IP Security Protocol Working Group A. Huttunen
(IPSEC) F-Secure Corporation
Internet-Draft B. Swander
Expires: August 16, 2004 Microsoft
V. Volpe
Cisco Systems
L. DiBurro
Nortel Networks
M. Stenberg
February 16, 2004
UDP Encapsulation of IPsec Packets
draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-08.txt
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 16, 2004.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This protocol specification defines methods to encapsulate and
decapsulate IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) packets inside
UDP packets for the purpose of traversing Network Address
Translators. ESP encapsulation as defined in this document is capable
of being used in both IPv4 and IPv6 scenarios. The encapsulation is
used whenever negotiated using Internet Key Exchange (IKE).
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Packet Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 UDP-encapsulated ESP Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 IKE Header Format for Port 4500 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 NAT-keepalive Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Encapsulation and Decapsulation Procedures . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1 Auxiliary Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1 Tunnel Mode Decapsulation NAT Procedure . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2 Transport Mode Decapsulation NAT Procedure . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2 Transport Mode ESP Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3 Transport Mode ESP Decapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4 Tunnel Mode ESP Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5 Tunnel Mode ESP Decapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. NAT Keepalive Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1 Tunnel Mode Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2 Transport Mode Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Non-normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A. Clarification of potential NAT multiple client solutions . . 18
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 20
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1. Introduction
This protocol specification defines methods to encapsulate and
decapsulate ESP packets inside UDP packets for the purpose of
traversing NATs (see [Aboda03] section 2.2, case i). The UDP port
numbers are the same as used by IKE traffic, as defined in [Kiv04].
It is up to the need of the clients whether transport mode or tunnel
mode is to be supported (see [Aboda03] Section 3 criteria
"Telecommuter scenario"). L2TP/IPsec clients MUST support the modes
as defined in [RFC 3193]. IPsec tunnel mode clients MUST support
tunnel mode.
An IKE implementation supporting this protocol specification MUST NOT
use the ESP SPI field zero for ESP packets. This ensures that IKE
packets and ESP packets can be distinguished from each other.
UDP encapsulation of ESP packets as defined in this document is
written in terms of IPv4 headers. There is no technical reason why an
IPv6 header could not be used as the outer header and/or as the inner
header.
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2. Packet Formats
2.1 UDP-encapsulated ESP Header Format
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Destination Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ESP header [RFC 2406] |
~ ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The UDP header is a standard [RFC 768] header, where
o Source Port and Destination Port MUST be the same as used by IKE
traffic.
o IPv4 UDP Checksum SHOULD be transmitted as a zero value.
o Receivers MUST NOT depend upon the UDP checksum being a zero
value.
The SPI field in the ESP header MUST NOT be zero.
2.2 IKE Header Format for Port 4500
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Destination Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Non-ESP Marker |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IKE header [RFC 2409] |
~ ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The UDP header is a standard [RFC 768] header, and is used as defined
in [Kiv04]. This document does not set any new requirements for the
checksum handling of an IKE packet.
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Non-ESP Marker is 4 bytes of zero aligning with the SPI field of an
ESP packet.
2.3 NAT-keepalive Packet Format
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Destination Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0xFF |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The UDP header is a standard [RFC 768] header, where
o Source Port and Destination Port MUST be the same as used by
UDP-ESP encapsulation of Section 2.1
o IPv4 UDP Checksum SHOULD be transmitted as a zero value.
o Receivers MUST NOT depend upon the UDP checksum being a zero
value.
The sender MUST use a one octet long payload with the value 0xFF. The
receiver SHOULD ignore a received NAT-keepalive packet.
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3. Encapsulation and Decapsulation Procedures
3.1 Auxiliary Procedures
3.1.1 Tunnel Mode Decapsulation NAT Procedure
When a tunnel mode has been used to transmit packets (see [Aboda03]
Section 3 criteria "Mode support" and "Telecommuter scenario"), the
inner IP header can contain addresses that are not suitable for the
current network. This procedure defines how these addresses are to be
converted to suitable addresses for the current network.
Depending on local policy, one of the following MUST be done:
1. If a valid source IP address space has been defined in the policy
for the encapsulated packets from the peer, check that the source
IP address of the inner packet is valid according to the policy.
2. If an address has been assigned for the remote peer, check that
the source IP address used in the inner packet is the same as the
IP address assigned.
3. NAT is performed for the packet, making it suitable for transport
in the local network.
