Network Working Group G. Fioccola
Internet-Draft Huawei
Intended status: Standards Track R. Pang
Expires: 10 September 2023 China Unicom
S. Wang
China Telecom
B. Decraene
Orange
S. Zhuang
H. Wang
Huawei
9 March 2023
Advertising In-situ Flow Information Telemetry (IFIT) Capabilities in
BGP
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-ifit-capabilities-02
Abstract
In-situ Flow Information Telemetry (IFIT) refers to network OAM data
plane on-path telemetry techniques, in particular In-situ OAM (IOAM)
and Alternate Marking. This document defines a new BGP Router
Capability Code to advertise the In-situ Flow Information Telemetry
(IFIT) capabilities. Within an IFIT domain, IFIT-capability
advertisement from the tail node to the head node assists the head
node to determine whether a particular IFIT Option type can be
encapsulated in data packets. Such advertisement helps mitigating
the leakage threat and facilitating the deployment of IFIT
measurements on a per-service and on-demand basis.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 September 2023.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Definitions and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. IFIT Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. IFIT Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Capabilities Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Error handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
In-situ Flow Information Telemetry (IFIT) denotes a family of flow-
oriented on-path telemetry techniques, including In-situ OAM (IOAM)
[RFC9197] and Alternate Marking [RFC9341]. It can provide flow
information on the entire forwarding path on a per-packet basis in
real time.
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IFIT is a solution focusing on network domains according to [RFC8799]
that introduces the concept of specific domain solutions. A network
domain consists of a set of network devices or entities within a
single administration. As mentioned in [RFC8799], for a number of
reasons, such as policies, options supported, style of network
management and security requirements, it is suggested to limit
applications including the emerging IFIT techniques to a controlled
domain.
Hence, the family of emerging on-path flow telemetry techniques MUST
be typically deployed in such controlled domains. The IFIT solution
MAY be selectively or partially implemented in different vendors'
devices as an emerging feature for various use cases of application-
aware network operations. In addition, for some use cases, the IFIT
are deployed on a per-service and on-demand basis.
This document defines a new BGP Router Capability Code to advertise
the supported IFIT capabilities of the egress node to the ingress
node in an IFIT domain when the egress node distributes a route, such
as EVPNv4, EVPNv6, L2EVPN(EVPN VPWS and EVPN VPLS) routes, etc. Then
the ingress node can learn the IFIT node capabilities associated to
the routing information distributed between BGP peers and determine
whether a particular IFIT Option type can be encapsulated in traffic
packets which are forwarded along the path. Such advertisement is
also useful for avoiding IFIT data leaking from the IFIT domain and
measuring performance metrics on a per-service basis through steering
packets of flow into a path where IFIT application are supported.
This document defines an IFIT BGP Router Capability Code
[I-D.ietf-idr-entropy-label]. This allows a distributed solution,
while [I-D.ietf-idr-sr-policy-ifit] allows to centrally distribute
Segment Routing (SR) Policies and can be considered as a centralized
control solution. Therefore, this document enables the IFIT
application in networks where no controller is introduced and it
helps network operators to deploy IFIT in their networks.
Since BGP can be used to advertise a candidate path of a SR Policy
([I-D.ietf-idr-segment-routing-te-policy]), in a SR network it may be
convenient to advertise IFIT capabilities in BGP as well, as
specified in this document. While, in other scenarios, ICMPv6 can
also be an alternative solution ([I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-conf-state]).
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119],
RFC 8174 [RFC8174].
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1.2. Definitions and Acronyms
* IFIT: In-situ Flow Information Telemetry. This term refers to the
on-path telemetry techniques also known as In-situ OAM (IOAM)
[RFC9197] and Alternate Marking [RFC9341].
* OAM: Operation Administration and Maintenance
* NLRI: Network Layer Reachable Information, the NLRI advertised in
the BGP UPDATE as defined in [RFC4271] and [RFC4760].
2. IFIT Domain
IFIT deployment modes can include monitoring at node-level, tunnel-
level, and service-level. The requirement of this document is to
provide IFIT deployment at service-level, since different services
may have different IFIT requirements. With the service-level
solution, different IFIT methods can be deployed for different VPN
services.
The figure shows an implementation example of IFIT application in a
VPN scenario.
+----+ +----+
+----+ | | +----+ | | +----+
|CE1 |------|PE1 |==========|RR/P|==========|PE2 |------|CE2 |
+----+ | | +----+ | | +----+
+----+ +----+
|<------------IFIT Domain--------->|
|<---------------BGP-------------->|
|<----------------------------VPN--------------------------->|
Figure 1. Example of IFIT application in a VPN scenario
Figure 1
As Figure 1 shows, a traffic flow is sent out from the customer edge
node CE1 to another customer edge node CE2. In order to enable IFIT
application for this flow, the IFIT header must be encapsulated in
the packet at the ingress provider edge node PE1, referred to as the
IFIT encapsulating node. Then, transit nodes in the IFIT domain may
be able to support the IFIT capabilities in order to inspect IFIT
extensions and, if needed, to update the IFIT data fields in the
packet. Finally, the IFIT data fields must be exported and removed
at egress provider edge node PE2 that is referred to as the IFIT
decapsulating node. This is essential to avoid IFIT data leakage
outside the controlled domain.
