I2RS working group                                              S. Hares
Internet-Draft                                                    Huawei
Intended status: Informational                                D. Migault
Expires: February 20, 2017                                    J. Halpern
                                                         August 19, 2016

                   I2RS Security Related Requirements


   This presents security-related requirements for the I2RS protocol for
   mutual authentication, transport protocols, data transfer and

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Security Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  I2RS Specific Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Security-Related Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Mutual authentication of an I2RS client and an I2RS Agent   5
     3.2.  Transport Requirements Based on Mutual Authentication . .   6
     3.3.  Data Confidentiality Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.4.  Data Integrity Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.5.  Role-Based Data Model Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.6.  Security of the environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   The Interface to the Routing System (I2RS) provides read and write
   access to information and state within the routing process.  An I2RS
   client interacts with one or more I2RS agents to collect information
   from network routing systems.

   This document describes the requirements for the I2RS protocol in the
   security-related areas of mutual authentication of the I2RS client
   and agent, the transport protocol carrying the I2RS protocol
   messages, and the atomicity of the transactions.  These requirements
   align with the description of the I2RS architecture found in
   [RFC7921] document which solves the problem described in [RFC7920].

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-ephemeral-state] discusses I2RS role-based access
   control that provides write conflict resolution in the ephemeral data
   store using the I2RS Client Identity, I2RS Secondary Identity and
   priority.  The draft [RFC7922] describes the traceability framework
   and its requirements for I2RS.  The draft [RFC7923] describes the
   requirements for I2RS to be able to publish information or have a
   remote client subscribe to an information data stream.

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1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Definitions

2.1.  Security Definitions

   This document utilizes the definitions found in the following
   documents: [RFC4949] and [RFC7921]

   Specifically, this document utilizes the following definitions from

   o  access control,

   o  Authentication,

   o  Data Confidentiality,

   o  Data Integrity,

   o  Data Privacy,

   o  Identity,

   o  Identifier,

   o  Mutual Authentication,

   o  role,

   o  role-based access control,

   o  security audit trail, and

   o  trust.

   [RFC7922] describes traceability for I2RS interface and the I2RS
   protocol.  Traceability is not equivalent to a security audit trail.

2.2.  I2RS Specific Definitions

   I2RS component protocols

      Protocols which are combined to create the I2RS protocol.

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   I2RS Higher-level protocol

      The I2RS protocol exists as a higher-level protocol which may
      combine other protocols (NETCONF, RESTCONF, IPFIX and others)
      within a specific I2RS client-agent relationship with a specific
      trust for ephemeral configurations, event, tracing, actions, and
      data flow interactions.  The protocols included in the I2RS
      protocol protocol are defined as I2RS component protocols.  (Note:
      Version 1 of the I2RS protocol will combine only NETCONF and
      RESTCONF.  Experiments with other protocols such as IPFIX have
      shown these are useful to combine with NETCONF and RESTCONF

   I2RS message

      is a complete data message of one of the I2RS component protocols.
      The I2RS component protocols may require multiple IP-packets to
      send one protocol message.

   I2RS multi-message atomicity

      An I2RS operation (read, write, event, action) must be contained
      within one I2RS message.  Each I2RS operation must be atomic.
      While it is possible to have an I2RS operation which is contained
      in multiple I2RS (E.g. write in multiple messages), this is not
      supported in order to simplify the first version of I2RS.
      Multiple-message atomicity of I2RS operations would be used in a
      roll-back of a grouping of commands (e.g. multiple writes).

   I2RS transaction

      is a unit of I2RS functionality.  Some examples of I2RS
      transactions are:

      *  The I2RS client issues a read request to a I2RS agent, and the
         I2RS Agent responding to the read request

      *  The I2RS client issues a write of ephemeral configuration
         values into an I2RS agent's data model, followed by the I2RS
         agent response to the write.

      *  An I2RS client may issue an action request, the I2RS agent
         responds to the action-request, and then responds when action
         is complete.  Actions can be single step processes or multiple
         step process.

      *  An I2RS client requests to receive an event notification, and
         the I2RS Agent sets up to send the events.

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      *  An I2RS agent sends events to an I2RS Client on an existing

      An I2RS action may require multiple I2RS messages in order to
      complete a transation.

   I2RS secondary identifier

      The I2RS architecture document [RFC7921] defines a secondary
      identity as the entity of some non-I2RS entity (e.g. application)
      which has requested a particular I2RS client perform an operation.
      The I2RS secondary identifier represents this identity so it may
      be distinguished from all others.

   I2RS routing system

      Layer three (L3) routing systems which include physical routers,
      virtual routers (in hypervisors or load splitters), and other
      devices supporting L3 routing in order to forward packets based on
      L3 headers.

3.  Security-Related Requirements

   The security for the I2RS protocol requires mutually authenticated
   I2RS clients and I2RS agents communicating over a secure transport.
   The I2RS protocol MUST be able to provide atomicity of an I2RS
   transaction, but it is not required to have multi-message atomicity
   and roll-back mechanism transactions.  Multiple messages transactions
   may be impacted by the interdependency of data.  This section
   discusses the details of these security requirements.

