.
However, for currently defined modes, relatively little damage will
be done if an unsigned query of this sort is accepted and processed,
as described above, for each mode. In addition, requiring that a TKEY
query be signed by a TSIG (if there exists an acceptable exchanged
key between the parties) or a SIG(0) may itself impose significant
computational requirements on the server, particularly in verifying
SIG(0) public key signatures.
Responses to TKEY queries MUST always have DNS transaction signatures
to protect the integrity of any keying data, error codes, etc. This
signature MUST use a previously established secret (TSIG) or public
(SIG(0)) key and MUST NOT use any key that the response to be
verified is itself providing.
To avoid replay attacks, it is necessary that a response or querier
establishment mode query involving TKEY not be valid if replayed on
the order of 2**32 second (about 136 years) later. To accomplish
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this, the keying material used in any TSIG or SIG(0) RR that
authenticates a TKEY message MUST NOT have a lifetime of more then
2**31 - 1 seconds (about 68 years). Thus, on attempted replay, the
authenticating TSIG or SIG(0) RR will not be verifiable due to key
expiration and the replay will fail.
General protection against denial of service via the use of TKEY is
not provided.
Changes from Previous Draft
Fix one letter typo in Section 5.
Make default CLASS for TKEY be ANY.
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References
[Schneier] - Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols,
Algorithms, and Source Code in C", 1996, John Wiley and Sons
RFC 1034 - P. Mockapetris, "Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities",
STD 13, November 1987.
RFC 1035 - P. Mockapetris, "Domain Names - Implementation and
Specifications", STD 13, November 1987.
RFC 1750 - D. Eastlake, S. Crocker & J. Schiller, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security", December 1994.
RFC 1982 - Robert Elz, Randy Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic",
09/03/1996.
RFC 1995 - Masataka Ohta, "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", August
1996.
RFC 2030 - D. Mills, "Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) Version 4
for IPv4, IPv6 and OSI", October 1996.
RFC 2104 - H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication", February 1997.
RFC 2119 - S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997.
RFC 2136 - P. Vixie, S. Thomson, Y. Rekhter, J. Bound, "Dynamic
Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", 04/21/1997.
RFC 2434 - T. Narten, H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs, October 1998.
RFC 2437 - B. Kaliski, J. Staddon, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.0", October 1998.
RFC 2535 - D. Eastlake, "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
March 1999.
RFC 2539 - D. Eastlake, "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the Domain
Name System (DNS)", March 1999.
draft-ietf-dnsind-tsig-*.txt - P. Vixie, O. Gudmundsson, D.
Eastlake, "Secret Key Transaction Signatures for DNS (TSIG)".
Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd [Page 16]
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Author's Address
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
65 Shindegan Hill Road, RR #1
Carmel, NY 10512 USA
Telephone: +1 914-276-2668 (h)
+1 914-784-7913 (w)
FAX: +1 914-276-2947 (h)
email: dee3@torque.pothole.com
Expiration and File Name
This draft expires June 2000.
Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsind-tkey-03.txt.
Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd [Page 17]
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