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Since the IFIT decapsulating node MUST be able to handle and remove
the IFIT header, the IFIT encapsulating node MUST know if the IFIT
decapsulating node supports the IFIT application and, more
specifically, which capabilities can be enabled.
3. IFIT Capabilities
This document defines the IFIT Capabilities as a 32-bit bitmap. The
following format is used:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+----------------------------------------------------+
|P|I|D|E|M| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+----------------------------------------------------+
Figure 2. IFIT Capabilities
* P-Flag: IOAM Pre-allocated Trace Option Type flag. When set, this
indicates that the router is capable of IOAM Pre-allocated Trace
[RFC9197].
* I-Flag: IOAM Incremental Trace Option Type flag. When set, this
indicates that the router is capable of IOAM Incremental Tracing
[RFC9197].
* D-Flag: IOAM DEX Option Type flag. When set, this indicates that
the router is capable of IOAM DEX [RFC9326].
* E-Flag: IOAM E2E Option Type flag. When set, this indicates that
the router is capable of IOAM E2E processing [RFC9197].
* M-Flag: Alternate Marking flag. When set, this indicates that the
router is capable of processing Alternative Marking packets
Alternate Marking [RFC9341].
* Reserved: Reserved for future use. They MUST be set to zero on
transmission and ignored upon receipt.
3.1. Capabilities Advertisement
The BGP Router Capabilities Attribute (RCA attribute, or just RCA) is
defined in [I-D.ietf-idr-entropy-label]. It is an optional,
transitive BGP attribute with type code 39. The RCA has as its data
a network layer address, representing the next hop of the route the
RCA accompanies. The RCA signals potentially useful optimizations,
so it is desirable to make it transitive; the next hop data is to
ensure correctness if it traverses BGP speakers that do not
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understand the RCA.
The Attribute Data field of the RCA attribute is encoded as a header
portion that identifies the originator of the attribute, followed by
one or more capability TLVs.
It is modified or deleted when the next-hop is changed, to reflect
the capabilities of the new next-hop.
The IFIT Capabilities described above can be encoded as a BGP Router
Capability Code in the RCA attribute. It can be included in a BGP
UPDATE message and indicates that the BGP Next-Hop supports the IFIT
capabilities for the NLRI advertised in this BGP UPDATE.
The Network Address of Next Hop, as part of the RCA, is the IPv4 or
IPv6 Address of the IFIT decapsulating node.
The IFIT Router Capability is defined below and is a triple
(Capability Code, Capability Length, Capability Value) aka a TLV:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Capability Code (TBA1) | Capability Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IFIT Capabilities |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3. IFIT Router Capability
* Capability Code: a two-octet unsigned binary integer that
indicates the type of Capability advertised and unambiguously
identifies an individual capability. This document defines a new
Router Capability Code called IFIT Router Capability. The
Capability Code is TBA1.
* Capability Length: a two-octet unsigned binary integer that
indicates the length, in octets, of the Capability Value field.
The length MUST be four octets.
* IFIT Capabilities: as defined in Section 3.
3.2. Error handling
The IFIT Capabilities is considered malformed and must be disregarded
if its length is other than four.
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3.3. Operation
A BGP speaker that sends an UPDATE with the BGP Router Capabilities
Attribute MAY include the IFIT Capabilities if IFIT is configured and
enabled. The inclusion of the IFIT Capabilities with the NLRI
advertised in the BGP UPDATE indicates that the BGP Next-Hop can act
as the IFIT decapsulating node and it can process the specific IFIT
encapsulation format indicated in the capability value. This is
applied for all routes indicated in the same NRLI.
The IFIT Capabilities MUST reflect the capabilities of the router
indicated in the BGP Next-Hop. If a BGP speaker sets the BGP Next-Hop
to an address of a different router, it MUST NOT advertise the IFIT
Capabilities not supported by this router. Therefore the IFIT
Capabilities MUST be re-advertised according to the new BGP Next-Hop.
In case of large networks, the IFIT domain may span across multiple
Autonomous Systems (ASes) and hence the IFIT Capabilities need to be
able to cross AS boundaries if configured to do so. In this case, it
is also possible to pass this information between BGP clusters to
keep the IFIT methods consistent. BGP Link-State (BGP-LS) may allow
to bring the information back to a centralized controller as well.