   There are dependencies in some of the requirements below.  For
   confidentiality (section 3.3) and integrity (section 3.4) to be
   achieved, the client-agent must have mutual authentication (section
   3.1) and secure transport (section 3.2).  Since I2RS does not itself
   provide confidentiality and integrity, it depends on running over a
   secure Transport that provides these features.

3.1.  Mutual authentication of an I2RS client and an I2RS Agent

   The I2RS architecture [RFC7921] sets the following requirements:

   o  SEC-REQ-01: All I2RS clients and I2RS agents MUST have an
      identity, and at least one unique identifier that uniquely
      identifies each party in the I2RS protocol context.

   o  SEC-REQ-02: The I2RS protocol MUST utilize these identifiers for
      mutual identification of the I2RS client and I2RS agent.

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   o  SEC-REQ-03: An I2RS agent, upon receiving an I2RS message from a
      I2RS client, MUST confirm that the I2RS client has a valid

   o  SEC-REQ-04: The I2RS client, upon receiving an I2RS message from
      an I2RS agent, MUST confirm the I2RS agent has a valid identifier.

   o  SEC-REQ-05: Identifier distribution and the loading of these
      identifiers into I2RS agent and I2RS Client SHOULD occur outside
      the I2RS protocol prior to the I2RS protocol establishing a
      connection between I2RS client and I2RS agent.  (One mechanism
      such mechanism is AAA protocols.)

   o  SEC-REQ-06: Each Identifier MUST have just one priority.

   o  SEC-REQ-07: Each Identifier is associated with one secondary
      identifier during a particular I2RS transaction (e.g. read/write
      sequence), but the secondary identifier may vary during the time a
      connection between the I2RS client and I2RS agent is active.
      Since a single I2RS client may be use by multiple applications,
      the secondary identifier may vary as the I2RS client is utilize by
      different application each of whom have a unique secondary
      identity and identifier.

3.2.  Transport Requirements Based on Mutual Authentication

   SEC-REQ-08: The I2RS protocol MUST be able to transfer data over a
   secure transport and optionally MAY be able to transfer data over a
   non-secure transport.  A secure transport MUST provide data
   confidentiality, data integrity, and replay prevention.

   The default I2RS transport is a secure transport.

   A non-secure transport can be used for publishing telemetry data or
   other operational state that was specifically indicated to non-
   confidential in the data model in the Yang syntax.  Since the non-
   secure transport is optional, the operator may transmit this data
   over a secure transport.  The following are further restrictions on
   the non-secure transport:

   o  The configuration of ephemeral data in the I2RS Agent by the I2RS
      client SHOULD be done over a secure transport.

   o  It is anticipated that the passing of most I2RS ephemeral state
      operational status SHOULD be done over a secure transport.

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   o  As [I-D.ietf-i2rs-ephemeral-state] notes, each data model SHOULD
      indicate whether the transport exchanging the data between I2RS
      client and I2RS agent is secure or insecure.

   SEC-REQ-09: A secure transport MUST be associated with a key
   management solution that can guarantee that only the entities having
   sufficient privileges can get the keys to encrypt/decrypt the
   sensitive data.  Per BCP107 [RFC4107] this key management system
   SHOULD be automatic, but MAY be manual in the following scenarios:

      a) The environment has limited bandwidth or high round-trip times.

      b) The information being protected has low value.

      c) The total volume of traffic over the entire lifetime of the
      long-term session key will be very low.

      d) The scale of the deployment is limited.

   Most I2RS environments (Clients and Agents) will not have the
   environment described by BCP107 [RFC4107] but a few I2RS use cases
   required limited non-secure light-weight telemetry messages that have
   these requirements.  An I2RS data model must indicate which portions
   can be served by manual key management.

   SEC-REQ-10: The I2RS protocol MUST be able to support multiple secure
   transport sessions providing protocol and data communication between
   an I2RS Agent and an I2RS client.  However, a single I2RS Agent to
   I2RS client connection MAY elect to use a single secure transport
   session or a single non-secure transport session.

   SEC-REQ-11: The I2RS Client and I2RS Agent protocol SHOULD implement
   mechanisms that mitigate DoS attacks.

3.3.  Data Confidentiality Requirements

   SEC-REQ-12: In a critical infrastructure, certain data within routing
   elements is sensitive and read/write operations on such data SHOULD
   be controlled in order to protect its confidentiality.  For example,
   most carriers do not want a router's configuration and data flow
   statistics known by hackers or their competitors.  While carriers may
   share peering information, most carriers do not share configuration
   and traffic statistics.  To achieve this, access control to sensitive
   data needs to be provided, and the confidentiality protection on such
   data during transportation needs to be enforced.

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3.4.  Data Integrity Requirements

   SEC-REQ-13: An integrity protection mechanism for I2RS MUST be
   provided that will be able to ensure the following:

      1) the data being protected is not modified without detection
      during its transportation,

      2) the data is actually from where it is expected to come from,

      3) the data is not repeated from some earlier interaction of the
      protocol.  (That is, when both confidentiality and integrity of
      data is properly protected, it is possible to ensure that
      encrypted data is not modified or replayed without detection.)