3.1.2 Transport Mode Decapsulation NAT Procedure
When a transport mode has been used to transmit packets, contained
TCP or UDP headers will contain incorrect checksums due to the change
of parts of the IP header during transit. This procedure defines how
to fix these checksums (see [Aboda03] Section 2.1, case b).
Depending on local policy, one of the following MUST be done:
1. If the protocol header after the ESP header is a TCP/UDP header
and the peer's real source and destination IP address have been
received according to [Kiv04], incrementally recompute the TCP/
UDP checksum:
* subtract the IP source address in the received packet from the
checksum
* add the real IP source address received via IKE to the
checksum (obtained from the NAT-OA)
* subtract the IP destination address in the received packet
from the checksum
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* add the real IP destination address received via IKE to the
checksum (obtained from the NAT-OA)
Note: if received and real address are the same for a given
address, say the source address, the operations cancel and don't
need to be performed.
2. If the protocol header after the ESP header is a TCP/UDP header,
recompute the checksum field in the TCP/UDP header.
3. If the protocol header after the ESP header is an UDP header,
zero the checksum field in the UDP header. If the protocol header
after the ESP header is a TCP header, and there is an option to
flag to the stack that TCP checksum does not need to be computed,
then that flag MAY be used. This SHOULD only be done for
transport mode, and if the packet is integrity protected. Tunnel
mode TCP checksums MUST be verified. [This is not a violation to
the spirit of section 4.2.2.7 in RFC 1122 because a checksum is
being generated by the sender, and verified by the receiver.
That checksum is the integrity over the packet performed by
IPsec.]
In addition an implementation MAY fix any contained protocols that
have been broken by NAT (see [Aboda03] Section 2.1 case g).
3.2 Transport Mode ESP Encapsulation
BEFORE APPLYING ESP/UDP
----------------------------
IPv4 |orig IP hdr | | |
|(any options)| TCP | Data |
----------------------------
AFTER APPLYING ESP/UDP
-------------------------------------------------------
IPv4 |orig IP hdr | UDP | ESP | | | ESP | ESP|
|(any options)| Hdr | Hdr | TCP | Data | Trailer |Auth|
-------------------------------------------------------
|<----- encrypted ---->|
|<------ authenticated ----->|
1. Ordinary ESP encapsulation procedure is used.
2. A properly formatted UDP header is inserted where shown.
3. The Total Length, Protocol and Header Checksum fields in the IP
header are edited to match the resulting IP packet.
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3.3 Transport Mode ESP Decapsulation
1. The UDP header is removed from the packet.
2. The Total Length, Protocol and Header Checksum fields in the new
IP header are edited to match the resulting IP packet.
3. Ordinary ESP decapsulation procedure is used.
4. Transport mode decapsulation NAT procedure is used.
3.4 Tunnel Mode ESP Encapsulation
BEFORE APPLYING ESP/UDP
----------------------------
IPv4 |orig IP hdr | | |
|(any options)| TCP | Data |
----------------------------
AFTER APPLYING ESP/UDP
--------------------------------------------------------------
IPv4 |new h.| UDP | ESP |orig IP hdr | | | ESP | ESP|
|(opts)| Hdr | Hdr |(any options)| TCP | Data | Trailer |Auth|
--------------------------------------------------------------
|<------------ encrypted ----------->|
|<------------- authenticated ------------>|
1. Ordinary ESP encapsulation procedure is used.
2. A properly formatted UDP header is inserted where shown.
3. The Total Length, Protocol and Header Checksum fields in the new
IP header are edited to match the resulting IP packet.
3.5 Tunnel Mode ESP Decapsulation
1. The UDP header is removed from the packet.
2. The Total Length, Protocol and Header Checksum fields in the new
IP header are edited to match the resulting IP packet.
3. Ordinary ESP decapsulation procedure is used.
4. Tunnel mode decapsulation NAT procedure is used.
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4. NAT Keepalive Procedure
The sole purpose of sending NAT-keepalive packets is to keep NAT
mappings alive for the duration of a connection between the peers
(see [Aboda03] Section 2.2 case j). Reception of NAT-keepalive
packets MUST NOT be used to detect liveness of a connection.
A peer MAY send a NAT-keepalive packet if there exists one or more
phase I or phase II SAs between the peers, or such an SA has existed
at most N minutes earlier. N is a locally configurable parameter with
a default value of 5 minutes.