4. IANA Considerations
The IANA is requested to make the assignments in the "BGP Router
Capability Codes" registry for the IFIT Router Capability:
+=======+===================+===============+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+=======+===================+===============+
| TBA1 | IFIT Capabilities | This document |
+-------+-------------------+---------------+
Table 1
5. Security Considerations
This document defines a new BGP Router Capability Code to advertise
the IFIT capabilities. It does not introduce any new security
considerations beyond the one described in
[I-D.ietf-idr-entropy-label].
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IFIT methods are applied within a controlled domain and solutions
MUST be taken to ensure that the IFIT data are properly propagated to
avoid malicious attacks. Both IOAM method [RFC9197] and Alternate
Marking [RFC9341] [RFC9343] respectively discusses that the
implementation of both methods MUST be within a controlled domain.
The BGP Router Capability Attribute being a transitive attribute in
order to facilitate early deployments it may leak outside of the
domain if both the NLRI carrying this capability is advertised
outside of the domain and the ASBR does not support
[I-D.ietf-idr-entropy-label]. In general, it is not an issue for
IFIT because the only information about the capabilities would be
leaked. However if any capability leakage must be avoided, one must
ensure that all the border routers must support the BGP Capability
code feature.
6. Contributors
The following people made significant contributions to this document:
Yali Wang
Huawei
Email: wangyali11@huawei.com
Yunan Gu
Huawei
Email: guyunan@huawei.com
Tianran Zhou
Huawei
Email: zhoutianran@huawei.com
Weidong Li
Huawei
Email: poly.li@huawei.com
7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Ketan Talaulikar, Haoyu Song, Jie
Dong, Robin Li, Jeffrey Haas, Robert Raszuk, Zongpeng Du, Yisong Liu,
Yongqing Zhu, Aijun Wang, Fan Yang for their reviews and suggestions.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
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[I-D.ietf-idr-entropy-label]
Decraene, B., Scudder, J., Henderickx, W., Kompella, K.,
satyamoh@cisco.com, Uttaro, J., and B. Wen, "BGP Router
Capabilities Attribute", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-idr-entropy-label-03, 20 February 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-
entropy-label-03>.
[I-D.ietf-idr-segment-routing-te-policy]
Previdi, S., Filsfils, C., Talaulikar, K., Mattes, P.,
Jain, D., and S. Lin, "Advertising Segment Routing
Policies in BGP", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-idr-segment-routing-te-policy-20, 27 July 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-
segment-routing-te-policy-20>.
[I-D.ietf-idr-sr-policy-ifit]
Qin, F., Yuan, H., Yang, S., Zhou, T., and G. Fioccola,
"BGP SR Policy Extensions to Enable IFIT", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-idr-sr-policy-ifit-
05, 24 October 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-sr-
policy-ifit-05>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9197] Brockners, F., Ed., Bhandari, S., Ed., and T. Mizrahi,
Ed., "Data Fields for In Situ Operations, Administration,
and Maintenance (IOAM)", RFC 9197, DOI 10.17487/RFC9197,
May 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9197>.
[RFC9326] Song, H., Gafni, B., Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., and T.
Mizrahi, "In Situ Operations, Administration, and
Maintenance (IOAM) Direct Exporting", RFC 9326,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9326, November 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9326>.
[RFC9341] Fioccola, G., Ed., Cociglio, M., Mirsky, G., Mizrahi, T.,
and T. Zhou, "Alternate-Marking Method", RFC 9341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9341, December 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9341>.
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[RFC9343] Fioccola, G., Zhou, T., Cociglio, M., Qin, F., and R.
Pang, "IPv6 Application of the Alternate-Marking Method",
RFC 9343, DOI 10.17487/RFC9343, December 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9343>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-conf-state]
Min, X., Mirsky, G., and L. Bo, "Echo Request/Reply for
Enabled In-situ OAM Capabilities", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-conf-state-10, 21
November 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-conf-state-10>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC4760] Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter,
"Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 4760,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4760, January 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4760>.
[RFC8799] Carpenter, B. and B. Liu, "Limited Domains and Internet
Protocols", RFC 8799, DOI 10.17487/RFC8799, July 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8799>.
Authors' Addresses
Giuseppe Fioccola
Huawei
Munich
Germany
Email: giuseppe.fioccola@huawei.com
Ran Pang
China Unicom
Beijing
China
Email: pangran@chinaunicom.cn
Subin Wang
China Telecom
Guangzhou
China
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Email: wangsb6@chinatelecom.cn
Bruno Decraene
Orange
Email: bruno.decraene@orange.com
Shunwan Zhuang
Huawei
Beijing
China
Email: zhuangshunwan@huawei.com
Hiabo Wang
Huawei
Beijing
China
Email: rainsword.wang@huawei.com
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