   SEC-REQ-14: The I2RS client to I2RS agent transport protocol MUST
   protect against replay attack.

   Requirements SEC-REQ-13 and SEC-REQ-14 are requirements for the
   secure channel which must be supported as the default by every I2RS
   Agent, and by every I2RS client communicating over a secure
   transport.  In order to provide some traceability or notification for
   the non-secure protocol, SEC-REQ-15 suggests traceability and
   notification are important to include for any non-secure protocol.

   SEC-REQ-15: The I2RS protocol MUST provide a mechanism for message
   traceability and notification requirements requirements found in
   [RFC7922] and [RFC7923] that can be supported in communication
   channel that is non-secure to trace or notify about potential
   security issues.

3.5.  Role-Based Data Model Security

   The I2RS Architecture [RFC7921] defines a role or security role as
   specifying read, write, or notification access by a I2RS client to
   data within an agent's data model.

   SEC-REQ-16: The rules around what role is permitted to access and
   manipulate what information plus a secure transport (which protects
   the data in transit) SHOULD ensure that data of any level of
   sensitivity is reasonably protected from being observed by those
   without permission to view it, so that privacy requirements are met.

   SEC-REQ-17: Role security MUST work when multiple transport
   connections are being used between the I2RS client and I2RS agent as
   the I2RS architecture [RFC7921] states.  These transport message
   streams may start/stop without affecting the existence of the client/

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   agent data exchange.  TCP supports a single stream of data.  SCTP
   [RFC4960] provides security for multiple streams plus end-to-end
   transport of data.

   SEC-REQ-18: I2RS clients MAY be used by multiple applications to
   configure routing via I2RS agents, receive status reports, turn on
   the I2RS audit stream, or turn on I2RS traceability.  Application
   software using I2RS client functions may host multiple secure
   identities, but each connection will use only one identifier with one
   priority.  Therefore, the security of each I2RS Client to I2RS Agent
   connection is unique.

   Please note the security of the application to I2RS client connection
   is outside of the I2RS protocol or I2RS interface.

   Sec-REQ-19: If an I2RS agents or an I2RS client is tightly correlated
   with a person, then the I2RS protocol and data models SHOULD provide
   additional security that protects the person's privacy.  An example
   of an I2RS agent correlated with a person is a I2RS agent running on
   someone's phone to control tethering, and an example of a I2RS client
   might be the client tracking such tethering.  This protection MAY
   require a variety of forms including: "operator-applied knobs", roles
   that restrict personal access, data-models with specific "privacy
   roles", and access filters.

3.6.  Security of the environment

   The security for the implementation of a protocol also considers the
   protocol environment.  The environmental security requirements are
   found in: [I-D.ietf-i2rs-security-environment-reqs].

4.  Acknowledgement

   The authors would like to thank Wes George, Ahmed Abro, Qin Wu, Eric
   Yu, Joel Halpern, Scott Brim, Nancy Cam-Winget, DaCheng Zhang, Alia
   Atlas, and Jeff Haas for their contributions to the I2RS security
   requirements discussion and this document.  The authors would like to
   thank Bob Moskowitz for his review of the requirements.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This draft includes no request to IANA.

6.  Security Considerations

   This is a document about security requirements for the I2RS protocol
   and data modules.  The whole document is security considerations.

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7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC4107]  Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
              Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, DOI 10.17487/RFC4107,
              June 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4107>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,

   [RFC7920]  Atlas, A., Ed., Nadeau, T., Ed., and D. Ward, "Problem
              Statement for the Interface to the Routing System",
              RFC 7920, DOI 10.17487/RFC7920, June 2016,

   [RFC7921]  Atlas, A., Halpern, J., Hares, S., Ward, D., and T.
              Nadeau, "An Architecture for the Interface to the Routing
              System", RFC 7921, DOI 10.17487/RFC7921, June 2016,

7.2.  Informative References

              Haas, J. and S. Hares, "I2RS Ephemeral State
              Requirements", draft-ietf-i2rs-ephemeral-state-15 (work in
              progress), July 2016.

              Migault, D., Halpern, J., and S. Hares, "I2RS Environment
              Security Requirements", draft-ietf-i2rs-security-
              environment-reqs-01 (work in progress), April 2016.

   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
              RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,

   [RFC7922]  Clarke, J., Salgueiro, G., and C. Pignataro, "Interface to
              the Routing System (I2RS) Traceability: Framework and
              Information Model", RFC 7922, DOI 10.17487/RFC7922, June
              2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7922>.

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   [RFC7923]  Voit, E., Clemm, A., and A. Gonzalez Prieto, "Requirements
              for Subscription to YANG Datastores", RFC 7923,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7923, June 2016,

Authors' Addresses

   Susan Hares
   7453 Hickory Hill
   Saline, MI  48176

   Email: shares@ndzh.com

   Daniel Migault
   8400 boulevard Decarie
   Montreal, QC  HAP 2N2

   Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com

   Joel Halpern

   Email: joel.halpern@ericsson.com

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