A peer SHOULD send a NAT-keepalive packet if a need to send such
packets is detected according to [Kiv04] and if no other packet to
the peer has been sent in M seconds. M is a locally configurable
parameter with a default value of 20 seconds.
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5. Security Considerations
5.1 Tunnel Mode Conflict
Implementors are warned that it is possible for remote peers to
negotiate entries that overlap in a SGW (security gateway), an issue
affecting tunnel mode (see [Aboda03] Section 2.1 case e).
+----+ \ /
| |-------------|----\
+----+ / \ \
Ari's NAT 1 \
Laptop \
10.1.2.3 \
+----+ \ / \ +----+ +----+
| |-------------|----------+------| |----------| |
+----+ / \ +----+ +----+
Bob's NAT 2 SGW Suzy's
Laptop Server
10.1.2.3
Because SGW will now see two possible SAs that lead to 10.1.2.3, it
can become confused where to send packets coming from Suzy's server.
Implementators MUST devise ways of preventing such a thing from
occurring.
It is RECOMMENDED that SGW either assign locally unique IP addresses
to Ari's and Bob's Laptop using a protocol such as DHCP over IPsec,
or uses NAT to change Ari's and Bob's Laptop source IP addresses to
such locally unique addresses before sending packets forward to
Suzy's Server (this covers "Scaling" criteria of section 3 in
[Aboda03]).
Please see Appendix A
5.2 Transport Mode Conflict
Another similar issue may occur in transport mode, with 2 clients,
Ari and Bob, behind the same NAT talking securely to the same server
(see [Aboda03] Section 2.1 case e).
Cliff wants to talk in the clear to the same server.
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+----+
| |
+----+ \
Ari's \
Laptop \
10.1.2.3 \
+----+ \ / +----+
| |-----+-----------------| |
+----+ / \ +----+
Bob's NAT Server
Laptop /
10.1.2.4 /
/
+----+ /
| |/
+----+
Cliff's
Laptop
10.1.2.5
Now, transport SAs on the server will look like:
To Ari: Server to NAT, <traffic desc1>, UDP encap <4500, Y>
To Bob: Server to NAT, <traffic desc2>, UDP encap <4500, Z>
Cliff's traffic is in the clear, so there is no SA.
<traffic desc> is the protocol and port information. The UDP encap
ports are the ports used in UDP encapsulated ESP format of Section
2.1. Y,Z are the dynamic ports assigned by the NAT during the IKE
negotiation. So IKE traffic from Ari's laptop goes out on UDP
<4500,4500>. It reaches the server as UDP <Y,4500>, where Y is the
dynamically assigned port.
If the <traffic desc1> overlaps <traffic desc2>, then simple filter
lookups may not be sufficient to determine which SA needs to be used
to send traffic. Implementations MUST handle this situation, either
by disallowing conflicting connections, or by other means.
Assume now that Cliff wants to connect to the server in the clear.
This is going to be difficult to configure since the server already
has a policy from Server to the NAT's external address, for securing
<traffic desc>. For totally non-overlapping traffic descriptions,
this is possible.
Sample server policy could be:
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To Ari: Server to NAT, All UDP, secure
To Bob: Server to NAT, All TCP, secure
To Cliff: Server to NAT, ALL ICMP, clear text
Note, this policy also lets Ari and Bob send cleartext ICMP to the
server.
The server sees all clients behind the NAT as the same IP address, so
setting up different policies for the same traffic descriptor is in
principle impossible.
A problematic example configuration on the server is:
Server to NAT, TCP, secure (for Ari and Bob)
Server to NAT, TCP, clear (for Cliff)
The problem is that the server cannot enforce his policy, since it is
possible that misbehaving Bob sends traffic in the clear. This is
indistinguishable from Cliff sending traffic in the clear. So it is
impossible to guarantee security from some clients behind a NAT, and
also allow clear text from different clients behind the SAME NAT. If
the server's security policy allows, however, it can do best effort
security: if the client from behind the NAT initiates security, his
connection will be secured. If he sends in the clear, the server will
still accept that clear text.
So, for security guarantees, the above problematic scenario MUST NOT
be allowed on servers. For best effort security, this scenario MAY be
used.
Please see Appendix A
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6. IANA Considerations
No IANA assignments are needed.
This document depends on the reserved SPI value of zero (0) not being
sent over the wire as a part of an ESP-packet [RFC 2406].
This document defines a "Non-ESP Marker" as 4 bytes of zero aligning
with the SPI field of an ESP packet, and generally being followed by
something that is not an ESP packet.
With regard to NAT-traversal in IKE case, the Non-ESP Marker is being
followed by an IKE packet as specified in Section 2.2.
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7. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Tero Kivinen and William Dixon who contributed actively to
this document.
Thanks to Joern Sierwald, Tamir Zegman, Tatu Ylonen and Santeri
Paavolainen who contributed to the early drafts about NAT traversal.
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Normative references
[RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
August 1980.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2406] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.
[RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
[Kiv04] Kivinen, T., Huttunen, A., Swander, B. and V. Volpe,
"Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE", ID
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-08.txt, Februart 2004.
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Non-normative references
[RFC1122] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, October 1989.
[RFC3193] Patel, B., Aboba, B., Dixon, W., Zorn, G. and S. Booth,
"Securing L2TP using IPsec", RFC 3193, November 2001.
[Aboda03] Aboda, B. and W. Dixon, "IPsec-NAT Compatibility
Requirements", ID draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-reqts-06.txt.
Authors' Addresses
Ari Huttunen
F-Secure Corporation
Tammasaarenkatu 7
HELSINKI FIN-00181
FI
EMail: Ari.Huttunen@F-Secure.com
Brian Swander
Microsoft
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
US
EMail: briansw@microsoft.com
Victor Volpe
Cisco Systems
124 Grove Street
Suite 205
Franklin, MA 02038
US
EMail: vvolpe@cisco.com
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Larry DiBurro
Nortel Networks
80 Central Street
Boxborough, MA 01719
US
EMail: ldiburro@nortelnetworks.com
Markus Stenberg
FI
EMail: markus.stenberg@iki.fi
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Appendix A. Clarification of potential NAT multiple client solutions
This appendix provides clarification about potential solutions to the
problem of multiple clients behind the same NAT simultaneously
connecting to the same destination IP address.
Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 say that you MUST avoid this problem. As
this isn't a wire protocol matter, but a local implementation matter,
specification of the mechanisms do not belong in the protocol
specification itself. They are instead listed in this appendix.
Choosing an option will likely depend on the scenarios for which you
use/support IPsec NAT-T. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, so
other solutions may exist. We first describe the generic choices that
solve the problem for all upper layer protocols.
Generic choices for ESP transport mode:
Tr1) Implement a built-in NAT (network address translation) above
IPsec decapsulation.
Tr2) Implement a built-in NAPT (network address port translation)
above IPsec decapsulation.
Tr3) An initiator may decide not to request transport mode once NAT
is detected and instead request a tunnel mode SA. This may be a retry
after transport mode is denied by the responder, or it may be the
initiator's choice to propose a tunnel SA initially. This is no more
difficult than knowing whether to propose transport mode or tunnel
mode without NAT. If for some reason the responder prefers or
requires tunnel mode for NAT traversal, it must reject the quick mode
SA proposal for transport mode.
Generic choises for ESP tunnel mode:
Tn1) Same as Tr1.
Tn2) Same as Tr2.
Tn3) This option is possible if an initiator is capable of being
assigned an address through it's tunnel SA with the responder using
DHCP. The initiator may initially request an internal address via the
DHCP-IPsec method, regardless of whether it knows it is behind a NAT.
Or it may re-initiate an IKE quick mode negotiation for DHCP tunnel
SA after the responder fails the quick mode SA transport mode
proposal, either when NAT-OA payload is sent or because it discovers
from NAT-D the initiator is behind a NAT and it's local
configuration/policy will only accept connecting through NAT when
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being assigned an address through DHCP-IPsec.
There are also implementation choices offereing limited
interoperability. Implementors should specify what applications or
protocols should work using their NAT-T solution if these options are
selected. Note that neither Tr4 nor Tn4, as described below, are
expected to work with TCP traffic.
Limited interoperability choices for ESP transport mode:
Tr4) Implement upper layer protocol awareness of the inbound &
outbound IPsec SA so that it doesn't use the source IP and the source
port as the session identifier. (E.g. L2TP session ID mapped to the
IPsec SA pair which doesn't use the UDP source port or the source IP
address for peer uniqueness.)
Tr5) Implement application integration with IKE initiation such that
it can rebind to a different source port if the IKE quick mode SA
proposal is rejected by the responder, then repropose the new QM
selector.
Limited interoperability choices for ESP tunnel mode:
Tn4) Same as Tr4.
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Intellectual Property Statement
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This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
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